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Confronting the Present: The Coup 
of May 2000 
A Haroon Akram-Lodhi 
On 19 May 2000, as 
Confronting Fiji Futures went 
to press, a group of 7 men 
armed with machine guns 
entered the Parliamentary 
Complex in Suva. They took 
the Prime Minister, 
Mahendra Chaudhry, 
members of the Cabinet, and 
other members of the Fiji 
Labour Party-led People's 
Coalition Government 
hostage, including Ganesh 
Chand, a contributor to this 
book. A previously little­
known figure, George 
Speight, took responsibility 
for the attempted coup, 
stating that he had assumed 
executive power in order to 
represent the interests of 
indigenous Fijians. It was 
later revealed that rogue 
elements within the Fiji 
Military Forces' Counter 
Revolutionary Warfare Unit 
were directing the attempted 
coup . Indigenous Fijian 
youths rampaged through 
Suva and other 
communities, smashing 
windows, looting shops, 
setting fire to buildings, and 
terrorising their fellow 
citizens. Despite the 
declaration of a state of 
emergency by the President, 
Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, the 
police and the army seemed 
unable to contain the 
violence. 
With widespread doubt community politics that it 
about who was in charge of suggested was not universal. 
the country, the Great It can be argued that the 
Council of Chiefs met. On 25 failure of the senior 
May, following an intensely members of the government 
divided meeting, the council to recognise and seek to 
authorised the President to strengthen the fragility of 
establish, pending the the political consensus 
release of the hostages and helped create a climate that 
the resignation of the Prime made the coup possible. 
Minister, a new interim Even backbenchers and 
administration drawn from grassroots members within 
a council of advisers. the indigenous Fijian parties 
Although common law was that formed part of the 
used to justify the Coalition did not support 
authorisation, the suggested the 1997 constitutional 
arrangements were clearly settlement, or did so 
extra-constitutional. Speight grudgingly. It would appear 
rejected the arrangements. that the rapid movement 
The coup is an demonstrated by the 
unfortunate reminder of the government at times on 
salience of the issues raised sensitive issues was an 
in Confronting Fiji Futures. unnecessarily dangerous 
Robbie Robertson argues course of action. Rapid 
that Fiji has witnessed only movement on sensitive 
a partial retreat from the issues overrode the positive 
exclusionary communalism achievements of the 
that shaped the politics of government, such as the 
the country in the aftermath maintenance of macro­
of the 1987 coups, despite economic stability . It 
the achievements of the 1997 overrode a number of major 
Constitution and the 1999 policies to assist the poor, 
elections. The limited extent significantly Fijians. It 
of this partial retreat has helped create the ground 
been vividly illustrated by upon which the Taukei 
the coup, which has also movement could be revived, 
illustrated, as both Yash and the politics of exclusion 
Ghai and Satendra Prasad resur rected as a viable 
note in this book, that political strategy. 
support for the 1997 
Constitution and the cross-
Land is a particularly 
sensitive issue. Indigenous 
Fijians own the land, but it 
is worked by Indo-Fijians. 
The government had been 
seeking to deal with the 
issue of land during its term 
of office. Biman Prasad and 
Sunil Kumar examine the 
complexity of the issue here. 
Speight has made it clear 
that indigenous Fijians 
wanted 'their' land back. 
The land issue is seen by 
many indigenous Fijians as 
the answer to the economic 
backwardness and social 
exclusion faced by some 
within their community­
the 'Fijian question' 
(William Sutherland). Yet, as 
Sutherland makes clear, 
land will not resolve the 
Fijian question. During the 
course of the 1990s the Fiji 
state undertook an extensive 
program of structural 
reform, examined in detail in 
this volume. A central 
component was economic 
affirmative action for the 
benefit of the indigenous 
Fijian community as a whole 
but which, as is documented 
by Steven Ratuva, ended up 
benefiting a minority within 
the indigenous Fijian 
community. Structural 
reform and economic 
affirmative action stood in 
contradiction, and the result, 
as discussed in different 
ways in the contributions by 
John Cameron, Jacqueline 
Leckie, Sepehri and Akram­
Lodhi, Chand, Sutherland, 
Robertson and Ratuva, was 
a deepening of social 
inequality. This created the 
material circumstances in 
which a violent reassertion 
of what Simione Durutalo 
termed the 'paramountcy' of 
indigenous Fijian interests in 
Fiji could take place. 
Historically, communalism 
has been a viable political 
strategy to maintain the 
fa<;ade of unity in the face of 
difference, as the events of 
May 2000 demonstrate. 
The irony is that the 
presumed homogeneity of 
the indigenou s Fijian 
community is now very 
much a fiction. Social 
inequality occurs not just 
between communities; it 
occurs within them. The 
contributions by Holger 
Korth, Steven Ratuva, 
William Sutherland and 
Robbie Robertson demon­
strate the sharp social, 
economic and geographical 
differentiation that has 
occurred within the 
indigenous Fijian com­
munity since 1987. W hile 
some have prospered, many 
have not, and the result of 
these economic differences 
has been a fracturing of the 
culture of the indigenous 
Fijian community. Add to 
this the difficulties described 
by Robertson in even 
defining an indigenous 
Fijian. The leader of the coup 
embodies the contradictions. 
Speight, who is of 
indigenous Fijian and Euro­
Fijian parentage, is a foreign­
educated failed businessman 
who both benefited from the 
economic affirmative action 
policies of previous govern­
ments while at the same time 
being unable to navigate the 
treacherous waters of 
structural reform. He is an 
atypical indigenous Fijian. 
As stressed by Martin 
Doornbos and Haroon 
Akram-Lodhi, Fiji in 2000 is 
a very different country from 
Fiji in 1987. The most 
important social cleavage in 
Fiji now lies within the 
indigenous Fijian com­
munity, demonstrated at 
length by the contributors to 
this book. Differences of 
status, region, and class 
have fostered conflict within 
the indigenous Fijian com­
munity, and it is this conflict 
which explains the origins of 
the coup, an expression of 
attempts within the 
indigenous Fijian com­
munity to establish political 
ascendancy. In particular, 
the coup has witnessed the 
indigenous Fijian nouveaux 
riches that emerged, as 
described by Steven Ratuva, 
out of the economic affir­
mative action policies since 
1987 come into conflict with 
the economically connected 
aristocracy that ruled Fiji 
between 1970 and 1992. Both 
groups have used indi­
genous Fijian nationalism in 
an effort to unite themselves 
with the indigenous Fijian 
community from which they 
have become increasingly 
cut off. It is the deepening 
recognition of social cleavage 
within the indigenous Fijian 
community that has led 
more indigenous Fijians to 
accept the basic multiethnic 
and multicultural reality of 
their country than at any 
time in its history. It is these 
people who, along with the 
members of the other 
communities of Fiji, tried to 
oppose the coup. Indeed, it 
is the extent of the 
opposition to the coup 
across the communities of 
Fiji that can give rise to a 
guardedly cautious opti­
mism as Fiji confronts its 
futures. 
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Pref ace 
A Haroon Akram-Lodhi 
Fiji is one of the largest Pacific Island countries. With a per capita GNP 
in 1997 of US$2470 Fiji is classified by the World Bank as a lower­
middle income developing country. Further, with an average life 
expectancy of 72 years, infant mortality of approximately 22 per 
thousand, and an adult literacy rate of 91 per cent, Fiji has a high level 
of social development, being ranked number 46 in the United Nations 
Development Programme's 1997 human development index. However, 
despite what has been in regional and comparative terms a reasonably 
enviable record of 'development', Fiji has not been at peace with itself. 
In common with countries as diverse as Scotland, Canada, Belgium, 
South Africa, Rwanda, Burundi and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Fiji has 
witnessed, over the post-independence period, the increasing 
politicisation of identity. More specifically, in Fiji social dissent and 
conflict commonly use the identity politics of ethnicity. As a direct 
consequence, in 1987 the seeming tranquility of Fiji was shattered by 
two military coups-the first in the South Pacific region. 
Since the coups there have been dramatic changes in Fiji's society, 
politics and economy. The period has witnessed four governments: an 
unelected, military-backed Interim Government between 1987 and 1992; 
two governments elected under the 1990 Constitution and led by 
Sitiveni Rabuka, the leader of the 1987 coups; and the government 
elected in 1999 under the provisions of the 1997 Constitution and led 
by the Fiji Labour Party (FLP). Fiji's governments between 1987 and 1998 
altered the structure of the economy, primarily by encouraging the 
production of garments in tax-free factories and by seeking to integrate 
Fiji increasinglyinto the global economy through a reduction in trade 
barriers. At the same time the labour force has changed: the feminisation 
of the waged labour force has occurred with the expansion of the 
garment sector, skilled Indo-Fijian labour has emigrated and urbanisation 
has increased sharply. There has also been a reassertion of elite politics, 
a reassertion that stands in sharp relief to social change in a vigorous 
civil society. The end of the 'Sunday ban' and the introduction of 
television have most vividly illustrated this change. In 1999 Fiji is a very 
different country from that which was traumatised by the 1987 coups. 
xii 
Moreover, change will continue to confront Fiji in the future. The 
new constitutional settlement agreed to in 1997, alterations in agrarian 
relations emerging out of the termination of land leases, the further 
erosion of trade preferences as a consequence of a new round of 
multilateral world trade negotiations and continued globalisation 
have major implications for the country in the next fifteen years. For 
those interested in Fiji, these changes and the challenges they create 
need to be understood. Recent scholarship on Fiji has however often 
tended to look back, focusing on the changes which occurred in the 
twelve years following the coups. Necessary as a sound historical 
perspective is, it is also necessary to use historical understanding to 
seek to grasp the implications for present and for the future. This is 
especially the case in a society that has been as divided as Fiji. 
That such an approach has been largely lacking indicates, in 
academic terms, a gap in the literature on Fiji . This gap was identified 
by Haroon Akrain-Lodhi and Robbie Robertson in 1997 and led to the 
development of an informal collaborative research project based at the 
Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague, the Netherlands. The 
choice of the ISS as the base for the project might at first glance appear 
odd, being situated such a long way from the South Pacific region. 
However, a fortuitous set of circumstances meant that over the course 
of eighteen months the ISS was host, for varying periods of time, to 
seven of the contributors to the current volume. Moreover, the ISS has 
a long if somewhat understated tradition of collaborative teaching, 
research and advisory services in the South Pacific region. Thus, rather 
than being an odd choice, the ISS was in fact an ideal choice to serve 
as the base for the project. 
A second fortuitous coincidence has reinforced the need for the 
forward-looking research contained in this book. The primary editorial 
work on the book was completed around the time of Fiji's 1999 general 
elections, the outcome of which came as a surprise to many local and 
international observers. In the 1999 general elections the peoples of Fiji 
resoundingly rejected both the government and the two parties which 
were largely responsible for steering the 1997 constitutional settlement 
through parliament, the Soqosoqo Ni Vakavulewa Ni Taukei (SVT) and 
the National Federation Party (NFP). In a vivid repudiation of the 
legacy of the coups, victory went to the FLP, which obtained an 
outright majority. The victory of the FLP led to the elevation of its 
leader, Mahendra Chaudhry, to the post of Prime Minister-the first 
Indo-Fijian to hold that position in the history of the country. 
xiii 
It is unlikely that those who framed the 1997 constitutional 
settlement could have envisaged a situation in which one party would 
achieve an overall majority of parliamentary seats at this stage in Fiji's 
political development, garnering limited but nevertheless significant 
support from across the multiplicity of Fiji's ethnic communities. 
However, despite the surprise of the outcome, the Cabinet which has 
emerged is a multiparty one, in line with the principles of the 
Constitution and the political processes which it has engendered, and 
with a greater range of representation than that of any previous 
government in Fiji-a situation sought by those who framed the 
Constitution and welcomed by the peoples of Fiji. 
The FLP was elected on a platform of social and economic justice. 
Such a platform stands in sharp relief to the policies of structural 
adjustment pursued by successive governments since 1986. However, 
it is unclear whether the FLP will be able, in the context of multiparty 
government and in the context of the probable end of the country's 
preferential market access for most of its exports, to formulate 
independent policies that address the country's remarkably poor 
economic performance. Yet the need for fresh, forward-looking 
economic policy is urgent: Fiji's rate of growth of GDP per capita has 
fallen from 4.2 per cent per annum between 1965 and 1980 to only 0.5 
per cent per annum between 1980 and 1993, and the political 
consequences of deepening economic insecurity could be significant. 
Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether Fiji's new government will 
be able to 'adjust' structural adjustment. 
At the same time, it remains to be seen whether the victory of the 
explicitly multiethnic FLP represents the bold leap into the dark which 
is needed to move beyond the primacy of the politics of identity in Fiji. 
Granted, the signs from the new government have appeared 
promising. As Mahendra Chaudhry said on 19 May 1999, after having 
been sworn in as Prime Minister, 'I, and my government, are 
committed to promoting multi-racialism in our country, multi­
racialism that brings our different communities together '. In such 
circumstances, it is to be hoped that a forward-looking assessment of 
the broad social, economic and political issues facing Fiji in the present 
and the future of the sort contained in this book will be useful to 
individuals and to policymakers seeking to bring communities 
together. Nonetheless, the contributors to this book recognise the 
xiv 
limits of their intervention. Obviously, no book can foster the 
emergence of genuinely united Fiji community. Rather, the emergence 
of a united Fiji community depends upon all the peoples of Fiji  
realising that they have changed, that Fiji has changed, and that the 
only way in which they can move forward into their collective futures 
is together. 
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Part I 
Politics, economics and social 
inequality 

CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: Confronting the 
future, confronting the past 
Martin Doornbos and A Haroon Akram-Lodhi 
'Th ings fal l  apart'1: a personal retrospective of Fiji i n  1987 
It was October 1987, and one of the authors was at a social gathering 
in Suva. One of the guests told the gathering: 'there is the body of a 
dead soldier lying in the morgue, but the relatives are not being 
informed'. The guests being addressed allowed the announcement to 
sink in for a moment. The key point was then made: 'the question of 
course is why not?'. 
This was evidently not an unknown soldier. However, this made 
the question only more compelling. One of the others present 
provided further details, which sharpened the point: 'apparently, they 
are having some difficulty with the cause of his death. Will (Colonel 
Sitiveni) Rabuka be facing greater public embarrassment if the man 
has been killed by an opponent of the coup, or if he turns out a victim 
of a liquidation within the army?'. A third speaker reflected: 'Rabuka 
evidently cannot use either. Yet, an internal reckoning strikes me as the 
most likely explanation; who else has weapons in this country, or at 
least at this point in time?'. 
It was a month since the second coup of 1987. In the absence of 
newspapers and uncensored radio, rumour and speculation was passed 
on and exchanged continuously. That is, until the evening, when 
everybody rushed home before the nine o'clock curfew. Before reaching 
home, one had to pass more than one checkpoint, a new experience to 
all who lived in Fiji. A spokesman for the military government on the 
radio offered the encouraging news that the number of burglaries had 
gone down since the curfew was introduced. 
3 
4 Confronti ng Fij i  Futu res 
The announcement of new decrees by the military government was 
greeted with an air of sceptical misgiving. If someone had the texts, 
people found out that the army and the police were allowed to shoot 
at people that had caused disturbances, and could not afterwards be 
held liable for murder. People found out that suspected elements 
could be detained by the security forces without prior notice. People 
found out that if they were detained, a panel would be constituted 
with the power to give non-binding advice about possible release after 
a month's detention. If the advice was ignored, the panel would meet 
again in six months. 
People, such as several members of staff of the University of the 
South Pacific (USP), were detained, and thrashed, without 
justification. The regime did indeed use harsh methods to intimidate 
its opponents, and this no doubt muted broad open protest, which was 
surprisingly absent. Thus, about 120 names were entered on a list of 
people who were prohibited to leave the country, out of fear for the 
damage they might cause to Fiji's image abroad. The perversity of the 
situation was apparent. As one of those listed asked, 'would not the 
existence of that list itself be much more damaging to the national 
image?'. Despite this, though, there were relatively few acts of 
violence, in large part because a structural basis for violence did not 
exist. There was, admittedly, some social friction, particularly in 
informal contexts. At the time though there seemed little doubt that 
both Indo-Fijians and most indigenous Fijians were not particularly 
happy with the installation of the military regime. 
Despite the lack of opposition, the tranquility of Fiji had been 
shattered, and the desperation that came in the wake of the new 
situation was pervasive. 'It is inconceivable and incomprehensible', a 
Dutch lecturer at USP remarked, 'to see such a wonderful and truly 
multicultural society collapse within such a short while. I cannot and I 
will refuse to believe that all this will really be destroyed'. A British 
physicist recounted how after eleven years of work in Fiji he had 
decided to apply for citizenship. 'At the moment of the first coup I 
stood in the queue for the immigration office. It was like hearing 
God's voice. Now, after the second coup, I have resigned.' 
Indo-Fijians felt the most desperation. Their future appeared very 
gloomy, with every day bringing new, deeply demoralising measures. 
Calls such as 'throw Indians out' and 'Fiji for Fijians' were heard, 
reflecting sentiments which from time to time had been articulated 
I ntrod uction: Confronting the futu re, confronti ng the past 5 
amongst a particular sub-stratum of indigenous Fijians. Though 
Rabuka' s military government did not quite echo these calls, it made it 
clear by various means that it intended to regard Indo-Fijians-who, 
after all, comprised fifty per cent of the population-as no more than 
second rate citizens. For example, Rabuka formally 'allowed' Hindu 
Indo-Fijians to celebrate Diwali, but without firecrackers, out of 
'security' considerations. With every passing day Indo-Fijians were 
dismissed from civil service positions to make room for the followers 
of the new order. Within the service sector, the granting of work 
permits was increasingly beset by discriminatory hurdles. Fiji's 
economy was highly dependent on the cultivation of sugarcane by 
Indo-Fijian farmers operating small holdings, and it appeared that the 
new regime was intent to keep them in that position, though as 
working ants without political rights. Parallels to South Africa and 
apartheid were continually being suggested. 
'It was all inevitable' opined a student at an improvised panel 
discussion, 'the differences were too big and they were becoming 
bigger and bigger; it had to come to an explosion at some point'. An 
older expatriate said that he too had seen it coming for quite some 
time: 'the rapid growth, especially from the early 70s onwards, of a 
professional class of Indo-Fijians on the one hand, and of almost 
exclusive recruitment of indigenous Fijians into the army on the other, 
sooner or later was bound to lead to confrontations'. He continued: 'it 
was a big mistake for Fiji to have gone in for those Unifil tasks in 
Lebanon. That has led to much too rapid an expansion of the army, 
based on (indigenous) Fijian recruitment as an easy employment 
project' . 
The inevitability of an ethnic confrontation was however widely 
disputed, by both indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians. 'Ethnic conflict 
is not what is at issue', one person argued, 'but it serves the new 
power holders-and some of the old ones-to portray it that way'. 
Who were these power holders? People knew. As one indigenous 
Fijian student said, 'it is not true that Fijians and Indians are living 
here in tension with one another. It is those other islanders who are 
making that up'. He was referring to the people of the Lau archipelago, 
and his insight pointed in two directions. In the first place there was a 
fundamental contradiction between the east and the west of Fiji. The 
'west' comprises mainly the west of Viti Levu. It was here where the 
country's wealth was concentrated-sugar, gold, pine plantations, and 
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tourism. In the west, indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians had been co­
habiting for generations, perhaps out of economic necessity, but 
nevertheless generally on good terms. Yet the west had no political 
power. It was the 'east', comprising the Lau archipelago and part of 
Vanua Levu, which was the origin of many political power holders. 
For example, most members of the Great Council of Chiefs, a 
neotraditional political body set up by the colonial power and which 
had had its powers substantially expanded over time, came from the 
east. The divide ran roughly parallel to the distinction between the 
Melanesian and the Polynesian politico-cultural spheres of influence, 
which met in Fiji: Polynesian, with hierarchical political traditions in 
the east; Melanesian, with more egalitarian structures, in the west. 
'Rabuka' s coup is not supported in the western part, but it opens 
the door for a direct confrontation between east and west', noted an 
observer with a deep understanding of Fiji. If such a confrontation had 
occurred, it would not have been the first. It is well established that 
the west of Fiji was subjugated and brought under colonial control by 
a coalition of the British and chiefs from the east of Fiji. Moreover, and 
this was the second insight of the indigenous Fijian student mentioned 
above, the dominance of the east in Fiji's politics had increasingly 
allowed it to establish a grip on the sources of wealth in the west. As a 
consequence, some voices in the west spoke cautiously of secession 
and the establishment of a separate state in the west of Fiji, but the 
instruments needed to achieve anything of the sort were totally 
lacking. While a further expansion of the army was to take place, as 
always recruitment occurred primarily in the east. 
The accumulation of economic and political power amongst a top 
layer of indigenous Fijians from the east of the country had been rapid 
and substantial, especially during the last term of office of the Alliance 
Party, which had witnessed a whole series of excesses and corruption 
scandals. 'It is the Alliance administration's poor performance and the 
new dichotomies it created which brought about increasing 
dissatisfaction among Fijians as well as Indians', a close observer 
quietly remarked. This in turn was a key factor leading to the 
emergence of the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) in 1985, and finally to the 
successful coalition of the FLP with the largely Indo-Fijian National 
Federation Party (NFP) . Together, the FLP-NFP Coalition won the 
April 1987 elections and toppled the Alliance, putting an end to 
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seventeen years of uninterrupted government control by Ratu Sir 
Kamisese Mara, a powerful figure with evident political talents but 
who during the last years of Alliance rule had become the centre of an 
increasingly tainted government. 
The Coalition government led by Dr Timoci Bavadra was not 
radical or revolutionary. While it declared itself in favour of a nuclear­
free Pacific, during its short time in office it pursued largely ad hoe 
solutions to immediate problems, particularly in the area of 
employment. Indeed, many insiders had felt that the Coalition 
government would not last long, falling apart as a result of internal 
contradictions between the FLP and the NFP. However, upon the 
formation of Bavadra' s government, events moved rapidly. Soon after 
the Coalition's electoral victory sounds of protest were heard from the 
emergent Taukei, or 'native Fijian', movement, which accused Indo­
Fijians of seeking to take over power in Fiji. The Taukei movement 
appeared at first a rather obscure entity, but when, after the elections, 
they provoked a series of disturbances and clashes, they reminded 
some older expatriates of the Nazi German 'brownshirts' prior to 
World War II. For others, they appeared reminiscent of Haiti's 'tom­
toms'. Certainly, there were affinities. 'The Taukei', said a political 
scientist at the time, 'constitutes lumpenproletariat, consisting of 
fighting gangs arising from amongst unemployed youth with a vague 
sense of alliance with people from the Lau islands. They themselves 
also largely originate from there' .  The Taukei undoubtedly prepared 
the climate for Rabuka's 14 May 1987 coup, and indeed following the 
coup Rabuka conducted a kind of public dialogue with the Taukei. As 
he put it, 'we are pursuing the same ends, but with different means'. 
In common with the Taukei, Rabuka emphasised the indigenous 
Fijian character of Fiji's identity. However, indigenous Fijian identity 
was itself, in part, the product of the colonial encounter. This was most 
clearly witnessed in the introduction of the 'Sunday ban'. Following 
the coup, an absolute observance of Sunday as a 'day of rest' came 
into force. At a stroke, nothing was allowed on Sundays: no sports, no 
games, no picnics, no gardening nor car washing. No taxis or buses 
ran, and all shops were closed. However, the Sunday ban, despite 
appearing to be a bow to Christian fundamentalism, had a political 
objective. Rabuka' s relationship with the Great Council of Chiefs was 
unclear. Rabuka' s relationship with the politico-economic power bloc 
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around Mara was also hazy. Indeed, Rabuka' s relationship with the 
indigenous Fijian community as a whole was unclear. As one 
indigenous Fijian student, struggling to comprehend political changes 
that he really did not understand, put it: 'what is really being 
engineered here? What else is waiting us?' .  Rabuka needed to solidify 
his position. The Sunday ban gained the support of many Methodist 
preachers and their congregations. It also offered Rabuka an 
opportunity to broaden his ideological base within the Taukei 
movement, many of whom were, paradoxically, actively practicing 
Christians, even if the macho jogging Taukei and the properly necktied 
Methodists appeared to be emotional antipoles. 
The regime may have been trying to expand its base of support, but 
the competence within Rabuka' s government to tackle the problems 
which it had both inherited and created, or indeed to even to 
acknowledge them, was extremely poor. 'One half of his team has a 
criminal record, while the other half has probably managed to escape 
it', judged a trained observer of Fiji's political scene and its actors. 'The 
economy is in crisis, and is running into a head-on disaster ' was how 
one person saw it, while a policy researcher at the Reserve Bank of Fiji 
observed that following successive devaluations of the Fiji dollar 'the 
reserves have been reversed'. Everywhere, talk was of an economic 
'nose-dive' . Whoever could afford to leave at least considered it, and 
in some sectors, particularly education and the public service, 
departures assumed massive proportions. Many companies 
retrenched staff, with instant effects in terms of people's ability to pay 
for rent, schools and buses; within a short space of time, noticeably 
fewer children were going to school. Tourism came to a standstill, 
notwithstanding spectacular budget offers being made to the US 
market. Several pine plantations went up in flames, in quiet protest. 
Indo-Fijian and indigenous Fijian sugarcane producers tried to protect 
themselves against potential food scarcities by reserving larger parts 
of their plots to grow food crops. Wealthy Indo-Fijian merchants and 
rich indigenous Fijians made sure their capital was out of the country 
as quickly as possible. 'If need be, we'll go back to the countryside, 
and to our traditional way of life', the Taukei claimed. 'But we don't 
want to go back to the land, and we would not even know how to 
cope there', a third generation urban indigenous Fijian woman stated. 
It was a heavy price to pay, not for democracy, but for its denial. 
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Words and meaning 
Many living in Fiji made caustic remarks about the reporting of the 
coup by foreign journalists. 'Most of them took it easy. They settled 
themselves in the lounge of the Grand Pacific Hotel and wrote a 
simplistic story about ethnic conflict between Indians and Fijians, 
exactly how Rabuka-and others behind him-would like to see it. We 
had hoped that at least the foreign press would correct that perverse 
image. '  The reality was of course more complex, as was demonstrated 
to one of the authors when visiting USP as an external advisor to the 
History /Politics Department just a few weeks after the second coup. 
Towards the end of the visit the time came to share some impressions 
with members of the Department before drafting the final report. A 
staff meeting was thus arranged, just prior to departure, and quite 
central to the issues which were raised for discussion was, as a result 
of declining student enrolments and the changed political climate, the 
increasingly vulnerable position in which the History /Politics 
Department found itself within the university. The situation called for 
a new strategy, in which, through the offering of regionally specific, 
non-traditional history courses and policy-oriented politics courses, 
the Department would seek to build an interdisciplinary, 
development-focused approach. It thus seemed opportune for the 
History /Politics Department to dilute its disciplinary identity and, 
metaphorically, go 'underground'. This viewpoint was verbally 
communicated to the members of the Department during the course of 
the meeting. 
Several weeks later, back in Europe, a clipping arrived in the mail 
from the Fiji Post of 31 October 1987. Under the bold headline 'Fight 
rages over Dutch scholar 's activities', the paper carried a lengthy 
article on a controversy between the government and the university, 
which, at first glance, seemed to originate from another planet: 
A verbal war continued yesterday between the Education Ministry 
and the University of the South Pacific over allegations that a visiting 
Dutch scholar had been advising USP staff to teach Marxism and 
Communism 'undercover' .  
Yesterday, Education Minister Ratu Filimone Ralogaivau reiterated 
what he said early this week that the visitor had advised staff in the 
Social Science department to go 'underground' and teach the two 
subjects. Ratu Filimone said he had been reliably informed of these 
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developments by a member of the staff who had been 'part of the 
discussions'. He said the move was designed to 'undermine the 
traditions of the Fijian people and thwart their present struggle in 
their own country'. 
'I am surprised that this type of activity is being deliberately permitted 
in an institution funded by the taxpayers of Fiji. It appears that those 
who administer USP are setting out to force the hand of the present 
govemment. . .The leadership of the university continues to be 
insensitive about the inspirations of the Fijian people . . .  The Vice­
Chancellor must understand that the Laucala Bay campus stands on 
the sovereign territory of Fiji and that the university is subject to the 
laws of Fiji . . .  ' 
In retrospect, what was interesting about this mini-crisis was not 
the different connotations of the word 'underground', but rather why 
its meaning was twisted. This was done to try and ensure that the 
external advisor 's report was not considered, and thus ward off any 
possible attacks to the offering of an undiluted, 'traditional' history of 
Fiji and Pacific culture within the History /Politics Department. 
Moreover, it was clear that the government's information had come 
from a staff member engaged in the teaching of traditional Fiji history 
and culture. That teaching had been done with the pre-colonial, 
colonial and the post-colonial periods all grasped within a single 
perspective of historical continuity, and with the colonial period being 
viewed as an interlude. 
The interesting point about the controversy however was that it 
linked a perceived threat to departmental continuity and hegemony in 
the offering of traditional history courses to the threat to the integrity 
of the indigenous Fijian community imagined by the supporters of the 
new regime. Developing course offerings on the wider economic and 
social transformations to which Fiji had been subject during colonial 
times and after would have implied recognition of the roles that Fiji's 
various peoples-migrant as well as indigenous-had come to play in 
these transformations. It would have had to address the new social 
and political context that had come into existence in the wake of these 
historical changes. In contrast, restricting history courses to a focus on 
the continuity of traditional Fiji institutions to the present day made it 
possible to negate the vastly changed social and economic situation 
that had emerged through Fiji's history-as indeed the Taukei and 
Rabuka's government also appeared intent to do. The parallel between 
the micro politics in the Department and the macro situation in the 
I ntroduction: Confronti ng the futu re, confront ing the past 1 1  
country could hardly have been closer. Indeed, the politicisation of the 
issue at the particular time directly linked the question of course 
offerings to the central issue at stake in the country: identity in Fiji at 
the time and thereafter. 
Crisis and identities 
Until the time of the coups, identities in Fiji had appeared quite simple 
and straightforward. It was generally clear who could be referred to as 
'Fijian' and it was similarly clear who could be identified as 'Indian' or 
'lndo-Fijian' .  Fuller integration had simply not been on the agenda. 
Distinct identities were largely reflective of the separate niches the two 
main ethnic groups occupied within Fiji's economy and society. Social 
contacts across communities were relatively limited: except for some 
sections within the urban milieu, most indigenous Fijians and most 
lndo-Fijians interacted primarily amongst themselves rather than with 
members of a range of ethnic communities. Without any overt enmity 
or direct confrontations taking place, social relations had largely 
seemed unproblematic, and Fiji could readily be portrayed as a Pacific 
paradise by tour operators and others. 
At another level, though, it was precisely this non-integration­
consciously engineered and preserved as it had been-which could be 
said to have constituted Fiji's main problematic feature. Superficially a 
multicultural society, its separate identities also signified unfulfilled 
social integration, social distance, differential access to political power 
and, though perhaps remotely, potential friction. Despite its various 
institutional mechanisms to ensure continued separate social and 
economic positions, such as in land, it is doubtful whether Fiji society 
in the longer run would have been able to sustain its seemingly 
appealing image alongside its lack of social integration. 
The coups ruptured the seeming tranquility that people had been 
enjoying and brought to the fore this simmering issue. As a 
consequence, over the last decade Fiji has been deeply engaged in a 
process of re-appraising itself, which is leaving its imprint in terms of 
changing self-images and changing collective understandings about 
the future. Numerous questions about the shape of social and political 
relationships have been raised, and continue to be articulated from 
different perspectives. At one end of the spectrum, they range from 
querying continued separate designations which might be employed 
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to keep ethnic groups apart, to asking whether ultimately all of Fiji's 
people may come to feel encouraged to call themselves 'Fijians' . At the 
other end of the spectrum, questions concern the preservation of 
authenticity, closely followed by a concern with the maintenance of 
the status quo. What both ends of the spectrum share is that they 
imply questions and concerns about the scope for power sharing and 
equity in any future constellation of social, cultural, political and 
economic arrangements in Fiji. 
At the same time, probably more aspects of Fiji's society and 
economy have been subjected to probing analysis during this period 
than has happened at any time before. Moreover, at the policy and 
political level, numerous interventions-aggravating, ameliorating, or 
just sustaining the situation-have been undertaken following 
identification of the 'problem' in the wake of the coup. All this added 
substantially to changing relations, and perceptions of relations. 
Clearly, the period has not been an easy one. Indeed, in socio­
psychological terms it is easy to see how the damage could have been 
irreparable. 
Apprais ing the aftermath 
Time has now come to recognise the importance of this aftermath; that 
is, to re-assess the net effects of all the self-searching and restructuring 
that has taken place during these twelve years, coupled to the equally 
significant social and political transitions that have been taking place 
on the ground. None of these have been minor and by themselves they 
signal the major differences, and possibly also the major gains, 
between the Fiji of today and that of twelve years ago-socially, 
economically, and politically. 
Significantly, recognising the transformations that have occurred 
over the last decade or more also places a different light on Fiji's 
condition today, thus allowing the coups and their aftermath to be 
viewed within a broader historical and comparative perspective. From 
such a perspective some fresh reinterpretations might well suggest 
themselves. One overriding way of viewing the crisis so far has 
been-quite naturally-to equate it with a shattering of earlier 
expectations of progressive and peaceful co-habitation and 
integration, even though only a few people at the time may actually 
have been giving any thought as to how that might be brought about. 
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Viewed from such a perspective, most of the different labels of 
national identity which have since been proposed either officially, such 
as 'Fiji Islanders', or unofficially, such as 'aboriginal' or 'ethnic' Fijians, 
could be seen as either reflecting fragmentation, or, at best, as perhaps 
rather feeble attempts at repair. 
Dominant and natural as this range of interpretations has been, in 
due course they might possibly make room for different kinds of 
understanding, including some that might have appeared out of the 
question or contentious at an earlier stage. Notably, given the complex 
and virtually unprecedented demographic situation with which the 
colonial experience had left Fiji, the relative outsider, for one, might 
wonder whether the confrontations signaled by the coup and after 
could not be viewed as a kind of inevitable or 'necessary' crisis the 
country would have to pass through: necessary in the sense of being 
needed before the country would be able to arrive at a painful 
recognition of the common destinies which its peoples must share. 
Reflecting on the present, it is also necessary to remember from where 
Fiji has come. Colonial rule had left a country singularly handicapped 
to be handled as a unit, and a unity, thus potentially ranking it among 
the 'impossible' nation-states, countries such as Sudan, South Africa, 
Cyprus, and others. With a near even balance between the two main 
ethnic groups, with the two groups having largely separate economic 
spheres, with the two groups governed through institutions which 
emphasised separateness, and with powerful elites keen to preserve 
institutionally entrenched positions, Fiji evidently had a long way to 
go. Against that background, 1987 constituted a major, unprecedented 
shock which, it appears, has served as a prelude to the intensive soul­
searching conducted over the past twelve years. If this reading is 
valid, it would just underscore the imperative, for Fiji's societal 
development and change, of constructing sound strategies oriented 
towards the country growing together, rather than growing apart. 
Surely, though, such speculative thinking has its limits, and social 
science as a matter of principle will only sparingly offer space for it. 
Nor should any such reflections be construed to imply more generally 
that army coups can provide reliable routes towards possible 
reconciliation. Nonetheless, what is important is that due attention 
should be given to the many ways in which, provoked by the coups, 
segments of Fiji society and government during its aftermath have 
been attempting to come to terms with the country's basic realities-
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whether from narrowly competitive, even retrogressive, or from more 
genuinely constructive angles-thus beginning to address issues about 
Fiji's future in a more head-on fashion than they probably had done at 
any time earlier. 
Confronting Fij i futures 
The present volume reflects this ongoing search for alternatives and 
direction, and aims to make a contribution to the debates by 
illuminating a range of relevant issues from several strategic vantage 
points. Therefore, the volume is divided into two sections. The first 
section is entitled 'Politics, economics and social inequality' and 
begins with Chapter 2, 'The implementation of the Fiji Islands 
Constitution' by Yash Ghai. Ghai examines both the process by which 
the new 1997 Constitution of Fiji Islands was constructed, as well as its 
objectives, before going on to focus on three issues: the electoral 
system; multi-party government; and accountability. Some questions 
are raised concerning how the new Constitution will be implemented, 
using the word 'implementation' to denote the dynamics of the inner 
logic of the Constitution, the directions in which it compels, promotes 
or facilitates change, as well the contradictions within it which may 
obstruct the achievement of its objectives. Ghai stresses that the 
ultimate success of the new Constitution will depend upon the extent 
to which civil society becomes committed to its norms and values, and 
on this critical factor there are as yet no guarantees. 
Chapter 3 is by Satendra Prasad and is entitled 'Fiji's 1999 general 
elections: outcomes and prospects' .  The chapter demonstrates that the 
alternative voting system used in the 1999 general elections has been 
able to foster cooperation amongst Fiji's political parties, and that this 
cooperation has been reinforced by the introduction of multiparty 
government. However, the new voting system has not been able to 
eliminate the recourse to ethnicity as a tool of political mobilisation. 
Ironically, the use of ethnicity may not have occurred in those seats 
'reserved' for Fiji's main ethic communities; rather, it may have 
occurred in those seats for which the entire electorate is eligible to cast 
its vote. Moreover, where it has fostered cross-community 
cooperation, this has been amongst elites; it has not occurred amongst 
the people. Nonetheless, as a national referendum on the 1997 
Constitution, the 1999 general elections demonstrate that it has 
received an overwhelming mandate from the peoples of Fiji. 
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Chapter 4 is entitled 'Fiji's economy: the challenge of the future' 
and is by Ardeshir Sepehri and Haroon Akram-Lodhi. The chapter 
begins by providing an overview of the evolution of Fiji's 
macroeconomic structure during the post-independence period, 
placing particular emphasis on changes occurring during the period 
between 1987 and 1992. It then focuses upon assessing the impact of 
domestic savings, public sector spending and external resources, 
including Fiji's preferential access to the European Union for its sugar 
exports, on the growth path of the Fiji economy by specifying a three­
gap model of growth in Fiji for the period 1971 to 1996. Once the 
three-gap model is estimated, the parameters of the model are used to 
simulate the period between 1997 to 2001 under four alternative 
growth path 'scenarios'. These scenarios examine the impact of a 
gradual elimination of Fiji's preferential access to the European Union, 
and thus a substantial reduction in the availability of foreign 
resources, which, should it occur, would have a major affect on the 
growth of the economy. Sepehri and Akram-Lodhi demonstrate that 
the challenge for Fiji's policy makers is to intensify export 
diversification efforts. They suggest that in order to develop a set of 
coherent and consistent policies to promote export diversification 
there is a pressing need to reduce the 'ethnicisation' of economic 
policy, arguing that a reduction in the role played by ethnicity in the 
formulation and implementation of economic policies may improve 
the efficiency of state intervention in the economy and in so doing 
contribute to enhanced economic performance. 
Chapter 5, 'Institutional rigidities and economic performance in 
Fiji', is by Biman Prasad and Sunil Kumar. Consistent with Chapter 4, 
Prasad and Kumar argue that the key constraints to improved 
economic performance in Fiji are a set of institutional rigidities. 
Supply-side structural adjustment policies in Fiji have, according to 
Prasad and Kumar, been based upon a neoclassical model which 
assume institutional structures as given and thus fail to consider their 
potential role as a constraint. Yet, argue the authors, institutional 
rigidities pervade the Fiji economy. Long-term growth will only 
increase if these institutional rigidities are addressed and resolved. 
Prasad and Kumar provide a case study of property rights in land to 
illustrate their main argument, arguing that key land tenure 
institutions are inefficient, and suggesting that this inefficiency has 
implications for investment, production and distribution. 
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Chapter 6 is by John Cameron and is entitled 'Confronting social 
policy challenges in Fiji'. Cameron examines the extent of the 
challenge confronting civil society and the state in Fiji in seeking to 
redistribute social and economic uncertainty, improve the degree of 
equality within society, and in so doing build 'social wealth'. Adopting 
a perspective similar to that found in Chapter 5, Cameron offers a 
critique of the neoliberal approach to social inequality and argues that 
the new institutional economics offers a countervailing approach 
rooted in distinctive moral and political perspectives which emphasise 
the interaction between civil society, state institutions and imperfect 
markets in facilitating improvements in the degree of equality within a 
society. In light of this framework, Cameron argues that the challenge 
confronting the state in Fiji is not in the detail of policy design but 
rather in the need to build on and invest in existing social wealth so as 
to institutionalise positive socio-economic processes. Three possible 
policy interventions which could institutionalise positive socio­
economic processes are briefly examined: health and nutrition, 
education and community relations. Cameron argues that the 
construction of a less unequal, more socially-inclusive, multicultural 
polity requires that state social policy actively support those civil 
society institutions in both major ethnic groups which have facilitated 
social wealth formation and a good quality of life for many of Fiji's 
peoples. 
Chapter 7, by Ganesh Chand, explores an important source of 
social inequality in its examination of 'Labour market deregulation in 
Fiji'. Chand looks at the background to deregulation policies, the 
objectives of the deregulation drive, the key mechanisms for deregulating 
the labour market, and some consequences of deregulation. Chand 
argues that the deregulation process was part of a wider set of structural 
adjustment policies which Fiji began adopting in the mid 1980s. The 
military coup and the subsequent collapse of the economy provided 
the opportunity for Fiji to push ahead with the adjustment program. 
As the gist of the new policy package was export-oriented 
industrialisation, deregulation was to align the labour market with 
this objective. The consequences of deregulation are demonstrated by 
Chand to have been a continuing decline in the unionisation rate, most 
notably in the manufacturing sector but more generally in the private 
sector; a rise in industrial disputes but a fall in the number and 
intensity of strikes; a fall in real wages; and an increasing prominence 
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of  female workers in wage employment. Chand notes that the new 
Constitution has repealed some of the decrees which were promulgated 
during 1991 and 1992, stressing that this suggests that the institutional 
framework structuring labour market outcomes in the early 1990s was 
regarded by many of the peoples of Fiji as unjust. However, Chand 
argues, repeal has occurred after a significant transformation in Fiji's 
labour market has already occurred. Labour market deregulation has 
therefore already had an impact that will be felt in the years to come. 
Chapter 8, entitled 'Women in post-coup Fiji: negotiating work 
through old and new realities', examines a second source of social 
inequality, that of gender relations. Written by Jacqueline Leckie, the 
chapter explores the ways in which the political economy of post-coup 
Fiji has profoundly shaped women's lives, expectations and identities. 
Predicated on the proposition that it is futile to separate work from 
other component's of women's lives, Leckie argues that change has 
been a reflection of women's cultures, the legacy of colonialism, the 
education system, the impact of the post-coup regime, and 
globalisation. According to Leckie, for women gender is the central 
thread through these changes; but they are also linked to other 
identities and hierarchies, and especially those of ethnicity and class. 
In part, she argues, this sheds light on the contradictory responses to 
change from women. For most women these responses are not 
polarised choices but rather represent what may seem to be a never­
ending balancing act between old and new realities, in which personal 
and collective identities are negotiated to varying degrees. Contestation 
over tradition, culture and political rights has thus been on going since 
the coups, although it was not given legitimate public space until the 
review of the 1990 Constitution. Leckie concludes by arguing that 
given the cultural and economic realities of the present, how Fiji's new 
constitution will improve women's rights remains a vitally important 
question. 
In Chapter 8 Leckie introduces the idea that social identity is 
rooted in political and economic processes. This idea is explored in 
more detail in the second section of Confronting Fiji Futures, 'The 
"Fijian" question', which offers detailed analysis on the political 
economy of indigenous Fijian identity. The section begins with 
Chapter 9, 'The problematics of reform and the "Fijian" question', by 
William Sutherland. Sutherland is concerned with the impact of post­
coup reforms on the 'Fijian' question which, at its most elementary, 
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comes down to a simple question: who is a Fijian? Sutherland argues 
that up to the early 1990s the state's economic reform agenda was 
driven primarily by nationalist indigenous Fijian demands but that 
from the mid 1990s, faced with increasing external pressures for 
greater liberalisation, the state not only picked up the pace and scope 
of reform but also increasingly had to distance itself from its nationalist 
agenda. In so doing the state alienated the political constituency on 
which it depended most critically. By the late 1990s the level of 
indigenous Fijian disaffection had grown, and the Fijian question 
remained unresolved. Sutherland concludes by demonstrating that 
how the Fijian question is managed in the future will be critical to the 
country's prospects for economic growth and political stability. 
Chapters 10 and 11 offer two case studies of the 'Fijian' question. 
Chapter 10 is entitled 'Addressing inequality? Economic affirmative 
action and communal capitalism in post-coup Fiji' and is by Steven 
Ratuva. Having defined 'communal capitalism', Ratuva provides an 
overview of the economic affirmative action policies intended to 
benefit indigenous Fijians in the wake of the 1987 coups. A case study 
of communal capitalism, that of the Fijian Holdings Company 
Limited, is presented by Ratuva because it is the flagship of 
indigenous Fijian communal investment, and is seen as a success story 
in as far as communal capitalism is concerned, yet it manifests some 
fundamental contradictions, which are explored in the chapter. In 
these explorations, Ratuva is able to substantiate the profound doubts 
he has about the benefits of economic affirmative action in Fiji, in large 
part because they have primarily benefited a small minority of 
indigenous Fijians. 
In Chapter 11, Holger Korth examines 'Ecotourism and the politics 
of representation in Fiji'. Korth demonstrates that the main thrust 
behind ecotourism development in Fiji has been the re-invention of Fiji 
as a 'destination image' which, in its production and consumption, 
centers on nature and indigenous Fijian ethnicity. Seemingly 
progressive in its environmentalist sensitivities, Korth shows that the 
development of ecotourism in Fiji has been driven by segments of the 
state apparatus. However, ecotourism development in Fiji has, 
according to Korth, been predicated upon the conservation of the 
social, cultural and natural ecology. Korth argues that while sustainable 
development requires this, it also requires more: the democratisation 
of decision-making processes, the equitable distribution of resources, 
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and equal opportunities across the age and gender divide. Ecotourism 
has failed to contribute to these. Closely examining certain aspects of 
ecotourism development, Korth shows that such development reflects 
ethnic divisions and prevalent post-coup political sentiments. Korth 
notes that it is, in this light, not surprising that ecotourism has had 
minimal economic impact. 
Chapter 12, by Robbie Robertson, concludes the volume. Entitled 
'Retreat from exclusion? Identities in post-coup Fiji', Robertson argues 
that Fiji has only partially retreated from the extremist nationalism 
that underlay the 1987 coups. Robertson notes that despite considerable 
achievements in the new 1997 Constitution, the nation still has to 
come to terms with its past. In particular, Robertson highlights issues 
of identity-including ownership of the national name-which remain 
largely unresolved. Robertson illustrates the complex paradox of 
identity in Fiji by examining the changing views of Sitiveni Rabuka on 
inter-community relations. This paradox, Robertson argues, means 
that the potential remains for powerful but fractious class interests to 
exploit ethnocentrism in order to maintain advantage, and thereby 
once more push the country back towards heightened communal 
division. 
The chapters offered in this collection represent a stocktaking of the 
rethinking processes that have been underway in Fiji since the coups. 
They point to the significant ways in which social, economic and 
political relations have been shifting since 1987, as well as to emerging 
changing perspectives on these relations and their future. In this 
regard, the chapters by Robertson, Sutherland, Ratuva, Leckie and 
Chand, amongst others, represent thoughtful discussions of different 
levels of post-coup transition and the re-interpretations to which they 
have given rise. The picture that emerges is one of a society that seems 
much better equipped now than it was twelve years ago to face and 
take up the challenges it is confronted with, and to recognise that 
integration on various fronts is going to be arduous, but nevertheless 
the only route worth going. 
The book's timeliness in this respect has been underscored by the 
spectacular and largely unexpected outcomes of the 1999 Fiji elections. 
The election results themselves have been indicative of the significant 
social re-orientation that has occurred in recent years in response to, or 
despite, all the governmental and non-governmental doctoring that 
was done. Satendra Prasad contributes an insightful analysis of the 
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elections in this volume. Evidently, changing social realities have 
given rise to a new and autonomous social dynamic which, more 
emphatically than ever before, begins to defy the ethnic 
categorisations once thought descriptive of basic social divisions. The 
importance of changing social realities in the Fiji context also lies in 
demonstrating that even complex institutionalised strings and knots 
cannot keep voters' feet tied all the time. As Robertson remarks, what 
official resources have failed to do, the popular vote may possibly 
achieve. 
Naturally, the drastically changed political constellation the 
elections have inaugurated invites another fresh wave of rethinking on 
the key issues confronting Fiji. It is hoped that the chapters that follow 
can serve as an aid in that process: many of the questions explored by 
the authors will no doubt feature prominently on the policy agenda 
and in public debate in the years to come. 
Endnote 
1 .  From W.B. Yeats The Second Coming: 
Turning and turning in the widening gyre 
The falcon cannot bear the falconer; 
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world. 
All quotations contained within this chapter are taken from the 
field notes of Martin Doornbos, collected and collated during his 
1987 visit to Fiji. 
CHAPTER 2 
The implementation of the 
Fiji Islands Constitution 
Yash Ghai 
This chapter1 examines some questions concerning the 
implementation of the new Constitution of Fiji Islands, adopted in 
1997. It might be thought that in light of the successful completion of 
the 1999 general elections such an examination is redundant. 
However, the chapter does not use 'implementation' in the narrow 
sense of the legislation and the administrative measures which give 
effect to some or all of the provisions of the Constitution. Rather, it 
employs it in a teleological sense, to denote the achievement of the 
objectives of the Constitution. In this sense, 'implementation' also 
denotes the dynamics of the inner logic of the Constitution, the 
directions in which it compels, promotes or facilitates change, as well 
the contradictions within it which may obstruct the achievement of its 
objectives. In this wider sense, it does not solely refer to measures 
taken by official bodies alone, important though they are, for various 
institutions must be funded and resourced, and various policy 
initiatives taken. Civil society institutions must also play a crucial role 
in this wider sense. Such a broad view of 'implementation' requires 
discussion of the objectives of the Constitution and the instruments it 
has provided for their achievement. Thus, after sketching the 
framework of analysis, the process by which the Constitution was 
constructed, and its objectives, the chapter will focus on three issues: 
(i) the electoral system; (ii) multiparty government; and (iii) 
accountability. 
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The Constitution as a paradox 
The 1997 Constitution of Fiji Islands is a rich and complex document. 
Paradoxically, it represents both an affirmation of liberalism­
especially significant after the repudiation of liberalism in the 1990 
Constitution-and a major qualification on it. This paradox is less the 
result of confusion on the part of the Fiji Constitution Review 
Commission (FCRC) (referred to henceforth as the Reeves Commission, 
after its chair) as rather the legacy of Fiji's constitutional and political 
history. Nevertheless, the interest of the 1997 Constitution lies precisely 
in this paradox, for the paradox reflects not only the tortured ethnic 
history of Fiji but also the more global concern of how to accommodate 
ethnic and cultural diversity within liberalism (Kymlicka 1989, 1995; 
Taylor 1994; Tully 1996) . The Constitution also marks a break, in 
different ways, with both earlier Fiji constitutions and with dominant 
liberal constitutionalism. For those familiar with Fiji's history, the 
previous sentence itself may seem paradoxical, for earlier constitutions 
themselves were a negation of liberalism. However, the fact is that the 
Constitution does not lend itself to simple accounts or explanations. It 
is rooted both in Fiji's specificity and in more general debates on 
'ethnic constitutionalism'. 
The new Constitution can be located within contemporary 
approaches to the constitutional settlement of ethnicity. In the classical 
liberal paradigm, no distinction is made between members of different 
ethnic communities. The key organising concept is that of citizenship, 
which carries with it rights and responsibilities on the basis of the 
equality of all. Cultural diversity can sometimes be accommodated 
through federalism, as in Canada for the Francophone community. 
However, such autonomy is generally fortuitous. For example, US 
federalism has been rigorously opposed to ethnic federalism, as is 
manifested in its attitude, until recently, to Puerto Rican claims to 
statehood, as Puerto Rico's Hispanic traditions were widely 
considered to be incompatible with the dominant traditions of the 
United States. In the classical liberal paradigm culture and religion are 
seen as belonging by and large to the private sphere, and should thus 
not intrude upon the public domain. More accurately, classical 
liberalism assumed cultural homogeneity and these possible dilemmas 
were not fully recognised. It is fair to say that in the negotiations for 
independent Fiji's first constitution, the leading party of Indo-Fijians, 
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the National Federation Party (NFP), pressed for a settlement rooted in 
the classical liberal paradigm, with its advocacy of the election of the 
entire legislature by a common roll electorate, a procedure which was 
also deeply rooted in the history of the lndo-Fijian community in Fiji. 
The other approach is to recognise diverse ethnic communities in 
public law. Within this broad approach, there are three different 
frameworks, which have little in common. The first is to adopt 
constitutional provisions designed to provide specific and limited 
recognition for ethnic groups, particularly minorities, typically 
through special representation in the legislature, property rights, 
and/ or personal laws. Many such provisions tend to be transitional, 
for they are located within a constitution which is based on equal 
citizenship, and which thus aspires to liberalism. Thus, although 
liberal constitutions seek to disregard cultural and ethnic differences, 
they may nonetheless reflect an underlying concern with the 
promotion of national integration. To this end, such a constitution may 
include provisions such as ethnic equity, independent commissions to 
remove ethnic discrimination or disabilities, and electoral systems that 
provide incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation. In some respects Fiji's 
first Constitution of 1970 seems to fall in this category, for its provision 
of communal seats was seen as temporary, even though other non­
liberal aspects of that Constitution, and particularly the system of 
administration based on the separation of indigenous Fijians from 
other groups, were permanent and entrenched. 
The second framework proceeds on the assumption of the 
hegemony of one ethnic community over others (Lustick 1980) . 
Ethnic hegemony ensures political order and stability through the 
subordination by one community of other communities, who are 
either disenfranchised completely or are grossly under-represented in 
the apparatus of the state. Control is a dominant concern of such a 
system, and as such it operates typically through various forms of 
coercion, political as well as economic. Colonialism and apartheid 
South Africa have been classical examples in recent history; while the 
Jewish dominance of Arabs in Israel, the Protestant dominance of 
Catholics in Northern Ireland, and the Malay dominance of other 
ethnic groups in Malaysia are contemporary examples. Such an 
approach is not inconsistent with the recognition of the culture of the 
subordinated; indeed, in many instances the recognition in public law 
of cultural diversity is a central device for subordination. 
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The third framework, consociationalism, may be said to be the 
exact opposite of this control model (Lijphart 1977) . It is a response 
to the inadequacies of the liberal, majoritarian approach in ethnically 
divided states, which fails to recognise and protect the specific 
interests of minorities or even significant ethnic groups or to provide 
a place for them in the decision making of the state apparatus. 
Consociationalism recognises different communities as corporate 
groups, with rights and responsibilities. It is premised on the principle 
that each community should be allowed to participate in the affairs of 
the state-legislative, executive and public services-in some 
acceptable proportion. It thus uses a system of pillars and quotas. 
The leaders of each community have a veto over decisions that they 
regard as affecting the community's interests adversely. It advocates 
maximum autonomy for each community over its internal affairs, 
whether through federalism or some other form of autonomy. 
Consociationalism is sometimes a description of constitutional 
arrangements that confer a corporate status on communities, for 
example by providing communal electoral rolls and/ or internal 
autonomy. It also provides for the cooperation of community leaders 
in government, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina or the first constitution of 
independent Cyprus. At other times the term is used to refer to the 
way a constitution actually works, even though it may not have 
formal consociational features. For a period of years, Malaysia would 
have been an example of the latter. 
Few constitutions fall neatly into these categories. However, as 
will be demonstrated below, while the 1970 Fiji Constitution had clear 
elements of consociationalism, its consociationalism was neither 
thorough nor equally just to all communities. By way of contrast, the 
1990 Constitution provided directly and explicitly for the 'control' 
system that was in many ways implicit in the 1970 Constitution. The 
1997 Constitution is different. Hovering between these paradigms, one 
may say that the 1997 Constitution uses consociationalism, but in an 
effort to achieve multiethnic integration. In that sense both the 1970 
and 1997 Constitutions were dynamic, in that they sought to 
restructure ethnic political relationships, as opposed to both the 1990 
Constitution and indeed the pure consociationalist model, which do 
not. However, before turning to the examination of the 1997 
Constitution, the process of its making is discussed. 
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The role of the Constitution: process 
As conceived by the Reeves Commission, an essential role of the 1997 
Constitution of Fiji Islands was to establish and consolidate a national 
consensus on how the country should be governed. If it succeeded in 
this aim, it would help to put aside the divisions and the bitterness of 
1987 coups and subsequent policies of discrimination. For this 
purpose it was important to adopt a procedure which would enable a 
critical examination of the 1990 Constitution. As a part of this, it was 
also important to give a wide opportunity to individuals, political 
parties and civic groups to express their views of the past, and their 
aspirations for the future. 
The process underpinning the formulation and the adoption of the 
1997 Constitution thus provides a vivid contrast to the procedures used 
in producing the 1970 and the 1990 Constitutions. The former was drawn 
up in a series of closed meetings between the political parties, principally 
the Alliance and the NFP. Differences between them that could not be 
resolved were settled by the British, particularly at London conferences. 
There was little public discussion of constitutional issues. The assumption 
underlying this procedure was that the only way to narrow and resolve 
ethnic differences was to make the necessary compromises among the 
elite in private. By way of contrast, the 1990 Constitution was made 
after the public was invited to make representations to a committee. 
Public hearings were held to provide legitimacy on the process and the 
outcome. However, the committee itself was packed with supporters 
of the coups, and was thus widely perceived by Indo-Fijians to lack 
impartiality. Consequently, it enjoyed little legitimacy among them. 
The Reeves Commission rejected a proposal for its hearings to be 
held in private, although it allowed a few individuals to present their 
views on a confidential basis (Fiji Constitution Review Commission 
(henceforth FCRC) 1996:4.4) . It instead promoted a wide consultative 
process, itself travelling extensively in the country. At the same time, 
the Commission also believed that it was important to learn from the 
experiences of other multiethnic countries. Finally, it valued the views 
of both local and foreign scholars. Consequently, it commissioned and 
eventually had published a number of studies relevant to its terms of 
reference, analysing local circumstances and policies, and foreign 
experiences, including Malaysia, Mauritius and South Africa (Lal and 
Vakatora 1997a, 1997b). 
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The Reeves Commission received in all 852 submissions (FCRC 
1996:4.5) . Representations were made not only by political groups, but 
also by religious organisations, trade unions, academics, women's 
groups, and the Citizens Constitutional Forum, a non-governmental 
organisation established specifically to promote public discussion of 
constitutional options, which had itself held consultations with a wide 
variety of groups before preparing its submission. It is probably fair to 
say that the issues were reasonably well understood, that all views 
were canvassed, and there was a high degree of interest in the issues 
and the process. There was also a thorough review of the 1990 
Constitution. As such, there had never before been such an 
opportunity for all the peoples of Fiji to participate in the constitution­
making process. 
Thoroughness was also manifested in the report and recommendations 
of the Reeves Commission. The report provides an impartial summary 
of the submissions it received, particularly from the major political 
parties. It builds on an emerging local consensus where that is 
appropriate, but it is not afraid to make innovative proposals that 
depart from the submissions to it. The report is moreover informed by 
developments in the international regime of rights and the experiences 
of other countries. Drawing from a careful analysis of its terms of 
reference, and without ignoring history, reality and constraints on 
change in Fiji, the Commission sets out in clear and forthright terms a 
framework of recommendations which are forward looking and which 
provide clear directions for change. Granted, the Reeves Commission 
could only achieve the objectives of its terms of reference through a 
series of compromises. Nonetheless, its vision for the future of Fiji had 
a remarkable degree of coherence. 
The recommendations of the Commission provided the basis on 
which the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee made its 
recommendations to Parliament. Although the Select Committee 
seems to have accepted the primary national goals spelled out by the 
Commission, it did not adopt all the recommendations of the 
Commission, especially on systems of elections and government. 
However, while the Select Committee did not articulate its own vision 
or the reasons for it deviating from the Reeves Commission 
recommendations, it does still seem to have been animated by the 
overall approach of the Reeves Commission. The Select Committee 
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did produce a consensus, which was rapidly transformed into a draft 
constitution which was given the force of law by a unanimous vote of 
Parliament, after the recommendations of the Select Committee had 
received the agreement of the Great Council of Chiefs. The work of the 
Select Committee and of Parliament, urged on by the leaders of all 
political parties, was rightly hailed as a breakthrough. It seemed to 
represent a reconciliation of sorts, but more importantly, a consensus 
on how Fiji should be governed and how its different communities 
should relate to each other. It was seen to mark a significant break 
from past policies and the institutionalisation of ethnic difference, 
although not as decisively as the Reeves Commission had 
recommended. In this light, it is not surprising that the 1997 
Constitution was widely welcomed in Fiji and abroad. 
Although the outcome of the process is to be welcomed, it is not 
possible to say that the process succeeded in completely reconciling 
ethnic communities. The terms of reference of the review, concluded 
after difficult and hard negotiations, had indeed provided a basis for 
reconciliation and a cooperative search for national consensus. The 
principal objective of the review was the promotion 'of racial harmony 
and national unity, and the economic and social advancement of all 
communities' (FCRC 1996:754-55), goals which seemed to override 
other virtues like 'democracy'. This objective had been agreed upon 
after protracted discussions between the government and the 
opposition, which resulted in support for the review in Parliament. 
Having been agreed, it might have been expected that it represented 
an important consensus under which the details of the constitution 
would have been worked out. However, the 'consensus' was criticised 
by many Indo-Fijians and indigenous Fijians as a 'sell out'. As a result, 
and perhaps not surprisingly, a spirit of consensus or amity was not 
much in evidence as the process unfolded, aggravating the task of the 
Reeves Commission as it received highly opposed submissions and as 
the drama of ethnic animosity was rehearsed before it daily. Far from 
political parties using the process to bring their supporters around the 
consensus of the terms of reference, some of them incited their 
supporters to further animosities against other communities. Nor did 
they try to use the process to establish rapport with leaders of other 
communities and parties. The lack of that spirit, or what seemed the 
absence of commitment to the terms of reference by some major 
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groups, threatened at times to sabotage the entire review. When 
agreement was finally reached on the constitution in the Joint 
Committee as well as in Parliament, it was grudging and half-hearted, 
with speeches belying the vote many cast, as if many members were 
acting under coercion. That lack of a complete commitment to the new 
constitutional dispensation will most probably act as a brake on its full 
and proper implementation. 
Nevertheless, it would be unrealistic to ignore the value of 
agreement on the Constitution. Even if not all the parties were 
wholeheartedly behind it, the agreement was based on the recognition 
that a generally acceptable constitution had to be a compromise; that 
no community or party could get all of what it wanted. The fact of 
unanimity, even if some members had reservations, was perhaps 
demonstrative of a broad recognition of the justice of the Constitution. 
The role of the Constitution: objectives 
The purpose of the 1997 Constitution is to provide a basis, on which 
all of Fiji's communities could agree, for the peoples of Fiji to live 
together under a system of government. It is intended to bring to an 
end the social and political stalemate that had resulted from the 1987 
coups and the constitutional system that was established as a 
consequence of the coups. That system was seen to be divisive, apart 
from its other defects, in failing to provide effective scrutiny of 
government or a proper system for the protection of rights. As part of 
its aim to promote a multiethnic ethic and national unity, the 
Constitution introduced a new electoral system and a new system 
under which multiparty politics is now conducted. In addition to 
providing a foundation for inter-ethnic harmony, it is also intended to 
strengthen the protection of rights and freedoms, bringing the scheme 
of rights in Fiji into conformity with the international regime of rights. 
It finally seeks to harmonise group rights with individual rights. 
The Constitution goes considerably further than previous Fiji 
constitutions in establishing a national ethic. It does so by strengthening 
the protection of human rights, regulating the conduct of leaders to 
ensure they behave responsibly and honestly, and committing the 
nation to social justice and the care of the disadvantaged. It also seeks 
to inculcate values of tolerance and compromise, through respect for 
the culture and traditions of others. It thus moves away from the 
stereotypes that have so bedevilled ethnic relations. 
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The Constitution was moreover intended to bring Fiji fully back 
into the community of nations, particularly the Commonwealth. In 
recent years the Commonwealth has developed a set of norms of 
rights and democracy to which it seeks to hold its members. It was 
well understood that Fiji would be re-admitted to the Commonwealth 
only if its constitution conformed to these norms and to the general 
international regime of human rights. To that end, a Commonwealth 
consultant prepared a review of the constitution, noting its substantial 
conformity with these norms, before Fiji was re-admitted. 
The orientation of the 1997 Constitution can be highlighted by 
contrasting it with its predecessors. The 1970 Constitution was based 
on the separation of races. Its centrepiece was the electoral system, 
which was dominated by communal seats and communal voting. 
Although there was provision for national seats, which had been 
intended to provide a basis for non-ethnic politics, the logic of 
communal seats prevailed over the logic of national seats. Moreover, 
while there was parity of seats between the two major communities, 
the over-representation of seats for the 'General Electors' roll-that is, 
those who were deemed to be neither indigenous Fijian nor Indo­
Fijian-was a device designed to ensure the dominance of the 
executive by indigenous Fijians. In this way the rather deformed 
Westminster system of the 1970 Constitution not merely kept 
communities apart politically, but also tended towards the dominance 
of one group over others. 
The 1970 Constitution had clear elements of consociationalism in 
the establishment of communal rolls. However, its consociationalism 
was neither thorough nor equally fair to all communities. It did not 
directly provide for inter-ethnic cooperation; in so far as that was 
considered desirable, it was left primarily to the voluntary cooperation 
of ethnic leaders, although the requirement that the Prime Minister 
consult with the Leader of the Opposition on various state 
appointments also provided a basis for limited cooperation. The 
proportionality principle, which was established for the legislature, 
was not extended to the executive. It was much more solicitous of the 
interests, property and institutions of indigenous Fijians and of the 
political interests of 'others' than of Indo-Fijians. 
At the same time, it was also possible to regard liberalism as the 
dominant framework of the 1970 Constitution, for the system of 
national seats was to be catalyst by which communal politics and 
communal parties would be transcended. This was reinforced by the 
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understanding that the electoral system would be reviewed, in order 
to provide further incentives for inter-ethnic cooperation. Even if the 
forward looking recommendations of the electoral review by the Street 
Commission, which proposed an increase in the number and nature of 
national seats, making them non-communal and elected on a system 
of proportional representation, had been adopted, integration would 
however have been problematic because the separate administrative 
structure governing indigenous Fijians, termed the 'Fijian 
Administration', entailed a considerable separation of communities. 
The rejection of the Street Commission's recommendations shows that 
the 1970 Constitution may have been perceived by some politicians 
less in liberal terms than in terms of 'control', whereby political 
stability, and a measure of multiethnic stability, would be achieved 
under the hegemony of indigenous Fijians. Indeed, it can be argued 
that the disenchantment of some politicians with the 1970 Constitution 
in 1987 arose precisely from the realisation that its liberal impulses 
were at least as strong as its 'control' orientation. 
The silent agenda of the 1970 Constitution, that of political order 
and stability under the dominance of one ethnic group, made it 
perhaps comparable to apartheid South Africa and contemporary 
Malaysia and Israel. However, the 1970 Constitution was constantly 
under threat from the vagaries of elections for national seats. The overt 
basis of the 1990 Constitution was to maintain the previously silent 
agenda while eliminating the threat posed by elections for national 
seats. The 1990 Constitution therefore removed any vestiges of cross­
community voting, completing the political separation of ethnic 
groups, and thus making politics almost exclusively ethnic. In so 
doing, the 1990 Constitution aimed to ensure the permanent and 
undisputed rule of indigenous Fijians. It gave a disproportionately 
large representation to them in both houses of Parliament. Thus, in the 
House of Representatives 37 out of 70 seats were reserved for 
indigenous Fijians. In addition it provided that a Prime Minister 
always had to be an indigenous Fijian. Preferential treatment in, for 
example, education, public service, and commerce, was to benefit only 
the indigenous Fijian community (Ratuva, this volume) . It also elevated 
other indigenous Fijian institutions, placing them in important 
respects over state institutions. As a consequence, it dispensed with 
the rather awkward, residual agenda of the 1970 Constitution, which 
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had as its explicit ultimate aim the development of a multiethnic 
society in Fiji. The sidelining in this way of Indo-Fijians had an effect 
that was predictable: factionalism within the indigenous Fijian 
community, which had been largely contained under the more balanced 
allocation of communal seats in the 1970 Constitution, emerged. 
By contrast, the 1997 Constitution is based on a recognition of Fiji's 
multiethnic character. It seeks to promote national unity so that all 
communities are respected and their interests protected. Its electoral 
system provides clear incentives for multiethnic politics, either through 
the collaboration of ethnic parties or indeed their replacement by 
multiethnic parties. It requires a multiparty government, in the 
expectation that leaders from all ethnic groups will participate in the 
government. However, although it is easy to distinguish the 1997 
Constitution from its predecessors, its orientation towards multiethnic 
politics and government is not without ambiguities. It has not, and 
realistically could not, disregard entirely the burden of the constitutional 
and political history of the country. In the language of scholars of ethnic 
relations, it is neither fully consociational nor fully integrative. The 
entrenchment of extensive provisions for the Fijian Administration and 
the eminent role given to the Great Council of Chiefs serves to separate 
ethnic groups and privileges one against all others. Moreover, by 
providing a framework for indigenous Fijian politics somewhat 
detached from the national framework, it hinders inter-ethnic 
integration. Hovering between these paradigms, one may say that the 
1997 Constitution uses consociationalism to achieve integration, but 
for the present consociationalism is more evident. These ambiguities 
complicate the task of the implementation of the Constitution. 
It is clear that the objectives and structure of the 1997 Constitution 
differ in significant respects from the earlier constitutions. As has been 
demonstrated, it was adopted after a more participatory process than 
had previously been the case. As will be seen, it seeks to accommodate 
shared executive power amongst the major communities, a principle 
of proportionality in other institutions of the state, and ethnic equity. 
Its goals are ethnic harmony and national unity, to be achieved by 
adherence to a national ethic of reconciliation and compromise. 
Whether political habits generated by previous constitutions can be 
changed to accord with these new goals and methods is a central 
question in any examination of implementation. 
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Implementing the Constitution 
Several provisions of the Constitution are 'non-executing' and require 
legislation to be implemented. At the time of writing, some progress 
had already been made. In addition to legislation concerning the 
electoral system, including the mechanism for drawing up boundaries, 
which was used in the 1999 general elections, there is now legislation 
on: Emergency Powers; an expanded jurisdiction for the Ombudsman; 
citizenship; the Human Rights Commission; and the Freedom of 
Information Act. Legislation and administrative machinery have yet to 
be made for the scheme of chapter 5, which provides for social justice; 
and the Code of Conduct for senior state office holders, including 
Members of Parliament. Consideration of these questions is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. However, it should be stated that it is 
important that the necessary legislation and the resources to 
implement them be provided as soon as possible. The Constitution 
cannot be separated into compartments. All its parts are integral to its 
purpose, orientation and method. For example, the strengthening of 
the protection of rights should be seen as counterbalancing a possible 
loss, namely parliamentary supervision of government, which may 
occur with the establishment of multiparty government. 
In this section, key provisions of the Constitution relating to the 
electoral process, multiparty government and accountability will be 
discussed. Commentary will be offered on some issues relating to their 
implementation. To recapitulate, the Constitution seeks to establish a 
multiethnic Fiji, which is understood to be, in the political field, a 
system in which there is less pre-occupation with ethnicity and a 
clearer focus on social and economic issues from a broader, national 
perspective. It is a system in which political parties should coincide 
decreasingly with ethnicity, and should increasingly be organised 
along different alignments, such as class or region, however 
problematic such alignments may be. It is a system in which the 
concept of citizenship, the Fiji Islander, will replace that of ethnicity. 
The electoral system 
The Commission considered that these objectives would be achieved 
through a combination of rules for institutions and a national ethic, 
which would animate the functioning of these institutions. There are 
various provisions in the Constitution which seek to achieve this 
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objective. So far as institutions are concerned, it provides for 25 of the 
71 seats in the House of Representatives to be open to candidates of 
any ethnic group and for which all voters resident in the constituency 
may vote. The voting for these, as for communally reserved seats, is by 
alternative vote (AV) . Under the AV system, a voter has to rank their 
preference among all the candidates. A winning candidate has to have 
an absolute majority; if no candidate obtains an absolute majority after 
the count of first preferences, the second-or subsequent-preferences 
of those who voted for candidates who came bottom of the poll on the 
first count are taken into account. The second and subsequent 
preferences of a voter can thus be crucial in determining the result 
(Prasad, this volume) . In communal seats this method of voting 
principally serves the purpose of ensuring that the winning candidate 
enjoys clear majority support. In non-communal 'open' seats, however, 
its purpose is to provide incentives for political parties to cooperate 
across ethnic frontiers by opening up possibilities of arrangements 
between political parties whose core support comes from different 
ethnic groups. By making recommendations to their supporters 
concerning second and subsequent votes in open seats, parties can, in 
effect, try to 'trade' the second and subsequent preferences of their 
supporters. The trade off can of course take place between parties of 
the same ethnic group, but since they will be in competition in open 
constituencies where the members of that ethnic group predominate, 
trade between political parties of different ethnic groups makes better 
political sense. Indeed, the logic of the system might well lead to a 
multiplicity of multiethnic parties; this was the expectation of the 
Reeves Commission, which recommended it. Additionally, it was 
expected by the Commission that candidates with moderate views 
would have an advantage over those espousing extreme views, as 
they would have a chance of capturing more second preferences 
(FCRC 1996:9.150-52, 10.31-109; see also Horowitz 1997) . The 
outcome of elections held under the provisions of the Constitution 
should thus either be coalition government or, better still, government 
by a party with multiethnic membership. 
The Reeves Commission strongly believed that the AV system 
would operate in this way in open seats; indeed, it was content to 
propose this system as the only device for a multiethnic government. 
Since the incentives for cooperation between or the integration of 
parties would lie in the voting for open seats, it recommended that a 
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predominant number of seats--45 out of a total of 70-should be open 
seats. Even the 25 communal seats were seen as a transitional 
arrangement, to be eventually replaced by open seats. 
The Joint Parliamentary Select Committee was less willing to take 
such a bold step. Its indigenous Fijian members wanted to retain a 
larger number of communal seats. It thus decided, having agreed on a 
total membership in the House of Representatives of 71, on 46 
communal and 25 open seats. Nonetheless, like the Reeves 
Commission, the Select Committee also favoured a party of 
government that was multiethnic-a so-called government of national 
unity. However, in a major dissent from the thinking of the Reeves 
Commission, it sought to achieve that government by a more direct 
way-by the Constitution mandating a multiparty cabinet. The 
Constitution provides that any party with at least 10 per cent of the 
seats in the House of Representatives is entitled to a proportionate 
share of cabinet posts. The Reeves Commission recommendation 
would have retained the essential principle of majority government as 
in the standard Westminster model, to which it was strongly 
committed (FCRC 1996:22) . By way of contrast, the Constitution 
creates a major modification of parliamentary government, which will 
over time undoubtedly raise problems in its operation. 
Some implications of the deviation of the Select Committee from 
the Reeves Commission recommendation can be noted. For a start, 
although it may sound logical it is not self-evident that the Reeves 
Commission proposal would have led to cooperation between parties 
with different ethnic bases, much less to multiethnic parties. Apart 
from some confusion on the part of the Commission on the technical 
details of how the proposed system would operate (Arms 1997), the 
proposed system would have required a very major re-drawing of 
constituency boundaries to achieve a significant mix of ethnic 
populations. At best, it would have been difficult to avoid 
constituencies where one community was not a majority, although it 
might have been possible to have a number of constituencies with 
different ethnic majorities, thus facilitating some trade off. Moreover, 
even if such constituencies were achieved, old habits of ethnic voting 
would have been likely to continue, and the supporters of a party 
might well have ignored the advice of the party as to how they should 
cast their second and subsequent votes, preferring to vote for other 
candidates of their own ethnicity (Chai 1997a). 
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In the different arrangements under the Constitution, the 
probability of the AV system working over time in the way that was 
envisaged by the Reeves Commission becomes even less likely. The 
number of open seats is only about a third of the total membership of 
the House of Representatives. Winning open seats thus becomes less 
crucial to the right to form a government. A party, particularly if 
rooted in one of the two major ethnic groups, might well decide in 
future elections to adopt a strategy directed towards winning the more 
numerous communal seats. If old habits were to persist, the chances 
are that the strategy would be designed to exploit ethnic divisions by 
attacking politicians of one's own ethnic affiliation for being soft on 
other communities. 
A better understanding of how the new system might work over 
time can be obtained through an examination of the electoral 
experience under the 1970 Constitution. Granted, the new electoral 
arrangements differ from the 1970 Constitution. However, it remains 
to be seen whether its logic is significantly different. Under the 1970 
Constitution the House of Representatives consisted of 52 members, 
elected on a combination of 27 communal and 25 national seats. 
National seats were ethnically allocated but all the voters in the relevant 
constituency voted for them-hence the system came to be known as 
'cross voting'. There were three electoral rolls: for indigenous Fijians, 
which included Rotumans and other Pacific islanders; for Indo-Fijians; 
and for General Electors. Indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians each had 
12 communal and 10 national seats, while the General Electors had 3 
communal and 5 national seats. Communal seats were contested on 
the basis of single member constituencies on a 'first past the post' 
basis, using communal electoral rolls. For national seats each voter 
had three votes to cast: one for an indigenous Fijian, one for an Indo­
Fijian, and one for a General Elector. 'First past the post' operated in 
constituencies where three such members were to be elected. 
The logic of the political system was dictated by the communal 
rather than the national seats. Political parties were organised 
essentially on ethnic lines, in order to compete for communal seats. 
There was one dominant party for each of the communities. While the 
need to contest national seats compelled each of the major parties to 
extend its appeal beyond the community they principally represented, 
for the most part this was not successful: each party was content to 
field a few candidates from other ethnic groups. National seats were 
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decided principally by communal votes; thus, indigenous Fijian 
candidates sponsored by the dominantly Indo-Fijian NFP were 
successful as a result of Indo-Fijian votes, and so on. This was possible 
because of the concentration of Indo-Fijians and indigenous Fijians in 
different parts of the country. Consequently, national seats won by 
candidates who relied on the vote of the other sponsoring community 
had little support in their own community, while those who relied on 
votes from their own communities had little support in other 
communities. In this way cross-voting seats became an extension of 
communal seats. 
The Alliance Party in the years immediately following 
independence was a partial exception to this trend. It attracted a 
significant percentage of Indo-Fijian votes, especially for the cross­
voting seats, in which it often achieved over 20 per cent of the vote. By 
way of contrast, the NFP commonly gained less than 5 per cent of 
indigenous Fijian votes. However, the Alliance Party had to maintain 
its support amongst indigenous Fijians if it was to remain a serious 
political contender, especially as militant indigenous Fijian parties 
were bidding for the support of its principal electorate. The logic of 
the system compelled the Alliance Party to progressively champion 
exclusively indigenous Fijian interests. The disregard by it of Indo­
Fijian interests gradually led to the attrition of its Indo-Fijian support, 
so that by 1977 it had lost most of it and the parties settled back to 
relying on their old ethnic constituencies. 
The electoral provisions and general circumstances of the 1997 
Constitution are sufficiently different that the analogy of earlier 
experience may be misleading. Nonetheless, it should be noted that in 
future elections conducted under the 1997 Constitution the incentive 
to appeal across ethnic frontiers may be reduced by provisions for 
multiparty government. Any party, which obtains at least 10 per cent 
of the seats-that is, 8 seats-is entitled to be represented in the 
government. Even an extremist party has a chance to get into the cabinet. 
Just as a proportional representation system for the legislature tends to 
produce a multiplicity of parties, so too the low threshold proportionality 
rule for the cabinet could have the same effect. There is thus a possibility 
that a multiparty government could in the future emerge in which the 
partners were somewhat incompatible, if not actually hostile, and the 
result would be the transference of bitter and fundamental differences 
from the public arena, via the legislature, to the cabinet. 
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Of course, a party with the higher ambition of directing 
government by providing the Prime Minister would aim for bigger 
representation. The President appoints as Prime Minister the member 
of the House of Representatives who, in the President's opinion, can 
form a government that has the confidence of that House. This 
formulation, taken from the traditional Westminster system, may not 
appear to be entirely appropriate for multiparty government if, 
following an election, the partners were incompatible. However, it 
would seem that in circumstances where no party obtains an absolute 
majority of seats the President would need to judge which party 
leader would be most likely to be acceptable to the other parties which 
would be eligible to form a government. In normal circumstances the 
party with the largest representation in the House of Representatives 
would probably be invited to assemble a cabinet. There is thus still a 
clear incentive for a party to broaden its appeal across ethnic divides, 
unless of course it considers that such broadening would alienate its 
own ethnic supporters. This suggests that politicians wanting to 
broaden their base of support for the open seats will do so through 
cooperation between, rather than the integration of, parties. However, 
even if only that limited progress were made in future elections held 
under the provisions of the Constitution, it would be an advance upon 
previous electoral systems. 
Multiparty government 
Multiparty government as provided in the Constitution is a new 
concept for Fiji. It is also rare in other parts of the world. The Fiji 
provisions are drawn to a large, but not complete, extent from the 
interim South Africa constitution, on which the joint submission of the 
NFP-Fiji Labour Party (FLP) to the Reeves Commission was based 
(NFP-FLP 1995) . While the Constitution is relatively specific on the 
method for the formation of multiparty government, it has few 
provisions for its operation. In such circumstances, a few cautious 
speculations on how multiparty government may function can be 
offered. 
In Section 97 the Constitution establishes the principle that the 
government must have the confidence of the House of Representatives. 
As already noted, the process of the formation of government starts 
with the appointment by the President of a member of the House of 
Representative who, in the President's judgement, can form a 
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government that has the confidence of the House. This rule, contained 
in Section 98, is no different from previous constitutions, but its 
operation may not be as straightforward as before, particularly as the 
configuration of parties will change under the impetus of the new 
electoral system. The concept of 'the confidence of the House' may also 
take on a new colouration because of the fact that all the major parties 
are entitled to be part of government. It would be normal for the 
President to appoint the leader of the largest party as Prime Minister­
designate, as happened following the 1999 general elections. However, 
if in the future the largest party does not have a majority in the House, 
and instead two smaller parties, who had formed an electoral pact 
under which they had agreed to support for appointment to the prime 
ministership the leader of the larger of the two parties in the House, 
had a majority between them, the President would in all likelihood 
call upon that leader to form a government. The bargaining between 
parties which was witnessed following the 1999 general elections has 
thus in all probability become embedded within the process under 
which a government in Fiji is formed. Indeed, in the future the 
President may have to engage in much more extensive consultations 
with party leaders before deciding whom to appoint as Prime 
Minister. It is to be hoped that this will not lead to the horse trading 
and bribery that has become endemic in Papua New Guinea before the 
vote for the Prime Minister on the floor of the House (Ghai 1997b). 
Sections 99(5) and 99(7) of the Constitution entitle but do not 
compel any political party to join the cabinet. The Prime Minister has 
to invite eligible parties to join government, but they may decline, as 
occurred after the 1999 general elections. It is important to underscore 
this point; although there is an element of voluntariness in the 
arrangements, much of the analysis of the possible difficulties facing 
multiparty government in the future is based upon the assumption 
that every eligible party will join the cabinet. Constitutionally, it does 
not appear that the Prime Minister can impose conditions on the 
invitation to other parties to join the cabinet. If the Prime Minister 's 
party needed the support of other parties to form a government, these 
parties would then be in a strong position to negotiate policies that 
would bind the government. However, if the Prime Minister 's party 
had a majority or substantial numbers, it might exercise a hegemonic 
role, and other parties might be compelled into compliance with its 
priorities. 
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It is clear that despite the outcome of the 1999 general elections 
smaller parties-that is, those with less than 8 members-will in all 
likelihood be less favourably placed than before, for previously they 
might have held the balance between two major and opposing groups. 
Now their support will seldom be crucial, unless a major party opts to 
stay out of government and to oppose it, as happened following the 
1999 general elections, or unless their support was crucial for a major 
party during elections. Moreover, such smaller parties will not be 
entitled to enter the cabinet. Granted, Section 99(6) of the Constitution 
does permit the Prime Minister to appoint as minister a member of 
such a party, but only by sacrificing a ministerial post from the quota 
of the Prime Minister 's party. This provision was designed, it would 
seem, for the benefit of those parties which seek to represent General 
Electors. While a concern for minorities is no doubt commendable, the 
provision betrays a continuing obsession on the part of those who 
framed the Constitution with ethnically based parties, and goes 
against the logic of multiparty government. 
According to Section 99(1) ,  the Prime Minister decides on the 
appointment of ministers. However, when appointing persons from 
participating parties the Prime Minister has to consult with the leader 
of that party. Section 103 holds that the Prime Minister alone decides 
on the allocation of portfolios, while Section 99(1)  holds that the Prime 
Minister also decides on the dismissal of ministers. Obviously, in both 
cases the Prime Minister will do well to consult with the leaders of 
other parties in the cabinet. The Prime Minister would effectively have 
to do so in the case of dismissal, for the post that becomes vacant 
would have to replaced after consultation with the leader of the 
relevant party. In most Westminster systems, the Prime Minister is no 
longer primus inter pares (one member of a collective leadership), as in 
constitutional theory, but effectively the one who makes the key policy 
and administrative decisions of the government. Such is not the case 
under the 1997 Constitution, and while this would not create a major 
constitutional problem if the government consisted of one party, it 
could become problematic in case of coalitions. Moreover, in the case 
of the Fiji Constitution the problems and difficulties may be even 
greater, for two reasons. The first reason is that the purpose of 
multiparty government is power sharing, which could be negated if 
the Prime Minister were not to consult other partner parties. The 
second reason is that multiparty government is mandated by the 
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Constitution, and is not a voluntary arrangement. A 'forced' marriage 
of this kind requires utmost sensitivity, consultation and compromise, 
and therefore effectively changes the nature of the office of the Prime 
Minister. 
The Constitution provides relatively few rules for the functioning 
of the cabinet. It is not clear, for example, how far the Prime Minister 
has to consult with or act in accordance with the advice of the cabinet 
in the exercise of functions directly vested in the Prime Minister 's 
Office . The Prime Minister plays an important role in the appointment 
of key officers such as the Ombudsman, the Human Rights 
Commission, heads of departments and secretary to the cabinet, 
presidents of certain tribunals, and the Chief Justice. The Prime 
Minister exercises other powers as well, including the important one, 
introduced through a 1998 amendment, Section 5(2), of advising the 
President on the dissolution and proroguing of Parliament. Through 
Section 102 the cabinet is collectively responsible to the House for the 
governance of the state, which means that all ministers must support 
the policy decided by the cabinet, even if the minister or the party the 
minister represents has voted against that policy in the cabinet. The 
collective responsibility of the cabinet may deprive representatives of 
these parties from voicing in public their disagreement with official 
policies. This may put them in a dilemma, for to retain the support of 
their followers they may need to distance themselves from the 
government of which they are a part. Alternatively, since the lure of 
office is so powerful in Fiji, as in other states, politicians may seek to 
stay in government and yet criticise it in public. However, this would 
put a strain on cabinet unity and effectiveness. Yet it would seem that 
the Prime Minister could not expel such a party from the government, 
for the sanctions for breach of collective responsibility are political and 
not legal. This is in and of itself interesting, in that in other respects the 
Constitution transforms many issues and decisions that are political in 
the traditional Westminster system into legal ones. 
It would seem, following from the above discussion, that 
inadequate attention was paid in the drafting of the Constitution to 
the operation of multiparty government. For example, the rules for 
individual and collective responsibility of ministers owe more to the 
traditional Westminster system than to one that enjoins power sharing. 
The difficulty may have arisen from slavishly adopting the Reeves 
Commission's proposal on the parliamentary system, which, as has 
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already been mentioned, was not well disposed towards compulsory 
power sharing, favoured a traditional Westminster system, and was in 
any event rather conservative on recommendations for the executive. 
It will be necessary, for the proper functioning of multiparty 
government, to establish agreement amongst the parties or develop 
conventions or even possibly laws as to the method of decision 
making in the cabinet and the way in which the Prime Minister can 
exercise directly vested functions. The proper functioning of 
multiparty government will require that such decisions be made in 
consultation with the cabinet, or at least with leaders of political parties 
participating in government. It is also necessary to reconsider the role 
of collective responsibility. One function served by the rule of collective 
responsibility is to maintain the unity of the government in the face of 
an opposition ever keen to replace it through a vote of no confidence. 
A vote of no confidence against the kind of government established by 
the Constitution is however unlikely, unless the participating parties 
fall out, and it may be that they are more likely to fall out due to the 
presence of the collective responsibility rule than its abolition. On the 
other hand, some modified rule of collective responsibility or some 
convention will be needed to ensure that there is basic respect for 
policies adopted by the cabinet, especially if the rules for decision 
making become more consensual. Multiparty government provides the 
possibility of moving away from adversarial to more consensual modes 
of parliamentary business as well, which would also provide for a more 
meaningful role for backbenchers, as discussed in the next section. 
Even with such conventions, there may be problems. Discipline 
within the government may come under strain because of the 
multiplicity of parties within it. There may be tendencies towards 
'inner ' and 'outer ' groups in the cabinet. The budgetary process, and 
the special role of the minister of finance, may lead to the exclusion of 
some political groups or change the nature of the process. Consensus 
may be hard to establish. Parties which, once in the cabinet, are 
expected to cooperate, may have fought against each other in the 
elections, perhaps leaving resentment and bitterness in their train. If 
extremist parties eventually find their way into government, they will 
make ethnic accommodations difficult, for the probability is that they 
will be quick to accuse other parties of their own ethnic affiliation of 
selling the community 'down the river ' .  Instead of consensus and 
cooperation, there may be veto and blockage. 
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It therefore has to be acknowledged that despite the outcome of the 
1999 general elections constitutional provisions for elections or for 
multiparty government by themselves will not necessarily achieve 
ethnic cooperation or harmony. Indeed, it is seldom that constitutions 
have such an ineluctable outcome. Their provisions are meditated by 
and through institutions, the judiciary and the public service, and 
perhaps most importantly, by politicians and their parties. This is 
particularly true of the two sets of provisions that have been examined 
above-the electoral system and multiparty government. It was for 
this reason that the Reeves Commission emphasised the ethics of the 
nation under the new dispensation. It said that 
Racial harmony is not merely an absence of conflict. It connotes a 
positive attitude by the members of each community towards those of 
other communities, based on mutual respect and trust, a sympathetic 
appreciation of one another 's values and traditions, and tolerance of 
different beliefs, customs and cultural attitudes (FCRC 1996:3.45). 
National unity connotes a willingness of all communities to work 
towards common goals. It must be built on the existing foundation of 
shared interests and values, including the loyalty and commitment to 
the country of all its citizens. The shared citizenship of the members of 
the indigenous and the non-indigenous communities alike gives them 
the right to participate in national life and the conduct of government 
(FCRC 1996:3.47). 
Racial harmony and national unity should be promoted by reducing or 
eliminating sources of tension between communities. Their shared 
interests values and priorities should be recognised. All communities 
are interdependent. Every community should therefore regard the 
major concerns of another community as national concerns, whose 
solution is essential in their own interests, as well as the interests of 
the whole country (FCRC 1996:3.50). 
So important did the Commission consider these attitudes to 
politics and to inter-ethnic relations that it proposed to make them 
part of the national ethic-and a constituent part of national political 
morality-by incorporating them in a Compact to be included in the 
Constitution. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Compact are of special 
interest. Paragraph 7 says that in 'forming a government, and in that 
government's conduct of the affairs of the nation through the 
promotion of legislation or the implementation of administrative 
policies, full account should be taken of the interests of all 
communities'. Paragraph 8 says that to 'the extent that the interests of 
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different communities are seen to conflict, all interested parties should 
enter into negotiations in good faith in an endeavour to reach 
agreement'. 
The Commission also considered that the behaviour of leaders is 
fundamental to the improvement of inter-ethnic relations, although 
there is no express provision in the Compact on this point. Nonetheless, 
its views are worth quoting in full since they are so central to the 
conduct of electioneering and the exercise of power. It said 
Political, religious and other community leaders, together with 
individual community leaders, have a responsibility, both in public 
and in private, to show good sense, moderation and sensitivity in their 
comments on, and behaviour towards, members of other communities. 
They should refrain from attributing characteristics to the members of 
other communities on the basis of a stereotype or the behaviour of a 
particular person. They should also refrain from displaying racial 
prejudice themselves or attributing racial prejudice to others (FCRC 
1996:3.50). 
Short of the non-binding Compact, the Commission found no way 
to institutionalise these roles and norms. They establish a social 
agenda, the responsibility for which lies in large part with civil society. 
This point is discussed in the conclusion, highlighting the role of many 
private institutions and processes in the implementation of the 
Constitution. 
Accountability 
Understandably, most of the negotiations over the Constitution and 
much of the discussion since its adoption have focused on its ethnic 
dimensions. Consequently, not much attention has been paid to one of 
the major objectives of the Constitution, particularly as recommended 
by the Reeves Commission, which in tum built upon the 
recommendations of the Citizens Constitutional Forum and the joint 
submission of the NFP-FLP. This objective is to enhance the 
accountability of the government; to ensure clean and honest 
government and officials; and to promote parliamentary as well as 
public participation in the processes of decision making and 
supervision of the conduct of government. Various measures have 
been adopted for this purpose: Section 17 4 requires freedom of 
information legislation; Section 156 requires a Code of Conduct to 
regulate the behaviour and conduct of politicians and senior officials, 
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in order to ensure integrity and honesty; Section 74(3) promotes an 
increased role of parliamentary back benchers through sector standing 
committees; and Section 42 strengthens the office of the Ombudsman 
and establishes the Human Rights Commission. 
It could be argued that despite these provisions there might be less 
scrutiny and supervision of government under the new Constitution, 
as the leaders of all the key political parties are in most instances likely 
to be in the cabinet. Various factors suggest why there is likely to be 
less of the traditional type of accountability than before. For a start, 
there will be a lesser role for the opposition, or more accurately, the 
opposition will not be able to play an effective role. No party may 
accept clear responsibility for government policy, since this would 
entail blaming its partners. The electorate may not be offered a clear 
choice; and even if it is, the platform on which a party may have 
fought the election may need to be modified in cabinet to produce a 
consensus. Decision making may become less open, being made in the 
secrecy of the cabinet, while at the same time being protected from 
scrutiny by the principle of collective responsibility. Finally, because 
all major political parties may, at some point in the future, be in the 
cabinet the effectiveness of backbenchers may decrease, especially if 
party procedures for expulsion of its members are invoked or are 
threatened to be invoked. 
The new mechanisms for participation and accountability 
introduced by the Constitution, if properly implemented, will to some 
extent ��ake up for the loss of accountability that may emerge over 
time as the new arrangements for multiparty government are 
implemented. However, it is unlikely that they will be sufficient by 
themselves. It is necessary to reflect on the new arrangements to 
consider how the political process itself can be modified to enhance 
accountability. The following measures would help towards, and some 
are essential for, effective accountability. 
Political parties play an enhanced role under the new Constitution. 
Unless the parties are well organised and are themselves democratic 
and accountable, the chances of wider parliamentary or executive 
accountability are slim. The Reeves Commission probably overrated 
the stability and vibrancy of political parties in Fiji when it said that it 
believed that 'the party system is deeply embedded in the political 
culture' (FCRC 1996:2.75; for a critique, see Ghai 1997a:155-6) . For 
either that reason or for its general conservatism in legal policy, the 
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Commission rejected the proposal of the NFP and FLP that the 
Constitution should provide for the regulation of political parties. 
Perhaps Parliament could now be persuaded to enact appropriate 
legislation. 
A particular problem regarding the role of political parties is that 
under Section 71(1) (h) a political party can disqualify any of its 
parliamentary members from their seat in the House by the simple 
expedient of expelling them from the party. The only exception to this 
wide rule is if the member was expelled for action taken by them in 
their capacity as a member of a parliamentary committee, in which 
case they retain their parliamentary seat even though no longer a 
member of that party. As section 71 is formulated, MPs are not 
protected against expulsion for their views on the floor of the House. 
However, freedom of expression and the acceptance of dissent by MPs 
are particularly necessary under the new arrangements. Another way 
to deal with party intolerance is firm legislation to regulate the process 
and procedure of political parties, which was urged on the 
Commission by both the NFP and FLP. 
There are other ways too in which backbenchers can help in the 
supervision of the executive. The role of parliamentary select 
committees, to cover the scrutiny of the administration and of Bills 
and subsidiary legislation, can be a vital factor in creating an active 
role for backbenchers. No minister can be a member of a select 
committee, which means not only that the committees should be more 
independent of the government, but also that its members, 
particularly the chair, should develop their own expertise in order to 
be more effective. The select committees can also enhance public 
participation in supervision as well as policymaking by, for example, 
holding public hearings and consultations, giving a platform to 
individuals, trade unions, non-governmental organisations and other 
groups to make submissions to them on government policies and 
legislative proposals. These hearings should be open to the public and 
should be broadcast. Of course, if the committees are to discharge 
their responsibilities effectively they must be supplied with the 
necessary resources, including training. This in turn requires that some 
of the conventions of the traditional Westminster system need to be 
modified, as in the Standing Orders, or rules of party discipline in 
Parliament, in recognition of the significantly new system set up by 
the Constitution. 
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Public participation in law making can also be enhanced through 
changes in the process of law making. As is customary in many 
countries, a consultative paper containing an explanation and 
justification should precede legislative proposals. The paper can be 
used by all interested parties as the basis by which consultations are 
held. Ample time should be allowed for public comments. The 
government should set up machinery to review these comments and 
should be open to the revision of the policy accordingly. It may be 
argued that this process would slow down law making-but this may 
be precisely its virtue, for laws made with deliberation and after full 
consultation not only result in more acceptable laws, but also more 
effective laws. 
Then there is the role of the Leader of the Opposition. What role 
they play will depend greatly on whether there is a party with 
substantial public and parliamentary support which is willing to forgo 
its participation in the government and to assume the role of the 
opposition. The formal role of the Leader of the Opposition is not 
much different from that under the 1970 Constitution. For example, 
under Section 64(1) (c) the Leader of the Opposition nominates 8 
members of the Senate; under Section 132(1), the Leader of the 
Opposition has to be consulted on the appointment of the Chief 
Justice; under Sections 75(3)(4) and 78(8) respectively, the Leader of 
the Opposition must be consulted on the Constituency Boundaries and 
Electoral Commissions. In addition, the functions given to the Leader 
of the Opposition under the Standing Orders would presumably 
continue, as would the resources provided to the office for the 
discharge of its responsibilities. While it is important for the objectives 
of the Constitution that all major ethnic groups should be in the 
cabinet, it is not necessary that all major parties should also be in the 
cabinet. Indeed, it could be argued that the objective of honest 
government, which is effectively accountable to Parliament and the 
public, needs an effective Leader of the Opposition. Moreover, in 
keeping with the multiethnic aspirations of the Constitution it is 
important that the opposition party strives to include all ethnic groups 
so that criticisms are not seen, nor can they be dismissed, as merely 
ethnically motivated. The salience of this issue was highlighted in the 
aftermath of the 1999 general elections, when an ethnically based 
party emerged as the principal opposition to a multiethnic government. 
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However, above all else there is a challenge to civil society to 
ensure fair policies by, as well as accountability of, government. Social 
and non-governmental organisations should follow the conduct of 
government and proceedings in Parliament, they should provide 
audits of departments and parastatal bodies, use reports of the 
Auditor-General to raise questions about the probity of government, 
ensure that the Freedom of Information legislation is put to good use, 
that education about human rights is disseminated to the public, and 
that they supplement the work of the Ombudsman and the Human 
Rights Commission in appropriate ways. They have to highlight 
arbitrariness and corruption within government when it occurs. An 
informed and concerned citizenry is the ultimately the best safeguard 
against these practices. No democracy can function or survive without 
their vigilance. 
Conclusion 
Constitutional provisions are a mix of rules, norms and institutions. 
Perhaps the easiest part of implementation is the setting up of 
institutions. It is much harder to ensure that institutions and their 
office holders follow the norms that have been established. Much 
depends on the balance between the institutions of the executive and 
the institutions of control and accountability. Some assistance can be 
had from the rules; some rules are more likely to generate the results 
desired of them, others less so. For example, it is generally said that 
electoral laws are very efficacious, for politicians make an effort to 
understand them and are influenced in the pursuit of power by the 
incentives or disincentives provided by them (Sartori 1968), a view 
which had much influence with the Reeves Commission. The 
implementation of a constitution also depends on the commitment of 
citizens to its values and the ability of civic groups to mobilise in 
support of its objectives. The dominance of ethnic consciousness can 
have a major impact on how the constitution operates, particularly its 
electoral laws; and a rights ideology is particularly hard to inculcate, 
for the outrage that might otherwise be felt at the violation of rights is 
channelled into building ethnic hostilities. A constitution does not, as a 
rule, break down if its norms and values are not honoured; rather, it 
then works in quite different, and perverse, ways from that originally 
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envisaged and desired (Ghai 1997b). This analysis suggests that there 
are no guarantees that the 1997 Constitution of Fiji Islands will achieve 
its goals. 
While the 1997 Constitution represents a consensus, it does not 
have universal approval. The terms of reference of the review 
represented agreement between the government and the opposition as 
to the future direction for the governance and development of Fiji. The 
process by which the Constitution was made ensured the careful 
consideration of all alternatives. It was based on the unanimous 
recommendations of the Reeves Commission, on which there were 
nominees of the two major communities who pursued the interests of 
both their community as well as that of Fiji as a whole. The Great 
Council of Chiefs sanctioned it. It was adopted unanimously by 
Parliament. Most have welcomed it as being best able to tackle Fiji's 
contemporary problems. 
The Constitution provides a framework and institutions. These 
seek to direct policymaking and the manner of the exercise of state 
power, but they cannot by themselves determine how politics will be 
conducted. The Constitution may be hard to operate without goodwill 
and flexibility, as it is based on compromises, balances, and even 
contradictions. There will be need for frequent negotiations. It is now 
the obligation and responsibility of all involved in the process, and 
particularly politicians, to support the Constitution and to ensure that 
it is implemented in the spirit that animates it. A particularly heavy 
responsibility lies on political parties. 
Nonetheless, unless public attitudes and practices support a 
constitution, there is no guarantee that its purposes will materialise. 
Constitutional provisions are dependent on wider community 
commitment and practices; they depend on the view the public takes 
of the values the Constitution seeks to promote. Political and religious 
leaders must behave responsibly, promoting tolerance of and respect 
for other communities. Any person, and even more so a leader, who 
seeks to inflame racial animosity is in gross violation of the 
Constitution. While there is of course a limited role for the law in 
establishing these norms and values, it is, in the final instance, Fiji 
Islanders who must exercise their rights of citizenship to ensure the 
accountability of government and the observance by leaders of the 
spirit of the Constitution. 
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The prospects for the success of the Constitution are promising, 
especially in the aftermath of the 1999 general elections. In the near 
future there is bound to emerge be a new set of leaders from within 
Fiji's communities. These leaders are likely to have studied together 
and forged some kind of friendship during their student days. Many 
of them will enjoy the multiethnic and cosmopolitan nature of Fiji 
society. Moreover, the process of the review of the 1990 Constitution 
and the adoption of the 1997 Constitution have produced a new 
understanding of the problems facing the country. The awareness of 
the social, economic and political costs of the coups is now clear. 
Public support for inter-ethnic equity and social justice has thus 
grown. At the same time, the imperatives of globalisation are 
incompatible with a return to some form of narrow ethnicism. Further, 
the demography of Fiji is changing, to the clear advantage to 
indigenous Fijians. This should make indigenous Fijian leaders more 
relaxed about the political process, regardless of electoral and 
parliamentary rules. Perhaps most importantly, there is a palpable 
pride among key leaders, their supporters and people at large at 
having achieved a fair and popular constitution in difficult 
circumstances, and perhaps, as a result, a commitment to making Fiji 
as the world should be. 
Endnote 
1. This chapter was written before the 1999 general elections, being 
based on the inaugural Citizens Constitutional Forum 'Constitution 
Matters' Lecture, held on 27 August 1998 at the University of the 
South Pacific, Suva, Fiji. The chapter was not revised in light of the 
outcome of the elections, in large part because the results have 
reinforced the salience of the analysis contained in the chapter. The 
author is grateful to the Committee on Research and Conference 
Grants of the University of Hong Kong for a grant. He also wishes 
to thank Peter Larmour for valuable comments on a draft of the 
chapter. 
CHAPTER 3 
F ij i 's 1 999 general elections: 
outcomes and prospects 
Satendra Prasad 
Introduction 
For Fiji, the May 1999 general elections have been exceptionally 
significant and historic. 1  They were the first elections held under the 
provisions of the 1997 constitutional settlement, which was a product 
of unprecedented negotiation and compromise between the main 
political actors in Fiji (Ghai, this volume). As a consequence, the 
outcome of the elections provides some basis for interpreting the 
validity of certain key assumptions underpinning the 1997 Constitution. 
At the same time, the outcome of the 1999 elections can also provide 
some indication of the commitment of different political actors to the 
1997 constitutional settlement, in part because the 1999 general 
elections were the first since 1987 in which there was a real possibility 
of removing the dominant political party-in this case, the Soqosoqo Ni 
Vakavulewa Ni Taukei (SVT)-from power. Finally, the 1999 general 
elections were held in an environment where successive governments 
had, since 1986, made strong commitments to pursuing policies of 
structural adjustment and trade liberalisation (Sepehri and Akram­
Lodhi, this volume) . The outcome of the 1999 elections can provide some 
guide as to the extent to which these commitments have been accepted 
by the peoples of Fiji, which will undoubtedly affect Fiji's political and 
economic prospects as it negotiates global economic challenges. 
These aspects of the 1999 general elections have a bearing on some 
of the issues raised in other contributions to this collection. As a 
consequence, Fiji's 1999 general elections may help us assess how 
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some of the issues raised in this collection are likely to play themselves 
out over the next decade. In part, this is because a reflection on the 
outcome of the elections and an evaluation of some of the key voting 
trends that were witnessed may provide clues which facilitate an 
understanding of how dominant structures of ethnicity and class may 
effect the developmental prospects of this small, vulnerable and 
globalising economy. It is in this light that this chapter discusses the 
outcome of the 1999 general elections in Fiji. Following this 
introduction, the next section examines how some key features of the 
1997 Constitution may have affected the 1999 elections in ways other 
than those of electoral processes. The chapter then discusses the main 
political parties that engaged in the 1999 election and examines the 
strategies of the parties in light of the voting system that was used. 
The process that led to the formation of the Cabinet is also examined. 
In the context of these outcomes the chapter critically assesses the 
success of the alternative vote (AV) system, particularly in terms of its 
capacity to foster a more multiethnic politics in Fiji. The chapter 
concludes by examining whether the new Government will be able to 
respond to the challenge of the future in light of its constitutional 
obligations. 
The 1997 Constitution and the 1999 genera l  elections 
During the review of the 1990 Constitution much of the debate on the 
set of possible constitutional arrangements capable of dealing with 
ethnic divisions in Fiji came to revolve around three principal issues. 
The first issue was whether there should be a guarantee of indigenous 
Fijian advantage in the allocation of parliamentary seats, so as to allay 
any possible fears about the dilution of indigenous Fijian interests. The 
second issue followed: what was an acceptable ratio between 
ethnically reserved, 'communal' parliamentary seats and non­
reserved, 'open' parliamentary seats? The third issue tied the other 
two issues together: what was to be the electoral process under which 
members of parliament were to be elected to open and reserved seats? 
As will be seen, these issues had an impact on the particular strategies 
used by political parties during the course of the 1999 elections, and in 
so doing helped shape the outcome of the elections. 
The Fiji Constitution Review Commission (FCRC) argued that 
particularly but not exclusively in light of the events of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s it was necessary to move Fiji gradually but decisively 
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away from the 'politics of race' . To that end, the FCRC recommended 
that the predominant feature of the electoral system which was to 
emerge out of the constitutional review should be that parliamentary 
seats would be 'open': that is, all voters residing in a particular 
constituency would be free to contest and vote in an election. The 
FCRC therefore proposed that Fiji's parliament have 12 seats reserved 
for indigenous Fijians; 10 seats reserved for Indo-Fijians; 2 seats 
reserved for 'general electors', that is to say those voters who were 
neither indigenous Fijian nor Indo-Fijian; and 1 seat reserved for the 
Rotuman community. Thus, the FCRC recommended that 25 
parliamentary seats be reserved on the basis of ethnicity. Concurrently, 
the FCRC recommended that there be 45 open seats. The FCRC argued 
that the proposed ratio between open and reserved seats would 
ensure that political parties contesting elections would mainly focus 
their attention and hence their political strategies on winning the open 
seats, and indeed the FCRC' s recommendations represented a major 
window of opportunity for Fiji to reduce the ethnic orientation of its 
politics. 
However, the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee (JPSC), which 
was charged with developing a parliamentary consensus on the 
constitutional amendments to emerge out of the review process, 
rejected this ratio. Indeed, the JPSC favoured a reversal of the ratio of 
open to reserved parliamentary seats. The JPSC thus proposed that 23 
parliamentary seats be reserved for indigenous Fijians, 19 parliamentary 
seats be reserved for Indo-Fijians, 3 parliamentary seats be reserved 
for general electors, and 1 parliamentary seat be reserved for the 
Rotuman community. The JPSC further proposed that in addition to 46 
reserved parliamentary seats there be 25 open parliamentary seats. 
The reversal in the ratio of open parliamentary seats to reserved 
parliamentary seats clearly favoured those political parties which 
were organised on the basis of ethnicity, and thus apparently 
compromised an explicit objective of the FCRC: namely, movement 
away from the 'politics of race'. In this light, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the main political parties in the JPSC were the SVT and 
the National Federation Party (NFP) . Both are almost exclusively 
organised on the basis of ethnicity, with the SVT having been a key 
political actor amongst the indigenous Fijian community during the 
1990s and the NFP having been a key political actor amongst the Indo­
Fijian community since the 1960s. At the same time, as will be seen the 
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domination of reserved parliamentary seats in the allocation of total 
parliamentary seats had a critically important yet possibly unexpected 
impact on the strategies employed by the political parties during the 
1999 general elections. 
Despite an allocation of open to reserved parliamentary seats 
which favoured political parties organised on the basis of ethnicity, the 
1997 Constitution did introduce an additional mechanism which had 
as its explicit rationale the objective of reducing the role of ethnicity in 
Fiji's politics. This mechanism is power sharing. Under the 1997 
Constitution, all parties having 10 per cent or more of the membership 
of parliament are guaranteed representation in the executive arm of 
government, the cabinet. Membership in cabinet was to be in proportion 
to the overall number of parliamentary seats held. This provision of 
the 1997 Constitution, which represented a major departure away 
from the approach espoused by the FCRC, was designed to ensure 
that political parties would co-operate after the general elections. 
The 1999 general elections were conducted using an AV system. 
Under Fiji's AV system, voters must rank their preferences amongst 
the candidates for both open and reserved parliamentary seats. If no 
candidate secures an absolute majority of the first preferences expressed 
by the voters, those candidates at bottom of the poll are eliminated 
and the second preferences of those voters who voted for candidates 
at the bottom of the poll are counted. If no candidate secures an 
absolute majority of first and second preferences, the process is repeated 
until an absolute majority is secured for one candidate. 
Despite its apparent complexity, and the concomitant possibility 
that voters would not really understand the electoral system that they 
were using, the AV system was nevertheless adopted in order to 
overcome the excessively ethnic orientation of the elections which had 
been conducted under both the 1990 and the 1970 Constitutions. 
Granted, the processes at work in mobilising votes under the AV 
system for reserved and open seats were likely to be different. In 
reserved seats, it was to be expected that political mobilisation would 
follow those processes witnessed in elections under the 1990 and 1970 
Constitutions; namely, the main parties would emphasise ethnic 
interests and make appeals to 'ethnic unity'. However, for open seats it 
was hoped that the AV system would facilitate the deployment of less 
ethnically exclusive strategies by giving clear incentives to political 
parties in the pursuit of power to seek out votes from a multiplicity of 
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ethnic communities (Chai, this volume) . Indeed, the FCRC envisaged 
that the introduction of the AV system would in the long term promote 
the emergence and consolidation of multiethnic parties, while in the 
short term the introduction of the AV system would facilitate the 
emergence of cooperative arrangements and alliances between 
ethnically based parties (FCRC 1996) . Thus, the promotion of inter­
ethnic cooperation was an explicit aim of the AV system. Through the 
promotion of inter-ethnic cooperation, the electoral system was to have 
a key role in moving Fiji gradually but decisively away from the 
'politics of race' and towards an underlying goal of the 1997 
Constitution, namely the promotion of racial harmony and national 
unity (Prasad 1999) . Thus, while the choice of the voting system clearly 
has had an impact on the outcome of the 1997 elections, assessing the 
overall consequences of the introduction of the AV system is more 
complex, in large part because the assumptions that have underpinned 
its choice as a method of electing parliamentary representatives have 
had a significant effect on the final results of the election. 
Clearly, the provisions of the 1997 Constitution have had a deeper 
effect on the political processes underpinning the1999 general 
elections than a first glance at its stipulated electoral procedures might 
appear to indicate. In particular, the ratio of open to reserved 
parliamentary seats, the statutes governing the formation of the 
executive arm of government, and the electoral system have effected 
the outcome. This effect however has not been linear; rather, it has 
been refracted through the strategies of the political parties that 
contested the election. Party strategies and the outcome of the 1999 
general election is the subject of the next section. 
The resu lts of the 1999 general  elections 
The parties 
The main parties that contested the 1999 general elections were the 
1. Soqosoqo Ni Vakavulewa Ni Taukei (SVT) . The SVT was the 
dominant political party to emerge after the coups of 1987. 
Its support was derived almost exclusively from the 
indigenous Fijian community, and it formed the Government 
after both the 1992 and 1994 general elections. The SVT was 
the predominant indigenous Fijian party engaged in the 
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constitutional review process. It was also the central 
indigenous Fijian party in the JPSC, and as such took a large 
measure of responsibility for negotiating the new 
constitution. 
2. National Federation Party (NFP). The NFP was the oldest of 
the parties that contested the 1999 elections, having been 
formed in the 1960s during the agitation for independence. 
Since independence the NFP had remained in opposition, 
deriving its support largely from the Indo-Fijian community. 
It became an exclusively Indo-Fijian party after the 1992 
general elections, when it emerged as the largest Indo-Fijian 
political grouping. After the SVT, the NFP was the key 
player in the JPSC, and as such it also took a large measure 
of the responsibility for the new constitution. 
3. Fijian Association Party (FAP) .  The FAP emerged as a 
parliamentary breakaway from the SVT after the 1992 
elections, when the SVT's Sitiveni Rabuka, leader of the 1987 
coups, and the late Josefata Kamikamica, Finance Minister 
under the military-backed Interim Government and eventual 
founder of the FAP, clashed over who should become prime 
minister. The support base of the FAP is largely concentrated 
among indigenous Fijians from the central and southeastern 
provinces on Viti Levu. 
4. Fiji Labour Party (FLP). The FLP party was created in 1985, 
with strong support from the Fiji Trades Union Congress. It 
won the 1987 general elections in coalition with the NFP, 
under the leadership of the late Timoci Bavadra. The victory 
of the FLP-NFP coalition in 1987 led to two military coups . 
The coalition was ruptured by the 1992 elections. In both the 
1992 and 1994 elections the FLP won a minority of the seats 
reserved for the Indo-Fijian community. Nonetheless, despite 
drawing a large measure of support from within the Indo­
Fijian community, of all the political parties only the FLP has 
maintained some semblance of cross-community support 
and multiethnic orientation since the 1987 coups. 
5. Veitokani Ni Lewenivanua Vakaristo (VLV). This exclusively 
indigenous Fijian party evolved during the lead up to the 
1999 general elections. It draws its support and enthusiasm 
from a powerful segment within the Methodist Church. 
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6. Party of National Unity (PANU).  The PANU was in some 
senses a successor to the defunct All National Congress 
(ANC) . It emerged in the run up to the 1999 elections. Like 
the ANC, the PANU draws its support mainly from 
indigenous Fijians in western Viti Levu. 
7. Nationalist Vanua Takolavo Party (NVTLP). The NVTLP is the 
successor to the Fijian Nationalist Party. Like its predecessor, 
the NVTLP has developed a strongly nationalistic, if not 
indeed openly chauvinistic, indigenous Fijian platform, 
which is explicit in its anti-Indo-Fijian agenda. The NVTLP 
finds its main support in the central and southern provinces 
on Viti Levu. 
8. United General Party (UGP) . The UGP sought to represent 
the interests of the 'general electors', that is to say that 
portion of the population who were neither Indo-Fijian nor 
indigenous Fijian, and who are predominantly the 
descendents of European and Chinese migrants. 
In addition to these parties, a large number of smaller parties 
emerged in the lead-up to the elections. Moreover, a number of 
independent candidates stood for elected office. 
However, despite the multiplicity of parties, in the 1999 general 
elections the primary contest was between two groupings of parties: a 
more formal SVT /NFP /UGP coalition; and a looser, FLP /FAP /PANU 
combination. Both groupings consisted of individual parties that 
presented themselves as 'mainstream', capable of providing 
leadership to their supporters within the indigenous Fijian and Indo­
Fijian communities and capable of entering into 'deals' on behalf of 
their supporters. At the same time, both groupings collectively had a 
reasonable degree of internal discipline, and as such could be treated 
as 'unitary actors', able to produce a cohesive pre-election alliance 
with the capability to form a plausible government. 
The SVT /NFP /UGP coalition consisted of what might be 
considered the 'mainstream' ethnic parties. The coalition was 
consolidated during the period of the constitutional review, when the 
SVT and the NFP, the bulk of the coalition, worked closely together, 
and was considerably strengthened after the passing of the 
Constitution Amendment Act in 1997. During the elections, both the 
leaders of the SVT and the NFP, Rabuka and Jai Ram Reddy 
respectively, were correctly projected as the principal driving force 
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behind the revised constitution, having undertaken the principal 
negotiations, rallied the support of the elected members of the two 
ethnic groups for the constitutional settlement (Robertson, this 
volume), received the endorsement of the Great Council of Chiefs, and 
ensured the implementation of the necessary provisions of the new 
Constitution in the run up to the 1999 general elections. As such the 
two leaders were able to enter into pre-electoral agreements of 
importance to the two main ethnic groups in Fiji. From such a 
perspective, it is not surprising that ethnic unity became a principal 
theme of their campaigns and a key means by which they sought to 
mobilise political support. Economic issues, on which the parties 
largely agreed, such as the need to push ahead with policies of 
structural adjustment, were relegated to a secondary status. 
This contrasted with the FLP /FAP /PANU combination. The 
principal source of strength for this combination was the FLP, which 
had a pre-existing support base amongst Indo-Fijian sugarcane 
farmers and a narrower, but nonetheless significant, multiethnic 
support base amongst the trade unions. By way of contrast, the FAP's 
appeal was more regionally specific and was also perhaps apparent 
amongst a comparatively small segment of the liberal indigenous 
Fijian middle class (Ratuva, this volume). Similarly, the PANU was 
also a regional party. Thus, within this combination, and with the 
exception of the FLP, the other parties were less unitary, with weaker 
leadership and less unified platforms. This combination thus reflected 
the pattern of a looser, 'post-election' arrangement. 
The FLP /FAP /PANU combination concentrated its campaign 
upon economic and social issues, including low rates of economic 
growth, declining investment rates, and high unemployment (Sepehri 
and Akram-Lodhi, this volume). The FLP's emphasis on these issues 
was understandable, given both its origins and its support base. At the 
same time, both the PANU and the FAP also identified with these 
issues because economic stagnation and the impact of unemployment 
are, in Fiji, experienced more intensely in the urban areas and on Viti 
Levu, both of which served as the principal geographical base of 
support of the two parties. Notwithstanding a common overall 
agenda, there were clear policy differences between the FAP, the 
PANU and the FLP. The FLP demonstrated a consistently hostile 
attitude to policies of structural adjustment, while the FAP and the 
PANU were more sympathetic to the need to continue the structural 
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adjustment process even as they sought to reassure those that had lost 
out in the process that they would have recourse to social safety nets. 
However, despite these differences, in their emphasis on economic 
issues the second combination could be said to have been more class 
based, although it must be admitted that organisationally it remained 
a combination of three largely ethnically based parties. 
The 1999 general elections thus displayed a strong undercurrent of 
the tensions caused by alternative forms of political mobilisation. On 
the one hand there were two primarily ethnic parties, the SVT and the 
NFP, which had nonetheless been able to negotiate a new constitutional 
arrangement. On the other hand there was a more class based political 
momentum, which could be associated with the FLP-led combination, 
even though the organisational basis for this form of mobilisation was 
largely based upon ethnic groups. As will be seen, the impact of these 
factors will have been felt in the outcome of the election. 
Serious concerns were raised in advance of the elections about the 
capacity of the electoral authorities to administer elections under such 
a complex electoral system. Some doubts were also aired about the 
fairness of elections given the complexity of the AV system. It is 
however possible to assess the fairness of elections, using a set of 
agreed guidelines. These guidelines include: the independence of the 
electoral authorities; the respect for the law by the election 
administrators; the transparency and accuracy of the administration of 
the elections; and the 'voter-friendly' nature of the administration of 
the election (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 1998) . 
With the exception of the final point, both the peoples of Fiji and 
independent observers have generally regarded the 1999 general 
elections as having fulfilled these guidelines. Thus, the result has been 
seen as being by and large legitimate, and not capable of being 
challenged. 
Results in reserved seats 
As agreed by the JPSC and embedded within the 1997 Constitution, in 
the 1999 general elections there were 23 parliamentary seats reserved 
for indigenous Fijians ('Fijian communal seats'), 19 parliamentary 
seats reserved for lndo-Fijians ('Indian communal seats'), 3 
parliamentary seats reserved for general electors, and 1 parliamentary 
seat reserved for the Rotuman community. 
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Considering first those seats reserved for the indigenous Fijian 
community, overall the SVT received 38 per cent of the first 
preferences, while the FAP and VLV both received 18 per cent of the 
first preferences. The PANU and the NVTLP received 10 and 9 per 
cent of first preferences respectively. However, as a consequence of the 
AV electoral system, the distribution of first preferences and the 
distribution of parliamentary seats were very different. Table 3.1 
demonstrates the distribution of parliamentary seats amongst those 
parties that contested seats reserved for the indigenous Fijian 
community. As is demonstrated in Table 3.1, while the SVT received 38 
per cent of the first preferences, this was only translated into 5 
parliamentary seats, some 22 per cent of the total. The FAP, which 
received 18 per cent of the first preferences, won 9 parliamentary 
seats, some 39 per cent of the total, while the VLV, which also received 
18 per cent of the first preferences won only 13 per cent of the 
parliamentary seats. 
Turning to the seats reserved for other communities, amongst the 
Indo-Fijian community the FLP obtained 66 per cent of the first 
preferences, while the NFP received 32 per cent of the first preferences. 
Again however the distribution of first preferences was very different 
from the distribution of parliamentary seats: all 19 seats reserved for 
the lndo-Fijian community were won by FLP. Finally, the UGP won 
one of the 3 parliamentary seats reserved for the general electors; the 
other two seats reserved for the general electors as well as the seat 
reserved for the Rotuman community were won by independent 
candidates. 
Examining the results for the reserved parliamentary seats three 
points in particular stand out. The first point was the overwhelming 
support for the FLP amongst the Indo-Fijian electorate, which, by 
winning a clear majority in all seats reserved for the Indo-Fijian 
Table 3 . 1  1 999 election results for 'Fijian communal seats' 
SVT 5 
VLV 3 
FAP 9 
Independent 1 
PANU 4 
NVTLP 1 
Tota l number of seats 2 3  
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community, effectively wiped out the NFP. The success of the FLP can 
be attributed to its broad appeal amongst the Indo-Fijian community 
throughout the country: unlike 1987 and 1992, the FLP was successful 
in both rural and urban constituencies. Clearly, the effort to focus its 
policies upon the interests of smallholder Indo-Fijian farmers and 
urban working classes by articulating an anti-structural adjustment 
agenda worked. In a sense then although the use of reserved seats was 
expected to foster appeals to ethnic identity, in the case of the FLP 
voter choices may have been governed by factors other than ethnic 
identity alone. 
The second point to stand out from the results for the reserved 
parliamentary seats was the extent to which provincial loyalties 
appeared to strongly affect voting outcomes within the indigenous 
Fijian community. The SVT' s support was quite strong in Cakaudrove 
and Kadavu. Similarly, the PANU won all its reserved parliamentary 
seats in Ba. The FAP also won all of its reserved parliamentary seats 
on Viti Levu. Thus, no indigenous Fijian political party in the 1999 
general election was able to attract a wide base of support across the 
rural and urban regions of Fiji; provincialism appeared to overwrite 
the ideological appeals of the different political parties. Again, 
although the use of reserved seats was expected to facilitate the use of 
ethnic identity as a tool of political mobilisation, in the case of the 
indigenous Fijian electorate voter choices appeared to be governed by 
factors other than ethnic identity alone. This in turn helps explain, to a 
degree, the collapse of the ruling SVT, which won only 5 of the 23 
parliamentary seats reserved for the indigenous Fijian community. 
The third point to stand out from the results for the reserved 
parliamentary seats is more speculative. It may be the case that the 
policies pursued by the SVT while in power, both in the field of 
economic development and in its support for the consociational 
settlement between Fiji's ethnic communities (Chai, this volume), 
contributed to a strengthening of provincial loyalties and a weakening 
of the role played by ethnicity in political mobilisation. The policies of 
structural adjustment pursued by the SVT while in power have had 
geographically uneven effects both within and between Fiji's ethnic 
communities. Thus, different provinces are differentially positioned 
within the national political economy, which may have fostered a 
provincialism which has been simmering for a very long time and which 
to an extent may have been able to override appeals to ethnic unity. 
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At the same time, both Cakaudrove and Kadavu, where the SVT 
won decisive victories, are largely populated by indigenous Fijians. In 
these provinces there is little interaction between the two main ethnic 
communities and while there was clear support for the SVT this may 
not have represented support for one of its key policy initiatives, the 
consociational settlement, because in these provinces the SVT was, 
perhaps simplistically, seen as the party of indigenous Fijians. By way 
of contrast, in the western provinces of Viti Levu the PANU and the 
FAP did well. These provinces are far more ethnically mixed and there 
is considerable economic, social and political interaction between the 
ethnic communities. In these regions, therefore, the electoral 
arrangement reached between the PANU and the FAP on the one hand 
and the FLP on the other hand was perhaps more acceptable to the 
indigenous Fijian electorate, in part because of an acceptance of the 
need for a consociational settlement. If such an argument were 
accurate, the acceptance of the need for a consociational settlement 
would in all likelihood have weakened the electoral usefulness of an 
appeal to ethnic identity. In order to assess the veracity of these 
speculations there is a need for further scrutiny. In order to do this it is 
necessary to assess the results of the 1999 election in the 25 open 
seats. 
Results in open seats 
The results for the 25 open parliamentary seats are summarised in 
Table 3.2. Table 3.2 demonstrates the dominance of the FLP in the 
electoral contest for the open parliamentary seats, winning 72 per cent 
of the seats. The SVT, the FLP's nearest rival in the contest for the open 
parliamentary seats, could only win 12 per cent of the seats. 
The results presented in Table 3.2 have some bearing on 
understanding whether the AV electoral system was capable of 
promoting the broader objectives envisaged by the FCRC: namely, 
increased inter-ethnic cooperation between and within political parties. 
In only four of the open seats did the parties win on the first 
preference. Three of these seats were won by the FLP, while one was 
won by the SVT. In order to demonstrate then that the AV system 
encouraged inter-ethnic cooperation in the short term it would be 
necessary to show that parties engaged in electoral contests for the 21 
open seats which were not won on the basis of first preferences were 
able to come to arrangements concerning the 'sharing' of preferences. 
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Table 3.2 1 999 election results in the open seats 
FLP 
SVT 
FAP 
I ndependent 
NVTLP1 
1 8  
3 
UGP 1 
Tota l number of seats 2 5  
Note: 1 This seat has been subject t o  a recount following an appeal to the High Court by 
the FAP candidate. 
This in turn makes it necessary to think about the extent and type of 
cooperation between parties. In short, it becomes necessary to evaluate 
the strategies of Fiji's political parties during the 1999 elections. 
A first step in evaluating the strategies of Fiji's political parties in 
the open seats is to evaluate the ethnic composition of the open seats. 
As has already been demonstrated in the reserved seats, the FLP' s 
support amongst Indo-Fijians was overwhelming. This can be 
contrasted with the regional concentration of support for indigenous 
Fijian parties, and particularly the SVT, the PANU, the FAP and the 
VLV. Nonetheless, it is possible that while voter choice for the reserved 
seats may have been determined by factors other than ethnicity, for the 
open seats ethnicity may have remained the dominant logic governing 
voter choice. In order to gauge whether this was in fact the case it is 
necessary, as a first step, to assess the ethnic composition of the open 
seats that were contested. 
The Constituency Boundaries Commission defined the boundaries 
of all seats, including the open seats. In defining the open seats the 
Commission had to take into regard geographical factors as well as the 
ethnic composition of the constituency. This was because in order for 
the open seats to work effectively under the AV system there was a 
need to ensure a reasonable ethnic mix in each of the open seats. 
Despite this however in 14 open seats the proportion of the voting 
population attributable to one ethnic group exceeded 60 per cent. Of 
these 14 seats, in 8 the indigenous Fijian share of the voting population 
exceeded 60 per cent of the total voters. In these the SVT did well, 
winning three seats. At the other end of the spectrum, in 6 of the open 
seats the Indo-Fijian share of the voting population was in excess of 60 
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per cent of the total voters. The FLP won all 6 of these seats, and 
indeed won 3 on the basis of first preferences. The AV system may 
thus have had a curious effect on these 14 open seats. Despite the fact 
that in the reserved seats voter choice may have been guided by 
factors other than ethnicity, in 14 of the open seats parties which 
focused on winning a large majority of the votes of the dominant 
ethnic community had an apparently reasonable chance of winning 
outright. These open seats may thus have witnessed voter choice 
being guided by ethnicity. 
In the remaining 11 seats the share of the population between the 
two dominant ethnic communities was relatively more even: no 
community had more than 60 per cent of the electorate in any of these 
seats. It can be argued that the real contest in the 1999 general 
elections was in these 11 seats, because it was only in these seats that 
the allocation of preferences required that parties rooted in one ethnic 
community appeal to voters in other ethnic communities. The need to 
appeal to voters across the ethnic divide necessitated cooperation 
between parties, as envisaged by the FCRC, and led to pre-electoral 
arrangements between the political parties. Thus, as has already been 
noted, the SVT, the UGP and the NFP entered into a firm pre-election 
coalition. The FLP however operated somewhat differently. The FLP, 
the FAP and the PANU fielded candidates against each other in the 
open seats. Indeed, in several seats the competition between the FAP 
and the FLP candidates was particularly intense. The preference­
swapping deal arranged between the FLP, the FAP and the PANU was 
thus reserved for second preferences, in order to capitalise on the 
regional concentration of indigenous Fijian support for both the FAP 
and the PANU and more general Indo-Fijian support for the FLP. 
Working in this way not only denied the SVT /UGP /NFP candidates 
chances of gaining a majority on the first count, it also increased the 
FLP /FAP /PANU chances of winning on second and later counts. 
Overall then the FAP, the PANU and the FLP parties worked more 
realistically as a 'vote-pooling block' than did the SVT /NFP /UGP 
coalition. 
In addition to the advantages derived from the preference sharing 
arrangement and a majority of Indo-Fijian support, the FLP is 
estimated to have won in excess of 10 per cent of the indigenous Fijian 
vote outright in at least 6 of the remaining open seats. Thus, the FLP 
was well positioned to win a majority of the open seats where the 
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distribution of the population was relatively even between the two 
main ethnic communities. Given this, it is then not surprising that the 
FLP did very well in these seats. Overall, the FLP won 36 
parliamentary seats out of a total of 71 . 
Two further comments on the election results can be offered. The 
first recalls the point that the AV system was designed to promote 
increased cooperation between parties. Clearly, an examination of the 
results in the open seats shows that the type and level of cooperation 
between parties is crucial to understanding the outcome of the 
election. On this account then the AV system fulfilled its objective, 
albeit in ways which those who had designed the system probably did 
not envisage. The second comment concerns the overall outcome. 
Despite having misgivings about particular aspects of the Constitution, 
the SVT, the NFP, the FLP, the PANU and the FAP all support the 
broad parameters of the Constitution. Votes for these parties therefore 
may be taken to at least translate partially into support for the 
Constitution, and the 1999 elections can be considered to have been a 
national referendum on the Constitution. In this light, the mandate 
received in support of the 1997 Constitution is overwhelming by any 
account. 
Representation in cabinet 
The number of seats won by the FLP gave it the ability to form a 
government on its own. However, the Constitution required that the 
FLP invite other parties to participate in the executive. Table 3.3 
therefore presents the overall distribution of parliamentary seats by 
party, together with the resulting entitlement to cabinet seats as set out 
in the 1997 Constitution, as well as the proportion of cabinet seats 
actually held by individual parties. 
Particularly through its provisions for multiparty government the 
1997 Constitution seeks to institutionalise power sharing amongst 
Fiji's ethnic communities. Broadly, the concept of power sharing has 
been operationalised in the aftermath of the elections, albeit through 
some difficult negotiations and in a manner that is probably somewhat 
different from that envisaged by those who framed the Constitution. 
Initially, power-sharing negotiations focused on the FLP's proposed 
candidate for Prime Minister, its leader Mahendra Chaudhry. At first 
the PAP and the PANU refused to accept an Indo-Fijian as the Prime 
Ministerial candidate. Following the negotiation process, the FAP and 
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the PANU conceded the designation of an Indo-Fijian as Prime Minister 
in exchange for being over-represented in the Cabinet. This outcome 
was designed to allay fears about an Indo-Fijian dominated government. 
It was also a reward for the preference sharing arrangements that gave 
the FLP victory in several open seats. 
In line with constitutional obligations, the Prime Minister-designate 
invited the SVT to become a part of the cabinet. Initially, the SVT 
responded to this invitation favourably. However, the SVT also indicated 
that its participation was to be tied to a number of conditions, over 
which the Prime Minister was not prepared to negotiate (Fiji Times, 20-29 
May 1999) . As a consequence, the SVT is not participating in the cabinet 
even though it has cleared the threshold for cabinet representation. 
A power-sharing executive is likely to act as a safety valve against 
the outright domination of government by a single ethnic group. 
Indeed, this outcome is an implicit objective of the 1997 Constitution. 
However, power sharing at this level may also act in another, possibly 
more important, manner. Power sharing may prevent a single party 
from dominating the policy agenda. As a consequence, while the FLP 
went into the elections on a platform of social and economic justice, it 
is possible that it will not be able to implement the full range of its 
social and economic agenda, given the need to maintain the support of 
other political parties in the executive arm of government. Granted, 
Chapter Five of the 1997 Constitution directs the state to make 
provisions for programs designed 'to achieve for all groups or 
categories of persons who are disadvantaged effective equality of 
Table 3.3 Party representation in Cabinet after the 1 999 elections 
Party Tota l seats in  Per cent Actual per cent of 
Pa r l iament entitlement to Cabi net seats as 
Cab inet seats share of 22 min i sters 
FLP 36 50 59 
FAP 1 0  1 4  1 8  
SVT 8 1 1  0 
VLV 3 8/t 9 
PANU 4 8/t 9 
UGP  2 8/t 0 
NVTLP 2 8/t 0 
Independent and Rotuma 5 8/t 5 
Note: BI t - Below threshold 
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access to education, land, housing, and participation in commerce' 
(Ghai, this volume). Although this commitment is 'non-justiciable', 
were it to be enforced, the neoliberal direction of economic policy that 
came to be associated with the SVT over the past decade would 
certainly come into question. Despite this however the reality of 
power sharing may well result in the FLP's aversion to orthodox 
policies of structural adjustment being diluted to accommodate the 
more pro-liberalisation orientation of its partners in Cabinet, such as 
the VLV and the PAP. 
Reflections on the AV system 
Many commentaries in the local dailies and responses by political 
leaders following the swearing-in of the Cabinet have continued to 
raise concerns about an Indo-Fijian dominated government. After all, 
it was the emergence of Indo-Fijian power in the cabinet that led to the 
coups in 1987. Although public opposition is considerably more muted 
than that which was observed following the FLP-led victory in 1987, it 
remains a cause for concern. Many appear to blame the AV system as 
the primary cause of the downfall of the SVT government and the 
cause of 'disunity' amongst indigenous Fijians. Some further remarks 
about the operation of this system of voting are therefore in order. 
The AV system used in the 1999 general elections was introduced 
in order to generate effective government and effective political 
parties capable of serving national constituencies. At the same time, 
it was argued that the AV system provided the best incentives for 
cooperation between ethnically based political parties (FCRC 1996). 
Moreover, to reinforce the pursuit of inter-ethnic cooperation the JPSC 
tried to back up the strengths of the AV system by introducing 
constitutional provisions for multiparty government. However, the 
AV system did not work as it was thought it would. 
As has already been demonstrated, the political parties that 
contested the 1999 general elections attempted to maximise their 
strength by trying to win reserved seats. However, in trying to win 
such seats, while all the main parties relied upon obtaining support 
from within particular ethnic communities, those that were successful 
may not have used an appeal to ethnic identity as the means of 
obtaining that support. Rather, they may have used other forms of 
identity as the basis of electoral mobilisation. Thus, indigenous Fijian 
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parties relied heavily upon provincial loyalties, while the FLP relied 
heavily upon its support base amongst lndo-Fijian farmers and 
workers. The possible weakness of ethnic politics in the reserved seats 
was not expected of the AV system. 
Paradoxically, in open seats where one ethnic community 
dominated the voter population there was probably a wider implicit 
reliance upon ethnic identity as a central part of political mobilisation. 
This is probably true even as regards the most multiethnic of the major 
parties, the FLP. Granted, the FLP' s capacity to skilfully deploy its 
policy platform meant that its appeal to the Indo-Fijian vote in such 
seats did not have to be couched in ethnic terms. Nonetheless, even 
the FLP did not have to try and increase its support amongst the 
indigenous Fijian community in these seats; it could rely upon its 
support amongst Indo-Fijian farmers and workers to win seats. Such 
an outcome was not what the FCRC had expected of the AV system. 
Moreover, such an outcome is obviously not in the long term interest 
of a class-based party such as the FLP. 
Finally, in those open seats where no one community dominated 
the voter population, cooperation between parties was fostered in the 
form of efforts to share preferences. Thus, the AV system did indeed 
promote increased cooperation between parties. However, the type of 
cooperation between parties is also important to consider. The SVT 
and the NFP, the two principal actors in the constitutional review 
process, entered, along with the UGP, into a formal coalition. The voters 
rejected this. The FLP, on the other hand, entered into an agreement 
with the PANU and the FAP regarding second preferences, and were 
rewarded handsomely. It can thus be cautiously argued that when 
given appropriate alliance structures and incentives, communities in 
Fiji may be willing to vote for parties other than those rooted in their 
own ethnic group. 
However, the depth of the commitment to cross-community politics 
engendered amongst ordinary voters by party strategies designed to 
maximise first and second preferences can be questioned when the 
parties are themselves largely ethnically based. The 1999 general 
elections illustrate the point. Both the groupings were groupings of 
largely ethnically based political parties. To that end, the individual 
parties of these groupings organised their own campaigns. As a 
consequence, interaction between workers and supporters of different 
ethnically based political parties and indeed between voters of different 
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ethnic groups was limited. In this light, it is not surprising that during 
the elections there was little change in the mindset of voters: obviously, 
while the AV system did promote greater cooperation between parties, 
this occurred at the level of the elites who controlled the parties. That 
there was little change in the mindset of voters can be illustrated by the 
pattern of voting. Under the electoral procedures, voters could either 
indicate the political party of their choice or they could register their 
own individual preferences amongst the candidates of those parties. In 
most constituencies, less than 5 per cent of voters exercised their 
individual preferences, which would have demonstrated a greater 
willingness to engage in the messy realities of cross-community politics. 
Thus, the AV system may not have helped consolidate openness to 
multiethnic politics amongst ordinary party workers, supporters and 
voters. As a consequence, the AV system was not really able to break 
down the ethnicisation of politics in Fiji. Indeed, by fostering cooperation 
only amongst elites it may well be the case that the AV system harms 
the prospects for cross-community, ideology-based parties. 
In addition to not working as those who introduced it thought it 
would, the AV has had a clearly unfavourable impact upon the 
principle of proportionality in parliamentary representation. This is 
obviously demonstrated by the parliamentary representation of the 
SVT and the NFP. The SVT received 38 per cent of first preferences 
from within the indigenous Fijian community. This translated into 
only 11 per cent of overall seats in the House of Representatives. The 
NFP received 32 per cent of Indo-Fijian first preferences. This 
translated into no parliamentary seats. It is ironic that both the SVT 
and the NFP, which actively opposed proportional systems of 
parliamentary representation during the review of the constitution, 
would have been better represented in parliament under proportional 
representation. At the same time, the pooling of preferences which 
initially went to smaller, more independent parties and candidates in 
favour of one of the constituent parts of one of the larger party 
groupings may contribute to a loss of confidence in parliamentary 
democracy. Certainly, the AV system has severely weakened the 
parliamentary representation of the more extreme ethnic nationalist 
parties such as the NVTLP, and while a first reaction to such an 
outcome might be to welcome it, it is also necessary to be aware of 
potentially adverse consequences in the longer term should more 
extreme parties become disenfranchised from parliamentary 
representation as a consequence of the AV system. 
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Conclusion: confronting the present and the future 
Fiji's 1999 general elections were a national referendum on the 1997 
Constitution. Given that the SVT, the NFP, the FLP, the FAP and the 
PANU all supported-albeit with some reservations-the 1997 
Constitution, the mandate that it has received from the peoples of Fiji 
is overwhelming. However, despite this mandate, and despite the 
clear objectives of the Constitution in seeking to promote multiethnic 
politics in Fiji, it is clear that significant tensions remain between those 
who would use ethnicity as a primary means of political mobilisation 
and those who would use class as a primary means of political 
mobilisation. While the AV system has been able to foster cooperation 
amongst the political parties, and while multiparty government may 
reinforce this cooperation, the AV system has not been able to expunge 
the recourse to ethnicity as a tool of political mobilisation. It has 
possibly permitted a 'de-ethnicisation' of politics in reserved seats. 
However, it is indeed ironic that under the AV system the use of 
ethnicity may have been reinforced in those seats specifically designed 
to foster the emergence of a multiethnic politics: the open seats. 
Moreover, where it has fostered cross-community cooperation, this has 
been amongst elites; it has not occurred amongst people. In this light, 
two suggestions emerge. The first is that Fiji would do well to 
critically reassess the suitability of AV system. Electoral systems which 
respect the proportionality of parliamentary representation are also 
capable of breaking down inter-ethnic boundaries, and perhaps these 
should be considered anew in light of the outcome of the 1999 general 
elections. The second is that the ratio of open to reserved seats must be 
re-examined and possibly reversed if Fiji is to move decisively 
towards a less ethnically based system of politics. 
Clearly, as is evident in the other contributions to this volume, the 
tension between the use of ethnicity and the use of class as primary 
means of political mobilisation will continue to define the parameters 
of Fiji's politics. In this light, it is significant that the main challenges 
that any Fiji government will confront over the next decade are likely 
to emerge from factors associated with economic globalisation. It is 
unclear whether a consociational arrangement that may work to 
consolidate and indeed reify contested categories of ethnicity favours 
or undermines the capability of national governments to negotiate in 
an increasingly open, unforgiving and undiscriminating international 
environment. 
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What is of a more immediate concern to the peoples of Fiji, 
however, is the level of commitment of the new government to the 
implementation and operation of the new Constitution. To a large 
extent it was the leaders of the NFP and the SVT who were able to 
negotiate a constitutional settlement, rally the support of the elected 
members of the two ethnic groupings for the constitutional 'deal', 
receive the endorsement of the Great Council of Chiefs, and ensure the 
implementation of the electoral provisions of the Constitution. The 
situation has now changed. Following the elections, the mantle of 
political leadership has passed on to leaders whose parties were less 
central to the negotiation of the Constitution. It remains to be seen 
whether the new government will accord a similar degree of 
importance to the implementation of all the provisions of the 
Constitution. It also remains to be seen whether the new government 
is committed to promoting the consensus amongst Fiji's main political 
parties regarding social and economic policy, which is implicit in the 
constitutional provisions regarding the formation of the executive. The 
extent of the commitment to policy consensus will be seen most 
prominently in the attention which is paid by the new government to 
indigenous Fijian rights and interests. Indeed, it is possible that the 
FLP' s electoral commitment to delivering an ambitious social package 
may collide with the commitment to enhancing indigenous Fijian 
rights and interests that is a core pillar upon which the Constitution 
rests. Were such a collision to occur, it would undermine the potential 
that the FLP-led government has to radically transform Fiji's economy 
and its politics. Fiji's politics have entered a new era, and what the 
future may hold has yet to unfold. 
Endnote 
1 .  This chapter is a substantially revised version of Prasad (1999) . 
CHAPTER 4 
Fiji's economy: the challenge 
of the future 
Ardeshir Sepehri and A Haroon Akram-Lodhi 
Introduction 
Following a decade of relatively high rates of economic growth during 
the 1970s, Fiji's economic performance declined considerably in the 
1980s. Economic growth both slowed down and became increasingly 
erratic, and for many policymakers it appeared that the country's 
decade-old experience with an inward-looking import-substituting 
industrialisation strategy had reached its limits. In an effort to restore 
economic growth Fiji embarked upon an orthodox structural 
adjustment program which sought, among other things, to redirect 
industrial policy towards export-led growth while pursuing 
macroeconomic stabilisation, external trade liberalisation and internal 
deregulation, including changes in agricultural markets, public sector 
restructuring and financial sector reform (Akram-Lodhi 1996; Elek, 
Hill and Tabor 1993). While the adjustment program was apparently 
successful, to the extent that it reversed the decline in the trend rate of 
growth of output, diversified exports and restored macroeconomic 
balances, it fell short of policymakers' expectations in other aspects. 
The adjustment program did little to reverse the declining trend in the 
rate of growth of investment, failed to achieve a reasonably high rate 
of growth of output, and did little to spur a generalised increase in job 
creation. 
While Fiji's economic difficulties and their causes have been 
studied, these studies have been mainly descriptive; no recent attempt 
has been made to quantify the main constraints upon economic 
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growth in Fiji. This chapter addresses this shortcoming. It assesses the 
role and significance of domestic private and public sector savings, as 
well as foreign savings, on the growth path of output by formulating 
and estimating a simple structural three-gap model of growth similar 
to that suggested by Bacha (1990) and Taylor (1991) .  According to the 
three-gap model, the utilisation and growth of productive capacity is 
constrained not only by domestic and foreign savings, as was initially 
discussed by Chenery and Strout (1966) in the context of the two-gap 
model, but also by the availability of public sector resources. There can 
be little doubt that public sector resources have played a crucial role in 
the economy of independent Fiji. Public sector savings and investment 
have been vital in determining the productive capacity of the economy 
and its growth rate, both directly through public enterprises and 
indirectly through investment in physical, social and human 
infrastructure. Therefore, this chapter estimates a three-gap model for 
the period 1971-96. The estimation results are then used to conduct 
simulations of the period 1997-2001.  Four distinctive policy 
simulations are conducted. These simulations assess the impact of a 
gradual elimination of Fiji's preferential access to the European Union 
(EU) for its sugar exports as well as the amount of foreign resources 
that would be needed if Fiji were to achieve a socially desirable 
growth rate. 
The economy of Fij i, 1970-98 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the major macroeconomic indicators 
during four main periods: the first post-independence decade, 1971 to 
1981; the crisis period of 1982 to 1986; the adjustment period under the 
Interim Government (1989-92)1; and the most recent period of 1993 to 
1996. In what follows, developments in the main macroeconomic 
indicators, and the underlying policy changes surrounding such 
developments, are examined. 
Economic policy and performance, 1 970-81 2  
Fiji inherited a colonial economic structure which changed little in 
the decade after independence in 1970, as the government pursued a 
development strategy based upon seeking to secure full employment 
through the continued use of the country's natural resources. Thus, as 
in the pre-independence period, agriculture continued to be the major 
Table 4. 1 Selected macroeconomic indicators, 1 97 1 -96 
1 97 1 -8 1  1 982-86 1 989-92 1 993-96 1 993 1 994 1 99 5  1 996 
Growth rates (% per  a nnum) 
Real GDP (consta nt 1 977 factor cost) 5 .2  1 . 3 5 . 5  2 .8 1 . 2 4 .5  2 .6 3 . 1 
Per capita GDP 3 .2  -0 .7 4.2 1 .4 -0. 5  2 .8 1 .3 1 .9 
Consumer price i ndex 1 1 .6 5 . 0  6 .4 2 .8 5 .2 0 .6 2 . 2 3 . 1  
Annual share of GDP (current factor cost) 
Agricu lture 25 . 7  1 9 .4 1 9 . 5  20 .0  1 9 .8 20 .9  1 9 . 9  1 9 .4 
Manufacturing 1 1 . 5 9 .8  1 1 .4 1 4.8 1 4.6  1 5 .0  1 4.8 1 4.8 
Gross f ixed investment 23 .2 20 .8  1 4.9 1 3 . 5  1 5 .8 1 2 . 9  1 3 .0  1 2 . 1  
Private fixed investment 1 2 .6 1 1 .3 5 . 6  5 .0  5 . 5  4.9 4.9 5 .0  
Government deficits 5 . 3  6 . 1  4.4 4.9 6 . 2  4.0 3.3 5.9 
Net exportsa -7.4 -2 . 5  2 . 5  4 .3  -2 .8  1 .6 9 .2  9 .2  
Annual share of merchandise exports 
Sugar and molasses 74.5 63 .9 40. 1  39 .3  39 .9 38.9 38.9 39 . 5  
Garments n . a b  n . a  1 9 .8 22 .6  2 1 .9 2 1 .2 24.2 23 . 1  
External debt (as % of G N P)c 28 .6  32 .4 2 1 .4 1 4.0d 20 . 5  1 7 .0  1 4.0 n . a .  
Mean daily real wage rates ( 1 985 prices) 
'a l l  industries' 1 3 . 2  1 2 .4 9 .7  9.8e 9 . 7  9 .9 n . a .  n . a .  
'man ufacturing '  1 3 .3  1 2 . 5  8.4 8 .4e 8 . 3  8 . 5  n . a .  n . a .  
Sources: Real variables such a s  GDP, investment, exports and imports, and government expenditures and revenues were obtained from the Fiji Bureau 
of Statistics Current Economic Statistics (various issues). All real variables are measured at  1977 prices. Balance of payments and foreign debt data were 
obtained from the Reserve Bank of Fiji Quarterly Review (various issues) and the World Bank's (1 997) Global Development Finance: Country Tables. Capital 
and intermediate imports data were calculated by the authors using the import data by SITC as reported in the United Nations International Trade 
Statistics Yearbook (various issues). Our thanks to Kishor Chetty for his help in obtaining certain data from the Fiji Bureau of Statistics. 
" exports of goods and non-factor services less imports of goods and non-factor services; b negligible; c at the end of each period; d at the end of 1995; 
� for the period 1993-94 only 
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economic activity, accounting, as Table 4.1 illustrates, for over 25 per 
cent of gross domestic product (GDP) over the period 1971-81 . Indeed, 
since 1970 agriculture has accounted for between 20 and 25 per cent of 
GDP. In 1996, agriculture provided almost a fifth of Fiji's GDP and 
employed, on a full-time or a part-time basis, more than 75 per cent of 
all households. Within agriculture, sugarcane continues to be the 
dominant crop. As late as 1996 sugar production accounted for over 12 
per cent of GDP, more than 40 per cent of the agricultural sector, 30 
per cent of the manufacturing sector, and provided direct employment 
for more than 25 per cent of the country's economically active 
population (Fiji Bureau of Statistics (various issues): Table 3.3) . In 1996 
the sugar industry provided about 40 per cent of exports by value 
(Table 4.1) .  Granted, the importance of the sugar sector has declined as 
independent Fiji has diversified its economic activities; for example, 
other significant natural resource-based activities currently include 
tourism, gold, fisheries and timber. Nonetheless, sugar production still 
plays a critical role in the performance of the overall economy. 
In theory, Fiji's sugar industry has been subject to the dictates of the 
international economy. However, in practice the impact of international 
economic conditions on Fiji's sugar industry has been muted because 
of quota arrangements with the EU. The Sugar Protocol agreed 
between the then European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries came into force in 1975 under 
the auspices of Protocol 3 of the Lome Convention (Prasad and 
Akram-Lodhi 1998). The Sugar Protocol committed Fiji to delivering 
specific quantities of sugar to the EEC at prices which were guaranteed 
and which were based upon the price of sugar set annually under the 
EEC's Common Agricultural Policy. In 1975 Fiji was allocated a quota 
of 163,600 metric tons of sugar, equivalent to 13.4 per cent of the total 
preferential quota. For the period 1990-92 Fiji's quota allocation 
amounted to an average of 42 per cent of the country's total sugar 
production and 46.6 per cent of the country's total sugar exports 
(MacDonald 1996) . Fiji received a price which not only averaged 
between 2.5 and 3 times the world market price but which was also 
significantly more stable than the world market price (Hermann and 
Weiss 1995) .  
In contrast to natural resource-based economic activities, the 
manufacturing sector has been small in size and subordinate in terms 
of its economic importance. The limited industrial development that 
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occurred during the first post-independence decade was largely based 
upon import-substitution, which protected domestic industries 
through a complex regulatory regime deploying quota, license and 
tariff protection. Thus, the contribution of manufacturing to GDP rose 
slightly from less than 11 per cent at the time of independence to about 
13 per cent by the end of first post-independence decade. The lower 
priority attached to industrialisation partly reflected the widely shared 
view that very small economies have only a limited potential for 
industrialisation. It also reflected an emphasis on employment­
generating labour-intensive activities as a means of maintaining 
communal relations between a population almost equally divided 
between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians. 
However, despite trade barriers the economy always had a 
comparatively high degree of openness to the international economy. 
Fiji relied upon a vast range of imported consumption, intermediate 
and capital goods to meet the demands of consumers and firms. Thus, 
in the period between 1971 and 1981, imports accounted for about 57 
per cent of GDP, exports for almost half of GDP, and net exports for -
7.4 per cent of GDP (Table 4.1) .  Post-colonial Fiji was therefore a 
hybrid: an economy with elements of dirigisme which was nonetheless 
deeply insinuated into the world economy (Narayan 1984) . 
State regulation was not confined to external trade. Indeed, it can 
be argued that the most important intervention by the government 
was the regulation of factor and product markets within the economy. 
A Prices and Incomes Board (PIB) was established to monitor and 
control the wholesale and retail prices of many goods and some 
services. In addition to the PIB, several ministries, including the 
present Ministries of Tourism and Transport, Works and Energy, 
Commerce, Business Development and Investment, Public Enterprises, 
and Labour and Industrial Relations, and several quasi-autonomous 
government institutions like the Native Land Trust Board and the 
Fijian Affairs Board, were empowered to regulate product and factor 
markets, including land and labour. The post-colonial government 
also exercised considerable power over productive activity, both 
directly, by establishing public enterprises in agriculture, manufacturing 
and services, as well as indirectly, by planning and setting production 
targets. Finally, the state intervened heavily in financial markets: 
interest rates were controlled, and the exchange rate was fixed. 
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Economic crisis, 1 982-86 
Overall economic performance, as measured by the rate of growth of 
GDP, has varied considerably since 1970 (Table 4.1) .  In the first decade 
following independence, economic performance was generally good, 
as Fiji witnessed real GDP growth of 5.2 per cent per year and 
removed 'some of the worst elements of the colonial inheritance' 
(Cameron 1994:420) .  However, this performance was not sustained 
through the first half of the 1980s. In the early 1980s 'Fiji was 
undergoing a multi-dimensional crisis' (Cameron 1994:420) consisting 
of drought, cyclones, the 1979 oil price rise, and unexpected 
turbulence in international sugar prices. As a consequence, real GDP 
growth dropped to 1 .2 per cent per annum during the period between 
1982 and 1986; over the same period, real per capita GDP contracted 
by 0.7 per cent per year. As might be expected, the stagnation of 
output was accompanied by increasing fiscal imbalance: the fiscal 
deficit rose from 5.3 per cent of GDP during the period between 1971 
and 1981 to 6.1 per cent during the period between 1982 to 1986. 
Foreign debt also continued to grow. Foreign debt as a percentage of 
gross national product (GNP) rose from 28.6 per cent at the end of 
1982 to 32.4 per cent by the end of 1986 (Table 4.1) .  
In light of what was clearly an economic crisis, in late 1986 the 
Finance Minister outlined the beginning of a change in Fiji's industrial 
policy by announcing the creation of tax-free factories, a form of 
export-processing zone (Akram-Lodhi 1992). This initiative was meant 
to be a first decisive step in a shift in industrial policy away from 
import-substitution and towards export promotion, a shift which had 
an extremely long gestation period, having been first mooted in 
Development Plan 6 published in 1970 (Chandra 1985). However, the 
1986 shift in industrial policy became a much deeper transformation 
in economic strategy in the wake of two coups led by Lieutenant­
Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka in May and September 1987. 
The 1987 coups were a severe economic shock. Tourism dropped 
by some 36 per cent, while farmers disrupted the sugar cane harvest in 
protest. The cessation of concessional credit, a sharp fall in inflows of 
foreign direct investment, and the flight of an estimated F$120 million 
(US$83 million) out of the country in 1987 and 1988 all reduced 
considerably the availability of foreign financial resources and hence 
imports. Given that some 40 per cent of budget revenues came from 
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customs and excise, the impact of the coups was quickly experienced 
by government: between 1986 and 1987 the budget deficit increased 
by over 12.5 per cent, to stand at almost 8 per cent of GDP. It was 
partly in response to the deepening crisis that the newly-appointed, 
military-backed Interim Government 'pinpointed industrialisation as 
being of prime importance to Fiji's future development' (Chandra 
1989:170) in that it could both stabilise and indeed expand the 
economy, and thus act to offset possible political unrest. 
Embedding structural adjustment, 1 987-92 
In transforming economic strategy the Interim Government was not 
only claiming to respond to the higher costs, excess capacity and 
resource misallocation associated with Fiji's attempt at import­
substitution, problems initially identified in the government's review 
of Development Plan 7 (Fiji Ministry of Finance, Central Planning 
Office 1979) .  It was also 'responding both to the international trend 
towards economic liberalisation and export-oriented industrialisation 
and to specific advice from its consultants and international agencies' 
(Chandra 1989:170). This advice had argued that Fiji needed to radically 
improve its export potential by reducing unit labour costs if it was to 
continue to grow (World Bank 1986; Fiji Employment and Development 
Mission 1984) . Given that much of this advice had been received prior 
to the coups, and given that the initial creation of tax-free factories 
predated the coups, the transformation in Fiji's economic strategy that 
occurred after 1987 should not so much be seen as a dramatic break 
with the past as rather a confirmation of policy processes :which had 
already been initiated prior to the coups. I 
The central themes in Fiji's transformation of economic strategy 
were embedded in the formulation and implementation of an 
orthodox structural adjustment program that by and large shared 
many features of World Bank and International Monetary Fund­
sponsored programs. The important exception to this rule was that Fiji 
received no financial transfers from either multilateral institution in 
exchange for initiating the program. The adjustment program aimed at 
a far reaching economic change through macroeconomic stabilisation, 
external trade liberalisation and internal deregulation, including 
changes in agricultural markets, public sector restructuring and 
financial sector reforms. These policy reforms were to facilitate 
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economic restructuring and transform Fiji from an 'inward looking, 
high tax, and slow growth economy to a dynamic outward looking, 
low tax and high growth economy' (Fiji Ministry of Finance 1991) .  
Macroeconomic stabilisation 
The increase in the budget deficit brought about by the collapse in 
tourism and the disruption of the sugar cane harvest necessitated the 
stabilisation of the economy. The government did this by implementing 
deflationary fiscal and monetary policies. On the fiscal side, the 
government imposed a 15 per cent wage cut on all civil servants. It 
also slashed public investment in real terms by a third. On the 
monetary side, the central bank, the Reserve Bank of Fiji, severely 
restricted the availability of private sector credit and imposed 
additional restrictions on outflows of foreign exchange. 
However, undoubtedly the most important component of the 
Interim Government's stabilisation package was a devaluation of the 
Fiji dollar (Akram-Lodhi 1996) . The value of the Fiji dollar is fixed by 
the Reserve Bank relative to a weighted basket of the currencies of 
Fiji's principal trading partners. A two-stage devaluation in June and 
October 1987 reduced the value of the dollar in nominal terms by 
some 33 per cent. When combined with the decline in real wages the 
impact was to bring about a fall in the real effective exchange rate of 
almost 28 per cent in the period between 1986 and 1988. The effect was 
to reduce further the attractiveness of capital flight and improve the 
competitive position of the economy by reversing the decline in 
output and investment caused by the coups. 
However, the government did not stop at stabilisation. It used 
economic crisis to cement macroeconomic reform by restructuring 
Fiji's fiscal stance. In the 1990 budget the Finance Minister felt 
confident enough to cut income tax rates by 20 per cent, leaving the 
highest rate at 40 per cent. At the same time exemptions and 
allowances were increased. To compensate for the loss of revenue and 
to ease the transition to a new value-added, tax existing indirect taxes 
were raised and the tax base was broadened by bringing some 40,000 
peasants into income tax for the first time. Plans to 'corporatise' 
several state-owned enterprises also moved forward. While this effort 
to force state-owned enterprises to follow commercial practices was 
envisaged to be a prelude to privatisation, the more immediate positive 
impact from the government's point of view was on its own accounts. 
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In the Interim Government's final 1992 budget further cuts in 
income tax and corporation tax were announced, the number of 
income tax bands was reduced, corporation tax was simplified, 
income tax thresholds were increased and the requirement that those 
below the threshold pay tax was ended. Finally, despite the 
resignation of the Interim Government prior to the May 1992 election, 
a key policy initiative, the much-debated value-added tax, was 
introduced on schedule in July by the newly elected government. 
Trade liberalisation 
The most visible aspect of the Interim Government's adjustment 
program was that of external trade liberalisation. Tax-free factories 
quickly became an important feature of Fiji's industrial and export 
policy (Akram-Lodhi 1992). Tax-free factories received substantial tax 
concessions in exchange for a commitment to export 95 per cent of 
output. Such concessions were available to both Fiji and international 
firms, thus placing both within a similar regulatory regime. Of the 119 
firms engaged in tax-free manufacturing by the end of 1992, 70 per 
cent were in garment production. Despite the fact that garment 
exports had started to increase prior to the introduction of tax-free 
factories, the performance of the garment factories was impressive: by 
1990 garment production for export comprised over 55 per cent of 
manufacturing production, over 22 per cent of total domestic exports, 
and over 37 per cent of all manufacturing employment (Akram-Lodhi 
1992; Elek, Hill and Tabor 1993). Almost half of those firms operating 
tax-free factories in 1992 were transnational corporations, albeit from a 
narrow group of countries. Economic changes in Australia and New 
Zealand in particular forced garment producers from those countries 
to seek to source production offshore in countries such as Fiji. In order 
to attract such businesses, the Interim Government eased and 
simplified approval procedures for foreign direct investment while at 
the same time expanding the resources available to the Fiji Trade and 
Investment Board so that it could enhance its capacity to attract 
foreign direct investment. Thus, the share of foreign direct investment 
in GDP was 27 per cent higher under the adjustment period of 1989 to 
1992 as compared to that of the immediate pre-adjustment period of 
1982 to 1986. The increase in international investment flows directed 
into Fiji might be taken to be a sign of confidence in the irreversible 
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nature of the change in Fiji towards a liberal, export-oriented 
economic regime. It also indicates the extent to which trade and 
investment are complementary phenomena. 
As regards imports, external trade liberalisation has meant an 
effective end to import licensing. The licensing regime used to sustain 
import substitution was largely eradicated as Fiji switched to an open 
general license scheme covering most consumption, intermediate and 
capital goods. Thus, prior to 1989 over 47 commodities required 
licenses; in 1991, only 9 commodities required licenses (Elek, Hill and 
Tabor 1993) . The government replaced import licensing with a 
simplified structure of tariffs. Maximum tariff levels were progressively 
cut, so that by 1992 most imports had attached to them a fiscal duty of 
30 per cent. Indeed, the last budget of the Interim Government held 
out the prospect of a maximum tariff of only 20 per cent in 1993, in 
part due to the introduction of a value-added tax designed to assist in 
reducing the dependence of revenue upon customs levies. 
Internal deregulation 
External trade liberalisation was accompanied by extensive internal 
deregulation. The overall thrust of the changes involved a reduction in 
barriers to entry in domestic markets, thereby potentially enhancing 
competitive discipline. Obviously, the shift to an open general license 
scheme was an important component of a reduction in barriers to 
entry. So too was the reduction and simplification of customs duties 
and corporation tax. However, internal deregulation went further than 
these obvious changes. Detailed sectoral economic targeting was 
eliminated after the coups. This reduced the non-market, linkage­
enhancing planning requirements that had been placed upon some 
firms. An enhancement of the role of markets was furthered by the 
elimination of price controls on a range of items. Indeed, the need for 
price controls was to some extent eliminated by the introduction of 
enforceable trading standards by the Ministry of Trade and Commerce 
in the last year of the Interim Government. 
Barriers to market entry were further diminished by attempts at 
reforming state-owned enterprises. Under the auspices of the Public 
Enterprise Unit in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the 
government corporatised several large public enterprises. This placed 
some state-owned enterprises on the same legal and commercial basis 
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as private sector firms, with the government theoretically committed 
to simply acting as the majority shareholder. Corporatisation led some 
firms to conduct efficiency-enhancing internal reforms. At the same 
time, the process did in theory open up protected markets to 
competition. However, only one seriously unprofitable firm was closed, 
while industrial action in several corporatised companies resulted in 
the kind of government intervention that corporatisation was 
supposed to prevent. 
The final major internal deregulation initiative of the Interim 
Government was to enhance the flexibility of the labour market 
(Chand, this volume) . In 1991 statutory wage guidelines were 
abolished in order to strengthen the position of employers in 
establishing the relationship between pay and productivity. This was 
followed by changes to labour legislation, which substantially 
increased government intervention in the internal affairs of unions. 
The effect of these changes to labour legislation was to make it less 
likely that the 80 per cent of the formally employed labour force which 
belonged to trades unions, professional associations or other, similar, 
organisations would assert their right to withdraw their labour. 
There can be no doubt concerning the impressive stabilisation of 
the economy in the period following the coups. Although real per 
capita GDP shrank by over 7 per cent in 1987 and inflation peaked at 
12 per cent in November 1988, by mid 1988 the economy was 
recovering. As demonstrated in Table 4.1, the economy grew at an 
average annual rate of 5.5 per cent over the period between 1989 and 
1992, fiscal deficits were reduced to 4.4 per cent of GDP, and net 
exports turned positive for the first time. Recovery was fuelled by 
higher sugar export earnings and by a gradual expansion of private 
sector credit. The recovery of the sugar sector was accompanied by a 
return of tourists; thus, government revenues increased. Buoyant 
government revenues permitted 1987 public sector wage cuts to be 
restored in real terms in 1988 and 1989. At the same time, higher 
earnings from sugar exports and tourism, combined with higher 
export earnings from garment and increasing foreign direct 
investment, helped to raise foreign reserves and reduce foreign debt. 
Net foreign direct investment increased from US$6.3 million in 1987 to 
an average annual net inflow of US$43 million during the period 
between 1989 and 1992. 
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While the structural adjustment program of 1987-92 was quite 
instrumental in restoring economic growth, it did little to reverse the 
decline in the trend rate of growth of investment, and particularly 
private investment. The share of fixed investment in GDP declined from 
23 per cent during the period 1971-82 to just under 15 per cent during 
the period 1989-92 (Table 4.1) .  Indeed, it dropped to as low as 12.1 per 
cent in 1996. Private investment as a percentage of GDP almost halved, 
dropping from its peak value of 14 per cent during the period 1977-81 
to 7.4 per cent during the period 1987-92. The economic crisis of the 
early 1980s, combined with fiscal restraints during the adjustment 
period, growing uncertainty over property rights in land and the 
future direction of government policy reforms, put severe constraints 
upon the growth of investment. 
Economic policy under Rabuka, 1 993-98 
In 1992 elections were held under the provisions of the discriminatory 
1990 Constitution. Rabuka, the leader of the coups and now a Major 
General, became Prime Minister at the head of a Soqosoqo Ni 
Vakavulewa Ni Taukei-General Voters' Party coalition government. 
Under Rabuka's leadership the explicit commitment to structural 
adjustment did not change: economic policy remained committed to 
macroeconomic stabilisation, external trade liberalisation and internal 
trade deregulation. Nonetheless, the exigencies of electoral politics­
however flawed-meant that the context had certainly shifted. While 
policy reform continued, the pace of reform slowed. Moreover, the 
impact of fluctuating fortunes in the sugar and tourism sectors sustained 
continued efforts by the government to diversify the pattern of economic 
activity, especially through the encouragement of manufacturing. 
Between 1993 and 1996 the economy grew at an annual average 
rate of 2.8 per cent-much less than that achieved in the decade 
following independence (Table 4.1) .  As they had since the mid 1980s, 
sugar, garment manufacturing and tourism dominated economic 
performance between 1993 and 1996. Sugar was responsible for 42 per 
cent of agricultural production in 1996. Moreover, between 1993 and 
1996 sugar comprised over 39 per cent of total exports (Table 4.1) .  At 
the same time, the redirection of industrial strategy towards export­
led growth in the mid 1980s led to a steady increase in 
manufacturing's contribution to GDP. By 1996 manufacturing 
accounted for almost 15 per cent of GDP (Table 4.1) .  While sugar 
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remained responsible for 22.4 per cent of manufacturing production in 
1996, the sector was in fact dominated by garment production for 
export in 120 tax-free factories, which in 1997 were responsible for 
two-thirds of all manufacturing employment. Garment exports 
increased from 4.1 per cent of total exports in 1986 to 23. 1  per cent of 
total exports in 1996. Indeed, the efforts of successive governments to 
transform Fiji into an export-oriented economy were, by the late 1990s, 
clearly successful. Exports went from 16.2 per cent of GDP in 1985 to 
28.2 per cent of GDP in 1994. Sugar and garments between them were 
responsible for over 60 per cent of all merchandise exports in 1996, 
and well over 60,000 jobs (Table 4 .1) .  Tourism, which provided around 
20 per cent of GDP in 1996, also made an important contribution to net 
exports. The steady improvement in trade balances during the early 
1990s led net exports, which had been in deficit for most of the post­
colonial period, to move into surplus. The improvement in the trade 
balances helped to restore foreign reserves-which in 1997 stood at 
US$347 million-and reduce foreign debt. Total foreign debt dropped 
from an average of 21 .4 per cent of GNP in 1992 period to 14 per cent 
in 1995 (Table 4.1) .  Inflation, which in Fiji is mainly determined by 
import prices and the exchange rate, was also significantly cut, 
averaging 2.8 per cent between 1993 and 1996. 
However, the public finances of low growth, export-driven Fiji 
were not particularly strong between 1993 and 1996 (Table 4.1) .  The 
government ran consistent budget deficits, which over the period 
between 1993 and 1996 averaged 4.9 per cent of GDP. Moreover, while 
the public finances did begin to improve in 1994 and 1995 (Table 4.1), 
it was subsequently discovered that the state-owned National Bank of 
Fiji (NBF), the largest domestic commercial bank, had, as a 
consequence of financial mismanagement and possible corruption, 
accumulated bad debts of more than F$200 million (US$143 million) 
and was near to collapse. In order to restructure the NBF the 
government was forced to give it a F$213.3 million (US$152 million) 
injection of capital. The impact of the rescue of the NBF on the budget 
deficit was enormous: the budget deficit reached an unsustainable 9.2 
per cent of GDP in 1997, of which over 12.3 per cent was a direct result 
of the rescue. 
At the same time, consistent budget deficits had other, less 
contingent, causes. A first factor was that the government had to meet 
accumulated debt repayment obligations. In 1996 accumulated debt 
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repayments accounted for 16 per cent of government spending and 
over the period between 1993 and 1996 debt repayments often 
exceeded the size of the budget deficit. Nonetheless, the strength of 
exports implied that the debt burden, while heavy, was manageable: 
the debt-service ratio fell from 11 .2 per cent in 1991 to 5.9 per cent in 
1995. 
A second factor was that the government was continuing to 
restructure its tools of revenue acquisition. In order to boost domestic 
competitiveness, the government sought to reform pricing in water, 
power and telecommunications utilities. In order to boost 
international competitiveness, increase simplicity and transparency, 
and in order to comply with World Trade Organization (WTO) non­
discretionary policies, the 1998 budget reviewed the tariff structure. 
Tariffs were cut on many imported non-locally produced goods. Some 
97 non-locally produced goods were subjected to a new tariff of 10 per 
cent, while some goods were moved onto a zero-tariff band. For those 
imported goods that competed with locally produced goods, tariffs 
were increased to 35 per cent. However, such a tariff fell within the 
WTO bound rate of 40 per cent. Moreover, it was promised that tariffs 
for imported goods that competed with locally produced goods would 
fall by 3 per cent a year every year to 2002. 
Fiscal weakness also contributed to budgetary deficits. 
Privatisation proceeds had been expected during the 1990s to improve 
the public finances. However, the first privatisation attempted by the 
government, that of the Government Shipyard, was a mess. One of the 
partners in the buyout went into receivership and government had to 
spend time and money searching for a new partner. At the same time, 
attempts to speed up privatisation required large budgetary outlays in 
order to meet the initial expenses of reorganising corporatised state­
owned enterprises and in order to locate possible purchasers of the 
assets. 
Fiscal weakness was exacerbated by tax non-compliance. The 
Finance Minister in the 1998 budget estimated that some 13 per cent of 
government revenues were lost due to non-compliance. In part, non­
compliance may have been a result of corruption as, in addition to the 
NBF scandal, in 1997 the police had launched corruption probes into 
the Customs Department, the Companies Office, the Registrar­
General' s Department and the Fiji Housing Authority. There can be 
little doubt that the perception that corruption in Fiji was becoming 
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both wider and deeper was at least in part responsible for the Finance 
Minister 's 1998 decision to set up an autonomous and independent 
Fiji Revenue and Customs Authority. 
Within the context of a low growth, export-driven, fiscally weak 
economy, the government relied heavily upon monetary policy. 
Between 1993 and 1996 the Reserve Bank allowed the Ml measure of 
the money supply to grow at an annual average rate of 11 per cent, 
well above both the nominal rate of growth of the economy and the 
real interest rate, in order to encourage growth. In order to offset the 
pressure on the exchange rate caused by monetary expansion, in 1997 
the government relaxed foreign exchange controls in an effort to 
increase inflows of foreign direct investment. However, in order to 
relax foreign exchange controls, the process of liberalising the current 
account was begun. While this had the affect of delegating current 
account transactions to commercial banks and increasing the share of 
retained export proceeds, it also had the affect of increasing the size of 
permissible company profit remittances and easing the capacity to 
invest offshore, both of which served to put further pressure on the 
exchange rate. 
However, unlike 1988, when an easing of monetary policy 
contributed to expansion, monetary policy failed to sustain an increase 
in the rate of growth of output. The government could not sustain the 
unsustainable, and in January 1998 the most important shift in 
monetary policy of the decade occurred when the Reserve Bank 
devalued the Fiji dollar by 20 per cent. Ostensibly, the basis of the 
decision to devalue was the need to mount a defensive reaction to the 
East Asian crisis, which had led to substantial depreciations in 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Korea and the Philippines. In the 
wake of these depreciations, Fiji's two largest trading partners, 
Australia and New Zealand, had seen their currencies depreciate. In 
Fiji's low growth, import-dependent, export-driven economy, the 
relative appreciation of the Fiji dollar against the currencies of the 
country's two largest trading partners meant a loss of competitiveness 
and a reduced capacity to export. This had the potential to dramatically 
destabilise the economy. At the same time, movements in the gold 
price had worked against the economy. 
Nonetheless, it is clear that devaluation in and of itself will not 
resolve the weaknesses of the Fiji economy in the short and medium 
term. It is true that devaluation will boost domestic production, as 
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locally produced products become cheaper than imports with which 
they compete. However, the scope for import-substitution in Fiji's 
small, open economy is clearly limited. Both exports and imports are 
very insensitive to changes in relative prices: price elasticities of the 
demand for exports and imports are estimated to be as low as -0.44 
and -0.27 respectively (Reddy 1997: Tables 1 and 2) . Fiji's import 
dependence must severely restrict the benefits of devaluation. 
Consider, for example, the three principal export industries. Sugar 
earnings from exports in Fiji dollar terms will rise as a result of the 
devaluation. However, so too will the cost of essential production and 
processing inputs that have to be imported, as well as the cost of 
transport. Similarly, devaluation might make the Fiji tourist industry 
more competitive. However, the sector as a whole is highly import 
dependent (Korth, this volume), and devaluation has raised the price 
of imports. The net benefits are thus likely to be much smaller than 
anticipated by policy makers. Finally, while the garment industry will 
have been given a competitive boost by the devaluation, the fact that 
labour is the only domestically provided input in the industry would 
serve to offset the competitive boost. Moreover, in those sectors where 
Fiji competes directly with East Asian countries and companies, the 
devaluation is, in many instances, less than the depreciation of their 
currencies, meaning that Fiji after the devaluation has lost a competitive 
advantage. This applies particularly to garments and tourism. 
At the same time, with increases in the prices of imports, inflation 
will rise in the short term and consumers will have to bear the brunt of 
the increase. The decline in real wages arising out of increased inflation 
should mean that the devaluation would impact upon domestic 
demand. Thus, it is clear that devaluation is an unimaginative means of 
dealing with a stagnant economy. The need to devalue also makes clear 
that after more than a decade of structural adjustment, the economy of 
Fiji is still plagued by structural weaknesses. That this is recognised by 
policymakers is clear from comments on the imperatives facing the Fiji 
economy in the wake of devaluation: government stressed the need for 
producers to reduce unit labour costs by improving efficiency and 
cutting costs. There are two routes by which lower labour costs could be 
secured in Fiji. The first is by cutting real wages; however, as already 
noted, cuts in real wages would serve to restrict domestic demand and 
economic growth. The second is by increasing investment and hence 
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labour productivity; however, the prospect for an improvement in 
productivity remains poor as long as the share of investment in GDP 
continues to fall, in the manner illustrated in Table 4.1 .  
Although per capita income grew at  an average annual rate of  4.2 
and 1 .4 per cent during the periods 1989-92 and 1993-96 respectively, 
the benefits of growth were not equitably distributed. It is estimated 
that 25 per cent of Fiji's households in general and 32.8 per cent of 
urban households in particular lived in poverty in 1990. Moreover, the 
proportion of the population in poverty between 1977 and 1990 
increased by about 10 percentage points amongst households overall, 
and by 21 percentage points amongst urban households (Prasad and 
Asafu-Adjaye 1998). According to the United Nations Development 
Programme, this situation had deteiiorated by 1996, especially as a 
result of rapid food price rises, rises which will accelerate in the wake 
of the 1998 devaluation (United Nations Development Programme/ 
Government of Fiji 1997) . Other indicators of income inequality, such 
as the Gini coefficient, also show a worsening of income distribution. 
The estimated Gini coefficient for Fiji suggests that, nationally, income 
inequality deteriorated by about 10 percentage points between 1990 
and 1997 for households overall, and by as much as 19 percentage 
points for urban households (Prasad and Asafu-Adjaye 1998) . 
Moreover, as illustrated in Table 4.1, mean daily real wages in ' all 
industries' declined from an average of F$12.40 during the period 
1982-86 to F$9.70 during the period 1989-92. The decline in real wages 
was consistent over the entire period between 1982 and 1992. It was 
more pronounced in the manufacturing sector, where mean daily real 
wages declined from an average of F$12.52 in the period 1982-86 to an 
average of F$8.40 in the period 1993-94, a decline of 33 per cent. 
Stagnant real wages sit alongside poor employment prospects for many. 
By the year 2000, 11,000 annual entrants onto the labour market will 
be chasing 5,000 annually created new jobs. Clearly, the current 
situation is a recipe for social conflict that can only be averted by job­
creating, demand-enhancing investment. 
Yet, as Table 4.1 indicates, investment continued its trend decline 
between 1993 and 1996, dropping to as low as 12.1 per cent of GDP in 
1996. The government, in the wake of low levels of investment, has 
explicitly sought to increase foreign direct investment, usually through 
the deployment of tax concessions. This is especially so in the tax-free 
factories, where 120 factories are responsible for two-thirds of all 
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manufacturing employment and 23 per cent of exports. However, the 
impact of the tax-free factories on the Fiji economy is reduced by 
leakages: half of all garment exports go to Australia, but non-labour 
inputs into garment production come from Australia. The result is that 
for some garment exports Australian content may reach 67 per cent of 
the product's value. Net exports from garments are therefore low. Fiji 
has been seeking revisions to the South Pacific Regional Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement's (SPARTECA) rules of origin, 
which dictate 50 per cent local content. It has long been realised that 
the rules of origin discourage efficiency improvements by 
discouraging investment (Akram-Lodhi 1992) .  
Tax concessions have also been used to little effect in the tourist 
industry. The government's most recent policy package was 
designed to increase the stock of five-star hotels in the country. To 
that end, investors were offered a 20-year corporate income tax 
holiday, the duty free entry of all capital goods, other concessions, 
and the option to sell privately-generated electricity to the national 
grid. The impact on investment has however been limited. Tax 
concessions have also been used in the timber industry, but although 
it has became an important export earner, in producing exports one­
seventh the value of those generated by sugar, it has been, to 
policymakers, a disappointment. The only sector where investment 
has been increasing has been in gold production, in which Emperor 
Gold Mines has expanded even as Pacific Island Gold has begun 
operating the new Mount Kasi mine. Gold generated 9.9 per cent of 
exports in 1996; however, the recent slump in the world gold price 
will affect further investment. Moreover, the scope for expansion is 
clearly limited. 
The current policy of granting concessions to investors has thus 
proven to be ineffective in boosting investment. Moreover, it may be 
fiscally unsustainable. As Elek, Hill and Tabor (1993:763) observe in the 
context of tax concessions to the garment industry, ' [i]f, as is likely, the 
relative share of export firms in the economy continues to expand, then 
it will become increasingly difficult to finance the physical infrastructure 
they need, or to assure an adequate supply of skill unless they make a 
contribution-through taxes-to the cost of providing them'. 
The next decade 
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The need to boost investment is also a priority because of the major 
challenges facing Fiji's economy in the next decade. Under the 
Uruguay Round's Agreement on Agriculture, the market access 
provisions of the Sugar Protocol were locked into the tariff schedules 
inspected and agreed upon by all signatories to the Agreement and 
subsequently all members of the WTO. The Agreement did not 
however make specific provisions in favour of Fiji. This means that the 
main continued benefit of the Protocol lies in its quota allocations and 
the price it offers for Fiji's sugar. However, it is likely that after 1999 
there will be major downward pressure on the EU' s internal sugar 
price, and thus the price received by Fiji for its sugar, as a result of two 
factors. The first is the reform of the EU' s Common Agricultural 
Policy, which is becoming increasingly likely. The second is the next 
round of WTO-initiated multilateral trade negotiations in agricultural 
products, which under the terms of the Agreement on Agriculture are 
due to begin in 1999. These negotiations 'will set in train a more 
powerful impetus to change than may at first sight seem obvious' 
(Roberts 1996:6) . Negotiations 
can be expected to broadly follow the lines of the Uruguay Round: 
further reductions of support, increases in market access (e.g. through 
further reduction of tariffs and tariff equivalents) and further 
reduction in export subsidies and subsidised export quantities 
(Roberts 1996:5) . 
Downward pressures on the sugar price received by Fiji will only 
be reinforced if, in the negotiations to construct a successor 
arrangement to the Lome Convention, negotiations that commenced in 
1998, Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is more 
strictly interpreted. A stricter interpretation is probable, in an effort to 
achieve WTO consistency. The implication of Article 24 is that the 
successor arrangement would have to move towards free trade over a 
specified time period and include all significant economic sectors, 
including sugar (Prasad and Akram-Lodhi 1998). If such were to be 
the case, the Sugar Protocol would become redundant, and would, in 
all probability, be scrapped, an outcome which would represent a 
severe economic shock to Fiji. 
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In addition, it is likely that SPARTECA will be revised over the 
course of the next decade, in part because Fiji has been seeking a 
bilateral agreement with Australia which strengthens its access to the 
dominant economy in the region, and in part because Australia has 
been considering enhancing its trade-based assistance. However, new 
agreements might not be as beneficial as might be thought. Australia 
and Fiji are both members of the WTO and thus agreements covering 
their trading relationships must be consistent with the rules of the 
WTO, and in particular Article 24. This implies that any revised 
agreements would have, as a final outcome, free trade over a specified 
time period, which would exclude no significant economic sector. It is 
difficult to envisage the circumstances under which an economy as 
small as Fiji's could avoid the trade-reducing impact of Australia's 
absolute advantage. 
A three-gap model3 
Domestic investment, foreign resources and government resources 
have all played a major part in Fiji's economic performance since 
independence. Clearly, economic performance has, in the aggregate, 
not been good, especially in the 1990s. Thus, the low growth, export­
driven, fiscally weak, import-dependent economy of Fiji faces major 
challenges over the medium term. There is in particular an urgent 
need to improve the share of investment in the economy if the poor 
economic performance of the 1990s is not to be replicated. In order to 
assess the significance of the level of government resources and 
foreign resources, as well as domestic savings, on the growth path of 
output and investment in Fiji, in this section a structural three-gap 
model of growth along the lines suggested by Fanelli, Frenkel and 
Winograd (1987), Bacha (1990) and Taylor (1991) is specified and 
estimated. 
The three-gap model provides a general framework by which to 
assess the role and significance of domestic private and public sector 
saving, as well as foreign saving, on the growth path of output and 
investment. At the same time, the three-gap model explicitly considers 
the interaction between capacity expansion and capacity utilisation. 
Finally, the three-gap model has minimal data requirements for both 
estimation and simulation. These three features make the three-gap 
model a more suitable means of understanding macroeconomic 
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growth processes than that provided by other open economy 
macroeconomic models. Granted, the three-gap model is a highly 
aggregated one-sector growth model in which price variations, 
including exchange rate variations, are not explicitly incorporated. 
Although it is possible to incorporate absolute prices into the three­
gap model (Solimano 1993), it is not yet possible to incorporate relative 
prices. This obvious limitation of the three-gap model should however 
be weighed against the already-mentioned benefits of the model. At 
the same time, the use of the three-gap model for understanding 
economies under adjustment is limited by the assumption that the 
structure of the economy is not changing. It should be noted though 
that this shortcoming is not particular to the three-gap model; most 
open economy macroeconomic models suffer from the same 
shortcoming. 
According to the three-gap model, the utilisation and expansion of 
existing productive capacity is constrained not only by domestic and 
foreign savings, as was initially discussed by Chenery and Strout 
(1966) in the context of the two-gap model, but also by the impact of 
fiscal limitations on government spending and thus on its public 
investment choices. In the absence of well-developed financial 
markets, the available methods of financing public investment are 
mostly confined to foreign borrowing, budget surpluses and inflation. 
Foreign resources can play a particularly significant role, especially if 
cutting current expenditures and inflation-based financing are not 
possible, either due to political circumstances or to external pressures 
on the fiscal authorities to curtail inflation. 
The model's formulation is presented in Table 4.2. All variables in 
the model are defined as a percentage of potential output (Q), which 
was estimated by passing a linear line through output peaks for the 
period between 1971 and 1996. 
Equation 1 defines real output (X) as the sum of gross domestic 
product (GDP) and real intermediate imports (Mk)·4 Capacity 
utilisation (u) is defined by Equation 2 as a ratio of output (X) over 
potential output (Q) . The rationale for working with X and Q as 
separate variables is that many developing economies often operate at 
less than full capacity, mainly as a result of the unavailability of 
foreign exchange and other structural bottlenecks. The capacity 
utilisation rate, then, allows an exploration of the way the three gaps 
interact in the process of economic growth. 
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Table 4.2 Specification of the three-gap model 
Rea l output 
Capacity uti l i sation 
Growth rate 
Equi l i brium 
Tota l i nvestment 
Total saving 
Private investment 
Private saving 
Publ ic sector saving 
Fisca l effort 
Pu bl ic sector borrowing 
requ i rements 
Intermediate im ports 
Capita l goods imports 
Foreign savi ng 
Three-gap equations 
G rowth-investment equation 
Savings gap 
Fore ign exchange gap 
F iscal gap 
X = G DP + Mk  ( 1 ) 
u = XJQ (2) 
g = 9o + k i  V g0; k>O (3) 
i = s (4) 
i= i + i  (5) p g 
s= sP + s9 + sf (6) 
i P = i0 + a i9 + � u V a; b>O (7) 
sP = cr0 + cr1 u V cr0; 0<cr1 <1  (8) 
s9 = z - s j* o<s< 1  (9) 
Z = Z0 + Z1 U V z0; Z1 >0 ( 1 0) 
7tU = i9 - S9 ( 1 1 )  
mk = a0 + a , u V a0; 0<a 1< 1  ( 1 2) 
mz = mo + m ,  i V m0; 0<m1 < 1  ( 1 3) 
sf = m + mk + mz + j* - e = <I> = �o + og + r ( 1 4) 
i 9 = [ 1 /( 1  + a)][( g - g0)/k - ( i0 + � u)] ( 1 5) 
( 1  + a) i9 - (cr1 + z1 - �) u = z0 - s f + cr0 + <t> - i0 ( 1 6) 
m 1 ( 1  + a) i 9 + [a, + m ,�] u = 
i9 - (1t + z1)  u = z0 - s j *  
( 1 7) 
( 1 8) 
Output growth is determined along Harrod-Domar lines, 
according to which the rate of growth of potential 04tput (g) is 
specified in Equation 3 as a linear function of the investment rate (i), 
which is in turn defined as investment as a percentage of potential 
output. The parameter (k) denotes the incremental output-capital 
ratio, while (g) denotes other factors affecting the rate of growth of 
output, such as labour productivity growth. Equation 4 states the 
equilibrium condition, or savings constraint, according to which 
investment (i) is equal to savings (s) . Total investment in Equation 5 is 
specified as the sum of private investment (ir) and government 
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investment (ig), with government investment defined as excluding 
investment by state-owned enterprises. Equation 6 specifies total 
savings as consisting of private saving (s/, public sector saving (sg) 
and foreign saving (sf) .  Private investment is defined in Equation 7. It 
is assumed that private investment varies with changes in demand 
conditions, as measured by (u), and with government investment. 
Private sector investment can vary positively with government 
investment, a 'crowding-in' effect, or negatively with government 
investment, a so-called 'crowding out' effect, depending on whether 
these two types of investment are complements or substitutes. Private 
savings are defined in Equation 8 and are specified in a standard way, 
according to which savings are assumed to vary positively with the 
capacity utilisation variable (u) . 
Public sector savings, investment and borrowing requirements are 
explained by Equations 9 to 11 .  Public sector savings are defined in 
Equation 9 as the difference between the fiscal effort variable (z) and 
interest payments on the government's foreign debt (s f), where (f) 
denotes interest payments on foreign debt and (s) the government's 
share. In Equation 10 the variable (z) defines the fiscal effort rate, also 
known as the public sector operating surplus, as the difference 
between current revenue net of transfers and subsidies plus the 
operating surpluses of public enterprises less government 
consumption expenditures and interest payments on the public 
sector's domestic debt. According to Equation 10, the public sector 
operating surplus is assumed to be primarily determined by the 
capacity utilisation rate (u), in that taxes, surpluses from public 
enterprises, and other receipts rise more rapidly than current spending 
when economic activity goes up. The strength of this response is 
measured by the parameter (z1), the marginal fiscal effort rate. In 
addition to the rate of capacity utilisation, the fiscal effort rate is 
influenced by other factors such as size of the tax base and the 
effectiveness of tax collection system. The strength of these other 
factors is captured by the parameter (zJ Equation 11 defines the 
public sector borrowing requirement (nu), or the public sector saving 
constraint, as the difference between government investment (ig) and 
public sector saving (s ) .  Note that in Equation 11 the public sector g 
borrowing requirement (n) is measured as a proportion of output (X), 
while (nu) denotes the public sector borrowing requirement as a 
percentage of potential output (Q). 
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The external sector is summarised by Equations 12 to 14. The 
import demand for intermediate goods (mk) is specified as a function 
of the capacity utilisation rate (u) in Equation 12, while import 
demand for capital goods (m) is specified as a function of domestic 
investment (i) in Equation 13. Equation 14 defines foreign savings, or 
the balance of payments constraint. The first part of Equation 14 
defines the current account deficit as competitive imports (m) plus 
intermediate imports (mk) plus capital goods imports (m) plus 
interest payments on foreign debt (f) less exports (e) . The capital 
account is presented in the second part of Equation 14, where (�8 ) 
denotes changes in the ratio of foreign debt over potential output, (8g) 
changes in official reserves, (r) the ratio of other capital inflows-such 
as foreign direct investment-over potential output, and ( <)>) total 
capital inflows as a percentage of potential output. Exports and capital 
inflows are treated as exogenous variables. 
The growth-investment equation, the savings gap equation, the 
foreign exchange gap equation, and the public sector savings gap 
equation are obtained from Equations 1 to 14 and are presented as 
Equations 15 through 18.6 In Equation 15, government investment (i8) 
and the capacity utilisation rate (u) are treated as variables which can 
be traded off to give macroeconomic equilibrium, meaning that the 
growth rate of capacity output (g) can be treated as a target policy 
variable. While the focus of Equation 15 is on government investment 
and capacity utilisation and not on growth, which, as documented 
earlier, has been weak, treating the growth rate of capacity output as a 
target policy variable is clearly attractive given poor economic 
performance. Equation 15 thus relates government investment (i8) to 
the capacity utilisation rate (u) and targeted potential output growth 
( g ) . The savings gap Equation 16 gives the maximum government 
investment attainable from a given rate of capacity utilisation (u) that 
satisfies the equilibrium condition defined in Equation 4. Higher 
government investment increases private investment and capacity 
utilisation and thereby generates sufficient savings to finance the 
higher investment. According to the foreign savings gap Equation 17, 
there is a trade off between government investment (i8) and the 
capacity utilisation rate (u) . Higher capacity utilisation generates a 
higher demand for intermediate imports that can only be met, given 
available foreign exchange, by cutting into capital goods imports and 
hence by lowering the growth rate of capacity. Lastly, the fiscal gap 
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Equation 18 shows government investment (ig) and the capacity 
utilisation rate (u) to move together as higher capacity utilisation 
generates more net fiscal revenue that can be channeled into capital 
formation. 
Econometric results 
The model specified in Table 4.2 was estimated using annual data for 
the period between 1971 and 1996 and using an ordinary least-squares 
technique.7 Since capacity utilisation (u) is estimated separately, 
simultaneity does not pose any problem. The results of the estimated 
behavioural equations are presented in Table 4.3. However, the 
parameter estimates presented in Table 4.3, as well as the simulation 
results presented in Table 4.4, should be treated as highly tentative. 
The model specified in Table 4.2 is, as already noted, a highly 
aggregated one-sector growth model in which price variations are not 
explicitly incorporated. Projected growth rates are in particular very 
sensitive to changes in world sugar prices and the performance of 
Fiji's non-sugar exports. Finally, and obviously, the quality of the data 
can always be better. 
Structural equations, three-gap results and policy implications 
Considering first the private investment equation presented in Table 4.3, 
the estimates generated by Equation 7 suggest that both the capacity 
utilisation rate and government investment are statistically significant 
determinants of private investment, explaining altogether about 95 
per cent of the variation in the private investment rate. However, the 
estimated coefficient of government investment suggests that higher 
government investment tends to crowd out private investment. It 
should be noted that such crowding out need not be detrimental to the 
economy. The impact of crowding out on the economy would depend 
upon the extent of crowding out, and the relative productivity of 
government and private investment. The results indicate that the 
crowding-out effect is incomplete, while the results do not convey 
any information about relative productivity. 
The capacity utilisation variable also appears to be a statistically 
significant determinant of private saving, fiscal effort and 
intermediate imports. Thus, the greater the degree of productive 
activity in the economy, the greater the rate of private savings which 
96 Confronti ng Fij i  Futures 
can be used to finance investment, the greater the rate of government 
revenue collection, and the greater the rate of imports which are used 
as inputs in productive activity. It can be noted that the marginal fiscal 
effort rate is considerably smaller than that reported for other middle­
income countries (Taylor 1993: Table 2.3) . It can also be noted that the 
estimates for intermediate imports indicate a high degree of 
dependence on imports. Finally, the estimates for imports of capital 
Table 4.3 Econometric results of the structural equations and the 
three-gap equationsa,b 
Private investmentc i p = 0 .03 1 + 0 .062 u - 0 . 547 jg 
( 1 .3 1 )  (4 .46) (-2 . 32) R2 = 0 .95  
Private saving sP = 0 .0 1 1 + 0 . 1 7  u 
(0 . 7 1 )  ( 1 1 . 08) R2 = 0 .92 
Fisca l effort z = - 0.084 + 0 . 1 1 7  u 
(-2 . 33) (2 .88) R2 = 0.42 
Import demand 
i ntermediate goods mk = - 0. 1 1 6 + 0 .3 1 6  u 
(-2 .43 ) (5 .87) R2 = 0 .72 
capital goodsd mz =0. 1 0 1 + 0 .39 i 
(0.44) (2 .29) R2 = 0 .80 
Three-gap equations 
Savings gap jg = - 0 .38 1  + 0.495 u 
Fisca l gap jg = - 0 . 1 27 + 0. 1 83 u 
Foreign exchange gap jg = 1 . 59 - 1 .924 u 
Notes: 
a t-statistics are given in parentheses under the coefficients, and the coefficients of 
determination (R2) are adjusted R2• All equations were tested and corrected for 
autocorrelation. 
b All equations were estimated using a dummy variable representing the coup of 1987 
and the period under the Interim Government, 1987 to 1992. The dummy variable was 
not statistically significant in any estimated equations, and hence is not reported here. 
c The private investment equation was estimated using annual data for the period 1977 
to 1996. Due to the high degree of correlation between private investment and potential 
output, the private investment equation was estimated using the level of private 
investment and actual output rather than their normalised ratios. Both current and 
lagged values of public sector investment were included in estimating the private 
investment equations. The lagged values were however not statistically significant, and 
are therefore not reported here. 
ct Due to the high degree of correlation between capital goods and imports and 
potential output, the equation for capital goods imports was estimated using the level 
of imports and investment rather than their normalised ratios. 
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goods demonstrate that the marginal propensity to import with 
respect to fixed capital formation is statistically significant. It is also 
relatively large, indicating Fiji's high degree of dependence on 
imported capital goods. Thus, the greater the rate of investment, the 
greater the extent of capital goods imports. 
Using the estimated values of the parameters and the values of the 
exogenous variables, the model was calibrated for 1996. The resulting 
three-gap equations are shown in Table 4.3 and visually displayed in 
Figure 4.1 .  Figure 4.1 demonstrates a sharp trade-off between 
government investment-which is to say, publicly funded capacity 
creation-and capacity utilisation under the foreign exchange 
constraint. The savings constraint line is steeper than the fiscal 
constraint line. This indicates that the government budgetary 
constraints are more binding than the savings constraint as more 
foreign capital becomes available. In such circumstances, an attempt to 
raise government investment in order to stimulate economic growth 
will put the government in fiscal difficulties, even though savings are 
in principle available to finance additional investment. 
The fiscal limitations on the government, as well as the crowding­
out effect of government investment, should be interpreted with great 
care. This is because of the highly aggregated nature of the model. 
Nonetheless, two possible explanations for these results can be 
suggested. The first is more 'economistic', in that it seeks to explain 
why government investment crowds out private investment. The 
crowding-out effect of government investment might be explained, 
amongst other factors, by the government's low savings rate, its 
massive budgetary appropriations to public enterprises/ and the 
preferential access to commercial credit that has been granted to 
public enterprises. At the same time, the government's increasing use 
of tax holidays to attract both domestic and foreign investment into 
the export sector, and most notably the garment, tourism and minerals 
sectors, when considered in light of a relatively small marginal fiscal 
effort rate, may have in fact exacerbated fiscal weakness. As a 
consequence, government deficits have had to be primarily financed 
by domestic borrowing. However, the financing of chronic 
government deficits by domestic borrowing has reduced private non­
financial investment, through a process of crowding out. There is 
therefore a need to recognise the impact of government spending on 
capacity utilisation, both in its impact on investment, through the 
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Figure 4. 1 Foreign exchange, saving and fiscal gaps 
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crowding-out effect, and in its generation of savings, through the 
inefficiency of public enterprises. In light of these possible 
mechanisms, it could be suggested that it is necessary to increase 
private domestic and foreign investment in order to enhance capacity 
creation and its utilisation. This in turn suggests two policies. The first 
deals with the monopolisation of domestic savings by the public 
sector, and the answer is both clear and orthodox: much deeper 
deregulation of the financial sector, primarily through privatisation. 
The second is consistent with existing government policy: the need to 
further mobilise external resources through the promotion of greater 
inflows of foreign direct investment. 
However, this economistic response is not satisfactory. This is 
because it diagnoses symptoms without giving an understanding of 
underlying causes. In order to understand underlying causes, it is 
necessary to try and explain why there may be fiscal limitations on the 
government and why government intervention in capacity creation 
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and utilisation may be detrimental to Fiji's economy. In order to 
address this broader issue, it is important to recognise that the state in 
Fiji  through the late 1980s and 1990s has sought to establish a delicate 
balance between promoting private sector growth and safeguarding 
the interests of its principal constituency, the indigenous Fijian 
community (Elek, Hill and Tabor 1993) .  As Sutherland points out in 
his contribution to this volume, the pursuit of this balance has been 
highly contradictory. Contradictions in the pursuit of this balance may 
in turn have had economic consequences. Recent work on Africa has 
established 'strong and specific mechanisms whereby ethnically 
fractionalised societies were liable to have worse economic performance 
than more homogenous societies' (Collier 1998:12)'8 This is because 
ethnic fragmentation may be 'bad for . . .  macroeconomic policy, (local) 
government performance, public sector wage determination, and the 
determinants of trust' (Collier 1998:3). Granted, the negative economic 
implications of ethnic diversity can be overcome. Collier (1998:12) 
stresses that 'political institutions matter more where a society has a 
potential problem of ethnic fractionalisation than in homogenous 
societies. Democracy has the capacity almost completely to offset the 
economic damage which can be done by a high level of 
fractionalisation'. Nonetheless, ethnic diversity-and particularly, 
according to Collier, moderate ethnic diversity of the type experienced 
in Fiji-may reduce the efficiency of government in circumstances 
where there is a lack of political rights. 
There is good reason to suspect that these kinds of mechanisms 
may have contributed to Fiji's economic performance during the late 
1980s and 1990s. On the one hand, the state sought to maintain its 
political base amongst the indigenous Fijian population by reducing 
the political rights of the Indo-Fijian community (Sutherland, this 
volume; Robertson, this volume). On the other hand, the state pursued 
explicit and implicit policies designed to promote economic affirmative 
action on behalf of the indigenous Fijian community (Ratuva, this 
volume). These policies have expanded the scope of ethnically based 
patronage within the state and society, and may have given rise to rent 
seeking on the part of individuals. The collapse of the National Bank 
of Fiji illustrates the capacity for rent seeking in post-coup Fiji. Ethnic 
preferences in post-coup Fiji may also have contributed to other 
inefficiencies in the public sector. Certainly, ongoing losses in many 
public enterprises have been acceptable to the state, in part because of 
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the 'ethnicisation' of economic policy. It is thus a reasonable 
hypothesis that the 'ethnicisation' of economic policy in Fiji has played 
a pivotal role in reducing the effectiveness of the state and has 
contributed to the creation of circumstances in which state 
intervention may be detrimental to the economy. 
Simulation results 
The estimated model can be used to simulate the effects of alternative 
policies by altering the values of individual variables such as the 
targeted growth rate of output, investment, exports and imports and 
then assessing the effect of such a change on the other variables 
contained in the model. In what follows, the model was simulated for 
the period between 1997 and 2001 . These simulations were undertaken 
under four growth path 'scenarios'. While the first two simulations 
assume that Fiji's preferential access to the EU for its sugar exports will 
terminate by 2001, scenarios I and II differ in terms of their underlying 
export growth rates. Scenario I follows a rather optimistic growth path, 
according to which the gradual elimination of Fiji's preferential access to 
the EU for its sugar is matched by a corresponding and offsetting 
export diversification effort, as a result of which the country's export 
earnings remain unchanged. This rather optimistic export growth rate 
is adjusted under simulation II to reflect the most recent data on Fiji's 
non-sugar export performance and the recent slow down in the 
economic growth of Fiji's main trading partners. 
Scenarios III and IV explore two quite different and distinctive 
growth paths: a growth rate that is most likely to occur; and a growth 
rate that meets 'socially desirable' ends. The most likely growth path 
scenario assumes that Fiji's preferential access to the EU remains in 
place until the end of 2001 and that Fiji's non-sugar export growth rate 
falls considerably short of those rates achieved during the early 1990s. 
Thus, Fiji's successful achievement in diversifying its exports during 
the early 1990s is assumed to come to an end. This occurs because of 
the low projected growth rates of Fiji's East Asian trading partners, as 
well as because of the domestic difficulties facing the country in its 
transition from the first, comparatively easy, phase of export-led 
growth to the next, more difficult, phase, under which the basis of 
such growth must be deepened in order for it to be sustained. 
Particular domestic issues include that of land leases (Prasad and 
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Kumar, this volume), as well as the future evolution of inter­
community relations in light of the new Constitution and the 1999 
general elections. By way of contrast, according to the 'socially 
desirable' growth path scenario, potential output and per capita 
output are assumed to grow at an average annual rate of 5.2 per cent 
and 4 per cent respectively. These rates of growth are almost identical 
to those rates achieved by Fiji during the 1970s. Unlike the first three 
scenarios, external resources are assumed to be both available and 
adequate under growth scenario IV, so that foreign exchange gaps, if 
any, can be filled. The results of these simulations are summarised in 
Table 4.4. 
Scenario I: Successful export diversification 
Considering first growth path scenario I, it is necessary to begin by 
noting that over the 10 year period between 1985 and 1994 Fiji 
received a price for its sugar exports to the EU which was, on average, 
65 per cent greater than the world market price. This preferential 
market access provided Fiji with an implicit subsidy amounting to 
about 3.5 per cent of Fiji's GDP per year over the period between 1985 
and 1994. The effect of a gradual elimination of this preferential 
market access between 1997 and 2001 on economic growth, 
investment, government revenues and borrowing requirements, and 
imports and external debt depends on the performance of non-sugar 
exports. For Fiji to continue to grow at the same rate as the rate of 
growth of output experienced in the 1996 base year-3.1 per cent­
and with no change in savings and investment ratios and government 
borrowing requirements, it is projected under scenario I that non­
sugar exports will have to grow at an annual average rate of 3.9 per 
cent between 1997 and 2001.  This is noted in Table 4.4. Higher non­
sugar export earnings and moderate import growth are then projected 
to produce a small current account surplus, equivalent to 2.5 per cent 
of total export earnings, and a reduction in external debt from 5.3 per 
cent of exports in 1996 to an average annual rate of 2.9 per cent 
between 1997 and 2001. However, this rate of growth of non-sugar 
exports appears to be unattainable, especially in light of the recent 
slowdown in economic growth in the East Asia and Pacific region, as 
well as the exhaustion of the first and easy stage of Fiji's export 
diversification drive. 
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Table 4.4 Projected growth path scenarios, 1 997-2001 
G rowth path scenarios 
Base year End of Sugar Protocol Most l ikely Socia l ly 
1 996 successful l im ited desirable 
export export 
diversification diversification 
I l l  IV 
Real growth rate 
(% per ann um) 
Actua l  GDP 3 . 1 3 . 1  -0 . 3  1 .3 5 . 2  
Per capita G D P  1 .9 1 .9 - 1 . 5  . 1  4 .0 
Potentia l  GDP 1 .3 3 . 1 0 .9  0 .9  2 .0  
Imports 7 . 7 1 .9 -0 .5 1 .3 4 .2 
Exports 1 5 . 5  3 . 9a 1 .3a  1 . 1 1 . 1 
As % of potential GDP 
(period average) 
Actua l  output 
(capacity uti l i sation rate) 8 1 . 5  8 1 . 5  78 .6 82 . 6  89 . 5  
Fixed investment 8 .0  8 .0  7 .8  8 . 5 1 0 . 8  
Govt. borrowing requ i rements 5 .4  5 .4 5 .4 5 .0  4 .7  
As % of exports 
(period average) 
Imports 97 . 7  97 .7  98 . 1  1 00.6 1 07 .3  
External  debt 1 7 .0 1 0 . 3  1 7 .0  1 7 . 0  24. 5 
Debt services 5 . 3  2 . 9  5 . 3  5 . 3  1 1 . 3 
Note: a Non-sugar exports only. 
Scenario II: Limited export diversification 
In growth path scenario II, export growth rates are adjusted 
downward to reflect the most recent export performance of Fiji as well 
as the developments in East Asia. Using the latest Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) forecasts for Fiji's 
main export markets and Fiji's most recent export performance, non­
sugar exports are assumed to grow at an average annual rate of only 
1 .3 per cent between 1997 and 2001.  It is also assumed that only 
moderate inflows of foreign direct investment are available, there is 
limited access to foreign financing and there is no change in Fiji's 
external debt to potential output ratio between 1997 and 2001 . Under 
these assumptions, imports and output growth will have to be 
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compressed in order to make do with reduced export earnings and 
limited capital inflows. This compression, as reflected in the decline in 
output growth and the capacity utilisation rate is, as shown in Table 
4.4, considerable. Reduced imports, including imports of capital and 
intermediate goods, make the foreign exchange constraint more 
binding as the gradual elimination of implicit subsidies under the 
Sugar Protocol pushes the foreign exchange constraint line in Figure 
4.1 towards the origin. Lower export earnings also reduce the 
maximum achievable rate of investment. As a consequence, actual 
output and per capita income are projected to shrink at an average 
annual rate of 0.3 and 1 .5 per cent respectively between 1997 and 2001 . 
The decline in actual output combined with a slow rate of growth of 
potential output lowers the average rate of capacity utilisation to 78.6 
per cent, and fixed investment to 7.8 per cent of potential output, over 
the period between 1997 and 2001 .  Although lower capacity utilisation 
reduces government tax revenues, an increase in the fiscal effort, such 
as the broadening of the tax base, leaves government borrowing 
requirements almost unchanged-the fiscal effort parameter rises 
from 0.117 in the base year of 1996 to 0.125 by 2001.  
Scenario III: The most likely growth path 
Unlike the previous two growth path scenarios, scenario III, the most 
likely growth path, assumes Fiji's preferential market access will 
remain in place at least until the end of 2001.  Making similar 
assumptions about the growth rates of non-sugar exports and capital 
inflows as those made under scenario II, the maximum achievable 
output and investment growth rates are reported in Table 4.4. Low 
rates of growth of export earnings, combined with limited capital 
inflows, are projected to reduce the growth rate of actual output from 
3.1 per cent in 1996 to an average of 1 .3 per cent per annum over the 
period between 1997 and 2001 .  With a population growth rate of about 
1 .2 per cent per annum, per capita income remains stagnant over the 
period. Fixed capital formation rises slightly, from 8 per cent of 
potential output in 1996 to 8.5 per cent of potential output over the 
period between 1997 and 2001.  The small increase in fixed capital 
formation reflects an increase in the capacity utilisation rate from 81 .5 
per cent in 1996 to 82.6 per cent over the period between 1997 and 
2001.  This slight increase in investment is primarily brought about by 
an increase in government investment, which rises from 2.2 per cent of 
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potential output in 1996 to 2.6 per cent of potential output over the 
period between 1997 and 2001. However, despite this slight increase in 
government investment, government borrowing requirements decline 
from 5.4 per cent of potential output in 1996 to 5 per cent of potential 
output over the period between 1997 and 2001 as additional public 
revenue efforts, such as a broadening of the tax base and 
improvements in tax collection, are achieved. Imports of capital and 
intermediate goods rise as a result of the increase in both capacity 
utilisation and fixed capital formation. These higher imports are 
financed partly by growing export earnings and partly by moderate 
capital inflows. As it has been assumed that there is limited access to 
foreign financing and moderate inflows of direct foreign investment, 
external debt and debt service as a percentage of exports remain 
unchanged over the period between 1997 and 2001. 
Scenario IV: The socially desirable growth path 
Given Fiji's low rates of economic growth during the past decade, 
projected economic growth under scenario III, the most likely growth 
path, will fall short of meeting the population's expectations and 
aspirations, as well the growth rates achieved by Fiji during the 1970s. 
Scenario IV examines the implications of a socially desirable growth 
path, in which actual output is assumed to grow at an average annual 
rate of 5.2 per cent, a rate that was achieved by Fiji in the 1970s. 
Potential output is also assumed to grow at annual average rate of 2 
per cent. These assumptions imply a steady increase in the capacity 
utilisation rate over the period between 1997 and 2001, so that by 2001 
capacity utilisation reaches almost 98 per cent. Higher capacity 
utilisation, combined with improvements in the socio-political 
environment, including a satisfactory resolution of land lease issues, 
reverse the steady decline in the investment rate experienced by Fiji 
during the past decade. Fixed capital formation rises from 8 per cent 
of potential output in 1996 to an average rate of 10.8 per cent of 
potential output per annum in the period between 1997 and 2001, 
while private investment similarly rises from 3.5 per cent of potential 
output in 1996 to 4.3 per cent of potential output over the period 
between 1997 and 2001 . It should be noted that these investment rates 
fall considerably short of the investment rates achieved by Fiji in the 
1970s, and are hence achievable. So too is the projected increase in 
government investment. Following years of low government 
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investment and the gradual deterioration of physical infrastructure, 
government investment rises slightly from 2.2 per cent of potential 
output in 1996 to an average annual rate of 2.8 per cent over the 
period between 1997 and 2001. Higher government investment is 
partly financed by higher capacity utilisation and partly by additional 
public revenues-the fiscal effort parameter rises from 0.118 in 1996 to 
0.125 in the period between 1997 and 2001 as the tax base is broadened 
and the collection of taxes is improved. As noted in Table 4.4, these 
higher tax revenues slightly reduce government borrowing 
requirements. Higher rates of capacity utilisation and investment also 
increase imports of capital and intermediate goods. To fill the foreign 
exchange gap, export earnings are supplemented by a moderate 
increase in foreign direct investment as well as by an increase in 
foreign debt. External debt is projected to grow from US$217 million 
in 1996 to US$431 million by the end of 2001; debt servicing also 
grows. However, relative to potential output, this foreign borrowing is 
not large, amounting to an average of 17.5 per cent of potential output 
over the period between 1997 and 2001. It is thus sustainable. 
The policy implications of the simulation results 
The size of the foreign financing gap under all four scenarios 
illustrates quite vividly the centrality of the foreign exchange 
constraint in general, and preferential access to the EU sugar market in 
particular, on the medium-term growth rate. It thus helps to explain 
why the Fiji government has been trying to promote and diversify 
exports. In the absence of compensatory financing a gradual 
elimination of Fiji's preferential market access will considerably 
reduce output growth and the capacity utilisation rate. This would 
have potentially destabilising consequences. For a country which has 
had a decade of slow growth and deepening economic insecurity, 
resulting, amongst other things, from the implementation of an 
orthodox structural adjustment program, low growth in output, 
investment and capacity utilisation are not without their own 
significant socioeconomic costs, both in the short and the long term. 
Moreover, given the short-term pain associated with the 
implementation of an orthodox structural adjustment program, these 
low rates of output and investment growth make it even harder to 
sustain the adjustment program. Finally, despite the implementation 
of a new constitution (Ghai, this volume), the 'ethnicisation' of 
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economic policy may continue to have an effect on the growth rate. 
This rather bleak outcome applies not only to an extreme scenario, 
such as scenario II, under which Fiji's preferential market access for its 
sugar exports is assumed to end. It also applies, to some extent, to 
scenario III, under which Fiji's preferential market access is assumed 
to be maintained until 2001 . 
Clearly, if a socially desirable growth rate is to be achieved in the 
short and medium term, there is a need to overcome the two most 
binding constraints facing the Fiji economy, namely the foreign 
exchange constraint and the fiscal constraint. The former requires an 
increase in foreign capital inflows and the latter an improvement in 
government savings. Since increases in concessional aid for a middle­
income economy such as Fiji are unlikely, the government is left with 
borrowing on international markets and attracting foreign direct 
investment in order to meet the foreign exchange requirements of a 
socially desirable growth path. Borrowing on the international market 
has its own costs, as the recent experience of East Asia clearly 
indicates. By way of contrast, Fiji has undoubtedly been relatively 
successful in attracting foreign direct investment during the 
adjustment period. However, the record of the adjustment period is 
that the government sought to attract foreign direct investment in 
order to 'remake' Fiji into a low-income economy. Thus, its export 
drive has been predicated upon attracting capital into low value­
added activities such as the low-wage, semi-skilled garment industry. 
This is clearly the wrong kind of export diversification, in that it is not 
based upon Fiji's comparative advantage. Fiji's comparative 
advantage surely does not lie in low value-added activities. Rather, 
Fiji's advantage is its workforce: well educated and comparatively 
well skilled. At the same time though the country is spatially isolated. 
The impact of spatial isolation can however be offset if Fiji uses the 
comparative advantage of its workforce to attract foreign direct 
investment into skill-intensive, higher value-added activities which 
are not affected by transport costs. International knowledge-based and 
information technology-utilising services offer one possibility which 
could utilise Fiji's comparatively skilled labour force and which would 
not necessarily be affected by Fiji's spatial isolation. Data processing is 
but one example of such services. Even in these circumstances though, 
greater care should be paid when seeking to attract international 
capital into Fiji. The state should seek to encourage joint ventures with 
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local capital, along the lines encouraged in China, Vietnam and India, 
so that that technology and know-how which is transferred into the 
economy is predicated upon deepening the human capital available to 
the Fiji economy and as such building competitive advantage. 
However, achieving the socially desirable path requires not only an 
increase in foreign capital inflows but also an improvement in 
government savings. This can be achieved in part by: redirecting 
investment, including foreign direct investment, into higher value­
added industries; by raising the fiscal effort rate and the public sector 
operating surplus; and by improving the efficiency of government 
revenue generation. Improved efficiency amongst public enterprises 
requires, amongst other things, greater market-based autonomy, 
greater managerial accountability, and a stronger link between 
performance and remuneration. Improvements in the productivity 
and operating surpluses of public enterprises would contribute to 
improved efficiency in government revenue generation. So too would 
the granting of tax concessions more wisely, the broadening of the tax 
base and improvements the tax collection system. Improvements in 
the efficiency of tax concessions requires, among other things, a shift 
away from the current policy of granting tax concessions across the 
board and towards granting them on a case-by-case basis, with the 
evaluation of each case based upon the extent to which the concession 
helps fulfil strategic priorities specified by the state. 
One final point can be made. It has been hypothesised in this 
chapter that the 'ethnicisation' of economic policy in Fiji may have 
played a role in reducing the effectiveness of state intervention. 
Clearly, more research needs to be done on this issue. Nonetheless, if 
the use of ethnicity in the allocation of resources has reduced the 
efficiency of resource allocation by the state, there is a clear need to 
end the 'ethnicisation' of economic policy in Fiji. 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter has been to review Fiji's macroeconomic 
performance and assess the relative significance of foreign exchange, 
domestic savings, and public sector resources on Fiji's economic 
growth. Using annual data for the period between 1971 and 1996 a 
three-gap model has been formulated and estimated. The estimated 
foreign exchange gap equation indicates a sharp trade-off between 
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investment, or capacity creation, and capacity utilisation. The 
government savings constraint also appears to be more binding than 
the savings constraint as more external resources become available. In 
such circumstances, attempts to raise government investment in order 
to stimulate economic growth will put the state into fiscal difficulties 
even though savings are in principle available to finance additional 
investment. 
To assess the significance for Fiji of the foreign exchange constraint 
in general, and Fiji's preferential access to the EU sugar market in 
particular, the model has been simulated for the period between 1997 
and 2001 under four growth path scenarios. The first two growth path 
scenarios assume that Fiji's preferential market access to the EU is 
eliminated over the period between 1997 and 2001 but differ in their 
assumptions concerning the success of export diversification. The 
third and fourth growth path scenarios assume that Fiji's preferential 
market access remains in place until 2001 but differ in their 
assumptions concerning growth in actual output, exports and capital 
inflows. 
The results from the first two scenarios suggest that in the absence 
of high growth rates of non-sugar exports, and with an absence of 
compensatory financing, the decline in output growth and capacity 
utilisation rates may be so considerable as to be potentially 
destabilising: the maximum achievable growth rate of per capita 
income was found to be -1 .5 per cent per year for the period between 
1997 and 2001. Even if Fiji's preferential market access were to remain 
in place until the end of 2001 the results of the most likely growth path 
scenario suggest stagnant per capita income over the period between 
1997 and 2001. Given the short-term pains associated with the 
implementation of an orthodox structural adjustment program and the 
slow growth in per capita income over the past decade, these low rates 
of output and investment growth would make it even harder to 
sustain policy credibility. 
However, the results suggest that the external financing required to 
achieve a socially desirable growth path is modest, amounting to an 
average of 17.5 per cent of potential output over the period between 
1997 and 2001 . In addition to a moderate increase in direct foreign 
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investment, foreign debt is projected to grow from US$217 million in 
1996 to US$431 by the end of 2001 . The size of the foreign financing 
gap under the socially desirable growth path illustrates quite vividly 
the centrality of the foreign exchange constraint in general, and 
preferential market access in particular, on Fiji's ability to achieve a 
modest rate of growth in the medium term. Clearly, the challenge for 
Fiji's policymakers is to intensify export diversification efforts and to 
improve the government savings rate. The former requires, among 
other things, a set of coherent and consistent export promotion efforts 
directed at utilising Fiji's comparatively well-educated and skilled 
workforce and attracting foreign direct investment into joint ventures 
in international services. Such a strategy, focused as it is on higher 
value-added activities, might serve to increase the rate of capacity 
utilisation in the economy and increase the rate of growth of the 
economy. Export diversification efforts should, however, be 
accompanied by an improvement in government savings if a modest 
rate of growth is to be achieved in the short and medium term. Finally, 
it has been suggested in this chapter that in order to improve the 
efficiency of state intervention in the economy, and thus government 
savings, there may be a need to reduce the 'ethnicisation' of economic 
policy. Clearly, achieving a socially desirable growth path in Fiji in the 
medium term is a major challenge for the new government. 
Endnotes 
1. Neither the year of the coups, 1987, nor the immediate catch-up 
year of 1988 have been used in calculating the period averages in 
this chapter, in an effort to gamer a better understanding of the 
relative economic performance of the Fiji economy under 
adjustment. It can be noted that making some alterations to the 
years included in the period averages does not shift the direction of 
change but rather only affects the magnitude of change, and only 
then to a small degree. 
2. The following three subsections draw heavily on Akram-Lodhi 
(1996). 
3. Less mathematically inclined readers may want to skip this section. 
4. Output is here defined in somewhat non-standard fashion, 
reflecting the importance of intermediate imports in production for 
a developing country such as Fiji. 
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5. Private savings (s ) were estimated as a residual from the 
Keynesian nation�l income identity, which can be written in 
normalised form as: 
s = i + i - s + e - m - m - m - J·* 
p p g g k z 
where other terms are as they are defined in the text. 
6. The growth-investment Equation 15 is obtained by substituting the 
total investment Equation 5 into the growth Equation 3 using the 
private investment Equation 7. The savings gap Equation 16 is 
obtained by substituting Equations 7 to 10 and 14 into Equation 3. 
Substituting Equations 12 and 13 into the foreign savings Equation 
14 yields the foreign savings gap Equation 17. Finally, the fiscal 
gap Equation 18 is obtained by substituting Equations 9 and 10 into 
Equation 11, the public sector borrowing requirement. 
7. Budgetary appropriations to public enterprises amounted to about 
55 per cent of total public sector capital expenditure over the 
period 1985-90 (Elek, Hill and Tabor 1993: Table 2). 
8 .  Our thanks to David Styan for directing us to Collier 's work on 
ethnicity and economic performance. 
CHAPTER 5 
Inst itutional r igidities and 
economic performance in F ij i  
Biman Prasad and Sunil Kumar 
Introduction 
It has been argued that the increased commitment towards structural 
adjustment policies in Fiji following the two military coups of 1987 
were an important step in placing Fiji in a position to cope with the 
deepening globalisation of the world economy. However, the 
performance of the Fiji economy over the last decade has been poor 
(Sepehri and Akram-Lodhi, this volume). Some would argue that this 
poor economic performance is because Fiji has not gone far enough in 
pursuing its structural adjustment policies, in large part because of 
political uncertainty. Now, a new constitution is in place (Chai, this 
volume). Many political and business leaders believe that the new 
constitution will resolve uncertainty and in so doing provide a climate 
conducive to investment and growth, especially if the pace of 
structural adjustment in Fiji picks up. 
However, it has been pointed out by Dunning (1997) that there are 
no universal prescriptions available to a country responding to the 
forces of globalisation. Each country has different institutional and 
economic structures, which will affect how it responds to global 
economic forces. As one of those institutions, the role of the state is 
vital in determining the economic performance of countries, both in its 
own direct interventions and in facilitating the development of the 
complementary economic, political, social and cultural institutions 
which can supplement performance. Fiji is no exception in this respect, 
and this helps explain why the performance of the state in Fiji has 
been in the spotlight. 
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In this chapter it is argued that the state in Fiji has paid insufficient 
attention to the institutions which provide the framework within 
which economic growth takes place. As such, the state has not 
addressed institutional rigidities that constrain growth. The chapter 
makes this argument by focusing on one particular institutional 
constraint to growth: property rights in land in Fiji. In the next section, 
the relationship between institutions and economic performance is 
discussed. The character of property rights in land in Fiji is critically 
examined and ways of transcending institutional rigidities in the 
assignation of property rights in land are evaluated. The final section 
provides some tentative conclusions. 
Institutions and economic performance 
The 'new institutional economics' 
Institutions in a society determine the way in which social, cultural, 
political and economic relations are conducted. They thus constitute 
the framework by which relations are structured. In structuring 
relations, institutions shape the various rules and procedures applied 
in a given set of circumstances. For example, when conducting 
economic activities, institutions can affect incentives and thus 
outcomes. Therefore, institutions and what they do are, as Adams 
(1993) notes, important when seeking to understand and affect the 
changes taking place in an economy or in a society. As a consequence, 
institutions and what they do need to be a central part of the policy 
process. This is increasingly being acknowledged by policy makers, 
who are coming to accept that within the economy growth is affected 
by the institutional framework and social practices which structure the 
process of development (Maki 1993; Hodgson 1989) . 
Development economics pioneers such as Hirschman (1958), 
Leibenstein (1957), Myint (1965), Fei and Ranis (1964), Myrdal (1957) 
and Nurkse (1953) all gave attention to institutions when explaining 
economic development. However, as Adams (1993) points out, what is 
now called the 'new institutional economics' is different from both 
mainstream and development economics. It clearly differs from the 
former, with its challenge to the neoclassical theory of individualistic 
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optimisation in competitive markets, a theory that does not accept the 
pervasive nature of institutional constraints. As for the latter, Adams 
writes that 
despite much agreement and interaction, an important division 
remained between institutional economists and development 
economists: the former stressed the importance of institutions and the 
dysfunctions of the market capitalist system in all settings, while the 
latter generally held to the tenet that institutions mattered and markets 
are meaningfully flaw-ridden only in relatively underdeveloped areas 
(1993:250) . 
A focal figure in the emergence of the new institutional economics 
is that of Nobel Laureate Douglass North. As Libecap notes, 
Douglass North has been one of the foremost economists in asserting 
that much more attention must be directed to the institutional 
structure of a society in general, and to its property rights 
arrangements in particular, for explaining variations in economic 
performance across societies and across time (1992:227). 
North's contribution can be traced from as early as 1955, when he 
first sought to explain economic growth by reference to the specific 
institutional structures present in a developed capitalist state (North 
1955:243) . Subsequently, North sought to explain the role of 
institutions in the overall performance of economies by differentiating 
between efficient and inefficient institutions and then attempting to 
demonstrate how these affected variables such as rate of growth of 
gross domestic product or the investment rate (North and Thomas 
1973:127) . 
Within the new institutional economics that North has helped to 
foster, issues such as property rights, the role of the state, the character 
of the bureaucratic structure and the control of technology have all 
occupied analytical prominence. At the same time however the new 
institutional economics has not been unaware of the role of social 
power in affecting the performance of an economy. Institutions reflect 
social power. Thus, the basis by which power is created, accessed and 
used has been seen by new institutional economists as being an 
important factor in determining the kind of institutional structures 
that emerge in a society and which thus have an impact upon the 
economy. 
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Property rights as an economic institution 
As North (1990:11) has written, neoclassical theory is based on the 
fundamental assumption of scarcity and hence competition. Its 
harmonious implications come from its assumptions about a 
frictionless exchange process in which property rights are perfectly 
and costlessly specified and information is likewise costless to acquire. 
Standard neoclassical theory thus assumes that a set of private 
property rights already exists and that such a set of rights governs the 
control and use of all resources . Moreover, neoclassical theory assumes 
that individuals engage in economic activities when the cost of 
information concerning the exchange, enforcement and policing costs 
of contractual activities are zero. It is under this set of assumptions 
that individuals become free to pursue the utility-maximising 
activities that ensure an efficient allocation of resources. 
However, this set of assumptions is exceedingly stringent. For 
example, in the process of exchange there is usually an unequal 
distribution and accumulation of information, which may lead to 
asymmetrical information (Riker and Weimer 1994) . Under conditions 
of asymmetrical information, exchange generates an inefficient 
outcome. Similarly, Tietenberg (1992) and Randall (1987) both argue 
that the application of neoclassical theory demands that property 
rights are universal, exclusive, transferable and enforceable. This too is 
quite stringent: costs may be involved in the maintenance of the 
private property rights structure, and such costs may generate an 
inefficient outcome. Clearly, the neoclassical framework, and 
particularly its assumptions concerning the structure and maintenance 
of property rights, may not be witnessed in the real world. 
Cost considerations underlie the inclusion of property rights into 
economic analysis. Coase (1960) was instrumental in facilitating such 
an inclusion, arguing that market distortions and hence costs arising 
from externalities could be eliminated by a clear definition of property 
rights. A clear definition of property rights would result in resources 
being allocated to those agents that placed the highest value upon 
such resources, and this would facilitate economic efficiency. 
However, interventions in the economics of property rights such as 
those of Cheung (1970), Demsetz (1967), Alchian (1974), Wallis and 
North (1986), Barzel (1989) and Pejovich (1990) have all noted that any 
system of property rights entails an ancillary set of costs pertaining to 
enforcement. These costs need to be integrated into any economic 
Institut ional  r ig id ities a nd economic performa nce in Fij i  1 15 
analysis. Clearly, private property is only secure and its owner can 
only reap the benefits of ownership if others are prevented from the 
unauthorised use, appropriation or expropriation of the private 
property. In the words of Adam Smith (1937:862), 'commerce and 
manufacture can seldom flourish long in any state which does not 
enjoy a regular administrative justice in which people do not feel 
themselves secure in possession of their property, and in which faith of 
contracts is not supported by the law'. 
Governance and property rights 
Thus, for property rights to be secure, contracts must be enforced. As a 
consequence, there emerges a pivotal role for the state: maintaining 
and enforcing the property rights of individuals. Moreover, as 
Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1984:139) point out, 'as contracts and 
property rights enforceability becomes institutionalised, free trade and 
capitalist development is promoted'. This is because where property 
rights are undefined, insecure or are not enforced by the state, people 
have less incentive to invest or undertake innovative, entrepreneurial 
initiatives (Scully 1988; Scully and Slottje 1991; Torstensson 1994) . 
However, in many developing countries there is a lack of security of 
property rights. There thus emerges a link between property rights 
and economic performance: the inability of governments to ensure the 
enforceability of property rights weakens investment, weakens 
entrepreneurial activity, and acts as an impediment to economic 
efficiency and growth. 
Riker and Weimer (1994) indicate the four characteristics of 
property rights that the state must enforce: allocation, trespass, 
alienation and credibility. The capacity of the state to enforce these 
four characteristics is a question of governance. The World Bank has 
defined governance as 'the state's management of economic and social 
resources' (World Bank 1994) . The governance capacities of the state 
may be higher in a country which is politically stable (Riker and 
Weimer 1994), where democratic principles are highly valued in civil 
society, and where the security of property has become socially and 
morally institutionalised. Conversely, the governance capacities of the 
state may be lower where the rule of law is weaker. In part, this is 
because the potential for corrupt rent seeking by individuals within 
the state structure is greater where the rule of law is weaker (Tullock 
1980) . Such 'directly unproductive profit-seeking' (Bhagwati and 
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Srinivasan 1980) activity generates income which is not based upon 
making a contribution to productivity improvements, and thus leads 
to a loss in the welfare of a society. 
Thus, governance affects economic performance, in part because 
the effectiveness of governance determines the extent to which 
property rights are enforced and this in turn affects investment. 
Property rights are thus an extremely important economic institution. 
Given this importance, in those developing countries that have 
significant agricultural sectors-countries such as Fiji-it is to be 
expected that property rights in land are an economic institution that 
has implications for economic performance. If property rights in land 
are, to paraphrase North (1990), institutionally efficient, growth will 
be enhanced. If property rights in land are institutionally inefficient, 
growth will be reduced. In order to assess the efficiency of property 
rights in land, it is necessary to examine land tenure institutions, as 
these are the basis by which property rights are assigned, and as such 
will have an impact on productivity. 
In the following section, the theoretical insights of the new 
institutional economics are applied to a case study of property rights 
in land in Fiji. This is done in order to assess the implications of 
economic institutions on economic performance in general, and in 
particular to assess whether institutional rigidities in property rights 
in land have had an impact on economic performance in Fiji. 
Property rights in  land in F ij i  
Agriculture i n  Fiji1 
For most of the post-independence period, agriculture has provided 
around a fifth of Fiji's gross domestic product. Agriculture is also a 
major employer, with more than 75 per cent of all households working 
on a full or part-time basis in crop production, livestock, forestry and 
fisheries (World Bank 1995a) . Sugarcane farming and processing 
dominates commercial agricultural activity, and has done since its 
introduction in the 1880s. Sugarcane farming accounted for more than 
40 per cent of the total agricultural sector in 1995. At the same time, 
sugarcane processing accounted for almost 30 per cent of the total 
manufacturing sector in 1995 (Fiji Bureau of Statistics (various issues) :  
Table 3.3). As a consequence, the sugar industry was worth more than 
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1 2  per cent of GDP in 1995. Moreover, the sugar industry remains the 
largest single source of employment in Fiji, providing direct 
employment for more than 25 per cent of the economically active 
population. Finally, sugar provided some 40 per cent of exports by 
value in 1992. 
In 1993 sugarcane farming in Fiji was done on 23,454 registered 
farms. According to the World Bank (1995a), the average size of a 
sugarcane farm was 4.2 hectares. The average area harvested was 3.11 
hectares, the average cane yield was 48 tonnes per hectare, and the 
average gross revenue received was F$8,314. Most sugarcane farms 
are thus small production units. Operating for most of the year with 
household labour, 61 per cent of sugarcane farms produce on average 
less than 150 tonnes of cane per year. Moreover, 24 per cent of 
sugarcane farms have operational holdings of one hectare or less and 
produce on average 50 tonnes or less of cane a year. 
Sugarcane farming is subject to long production cycles, inflexible 
resource allocation and the uncertainty of the weather. In Fiji, 
production uses self-provided seed cane, animal draught power and 
limited quantities of agro-chemical fertilisers. In addition to family 
labour, hired labour is used during the harvesting season. Cane 
harvesting is performed manually under a complex gang system that 
involves farmers working alongside some 13,500 seasonal harvesters, 
many of whom are landless migrants. Cane harvesters receive an 
average rate of F$7.50 for every tonne of cane cut. This translates into 
an average daily wage paid of approximately F$8.50, almost 40 per 
cent below the mean average for all industries in Fiji. However, in 
addition to wage costs the farmer hiring the cane harvesters often 
bears the cost of providing housing and meals for the temporary 
labour. 
Access to land 
Given the importance of agriculture in the Fiji economy in general, 
and the importance of sugarcane production in particular, the 
institutional structures that govern the access of farmers to land are of 
critical importance. This is because arable land, in Fiji as elsewhere, is 
scarce. According to a survey by Twyford and Wright (1965) the total 
land area of Fiji is about 7,000 square miles. Table 5.1 indicates the 
composition of land ownership in Fiji, as indicated by Nayacakalou 
(1971) .  Land can be owned by indigenous Fijian land-owning groups, 
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Table 5 . 1  Categories of land ownership in Fiji 
Native land 
Crown land 
Freehold 
Total 
Per cent of total area 
83 
1 0  
7 
1 00 
Source: Nay acakalou, R., 1971. 'Fiji : manipulating the sy stem', in R. Crocombe (ed.), 
Land Tenure in the Pacific, Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 
called mataqali, which is called 'native land'; owned by the state, which 
is called 'crown land'; or can be privately owned, which is called 
'freehold' land. Whilst the figures in Table 5.1 underestimate the 
distribution of native land, in that some crown land has reverted to 
native land (Ward 1995), they are broadly accurate. As is 
demonstrated in Table 5.1, 83 per cent of land in Fiji is classified as 
native land. Some 10 per cent of land in Fiji is owned by the state. This 
land is subdivided into two categories: crown land schedule A; and 
crown land schedule B. Schedule A is native land that reverted to the 
state after the demise of the mataqali. Schedule B is state land over 
which there are no mataqali claims. Finally, 7 per cent of the land is 
classified as freehold. The majority of this land was acquired during 
the late 1800s. While a small percentage of the overall land area, it 
should be noted that this land covers a large proportion of the arable 
area, and often includes better quality land. 
Table 5.2 classifies land according to its suitability for agricultural 
purposes for the years 1965 and 1978. Significant changes took place 
in the thirteen-year period. In 1965 Twyford and Wright found that 40 
per cent of Fiji's land area was unsuitable for agriculture, as it 
consisted of undulating to steep mountains covered with forests. In 
1978, using slightly different but broadly comparable definitions, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries found that only 6 per cent of the 
land area was wholly unsuitable for agriculture. Twyford and Wright 
found that only 20 per cent of the land area could be used for 
agriculture without any improvements being made. In 1978 this figure 
had dropped to only 16 per cent. In 1965 some 10 per cent of the land 
area could have become available for agriculture if appropriate 
improvements had been made. In 1978 this category had dramatically 
increased, to constitute 43 per cent of the land area. Finally, whereas in 
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Table 5.2 Land use classification i n  per cent, 1 965 and 1 978 
Land classification 1 965 1 978 
Suitab le for agricu lture ( 'F i rst C lass') 20 1 6  
Su itab le for ag ricu lture only after 
advanced improvement ('Second C lass') 1 0  43 
Su itable for agriculture only after advanced 
dra inage and so i l  conservation work ('Th i rd C lass') 30 35 
Unsu itable for agriculture ( 'Fourth C lass') 40 6 
Tota l 1 00 1 00 
Source: Fiji Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 1978. Census of Agriculture, Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries, Suva. 
1965 some 30 per cent of the land area needed drainage and soil 
conservation work in order to make it available for agricultural 
purposes, by 1978 this figure had increased to 35 per cent. 
Native land dominates the distribution of land in Fiji. It also 
dominates the distribution of arable land. This gives rise to a complex 
ethnic dimension in access to scarce arable land in Fiji. Currently, some 
75 per cent of sugarcane farmers are Indo-Fijian. They are responsible 
for about 88 per cent of sugarcane production. By way of contrast, 
about 25 per cent of sugarcane farmers are indigenous Fijian. They are 
responsible for about 12 per cent of total sugarcane production. Clearly, 
with the majority of agricultural land controlled by one community, the 
indigenous Fijian community, and with the majority of sugarcane 
farmers coming from a second community, the Indo-Fijian community, 
ethnicity is a major factor in agricultural production in Fiji. 
Moreover, ethnicity may also be a major factor in agricultural 
productivity in Fiji. The figures just quoted demonstrate that 
indigenous Fijian sugarcane farmers are comparatively less productive 
than Indo-Fijian sugarcane farmers. The cause of comparatively poor 
performance amongst indigenous Fijians is often put down to a lack of 
experience in sugarcane farming within the indigenous Fijian 
community, 'Fijian tradition', and institutional constraints of the type 
which will be discussed later in the chapter. Efforts have been made 
however to try and increase both the participation and the 
productivity of indigenous Fijians in sugarcane production in Fiji. One 
such effort has been the Seaqaqa cane project on Vanua Levu. 
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Table 5.3 Sugarcane production in the Labasa mill area, 1 986-95 
Years Production area Ton nes per hectare Tota l production 
(hectares) (tonnes) 
1 986 1 9,757 .6  5 1 . 5  1 ,0 1 7 ,372 
1 987 1 9,369 .6 45 .3  877,652 
1 988 1 9,353 .7  53 .5  1 ,034,787 
1 989 20,083 .7  49. 3  989,847 
1 990 1 9,990. 6  58. 5  1 ,  1 68,824 
1 99 1  2 1 , 560 . 5  47 . 7  1 ,029,223  
1 992 2 2,624.0 5 1 . 3 1 , 1 6 1 ,245 
1 993 23,043 .9 48 .8 1 ,  1 24,357  
1 994 23 ,346. 7  5 5 . 6  1 ,298,285 
1 995 236,86 1 . 1  54. 1 1 ,2 1 6,291  
Source: Fiji Sugar Corporation, 1996. Labasa Mill Database, Fiji Sugar Corporation, 
Labasa. 
A World Bank assessment of the Seaqaqa project argued that efforts 
to boost indigenous Fijian participation and productivity in sugarcane 
farming could be successful if such efforts both boosted the output of 
cane and witnessed improved performance by those indigenous Fijian 
farmers who had come from outside the district and were thus new to 
sugarcane farming (World Bank 1995a). Table 5.3 gives details of 
sugarcane production in the Labasa mill area, encompassing the 
Seaqaqa project area, between 1986 and 1995. Table 5.3 demonstrates 
the increase in productivity, from 51 .5 tonnes per hectare in 1986 to 
54.1  tonnes per hectare in 1995, an arithmetic trend rate of growth of 
1 .37 per cent per annum over the period. 
However, it can be debated whether there is a relationship between 
improved productivity in the Seaqaqa project and increased 
indigenous Fijian participation. The project sought to maintain a 
minimum 50 per cent farmer participation rate from the indigenous 
Fijian community. Table 5.4 details the ethnic origin of farmers in the 
Seaqaqa project between 1981 and 1993. Table 5.4 illustrates that by 
1993 indigenous Fijians comprised only 45.7 per cent of all farmers in 
the project, a decline of 11 .4 per cent over a 13 year period. 
Clearly, indigenous Fijian farm productivity remains at the very 
least a contentious issue. Notwithstanding this issue though there is a 
widespread movement in Fiji amongst the indigenous Fijian 
community which seeks to increase the participation of indigenous 
Table 5.4 
Years 
1 98 1  
1 982 
1 983 
1 984 
1 985 
1 986 
1 987 
1 988 
1 989 
1 990 
1 99 1  
1 992 
1 993 
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Percentage of lndo-Fijian and indigenous Fijian farmers in the 
Seaqaqa project, 1 981-93 
I nd igenous F ij ians (%) Inda-Fij ians (%) Others (%) 
56. 1 42 .3  1 .6 
55 .8  42 . 7  1 . 5 
55 .0  43 .4 1 .6 
53 . 5  44 .9 1 .6 
5 1 .7 46 . 7  1 .6 
50. 7 47 .7  1 . 6 
50.4 48.0  1 .6 
49. 1  49. 5  1 .4 
47 .7  50 .8  1 . 5 
47 .4 5 1 .3 1 .3 
47 . 1  5 1 . 3  1 .6 
46.9  5 1 . 6  1 . 5 
45 .7  53 .0  1 .3 
Source: Fiji Sugar Corporation, 1996. Labasa Mill Database, Fiji Sugar Corporation, 
Labasa. 
Fijians in farming, and particularly in sugarcane production. This 
would, as a first step, require that some land that is currently worked 
by Indo-Fijians revert to indigenous Fijian farmers. In order to 
understand how this might occur, and the possible consequences of 
such a development, it is necessary to examine land tenure institutions 
in Fiji . 
Land tenure institutions 
Access to native land is regulated by the Native Lands Trust Board 
(NLTB), which was created by the colonial government in 1940. The 
creation of the NLTB as the primary agricultural institution dealing 
with land tenure can be traced back to the needs of the sugar industry 
during the colonial period. According to Moynagh (1981), the Colonial 
Sugar Refinery pushed for the formation of smallhold farms. This 
required the division of native land into small units, under some kind 
of tenancy arrangement. However, dealing with individual and often 
undefined indigenous Fijian land-owning units was cumbersome. The 
establishment of the NLTB provided tenants with a single institutional 
body with which to deal. As will be seen, it did not remove the 
element of insecurity from tenurial relations in rural Fiji. 
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Table 5.5 shows the distribution of native land in Fiji. Section 15 of 
the Native Lands Trust Act (NLTA) provides that land may be 
'reserved' for the exclusive use of indigenous Fijians. Such land may 
not be leased out to non-indigenous Fijians unless it is not being used. 
Unreserved land may be used by indigenous Fijians or may be leased 
out. As demonstrated in Table 5.5, some 63 per cent of native land is 
unreserved, while some 37 per cent of native land is reserved. Of that 
land which is unreserved, just under 41 per cent is leased out. Of that 
land which is reserved, fewer than 15 per cent is leased out. 
Thus, the main institutional duty carried out by the NLTB, as 
specified by Section 8 of the NLTA, is the granting of leases to work 
native land and to consider the renewal or non-renewal of such leases. 
Section 9 of the NLTA gives a very specific condition that governs land 
leasing (Government of Fiji 1985:6) : 
No native land shall be dealt with by way of lease or licence under the 
provisions of this act unless the Board is satisfied that the land 
proposed to be made the subject of such lease or licence is not being 
beneficially occupied by the Fijian owners, and is not likely during the 
currency of such lease or licence to be required by the Fijian owners for 
their use, maintenance or support. 
Section 9 of the Act thus provides the NLTB with the power to 
determine the granting of leases on land that is not being used by 
indigenous Fijians. Indeed, any rental agreement that does not have 
the consent of the NLTB is null and void. Granted, informal 
Table 5.5 Classification of native land in Fiji 
Area (km2) 
Un reserved 
Reserved 
Total 
of wh ich : 
Un reserved nat ive land leased 
Reserved native land leased 
9528. 1 5  
5 508.47 
1 6036.62 
3 869 .3 1 
8 1 6.43 
Per cent of 
total native land 
63 .37 
36 .63 
1 00 .00 
Per cent of 
u nreserved/reserved land 
40 . 6 1  
1 4.82 
Source: Ward, M ., 1995. 'Land, law and custom: diverging realities in Fiji', in R.G. Ward 
and E. Kingdon (eds), Land, Custom and Practice in the South Pacific, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge:199. 
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arrangements between local mataqalis and tenants do occur. However, 
there is no legal basis for these arrangements. Thus, the NLTB 
dominates the supply of rentable agricultural land. 
In supplying land for rent, the NLTB must abide by provisions that 
regulate the leasing of agricultural land in Fiji. These regulations 
provide a framework within which the NLTB operates. As such, they 
could be considered a second agricultural institution dealing with 
land tenure. In 1966 comprehensive legislation called the Agricultural 
Landlord and Tenants Ordinance (ALTO) was put in place to formalise 
the leasing of agricultural land. The ALTO provided that leases be a 
minimum of ten-years and offer the possibility of two ten year 
renewals. The ALTO thus effectively provided maximum leases of 
thirty years, a degree of tenurial security that had not previously 
existed in rural Fiji. Nonetheless, in that there was not an automatic 
renewal of a lease after the initial ten-year period, an element of 
insecurity remained. This insecurity will no doubt have had an effect 
on economic incentives and, thus, long-term growth. 
In 1976, the ALTO was amended by Parliament, in the form of the 
Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act (ALTA) . Like the ALTO before 
it, the ALTA was intended to harmonise landlord-tenant relationships 
so that agricultural productivity could be increased. However, unlike 
earlier provisions both under the NLTA and the ALTO, the ALTA 
offered better protection for tenants seeking to exercise their right to 
use the land. This was particularly the case for tenants on freehold 
land. The ALTA thus provides the legal framework under which land 
leases are granted on all agricultural land in Fiji. The ALTA is 
therefore, after the NLTB, the second key institutional structure 
dealing with property rights and land tenure in rural Fiji. 
Sections 4 through 15 of the ALTA deal with issues around security 
of tenure. Under these sections, the ALTA provides a minimum thirty­
year period for all newly agreed leases. Moreover, for leases agreed 
under the ALTO regulations, a twenty-year renewal is stipulated. The 
tenant is required to pay a rent to the NLTB, which is set at 6 per cent 
of the unimproved capital value of the land. The unimproved capital 
value of the land is in theory determined every five years. Rents as a 
proportion of crop value vary tremendously. For example, conflicting 
data from the World Bank (1995a) and local research (Prasad 1995) 
suggests that rents for sugarcane land may vary from a low of F$50 
per hectare to a high of F$350 per hectare. 
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The NLTB distributes the rents it receives to the indigenous land­
owning unit, through its chiefs. Table 5.6 presents the distribution of 
rents collected by the NLTB. The figures provided in Table 5.6 differ 
from those used by many authors, including Nayacakalou (1971), 
Eaton (1988), Overton (1987), Rutz (1987) and Spate (1959). This is 
because, as Ward (1995) points out, there has been some scholarly 
confusion regarding the distribution of rents. The figures in Table 5.6 
follow Kamikamica and Davey (1988) and the NLTA itself, which is 
quite clear. 
After deduction of any sums in accordance with section 14 of the Act, 
the balance of any monies received by the Board by way of rents and 
premiums in respect of native land shall be distributed by the Board as 
follows: (a) to the proprietary unit, seventy per cent; (b) to the turaga ni 
mataqali, fifteen per cent; (c) to the turaga ni yavusa, ten per cent; (d) to 
the turaga I taukei, five per cent (NLTB Act, Section 11 (1), Capl34:28) . 
As is seen in Table 5.6, 25 per cent of the total rent goes to the 
NLTB. This is used to cover its own administrative costs. It is a matter 
of some debate as to whether this allocation represents value for 
money. The NLTB has been running at a loss for some years, requiring 
additional transfers from the state, and has not produced an audited 
financial statement since 1989. Its management of resources thus lacks 
transparency. This may have created opportunities for rent seeking 
behaviour on the part of its bureaucrats. Moreover, the introduction of 
positive discrimination into the civil service created a 'culture of 
mediocrity' which may have also affected the NLTB and which may 
have also contributed to the pursuit of directly unproductive profit­
seeking activities on the part of bureaucrats. 
Table 5.6 Distribution of rents collected by the N LTB 
Recip ient 
Native La nd Trust Board 
Head of vanua (Turaga ni Tauke1) 
Head of yavusa (Turaga ni Qal!) 
Head of mataqali (Turaga ni Mataqa/1) 
Members of mataqa/i 
Total 
Per cent of rent 
2 5  
3 . 7 5  
7 . 5  
1 1 .2 5  
52 . 5  
1 00 
Source: Kamikamica, J. and Davey, T., 1988. 'Trust on trial: the development of the 
customary land trust concept in Fiji', in Y. Ghai (ed.), Land, Government and Politics in 
the Pacific Island States, Institute of Pacific Studies, Suva. 
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Of the remaining 75 per cent of the rent, three chiefs, that is the 
head of the vanua, the yavusa and the mataqali, receive a total of 22.5 
per cent. The remainder goes to the members of the mataqali. It can be 
questioned whether the distribution of the 75 per cent of the rent that 
does not go to the NLTB is equitable, in that three members of one 
proprietary unit receive 22.5 per cent of the rent and all other members 
of the proprietary unit together receive 52.5 per cent. Moreover, just as 
the role of the NLTB may distort the operation of the land rental 
'market', so too does the unequal distribution of land rents, in that the 
unequal distribution of land rents may act as an incentive for rent 
seeking behaviour (Prasad and Tisdell 1996a) . Certainly, there can be 
little doubt that the designer of the institutional structure, the colonial 
power, did not mean it to be equitable; rather, it was meant to 
integrate chiefs into the hierarchy of colonial rule and thus remove a 
possible source of opposition to colonial power (Akram-Lodhi 1997) .  
In exchange for the payment of rent, the NLTB is required to allow 
the peaceful occupation and cultivation of the land during the tenancy, 
provided the tenant adopts 'proper' husbandry techniques in using 
the land. At the same time, the tenant has the right to harvest any 
standing crop on the land within 12 months of the expiry of the lease. 
Any improvements to the land or construction of dwellings on the 
land must have the consent of the NLTB. Finally, in the event of a 
dispute between the tenant and the NLTB the ALTA provides for the 
establishment of a tribunal to arbitrate the dispute. 
The ALTA appears, on the surface, to provide considerable security 
of tenure for tenants. However, the element of insecurity remains. This 
insecurity arises because the NLTB is functionally if not formally 
powerless to stop informal demands being made by the local land­
owning units. Such informal demands are very common: the local 
mataqalis claim to be the rightful owners of the land and often seek to 
negotiate directly with tenants over a range of issues, particularly 
rents and leases. These arrangements are known as vakavanua (Ward 
1995; Overton 1987; Eaton 1988; Prasad 1984) . These informal 
demands have, at times, been translated into forceful and violent 
action designed to achieve a particular claim. Indeed, it has been 
recently noted by the Fiji Times (16 February 1996) that 
land disputes have reached new heights in Fiji. Across the nation, 
landowners with a gripe against tenants are adopting a forceful and, 
in a few instances, violent methods to make their complaint known. 
They are resorting to vigilante-style roadblocks. 
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Conflicts between mataqalis and tenants often evolve into conflicts 
between landowners and the NLTB when the NLTB does not accede to 
landowner demands. In such circumstances, landowners, faced with 
opposition from both tenants and the NLTB, often threaten eviction. 
Conceptually, the NLTB can be understood as an institutional 
monopoly designed to manage common property in the land rental 
market. In Africa, the World Bank has argued that institutional 
monopolies designed to manage common property in land create 
unnecessary economic costs. The World Bank has made a similar 
argument in Fiji, claiming that the NLTB is a costly and inefficient 
economic institution (World Bank 1995a). Moreover, as an institutional 
monopoly which distorts the operation of a key factor market, that of 
agricultural land, the NLTB has the capacity to distort economic 
signals on a national scale by affecting relative prices, production and 
distribution. 
Institutional rigid ities and the future of land tenure 
arrangements 
As already noted, the ALTA came into effect in 1976. Pre-existing 
tenancy contracts were extended by 20 years, which meant that in 
1997 leases began to expire. The expiry of land leases creates a major 
institutional rigidity that constrains growth in Fiji. Moreover, the long­
term survival of the NLTB as a land tenure institution depends on how 
land lease problems are resolved, if for no other reason than the fact 
that the NLTB depends on rents to provide its income. The land lease 
problem in turn reflects a lack of flexibility within both the NLTB and 
the ALTA: despite being a pivotal land tenure institution, the NLTB 
cannot solve the land lease problem. This demonstrates that the NLTB 
and the ALTA (which regulates it) are inefficient economic institutions. 
The inefficiencies caused by such rigidities within land tenure 
institutions must be resolved if an economic environment within 
which growth can be facilitated is to be established. 
With an awareness that land leases were going to eventually 
expire, a number of reports have been produced since 1992 which 
consider the future of legislation governing agricultural land in Fiji, 
and in particular whether land leases should be renewed. These have 
been written within a context of declining land availability: it is clear 
that the availability of agricultural land will continue to decline as 
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demand for residential, commercial and tourism development 
continues to increase. Moreover, they have been written in light of the 
aforementioned movement within the indigenous Fijian community to 
encourage a reversion of agricultural land to farmers within the 
indigenous Fijian community. Finally, the reports have been written in 
light of the apparent productivity differences that exist between 
indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian farmers. Prasad and Tisdell (1996b) 
have estimated that if 30 per cent of the leases currently held by Indo­
Fijians were not renewed and the production on such land reverted to 
farmers from the indigenous Fijian community, there would be a 
production loss of 15.7 per cent of total sugarcane production. The 
estimate is based on the assumption that the productivity ratio 
between indigenous Fijian and Indo-Fijian farmers does not change. 
In 1992 the NLTB considered the land lease issue. In 1993 the Sugar 
Cane Growers Council considered the same issue, and in 1996 the 
government set up the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Review 
Research Unit to recommend changes to the ALTA. Even the World 
Bank, which has traditionally refrained from commenting on land 
leases and the structure of property rights in land, has now identified 
it as a major problem (World Bank 1995a) . These reports highlight five 
issues that must be considered. The first issue is the duration of the 
leases that are to be renewed. Surveys into this issue have invariably 
found that tenants want leases with duration of more than 50 years, 
while landowners prefer leases with duration considerably shorter than 
the current 30 years. The second issue is the conditions attached to the 
awarding of a lease, including landlord-tenant relations and issues 
around compensation for land degradation and land improvements. 
The third issue is the compensation that is to be paid to tenants whose 
leases are not renewed. The fourth issue is the need for more land to 
be made available to members of the land-owning units. The fifth 
issue is the need to further develop dispute settlement mechanisms. 
A widely canvassed solution to the land lease issue is that of a 
simple renewal of leases under the ALTA. However, this only provides 
a temporary solution to what is an institutional problem. So too does 
an alternative suggested by some in the NLTB: that leases be 
automatically renewed while at the same time the provisions of the 
ALTA are amended to restrict the rights of tenants. Therefore, the 
NLTB has recently issued a report on the ALTA which seeks to offer 
solutions to the land lease problem (NLTB 1997) . In this report, the 
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NLTB considers the practicality of increasing the use of sharecropping 
and fixed wage contracts in sugarcane farming. This strategy is based 
on the assumption that ultimately leases will expire and land will 
revert to indigenous Fijian owners. Not all of these landowners will 
want to directly engage in production; therefore, they will enter into 
sharecropping arrangements with former leaseholders or they will 
hire Indo-Fijian wage labour to work on the land. To support an 
expansion of sharecropping or an increased use of wage labour, the 
strategy suggests that the leases of tenants be extended, but only for 
that area of their land on which their dwellings are located. Some 
leaders within the Indo-Fijian community have argued that this 
strategy represents a return to the girmit era, during which time 
indentured South Asian labourers worked in Fiji under 5 year contracts. 
The strategy contained within the NLTB report does not however 
understand the mechanics of sharecropping or wage labour contracts. 
Sharecroppers and wage labourers have no incentive to increase the 
intensity of their effort, as they do not receive rewards commensurate 
with production risk (Stiglitz 1986; Newbery 1979) .  Furthermore, the 
cost of monitoring and supervising sharecroppers and wage labourers 
is high, representing an extra cost that must be borne. As a 
consequence, a shift towards sharecropping or wage labour may result 
in a decline in net income. The productivity implications of such a 
strategy would be reinforced by the reversion of a substantial 
proportion of cultivated land to comparatively less-productive 
indigenous Fijian farmers. This strategy could therefore have 
extremely detrimental economic implications for Fiji as a whole. 
Contrary to a strategy designed to increase sharecropping and 
waged labour, there are some who believe that farms should be 
amalgamated and the industry mechanised in an effort to enhance 
productive efficiency (NLTB 1996) . It is true that amalgamation might 
result in economies of scale. Nonetheless, the financial cost of 
mechanisation could be very high and indeed might outweigh any 
efficiency gain for a considerable period of time. Furthermore, 
mechanisation would reduce the number of seasonal workers 
employed in farming, and particularly the large numbers involved in 
harvesting. The social cost of the loss of income could be significant. 
A problem with these proposed 'solutions' is that they fail to 
recognise that the institutional structure governing tenure relations in 
rural Fiji results in a lack of well-defined property rights in land and 
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limits the extent of private property. From a theoretical point of view, 
this is likely to have a detrimental affect on economic performance, if 
for no other reason than the creation of what are in all likelihood 
substantial transactions costs in sorting out the existing leasing 
arrangements. Solving this problem, from the point of view of 
neoclassical economics, is reasonably straightforward: extend the 
development of private property rights in land. This implies two 
steps. The first step would be to convert all crown land into freehold 
property and allow any lease holders to buy the land they work at a 
market-determined price. This could have several benefits. The first 
would be to initiate an increase in agricultural productivity. The 
second would be to bring in revenue for the government. The third 
would be to boost public support for government economic policy, 
and in particular privatisation policy. However, as already 
demonstrated, crown land represents only a small percentage of total 
agricultural land. 
Therefore, a second, more radical, step would be necessary. This 
step would be the sale of all native land under lease. As demonstrated 
in Table 5.3, some 29 per cent of total native land is under lease to 
indigenous Fijians, Indo-Fijians and members of other communities. 
This means that the sale of native land under lease would involve 
more than a quarter of all native land. This land could be sold to the 
leaseholder at a market-determined price. However, the sale of native 
land does not necessarily imply the ownership of all such land leaving 
the indigenous Fijian community. There is no doubt that some of the 
land would be bought by individuals from within the land-owning 
unit; indeed, population growth requires that some land revert to the 
mataqalis . 
The cessation of communal ownership would of course be 
controversial. However, as pointed out by Ward (1995), the indigenous 
Fijian chiefs of Ba, Bua and Lau advocated individual ownership 
before the first native land ordinance in 1880. Indeed, Ward (1995) 
argues that the colonial rulers may have imposed communal 
ownership in Fiji. Moreover, the NLTB was created in an era where 
both the international and the domestic political and economic 
environment were very different. It was, as has already been argued, 
created by the British to serve specific political purposes. In this light, 
private property in land is not necessarily alien to indigenous Fijian 
political thinking. 
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Nonetheless, the privatisation of Crown land and the sale of native 
land would mean that some farmers would lose their leases. The 
impact of this could however be obviated to a degree by the sale of 
unleased land in a different location to those who had lost their land. 
This should, of course, apply to both Indo-Fijian and indigenous Fijian 
leaseholders. It could also be obviated by carefully planned 
resettlement and compensation packages for displaced tenants. 
There are however problems with the neoclassical solution. 
Obviously, even if one accepts that the sale of land to individuals 
would increase efficiency, the actual transaction would take place in a 
relatively new market in which prices would be unlikely to reflect 
opportunity costs; this could distort the incentives usually associated 
with the private ownership of property. At the same time, there are 
reasons to doubt that land privatisation would in fact increase 
efficiency. Certainly, in Africa, where efforts at land privatisation have 
gone quite far, there is little evidence to support the argument that 
land privatisation has increased agricultural productivity and hence 
agricultural efficiency (Bassett 1993:14). 
The reason why land privatisation has not improved agricultural 
efficiency is because, in the language of economics, land privatisation 
is a partial equilibrium solution to a general equilibrium problem: the 
theory of 'second best' must be taken into account. The theory of 
second best demonstrates that when markets are subject to a series of 
distortions the removal of one distortion need not necessarily improve 
economic performance and can indeed lead to a deterioration in 
economic performance (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). 
The theory of second best is relevant to the circumstances in rural 
Fiji. Clearly, the operation of the NLTB and the ALTA has affected the 
process by which land transactions in Fiji take place: the inflexibility of 
both institutions has undoubtedly created inefficiencies. These 
inefficiencies will have had effects on other, related markets, and most 
notably labour and product markets, as the impact of distortions filter 
through the economy. This then is where the theory of second best can 
be applied. Even though the NLTB and the ALTA have created 
inefficiencies in land transactions in Fiji, labour and product markets 
have undoubtedly adjusted in light of these inefficiencies. In such 
circumstances, removing the influence of the NLTB and the ALTA 
from land transactions-through, for example, privatisation-can 
have no predictable effect because it is not possible to know how 
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labour and product markets, having adjusted to take account of 
existing inefficiencies, would readjust in light of privatisation. Indeed, 
it is quite possible that privatisation would result in labour and 
product market adjustments that would further weaken economic 
performance. Thus, even though it is land transactions that are the 
source of economic inflexibilities, it is the overall institutional 
structure within which rural markets in Fiji operate which has been 
compromised. In such circumstances, there is no reason to believe that 
the removal of distortions in one market, the land market, no matter 
how inefficient, will in fact improve economic efficiency. 
It has already been argued that institutional rigidities in rural Fiji 
are likely to have had an effect on production, investment and 
distribution. These rigidities require imaginative solutions, the details 
of which are beyond the scope of this chapter. What is clear however is 
that further work is urgently needed. Out of a total of 134 native land 
leases that have expired at the time of writing, 102 have been renewed 
for a further term of 30 years. While such a development is to 
welcomed, albeit as a temporary solution, this does means that 32 
leases have not been renewed. The ongoing expiry of land leases 
suggests that land will revert back to farmers from within the 
indigenous Fijian community even though such farmers are less 
productive than their Indo-Fijian counterparts. The implications of 
such a development for economic performance are nothing less than a 
particularly vicious cycle: less productivity implies less investment, 
less growth and economic stagnation. There can be little doubt that Fiji 
is confronting a major challenge. 
Conclusion 
Mainstream economics has long been criticised for not taking seriously 
the role of institutional factors in determining the economic 
performance of countries. However, renewed interest in institutional 
economics has firmly put the role of institutional factors on the 
economic policy agenda for many developing countries. One pivotal 
institutional factor is the nature of property rights. According to North 
(1990), explaining disparities in the performance of economies 
requires consideration of, amongst other institutional factors, the 
nature of property rights. In many developing countries the nature of 
property rights are not well defined. Uncertainty over property rights 
has implications for investment, production and distribution. 
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In the case of Fiji, uncertainty over property rights in land is clear. 
The indigenous Fijian community controls the bulk of the arable land 
in Fiji. This land is managed on behalf of the land-owning units by the 
NLTB, which negotiates land leases and collects rents within the 
framework of the ALTA. The bulk of the tenants dealt with by the 
NLTB are from the Inda-Fijian community. However, both the NLTB 
and the ALTA, as land tenure institutions, lack flexibility: they are not 
'efficient' institutions. The ongoing expiry of land leases has led to 
renewed examination of alternatives to the current, inflexible 
institutional structure. This chapter has critically reviewed the 
alternatives, and has found them lacking. Yet the need for an 
alternative is clear if Fiji is to avoid a vicious cycle of less agricultural 
productivity, less investment and less growth. The new government 
which emerged following the 1999 general elections will therefore 
have to address the important task of finding a viable alternative to 
the current institutional structure and restoring confidence amongst 
the agricultural community in Fiji. 
Endnote 
1 .  This subsection is based directly on Prasad and Akram-Lodhi 
(1998) and is used with their permission. 
CHAPTER 6 
Confront ing social pol icy 
chal lenges in F ij i  
John Cameron 
Introduction 
Every society has ways of distributing social and economic 
uncertainty and insecurity within and between individuals, groups of 
individuals and institutions. The basis of this distribution is not 
random but rather is a result of a set of historically constituted 
processes that shape a society's institutions and its people's beliefs, 
motivations and aspirations. Social policy is an intervention by the 
state designed in general to alter this distribution and, more 
specifically, to redistribute and ultimately reduce the experience of 
uncertainty and insecurity. A critically important way by which social 
policy can reduce the experience of uncertainty and insecurity is 
through a reduction in the degree of inequality found within a society. 
In fostering socioeconomic security through a greater degree of 
equality within a society, state social policy represents an investment 
in the trust which underpins 'social wealth' and which builds an 
inclusive polity. 
Fiji had a per capita GNP of over US$2,000 in the mid 1990s (World 
Bank 1995a) . Further, with a comparatively long life expectancy, 
comparatively low infant mortality, and comparatively high adult 
literacy, Fiji had a reasonably satisfactory level of social development 
relative to its income. Despite this, however, Fiji did not have a 
socially inclusive polity. Notwithstanding a rich history of strong civil 
society actors and institutions, for most of the post-independence 
period state policy has been shaped by an elite which has used ethnic 
133 
134 Confronting Fi j i  Futu res 
identity as the basis for political mobilisation (Sutherland, this 
volume) . The 'politics of ethnicity' have not been able to foster trust 
between the archipelago's two major ethnic groups, in large part 
because state social policy has sought to redistribute social and 
economic uncertainty and insecurity between ethnic groups, to the 
detriment of one group, the Indo-Fijian community, in an effort to 
deliberately maintain the pre-independence policy framework of 
'separate development' . A major consequence of such a policy 
framework has been to foster inequality and social exclusion, both 
between and within the indigenous Fijian and the Indo-Fijian 
communities. 
It was only for a brief period during the mid 1980s that the policy 
framework that fostered inequality and social exclusion was 
challenged. During a period of multidimensional crisis, social 
demands based upon regional, class, gender and environmental 
conditions led to the formation of the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) and the 
call from those who had been excluded from elite politics for the 
construction of a less unequal, socially-inclusionary, multicultural 
polity which systematically confronted the deeper problems of ethnic 
tension, developmental values and dysfunctional economic 
tendencies. This call was however cut off by the 1987 military coups, 
which violently reasserted the primacy of the politics of ethnicity. 
Despite this, the call for a more inclusive polity did not disappear. 
Indeed, at the end of the 1990s it is being reactivated. The new 
constitutional settlement explicitly recognises the need to construct a 
less unequal, socially inclusionary multicultural polity in Fiji (Ghai, 
this volume) . The overwhelming victory of the FLP in the 1999 general 
elections demonstrates the extent to which the call for a more inclusive 
polity has deep roots within Fiji society. This is because ethnic tension 
and contradictory development processes have not disappeared; 
neither have claims based upon regional, class, gender and 
environmental conditions. In the construction of such a polity, the 
social policy of the state has a pivotal role to play. The redistribution of 
social and economic uncertainty and insecurity by the state must be 
done in a way which complements and augments the strengths of a 
diverse civil society, and in so doing develops the trust-and most 
particularly the inter-ethnic trust-which can improve the quality of 
people's lives in Fiji. 
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This chapter examines some of the major strategic issues in Fiji 
confronting social policy. A fundamental proposition of the chapter is 
that Fiji society was diverted from important debates about the 
fundamentals of social policy by the coups of 1987. Confronting the 
future of social policy would thus benefit from looking to the past. 
Looking back, it is clear that there remains a major challenge 
confronting civil society and the state in seeking to redistribute social 
and economic uncertainty and improve the degree of equality within 
society, and in so doing build social wealth in Fiji. In the next section, 
the neoliberal approach to social inequality and hence social policy is 
critically assessed and the new institutional economics (NIE) 
introduced as a countervailing approach rooted in distinctive moral 
and political perspectives which emphasise the interaction between 
civil society, state institutions and imperfect markets in facilitating 
improvements in the degree of equality within a society. In light of this 
framework, the third section examines the material reality of social 
inequality in post-colonial Fiji. It is argued that the challenge 
confronting the state is not in the detail of policy design but rather in 
the need to build on and invest in existing social wealth so as to 
institutionalise positive socioeconomic processes. The fourth section 
illustrates how this might be done by briefly examining three possible 
fields of policy which require the institutionalisation of positive 
socioeconomic processes, namely health and nutrition, education and 
community relations. The final section offers some conclusions. 
Neol ibera l  ideology, social pol icy and the NIE  
For most of  the past two decades socioeconomic development 
thinking has been fundamentally neoliberal in outlook. From a 
neoliberal perspective, inequality between individuals in both 
potential and outcome is the natural condition of humanity. The 
primary cause for this innate inequality may be either genetic 
potential or the mysterious ways of a divine creator. In either instance, 
as members of the species are observed to be different they will 
therefore be doomed to be unequal in socioeconomic experience. 
This view of society is found in Western liberal philosophy. It is 
consistent with the theorems of neoclassical economics concerning 
efficiency, equity and stability. The conclusions from such analysis, 
stressing a condition of 'natural' inequality, is that societies are best 
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organised for the social good on the basis of equal rights to individual 
voluntary contracts negotiated in free markets. The resulting 
allocation of resources, including inequality in control over resources 
between individuals, households and nations, will reflect unequal 
abilities and efforts in contributing to meeting others' desires, and the 
strength of one's own preferences for possessing scarce goods and 
services. The resulting distribution may thus be said to be equitable, 
albeit in a limited sense. Granted, some neoliberals go further, 
recognising that equality of contract requires equality of opportunity. 
They thus become advocates of equality in access to education, health 
and recruitment through merit-based procedures. Some may also 
show concern on the question of the right to inherit material wealth. 
Nonetheless, the argument that any form of deprivation rooted in 
social inequality demands collective action, in the shape of allocating 
resources towards the deprived, is marginalised by most neoliberal 
thinkers. The neoliberal view does not rule out individual altruistic, 
charitable actions as the philosophical basis for social policy: indeed, it 
highlights them. 
Recent emphasis in the development literature on the need to 
encourage growth in 'human capital' demonstrates the dominance of 
neoliberal thinking. Human capital is most easily applied to 
individuals; thinking about relationships between individuals and 
between groups of individuals is peripheral. Thus, inequality is not 
relational; it is the outcome of inadequate 'investment' by the 
individual or the individual's 'agent' in developing their own 
capacities. Human capital is thus, in its emphasis on the isolated 
individual, very much a product of neoliberal thinking. 
The introduction of the concept of 'social capital' recognises this 
deficiency, highlighting as it does the importance of both the quantities 
and qualities of relationships in the development process. However, 
social capital also has problems: in particular, the implicit application 
of quantification to non-material phenomena betrays its neoliberal 
origin. Therefore, an alternative concept can be proposed: social 
wealth. Social wealth is centrally concerned with the degree of trust in 
a society, a trust which is established on the frontier where culture, 
politics and economics intersect. Social wealth is the outcome of 'the 
form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement' 
(Putman 1993:167) which facilitate the coordination of action within 
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societies. Clearly, in order to be able to coordinate action, such norms 
must build trust. This concern with trust can lead to an analysis of the 
distribution of insecurity as a social phenomenon restricting trust and, 
in so doing, fostering a degree of inequality within a society. Indeed, 
although every society has ways of distributing social and economic 
insecurity, it is rare for the distribution to be egalitarian. Thus, 
inequality is a social phenomenon. Social policy can then, as already 
noted, be broadly conceptualised as being centrally concerned with 
how the state acts to reduce and redistribute uncertainty and insecurity 
and in so doing reduce the degree of inequality within a society. 
The all too apparent failure of neoliberalism to remove uncertainty, 
insecurity and inequality from the lives of people means that there is a 
need to develop a new policy agenda. This policy agenda should be 
based upon a countervailing philosophy rooted in distinctive moral 
and political perspectives and yet qualified by an element of 
hardheaded, rather than hard-hearted, economics. It can be suggested 
that the NIE could provide the basis of such a countervailing 
philosophy. The essential aspects of NIE which have attracted 
development economists can be summarised as being: an assumption 
that the operation of market forces has to be understood in a long 
term, institutional context; an assumption that changing civil society 
institutions can have high transitional costs; and a profound doubt 
regarding neoliberal claims that open markets guarantee efficiency, 
equity and stability, in large part because of bounded rationality, 
public goods, risk and uncertainty, and moral hazard, all of which 
facilitate the emergence in open markets of informational deficiencies. 
The NIE generates an economics that emphasises the interaction 
between civil society, state institutions and markets (Harriss, Hunter 
and Lewis 1995) . Moreover, in this interaction, state institutions are 
critical. State institutions can, by investing in social wealth, reduce 
inequality, strengthen civil society, and in so doing facilitate better 
outcomes from imperfect markets. Using the NIE and an emphasis on 
social wealth as the theoretical basis for state intervention thus 
requires understanding the historically-constituted processes shaping 
a society's institutions, its pattern of inequality, and its social wealth: 
the beliefs, motivations and aspirations of its people. The details of 
such an account are clearly beyond the scope of this chapter. Nonetheless, 
it can act as an organising framework to guide the analysis that follows. 
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The material rea l ity of inequal ity in F ij i  
Fiji came to  political independence in 1970 with a discriminatory 
pattern of policy priorities that had been set by the colonial regime. 
However, both major ethnic groups had, to an extent, sought to bypass 
the policy priorities of the colonial state. Within both the indigenous 
Fijian and the Indo-Fijian communities there was a long history of 
active civil societies fostering the development of non-market 
socioeconomic relationships and in so doing deepening the formation 
of social wealth. This social wealth facilitated self-provisioning in the 
areas of health care, education and social security. Thus, an extensive 
network of self-provisioning in health, education and social security 
was maintained and indeed deepened during the colonial period. This 
self-provisioning was crucial to the quality of lives of the most 
vulnerable people in Fiji prior to independence. 
The 1970s can be characterised as a decade of progress in 
equalising the terms and conditions under which the forms of state 
social provision inherited from the colonial period could be accessed. 
State institutions, particularly those delivering social policy 
interventions, were reformed and expanded, and much space was left 
to civil society and its institutions, which utilised the strong social 
wealth within both of Fiji's two main communities. This was 
accompanied by significant investment in infrastructure and the 
reform of taxation structures, which, along with institutional reform, 
removed some of the worst elements of the colonial inheritance. 
Nonetheless, by the start of the 1980s significant inequalities 
remained. Income inequalities between the indigenous Fijian and 
lndo-Fijian communities, to the benefit of the latter, were well 
documented (Sutherland 1992). So too were the income inequalities 
between men and women. However, as in other societies, the 
experience of inequality went beyond the monetary. The impact of 
state and civil society-led efforts to address non-monetary inequality 
were indirectly assessed in the early 1980s, when a program of 
research was undertaken to assess the adequacy of using 'active life 
profiles' (Seers 1977) as a means of integrating social analysis and 
planning under varying national conditions. As part of this program, a 
country study was carried out in Fiji (Cameron 1987a). 
Active life profiles are non-monetary indicators of social 
development. They seek to show how, for a specific group of people at 
a point in time, life expectancy can be broken down into a set of 
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activities that will be conducted over a life. In order to do this, life is 
first broken down into a set of mutually exclusive activities, or 'states 
of life'. The states of life considered in this chapter are those generally 
collected in national population censuses under the three headings of 
education, forms of economic activity and forms of economic 
inactivity. Demographic data provide links between these states of life. 
The proportion of people in a particular state of life are subdivided by 
age and then each age weighted by the average chance at birth of a 
person being alive at that age. Such weighting enforces consistency in 
the calculation. The results allocate a number of years to each state of 
life, and because the states of life are mutually exclusive the weighted 
sums will add up to life expectancy at birth. The expected duration in 
any state thus depends on the frequency of other states and a hidden 
state, that of being dead. A comparison of states of life across different 
groups can then be used to assess socioeconomic patterns and the 
general development status of a group of people. 
By way of example, Table 6 .1 presents the active life profiles for 
men in Fiji's two main ethnic groups around 1980. Table 6 .1 
demonstrates that around 1980 out of a life expectancy of 65.83 years 
for indigenous Fijian males, some 19 .67 years would, on average, be 
spent as a villager or as a family worker. By way of contrast, amongst 
Table 6.1  Active life profiles in years for men in Fiji around 1 980 
State of l ife All Fiji males Ind igenous F ij ian Inda-Fij ian 
Pre-school and 
in  education 1 6 .35  1 6 . 1 0  1 6 .36 
Vil lager and 
fami ly worker 1 0 . 54 1 9 .67 2 . 64 
Own business, inc lud ing 
sugar cane farm ing 9 . 73 5 .42 1 4 .42 
Employed by private 
employer 1 2 . 1 3  9 . 1 3  1 3 . 52 
Employed by government 7 . 1 0  7 . 70 6 . 3 1  
Inactive, unemp loyed, 
ret i red, un known 8 .0 1  7 . 33  8 .04 
Life expectancy at 
b i rth 63 .86 65 .83 6 1 . 6 1  
Source: Cameron, J., 1987b. 'Fiji: the political economy o f  recent events', Capital and 
Class, 33:32. 
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Indo-Fijian males, out of a life expectancy of 61 .61 years, some 14.42 
years would be spent, on average, engaged in their own business, 
including sugar cane farming. 
The research carried out in Fiji documented the material reality of 
social inequality between the two main ethnic groups in the early 
1980s. The research found that Fiji possessed the demographic and 
educational characteristics of a relatively developed country. This 
applied to the population as a whole, both major ethnic groups, and 
sexes. At the same time, the research found that the difference in the 
relative position of the two major ethnic groups in terms of average 
money-equivalent incomes was offset by differences in their relative 
position in terms of active life profiles. Thus, inequality between the 
ethnic groups in active life profiles ran against inequality in monetary 
terms, to the benefit of the indigenous Fijian community. A complacent 
conclusion might have been that the socioeconomic positions of the 
two main ethnic groups in Fiji were merely different, and not 
fundamentally unequal. However, the reality was more complex: 
while income was only one factor in inequality, the impact of other 
factors which might have been thought to offset monetary inequality, 
were in fact differentiated along clear lines. 
The research therefore considered in detail the components of the 
active life profiles, as indicators of inequality amongst groups in Fiji. 
Considering first data on education and economic activity for 
indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians, it appeared that both groups had 
a similar expected duration of education. This is demonstrated, for 
example, in Table 6.1 for males. This equality was however offset by 
dissimilarity when life cycles in patterns of economic activity were 
considered. A key difference existed between the communities in 
terms of their involvement in rural economic activities. Indigenous 
Fijians could expect a longer duration in rural economic activities 
where the individual exercised some explicitly recognised control over 
their life. Moreover, indigenous Fijians could expect a shorter duration 
of economic inactivity. Both are demonstrated in Table 6.1 for males. In 
large part, this dissimilarity might have been due to the term 'villager ' 
being exclusively applied to indigenous Fijians in the census data that 
formed the basis of the construction of the active life profiles. The 
exclusive assignation of this category did capture some important 
attributes of indigenous Fijian rural life, in terms of strong communal 
rights and obligations involving agricultural and non-agricultural 
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production and the distribution of produce. Indigenous Fijian life, by 
combining virtually equal access to education when compared to that 
obtained by Indo-Fijians, a longer expected duration in economic 
activities where the individual exercised some explicitly recognised 
control over their life, a shorter expected duration of economic 
inactivity, and a longer life expectancy, might have appeared to have 
had a higher quality of life and less inequality than that experienced 
by Indo-Fijians. This apparently higher quality of life amongst 
indigenous Fijians could be clearly contrasted with that of Indo­
Fijians, many of whom, having been involved in monocultural sugar 
cane production, homestead production for self-provision, or being 
economically inactive in agriculture, faced different relationships in 
agriculture as well as in private sector non-agricultural activity. 
In terms of gender-based differentials, the research on education 
and economic activity demonstrated that the expected duration of 
schooling for males and females in Fiji during the 1970s was virtually 
identical (Cameron 1987b). At the same time, women in Fiji had a life 
expectancy at birth seven years greater than men in the early 1980s. 
Lower infant mortality rates for females were important in explaining 
part of this difference; however, lower age-specific death rates were 
found for women at most ages when compared to men. Nonetheless, 
women faced a disadvantaged position. In terms of economic activity, 
including declared unemployment, women had an expected duration 
of economic activity which was only a fraction of that for men, 
although indigenous Fijian women had a higher expected duration of 
economic activity than Indo-Fijian women. Clearly, men stood 
between women and economic activity. This difference was reflected 
in the very large variation in the expected duration of economic 
inactivity between men and women; women could expect 
substantially longer periods of inactivity. It is however worth 
reinforcing the point that ethnic differences existed within women. 
Indo-Fijian women were disadvantaged in comparison with 
indigenous Fijian women, through having shorter lives, less control 
over their economic activities, and lower money-equivalent incomes. 
Gender-based differences in economic activity and inactivity in 
part reflected the way in which the census data collected in the 1970s, 
which formed the basis of the information used in the construction of 
the active life profiles, 'pushed' women into the economically inactive 
category. As elsewhere, women in Fiji have multiple economic roles. 
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Census questions in the past tended to seek to find a unique role. In 
these circumstances, when a person was asked whether their single 
role was looking after children, tending livestock, maintaining crops, 
selling vegetables, participating in community projects, going fishing 
or seeking waged work, it was not surprising that priority was 
attached to childcare-a category deemed in most censuses to reflect 
economic inactivity. However, for women, economic inactivity did not 
mean leisure but rather repetitive unremunerated domestic work in 
the service of others, including husbands, children and kin networks. 
The small number of women credited in the census as family workers 
and villagers compared with men supports the suggestion that 
women's work was inadequately recognised in the censuses of the 
1970s. Thus, the long expected duration of economic inactivity for 
women did not reflect freedom to choose. 
Inequality in Fiji in the post-independence period was thus 
multifaceted. It could exist in monetary or non-monetary dimensions. 
The way in which it existed in these two dimensions could be either 
mutually reinforcing or offsetting. The pattern of inequality also 
differed on the basis of certain group characteristics: whether someone 
was male or female, rural or urban, indigenous Fijian or Indo-Fijian. 
The research had clear implications for social policy: there was an 
obvious need to be sensitive to differences in patterns of life between 
Fiji's two main ethnic groups while at the same time using common 
principles to be even-handed in resourcing the differing needs of 
indigenous and Indo-Fijians. 
This pattern of inequality did not significantly change during the 
1980s. During the early 1980s Fiji underwent a multidimensional 
crisis. Economic indicators were moving violently as a consequence of 
the second major oil price rise and major fluctuations in the world 
market price of sugar. Environmentally, the impact of a year of 
drought was compounded by cyclone Oscar early in 1983; both had 
mutually reinforcing negative consequences for the sugar crop, the 
economy and thus for inequality. 
The multidimensional crisis damaged the process of social 
development in Fiji. Studies of poverty in the early 1980s suggested 
that there were roughly equal proportions of vulnerable people in 
both ethnic groups, though the risk of deep poverty may have differed 
between the two groups (United Nations Development Programme/ 
Government of Fiji 1997) . Thus, both major ethnic groups had, as in 
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the 1970s, broadly comparable experiences of socioeconomic 
deprivation and inequality, although this must be qualified by the 
recognition that specific differences in monetary income, economic 
activity, economic inactivity and non-monetary indicators were, as in 
the 1970s, real. 
The crisis demanded confident leadership; however, the Fiji 
government was unable to provide such leadership. In 1982 Fiji's 
socioeconomic development started to be governed by the dictates of 
neoliberalism. The failure of the government to provide confident 
leadership signalled the end of the independence 'honeymoon', 
exposed the ideological bankruptcy of the 'Pacific Way' as an 
innovative development strategy and facilitated the emergence of 
claims based upon regional, class, gender and environmental 
conditions. At the heart of these claims lay a common set of demands: 
for an end to an elite-dominated, socially exclusionary politics based 
upon ethnic mobilisation; and for the construction of a less unequal, 
socially-inclusionary multicultural polity in Fiji. 
The 1985 Fiji Trades Union Congress annual conference was a vital 
event in the process of the formation of the FLP as an organised 
expression of such demands. The FLP was not only needed to halt the 
erosion of the hard-earned rights of organised labour, but also to 
represent the demands of wider interests seeking to challenge the 
dominant status quo. This challenge had strong social policy 
implications: the emergence of the FLP helped to initiate a society­
wide debate on the future of multicultural relations in Fiji, and, more 
particularly, the way in which social policy could be configured so as 
to facilitate a less unequal, socially-inclusionary multiculturalism in 
Fiji. 
The previously predominant politics of ethnicity offered a 
fundamental challenge to those who sought to justify broad-based 
interventionist social policies designed to reduce inequalities in 
wealth, income and consumption, and to encourage the full expression 
of the capabilities of all citizens. The politics of ethnicity were however 
violently reasserted in 1987. It is not surprising that neoliberalism in 
Fiji was solidified during a period when the politics of ethnicity were 
being violently reasserted. With its explicit acceptance of 'natural' 
difference, neoliberalism is consistent with any politics that 
emphasises difference; thus, neoliberalism has clear affinities to the 
politics of ethnicity. 
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While both major ethnic groups could draw on histories of non­
market socioeconomic relationships rooted in active civil societies and 
deploying strong social wealth to provide education, health care and 
social security, neoliberal development strategies since the early 1980s 
may have undermined those aspects of civil society and social wealth 
that emphasised non-market relationships and guaranteed access to 
basic needs (Barr 1990; United Nations Development Programme/ 
Government of Fiji 1997) . At the same time, anti-poverty social policy 
was very weak in the 1980s, in large part because neoliberal ideology 
both 'naturalises' difference and questions the efficacy of intervention. 
Thus, neoliberal development strategies since the early 1980s increased 
inequality and poverty between and within both ethnic groups. 
The cha l lenge for social pol icy 
The 1990s have witnessed a sharp intensification of the politics of 
identity around the world. In many cases, greater sensitivity to the 
politics of diversity has been beneficial by increasing awareness of the 
need for socially inclusive policies: for example, increased 
consciousness concerning the social impact of gender relations. 
However, this need not be the case. The increasing politicisation of 
ethnicity within Fiji during the 1980s has meant that dissent and 
conflict are commonly rooted in the identity politics of ethnicity. The 
politicisation of ethnicity cannot produce uniform and predictable 
outcomes. It is therefore clear that the management of ethnic diversity 
in Fiji remains the major challenge for the next millennium. Social 
policy has a major role to play here. In that social policy is an 
intervention by the state designed in general to alter the distribution of 
social and economic insecurity, a critically important way by which 
social policy can reduce the experience of economic insecurity is 
through a reduction in the degree of inequality found within Fiji. In 
fostering socioeconomic security, social policy can build trust which 
can in turn help create the foundations of a new pattern of 
multicultural relations-one which recognises difference while noting 
common ground. Moreover, social policy can provide, or not provide, 
resources to challenge and change already-existing patterns of 
multicultural relationships. 
The challenges that the state in Fiji confronts in social policy are not 
those of detail. Social policy must confront the deeper problems of 
ethnic tension and contradictory developmental values. The challenge 
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now is thus to develop a social policy that complements and augments 
the strengths of those civil society institutions which remain strong 
despite more than a decade of neoliberalism. The state needs to 
institutionalise positive socioeconomic processes which build upon 
existing social wealth in order to develop a less unequal, socially­
inclusive society with higher levels of trust and an improved quality 
of life for the people of both ethnic groups. Meeting this fundamental 
challenge will contribute to eradicating poverty, ill health, and 
insecurity. This challenge demands much of the state in terms of 
creating an atmosphere for new interventions. Clearly, the agenda 
facing the new government is large. Space precludes detailed 
consideration of the breadth of interventions that could contribute to 
eradicating insecurity and building a socially inclusive society. Rather, 
three areas where new interventions would be welcome can be briefly 
discussed. These three areas are health and nutrition, schooling and 
community relations. 
Health and nutrition 
The relationship between undernutrition and poor health status has 
been emphasised in international conferences and is widely accepted 
as a 'stylised fact' (Asian Productivity Organisation 1991) .  However, 
the availability of sufficient calories is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition to break the link between diet and ill health. This 
is because the way in which diets change in the process of 
development can be a major cause of ill-health (Bonnemaison 1978; 
Thaman 1983; Cameron 1991) .  This has been the case in the South 
Pacific in general, and Fiji in particular, since the late 1970s. 
Fiji's Eighth Development Plan was the first plan to highlight the 
'promotion of proper nutrition' (Fiji Central Planning Office 1980:267) 
as the first priority of health policy. The 1980s saw some efforts in 
nutritional education as part of health policy. In practice, however, 
health policy in general and nutritional policy in particular has been 
uneven, primarily in terms of its spatial distribution, but also in terms 
of its impact on lower income households, as under neoliberalism 
market forces have been used increasingly to allocate access to 
nutritional and health care resources. 
The increasing resort to market forces, particularly in the allocation 
of access to nutritional resources in Fiji, has resulted in a dietary and 
lifestyle revolution over the past 20 years. This revolution has brought 
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with it a number of health problems that resemble those of richer 
economies, and particularly the significant increase in vulnerability to 
diseases linked to diet. The source of these problems is not however 
undernutrition. Rather, it is the contradictory articulation of 
unbalanced diets and overnutrition as the allocation of access to 
nutritional resources has become market-led. Unbalanced diets and 
overnutrition imply a different set of issues than those conventionally 
found in developing countries. In particular, it implies that poor 
nutritional status can exist side by side with good nutritional status, 
and that different policies are required to deal with the two sets of 
issues. 
In the case of poor nutritional status, an association between high 
food imports and low status can be observed and positively links 
economic policies, health policies and nutritional policies. A cross­
section of the overall level of Fiji's food imports in the 1980s showed a 
relatively high level of food imports, expressed in US dollars per 
capita per year. Under neoliberalism, the ratio of food imports per 
capita has increased. More imported food generally means a diet 
consisting of greatly increased proportions of refined sugar and 
saturated fats from both fatty meat and dairy products, with an 
associated higher energy intake. But more energy and less dietary 
fibre, in conjunction with the reduced physical activity associated with 
urbanisation, places stress on the body and can produce ill health, 
lower productivity and, in general, a lower quality of life. 
Granted, if diets prior to the increase in the intake of imported food 
had contained little animal-derived protein or were highly restricted 
in the variety of foods on which they were based, then the 
'gastronomic transition' might have had some desirable nutritional 
effects, which may in turn have offset some of the undesirable ones. 
However, except in the extreme conditions of natural disaster, there is 
no reason to believe that people living in such a biodiverse 
environment as that found in Fiji were regularly deprived of energy or 
protein. In these circumstances, few food imports are in any sense 
nutritionally 'essential'. An argument can therefore be made in favour 
of reducing food imports. Health and nutrition policy would then 
have a trade impact, by discouraging the use of low quality imported 
food and returning to greater self-provisioning, a return that would be 
predicated upon deepening investment in social wealth. Indeed, the 
peoples of Fiji, of both major ethnic groups and all income levels, 
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have, by not making full use of the capacity of their environments to 
provide healthy diets, unnecessarily high risks of ill health. However, 
self-provisioning should not be taken to mean exclusively community­
based production. Self-provisioning can also have a regional and a 
national dimension; indeed, it must have this dimension if it is to 
foster the development of social wealth between the two major 
communities in Fiji. 
Two possible policy options exist which would increase the ratio of 
self-provisioned food. The first would be to ban or impose quotas on 
imported items which were judged to be actually harmful 
nutritionally; this should not be ruled out, although it is up to 
nutritionists to make the case in Fiji. The second would be to raise 
duties differentially over time in a manner that took account of food 
consumption, nutritional status and agricultural production. Either 
policy option implies that decisions in the agricultural sector, and 
macroeconomic policy more generally, will impact upon the nutritional 
choices available and thus the overall health of the population. 
The problem of unbalanced diets has a health impact. In Fiji there 
has been some evidence of various forms of child malnutrition, 
notably around weaning, indicating the need to buttress nutrition 
policy with the promotion of breast feeding and adequately resourced, 
easily accessed, primary health programs (Barr 1990) . There has been 
much useful experience in innovative primary health care in the 
public and non-governmental sectors within the South Pacific region. 
Best practices need to be examined and assessed for their transferability. 
At the same time, the nutritional well being of adults in both the 
indigenous Fijian and the Indo-Fijian communities is also a concern. 
Adult malnutrition may be associated with a number of disorders, such 
as diabetes, hypertension, cardio-vascular disease and gout (Barr 1990) . 
Some of these adult diseases are, it must be admitted, also a 
function of overnutrition. In part, overnutrition has occurred because 
the peoples of Fiji have not been making full use of the capacity of 
their environment to provide healthy diets suitable to their cultural, 
and possibly physiological, potential. At the same time however the 
social and political upheavals of the last decade may have contributed 
to self-induced ill health. The possibility of self-induced ill health and 
its related health care costs suggests a peculiar variation on the 
syndrome described by Illich in the 1970s (Illich 1976) .  In this view, 
changes in diet can be a reflection of more general cultural, economic 
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and ecological pressures. These pressures have an impact on 
nutritional status, giving rise to phenomena such as alcohol abuse, the 
early cessation of breast-feeding, and other problems associated with 
'modernisation'. These pressures are recognisable in many societies. 
The policy response has to be multidimensional, involving 
agricultural, macroeconomic, health, education and social policy. The 
response also raises global issues involving the regulation of 
transnationals involved in the agro-food sector. 
Nutrition has in general not been a resource priority for the public 
sector. This must change. Health and nutrition policies in the complex 
mix of environments of Fiji will only be effective when the objectives, 
targets and strategies of such policies are adjusted to the conditions 
and needs at the country, regional, provincial, island, municipality and 
village level. This in turn requires a continuous dialogue between the 
various levels of government on all aspects of food production, 
distribution and consumption. There are international models of 
interactive, community based approaches to social policy formation 
which might be relevant to the country in this regard. 
Dialogue has not been the rule in the past. Specific policy 
development for nutrition was in the past largely allocated to the Food 
and Nutrition Committee, which brought together civil servants from 
various ministries plus representatives of non-governmental 
organisations and academics with interest in the health field. It can be 
argued that Fiji's Food and Nutrition Committee needs to be 
relaunched in order for it to take greater responsibility for 
coordinating nutrition interventions. For this to work, it is crucial that 
there are opportunities for people to comment systematically on 
program and project proposals, not only in the health field but also in 
the broader sphere of agricultural and marine resource development. 
In part, this is because in the longer term sustaining access to a 
nutritious diet means sustaining the environment within which that 
diet is produced. 
Education 
In order to foster the emergence of a less unequal, socially inclusive 
polity, there is a need to develop new approaches to Fiji's school 
curriculum. Four concepts should be integrated as core principles into 
Fiji's school curriculum: anti-racism, multiculturalism, global 
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citizenship and sustainable development education. In terms of the 
first two concepts, a lively debate has been conducted in the education 
field over the philosophical relationship between anti-racist and 
multicultural education (Foster 1990; Troyna and Hatcher 1992) .  This 
debate can be understood to have been centered on the challenge of 
presenting anti-racism as a universal, moral obligation for everyone, 
alongside a multicultural approach emphasising an element of moral 
relativism within a society. Anti-racism and multiculturalism can be 
considered to be consistent with the concept of global citizenship, 
which stresses universal political equality and thus has clear affinities 
with anti-racism and multiculturalism. Sustainable development 
education as a concept stresses the role of structural economic factors 
in fostering social inequality, as well as the impact of choices of 
technology in contributing to or restricting ecological degradation. 
Putting these issues into a formal curriculum context involves 
differing disciplinary emphases. The demands of multicultural 
education in schools can be understood as falling primarily upon the 
arts and humanities, while anti-racist education looks to politics and 
an element of biology. Global citizenship education requires a basis in 
environmental science and peace studies, while sustainable 
development education puts a stress on economics with an element of 
geography. Experience suggests that multicultural and global 
citizenship issues as wholly positive, universal concepts may be well 
understood by younger children. Anti-racism and sustainable 
development education are more complex concepts. Their more subtle 
relativistic considerations may be best handled from more local, 
immediate, experiential starting points which look towards older 
children and adult education. 
Despite the fact there are clear practical problems with handling 
the four concepts in one consistent framework, the shared values of all 
the concepts suggests that integrating them into one framework 
suitable to the specificities of Fiji offers an important challenge to Fiji's 
educationalists. However, the need to raise the profile of anti-racist, 
multicultural, sustainable development and global citizenship 
education within an integrated school curriculum in Fiji can only yield 
full benefits if even the most committed school staff are adequately 
resourced and supported by a multicultural, anti-racist ethic in social 
policy at national government level. 
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Community relations 
Community relations in Fiji turned violent in the 1980s, in part 
because of a growing criminalisation of urban young men who 
demonstrated especially violent individual behaviour. Moreover, since 
1987 there was a marked increase in the risk of collective violence. The 
major contributory factor to this deterioration in community relations 
was the increase in the social acceptability of violence, primarily as a 
result of the activities of the state in legitimising arbitrary violence. 
The increased politicisation of ethnicity meant that the potential for 
violence increased, and powerful interests sought to promote inter­
communal hostility. However, it should be stressed that while the 
potential for violence has increased in the last decade, Fiji has been 
atypical in that there has been only a limited recourse to the use of 
violence in civil society. Nonetheless, it remains the fact that there are 
now larger numbers of men who are ideologically and technologically 
equipped to engage in violent action. Positive action to reduce the 
potential for violence is needed as a social policy priority. 
In order to reduce the potential for violence, social policy in Fiji 
needs to be pro-active in building bridges between the two major 
communities. There is much that can be done in Fiji in developing 
means of communication and indicators that allow patterns of whole 
lives, including experiences of coercion and deception, to be 
understood sensitively at all levels of aggregation and in a way which 
omits no sub-group of people. Communicating the patterns of the 
lives of others to people remote from that experience is needed if 
community relations are to improve. Facilitating unstructured, 
mutually reflective cultural contact has a role to play in this regard. 
Conclusion 
Neoliberalism has been dominant in Fiji since 1982. This approach to 
development 'naturalises' inequality and fosters a degree of social 
exclusion which, in a divided society, can serve to maintain the status 
quo. Fiji, both prior to and during the period of neoliberalism, had at 
best limited success in reducing inequality. This limited success can be 
easily understood: civil society, social wealth and the NIE constitute a 
framework that asks questions about the effectiveness of market forces 
as guarantors of socioeconomic development. At the same time, from 
the mid 1980s up to and including the 1999 general elections, there 
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have been challenges to inequality and social exclusion in Fiji. 
Granted, Fiji's history of strong civil society institutions in both major 
ethnic groups has facilitated social wealth formation and a good 
quality of life for many of Fiji's people. Nonetheless, challenges 
remain. The construction of a less unequal, more socially-inclusive, 
multicultural polity requires that state social policy actively support 
civil society institutions in both major communities involved in the 
self-provisioning of healthcare, education and social security, while at 
the same time augmenting those institutions in a manner conducive to 
reducing inter-community inequalities and increasing trust. Social 
policy in health and nutrition, education and community relations can 
help in this regard. 
The people of Fiji still have exceptional room for maneuver with 
respect to their stocks of social wealth and natural capital. A future, 
progressive social policy could seek to ensure that all people in Fiji 
have sufficient knowledge and trust in each other to forego the 
possibility of inter-community violence. This requires that all people 
derive sufficient income to sustain themselves in good health, that the 
degree of equality within the country be increased, while at the same 
time bequeathing sufficient natural capital to future generations to 
meet the objectives of both local and global sustainability. Fiji was an 
example to the world in the 1970s, produced a promising indigenous 
socio-political movement in the 1980s, has stepped back from the 
brink of breakdown in the 1990s, and could become a leader in the 
construction of a more equal, socially-inclusive, multicultural polity. 
To do this requires a major rethink of the strategic objectives of state 
social policy, to which this chapter has been addressed. 
CHAPTER 7 
Labour market deregulation 
in F ij i  
Ganesh Chand 
Introduction 
In 1991, the military-backed Interim Government in Fiji promulgated 
numerous decrees that substantially amended the labour legislation of 
the country. The decrees were a part of a wider set of policies designed 
to deregulate the labour market, which in turn formed a component of 
a package of structural adjustment policies. The overall objective of 
these policies was to reassert the role of an unhindered market 
mechanism in allocating resources. In Fiji, this objective was to be 
achieved in various areas. In the public sector, the role of the 
government was to be reduced; towards this objective, all publicly 
owned ventures were to be gradually corporatised and eventually 
privatised. To provide incentives to the private sector, an indirect tax 
system was to take over from reliance on direct, and particularly 
income, taxes. In trade, protective policies were to be eliminated and 
the international market was to determine the prices of imports and 
exports. In the labour market, the free play of the forces of supply and 
demand was to determine labour utilisation and remuneration. 
While the policy shift towards structural adjustment had begun to 
be gradually implemented in Fiji in the mid 1980s, it was the military 
coup of 1987 and the subsequent collapse of the economy that 
provided the impetus for a rapid implementation of these policies. By 
the end of 1988, the Interim Government had announced that it was 
escalating the pace of implementing these policies, in order to revive 
economic growth. The cornerstone of the revival was to be export-
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oriented industrialisation. For this to succeed, the government 
emphasised the need to foster a wage-competitive economy. It was 
from this perspective that labour market deregulation policies were 
developed. 
For many years prior to the military coups national wage 
guidelines had been established, either through tripartite negotiations, 
through government initiative, or through semi-autonomous wages 
councils. However, within the new economic environment which 
followed the coups the government began to view such processes of 
wage determination as being 'not consistent with the flexibility and 
commercial realism required in different industries to retain a 
competitive position' (Government of the Republic of Fiji 1993:6) .  A 
new agenda was thus developed, a cornerstone of which was labour 
market deregulation. 
Labour market deregulation is an attempt by the state to free the 
determination of workers' wages from the influence of ' distortionary' 
institutions like trade unions. A totally deregulated labour market is 
one where only the worker and the employer determine the wages of 
the worker, through a process of decentralised bargaining. Wage levels 
are set through the interplay of labour market demand and labour 
market supply, which establish an 'equilibrium' wage which 'clears' 
the labour market. In principle, the equilibrium wage should reflect 
productivity of the workers. This theoretical perspective informed 
policy. When delivering his 1991 budget address, the Finance Minister 
announced that the regime was deregulating the wage settlement 
process. He argued that a primary cause of distortions in the labour 
market was 'excessive and uncontrolled union intervention' (Ministry 
of Finance 1991 :21) .  Policies announced in the budget were followed 
up, during 1991 and 1992 in particular. The essence of the changes in 
the policy framework was to limit the influence of trade unions on the 
functioning of the labour market. 
This chapter examines what labour market deregulation has 
entailed, the reasons for the reforms, and the impact of the reforms on 
the functioning of the labour market. It demonstrates that labour 
market deregulation has had a significant effect upon the rate of 
unionisation, upon strikes and industrial disputes, upon employee 
remuneration, and upon the structure of employment. The chapter 
recognises that the new Constitutional settlement has repealed many 
of the amendments to labour law, which were responsible for these 
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changes. The new government may also move to repeal some of 
changes to labour law enacted in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, in that 
the operation of the labour market has fundamentally changed, the 
impact of deregulation will continue to be felt. 
The post-independence labour market 
At independence in 1970 the labour market in Fiji was regulated by a 
set of laws which were inherited from the colonial power, Britain. The 
key acts regulating the labour market were the Wages Council Act of 
1960, the Trade Unions Act of 1964, the Employment Act of 1965, the 
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1965, and the Shop (Regulations of 
Hours and Employment) Act of 1965. In the immediate post­
independence period, the scope of this legislative framework was 
considerably enlarged, as state intervention in the labour market 
deepened. 
In part, expanded state intervention in the labour market was 
designed to offset increased labour militancy. The inflation rate rose 
from 4.1 per cent in 1970 to 6.5 per cent in 1972, 9.1 per cent in 1973, 
11 .2 per cent in 1974 and a peak of 14.4 per cent in 1975 (Fiji Bureau of 
Statistics, various issues (a)) .  The increase in inflation coincided with 
growth in formal employment outstripping growth in the labour force 
(Chand 1996) . In a situation of an increasingly tight labour market, 
worker solidarity increased and the unionisation rate rose in 
successive years following independence. In large part, worker 
solidarity increased because most of the post-1959 ethnically based 
unions had already collapsed by the late 1960s. The trade union 
movement was increasingly cutting across ethnic barriers, and worker 
solidarity was on the rise. Unions, with increasing success, militantly 
pressed the case for improvements in the terms and conditions 
governing the employment of labour. In 1971 a record number of 
strikes took place, and a record number of workdays were lost. In 
subsequent years, strike activity and lost workdays increased so that 
by 1975, 46 strikes took place involving 12,180 workers and resulting 
in 57,373 lost working days (Chand 1997) . To a large extent, organised 
labour was successful in pressing its case for improved living 
standards. The average annual increase in daily wages for the years 
1966 to 1970 had been 6.2 per cent. For the years 1971 to 1975, this 
jumped to 19.5 per cent (Chand 1996) . 
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In that price rises played a pivotal role in sustaining increased 
labour militancy, the post-colonial state rapidly sought to intervene to 
limit price rises. In April 1971, under Price Control Legislation, the 
Government placed certain commodities under price controls. While 
the range of controls was not very broad, it indicated the beginning of 
a deeper intervention into both product and labour markets. In 1972 
the Prime Minister's working party on unemployment recommended 
that a Prices and Incomes Board be formed to monitor prices in Fiji 
and, where necessary, set price controls. The Prices and Incomes Board 
was established in 1973. It was accompanied by a Counter Inflation 
Act, which imposed a wage and salary freeze for the year. At the same 
time, a Trade Disputes Act was passed. Its stated objectives were to 
provide an 'efficient' system for resolving industrial disputes through 
conciliation, voluntary mediation, and arbitration; to encourage the 
voluntary use of third parties by unions and employers so that 
solutions to differences that they could not solve between themselves 
might be found; and to provide powers to both the Minister and the 
Permanent Secretary for Labour and Industrial Relations to intervene 
in trade disputes, in order to facilitate an early settlement. Clearly, the 
state rapidly sought to regulate the activities of organised labour. In 
this light, it is not surprising that the Fiji Trades Union Congress 
(FTUC), the umbrella body of trade unions in the country, opposed the 
Trade Disputes Act: it placed limits on the use of industrial action as a 
tool for workers to improve their terms and conditions of 
employment. The FTUC held that the Act would 'result in a virtual 
stranglehold on trade unions. It will lead to reducing the free 
collective bargaining system to a farcical exercise' (FTUC 1976:9)1• 
Soon after the legislative barrage of 1973, an Industrial Relations 
Code of Practice was drawn up. Receiving support from the Labour 
Advisory Board, the Code, though not a legally binding document, 
aimed at introducing a 'reasonable' and constructive environment for 
collective bargaining (Leckie 1988: 140) . Then, in 1976, a Trade Union 
(Recognition) Act was enacted, which laid down the procedure for the 
recognition of trade unions. 
However, state efforts to regulate organised labour were not 
working. Workers in general, and public sector workers in particular, 
were not satisfied with the mechanisms developed by the state 
between 1971 and 1976. In response to increasing industrial disputes, 
growing unionisation, and a tense industrial relations climate, in 1976 
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the Prime Minister, representatives of the FTUC and employers 
established a Tripartite Forum, in which all three stakeholders were 
represented. In a sense, attempts by the state to unilaterally regulate 
the labour market were abandoned and organised labour was formally 
recognised as a social partner. From 1977 until 1984 the Forum was the 
single most important institution for wage negotiations in Fiji, 
developing in particular an institutional framework for the 
determination of national wage guidelines. The establishment of Wages 
Councils for various industrial sectors, and the setting of minimum 
wage guidelines complimented the Forum; both served to strengthen 
the institutional framework for determining labour incomes in Fiji. 
Why reform? 
Following the 1979 oil price shock, unstable international prices for 
Fiji's main export, sugar, and a series of natural disasters, the early 
1980s witnessed visible signs of economic stagnation. As economic 
performance deteriorated, union organisation deepened. In the mid 
1970s, the unionisation rate was about 44 per cent. The unionisation 
rate increased to a peak of 49 per cent in 1982 (Chand 1996). When, in 
the early 1980s, and following advice from international consultants 
and multilateral organisations, the government began re-examining 
the role of the state in light of poor economic performance, the labour 
market came under particular scrutiny. In line with an emerging 
neoliberal consensus in the developed market economies, trade unions 
came to be increasingly viewed in official circles as institutions that 
create distortions in what would otherwise be a reasonably 'efficient' 
labour market. Such distortions, it was argued, were primarily 
responsible for inflation and poor economic performance. In this 
context, and with a sluggish economy, it came as little surprise when 
the Government in November 1984 unilaterally imposed a wage 
freeze and effectively terminated the Tripartite Forum. The 1984 wage 
freeze heralded the beginning of a new era in economic policy in Fiji: 
that of structural adjustment. 
As a consequence of the wage freeze, the trade union movement 
announced plans for the launching of a political organisation to 
safeguard its interests in the legislature. The Fiji Labour Party (FLP), 
organised and formally launched by the FTUC in 1986, went on to win 
the 1987 national elections in coalition with the National Federation 
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Party (NFP) . When a military coup deposed the newly elected 
government in May 1987, most of the trade union leaders behind the 
FLP and the FTUC began to play an active role in opposing the coup, 
through the promotion of a movement for the restoration of 
democracy. International union solidarity also became a useful tool in 
pressuring the military-backed regime to return power to a 
democratically elected government. 
The coups led to the collapse of the national economy (Sepehri and 
Akram-Lodhi, this volume). Given this, a new economic policy 
package designed to revive the economy was put in place in 1989. The 
structural adjustment process, which had begun prior to the coups, 
was accelerated, with the aim of transforming Fiji from an inward 
looking economy into one that relied on export processing. The most 
important ingredient in the proposed transformation of the economy 
was to be the creation of wage-competitiveness with respect to other 
export processing economies around the Pacific Rim. 
To this end, labour law amendments were promulgated in 1991 
and 1992. These sought to address two concerns simultaneously. First, 
by weakening trade unionism, the military-backed regime thought it 
would weaken opposition to its rule. Second, by weakening trade 
unionism, union induced upward pressure on wages would be 
weakened, promoting greater wage competitiveness with respect to 
other export processing economies. 
Ingredients of the reforms 
In 1991 and 1992 the Industrial Associations Act, the Trade Union 
(Recognition) Act, the Trade Unions (Collection of Union Dues) 
Regulations, the Trade Unions Act, the Trade Unions Regulations and 
the Trade Disputes Act were all amended so that the substance of each 
were substantially changed. The changes in each of these areas are 
examined in turn. 
Industrial Associations Act 
Trade unions usually represent employees of a single employer. 
However, employees can have more than one employer: workers may 
be seasonally employed, while workers in agriculture may be engaged 
by different employers at different periods of the production cycle, 
making it impossible to identify a single employer over the entire 
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production period. In a similar vein, it may be difficult to clearly draw 
the line between employer and employee. For example, sugarcane 
farmers produce commodities that are sold to a central purchasing 
authority. While the central purchasing authority does not employ 
sugarcane farmers, they clearly have a hierarchical contractual 
relationship. In these sorts of circumstances, trade unions of the usual 
definition cannot be formed. Prior to 1991, in circumstances where a 
trade union was difficult to form, an industrial organisation could be 
formed to represent collective interests. The 1991 amendments to the 
Industrial Associations Act barred an industrial association registered 
under the Act from engaging in any trade dispute or matters 
connected with the regulation of relations between employees and 
employees, between employees and employers, or between employers 
and employers. The change thus restricted, if not eliminated, the 
capacity of an industrial association to represent collective interests. 
As a consequence of this amendment, industrial associations could 
no longer register industrial disputes. This provision effectively 
eliminated the power of industrial associations in the sugar industry. 
These associations were amongst the most powerful of the groups 
supporting democracy that emerged after the 1987 coups; the 
amendment thus restricted dissent. The amendment also restricted the 
capacity of the Fiji Garment Workers Association to represent collective 
interests. According to a Ministry of Labour official, this 'ensured the 
garment industry complete freedom from interference by its workers. 
The effect has been a continuation of individual bargaining in an 
industry where possible unionisation of approximately 10,000 workers 
could pose a big threat to a comparatively new industry' (Khan 1994:8). 
The amendments to the Industrial Associations Act were also 
designed to weaken the leadership of industrial associations. Under 
the amendments, an officer of an industrial association was prohibited 
from being an officer of another industrial association or of a trade 
union. This amendment was effectively intended to limit the power of 
particular trade union leaders who also held official positions in 
industrial associations. Commonly, these leaders were also active in 
the democracy movement. In a related amendment, the Registrar of 
Trade Unions was empowered to declare the election of a Secretary or 
a Treasurer as null and void on the grounds of the elected official 
lacking a formal education. A prohibition could also be placed on any 
person convicted of fraud, dishonesty or extortion. Such individuals 
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were banned for 5 years from holding the position of an officer in an 
industrial association. While this latter amendment might at first 
glance appear appropriate, it must be seen within the context of the 
amendments as a whole; it could be used to bar officials who had 
breached the amended laws-such as holding dual offices-and who 
in so doing were found to be 'dishonest'. 
Trade Union (Recognition) Act 
The amendments to the Trade Union (Recognition) Act dealt with the 
provisions by which new trade unions could gain recognition. Prior to 
1991, when 50 per cent of eligible employees joined a trade union and 
when there was no rival union a Compulsory Recognition Order could 
be obtained. This legally entrenched the position of the trade union. 
Under the amendments, when applying for a Compulsory Recognition 
Order the percentage of employees who had joined the union had to 
be based on the number of employees on the date of the application 
for recognition. The only exception was for those employees who left 
of their own accord. This amendment thus prevented employers from 
manipulating the 50 per cent requirement by either firing union 
members or hiring more non-union workers after the application for 
recognition had been made. This amendment was obviously to the 
benefit of trade unions. Many others, however, were not. 
One amendment allowed the Permanent Secretary for Labour to 
exclude from recognition those employees who acted in a confidential 
capacity or in matters relating to industrial relations. Through this 
provision the government substantially reduced the number of potential 
union members in the labour force. Many categories of workers, 
including administrative and secretarial workers and supervisory and 
managerial workers, could be excluded from collective bargaining on 
the basis that they had to maintain confidentiality or that they dealt 
with staff matters. 
A further amendment repealed provisions relating to the 
compulsory 'check-off' of trade union dues from members of recognised 
trade unions. Under the check-off provision, employers deducted union 
dues from pay packets and transferred the dues directly to the union. 
The repeal thus substantially weakened the financial base of trade 
unions, as it required financial officers of unions to collect dues from 
members individually on a weekly, fortnightly or monthly basis, a task 
which was cumbersome, in part because the fees charged by banks to 
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deduct dues directly from bank accounts was more than the cost of 
union membership. While the amendment to the Trade Unions 
(Collection of Union Dues) Regulations allowed unions and employers 
to enter into agreements to allow for union dues to be deducted 'at 
source', the provision clearly favoured employers, in that employers 
could charge heavy fees for this facility. 
Numerous unions and industrial associations felt the effect of the 
repeal of the check-off provision. A case in point is the Fiji Public 
Service Association (PSA), whose membership fell from 
approximately 4,500 in 1990 to about 2,800 by late 1992; the fall was to 
a large extent because of the repeal of the check-off provision. In its 
capacity as employer, the government negotiated with the PSA over 
the re-introduction of the check-off system. However, the government 
sought to drive a hard bargain. It sought a written undertaking from 
the PSA to acknowledge, support and endorse the labour reform 
decrees; abrogate the right to strike; cease seeking international 
solidarity for the trade union and democracy movement in Fiji; and 
bear the costs of the deduction. That the Government finally agreed in 
1992 to maintain the check-off system without condition reflects the 
efforts of the PSA in the face of attempts clearly intended to severely 
limit the effectiveness of public sector unions. 
In the private sector, following negotiations with employers many 
unions continued to use the check-off system. But 'the threat of 
withdrawal. . .hung over their heads' and 'could force them to 
compromise their demands' (Khan 1994: 10). Indeed, refusal to agree to 
the maintenance of the check-off system effectively killed some private 
sector unions. An example was the Fiji Garment, Textile and Allied 
Workers Union. This was registered in 1992 but was unable to survive 
as the garment manufacturers refused to provide a check-off system 
(Khan 1994:10). 
Yet another amendment empowered the Minister for Labour to 
declare as unlawful a strike or lockout over trade union recognition 
when, in the Minister 's view, all procedures governing recognition had 
not been followed. The Minister was thus provided with discretionary 
power in declaring strikes concerning recognition unlawful. The effect 
of this was the elimination of strikes and lockouts over the issue of trade 
union recognition. The implication of this amendment went beyond 
recognition, however; in a dispute over wages or conditions an 
employer could challenge recognition as a means of restricting recourse 
to industrial action (International Labour Organization (ILO) 1992:161). 
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Amendments regarding 'unlawful' strikes criminalised certain 
union activity. Thus, causing, procuring or counseling, or in any way 
encouraging, persuading or influencing others to take part in any 
strike, lock-out or boycott which had been declared unlawful were 
made criminal offences. Similarly, a cessation of work or a refusal to 
continue work in circumstances which gave rise to 'reasonable 
suspicion' that the worker was taking part in or acting in furtherance 
of an unlawful strike was made a criminal offence. A person found 
guilty of an offence relating to an unlawful strike was also barred from 
holding any post as an officer of a trade union for a period of two 
years from the date of committing the offence. 
Finally, an amendment gave Ministry of Labour officials the power 
to demand employers' employment records and from trade unions 
trade union membership records. In the wake of the coups, and the 
political environment they created, such an amendment might be 
considered an infringement of freedom of association. In summary 
then, these amendments weakened union membership, union 
solidarity, and union leadership. 
Trade Unions Act 
Amendments to the Trade Unions Act brought about substantive 
changes in the industrial relations climate. A starting point was the 
redefinition of 'strike'. 'Strike' had previously been defined as a 
cessation of work. This definition was expanded to include go-slows, 
work-to-rule, the withdrawal of goodwill, breaches of contract of 
service, and refusing to accept engagement for any work in which the 
workers were usually employed. A parallel amendment to the Trade 
Disputes Act similarly extended the definition of strikes. These 
amendments eliminated the use of 'non-strike' tools as a means of 
pursuing industrial action. 
A second change to the Trade Unions Act repealed the provision 
for disallowing the registration of unions where a union already 
existed. According to the Administrator General, Government policy 
had previously been to encourage horizontal industrial and sector­
based unions rather than 'in-house', plant-based, vertical unions. The 
result had been the rise of some very large unions which, according to 
the Administrator General, were 'too politically powerful and aligned 
so that quite often the interests of many of their members get 
forgotten . . .  [I]n their internal workings, principles and etiquette's (sic) 
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of democratic practices do not get observed' (FTUC files 1998). While 
the Administrator General stressed that the amendment was in line 
with the advice of the ILO's Committee of Experts and the ILO's 
Convention 87, this amendment, together with a provision enabling a 
group of five or more workers to form a trade union, encouraged the 
formation of 'new' trade unions. This was clearly the purpose behind 
the amendment. Some of the 'new' unions were ethnically based, 
while others were management-sponsored. Thus, whereas between 
1990 and 1991 only five new unions were registered, between 1992 
and 1994, 14 new unions were registered (Chand 1996) . Of the newly 
registered unions, nine were the result of splits within existing larger 
unions. The amendment thus reduced the power of large unions, and, 
according to the Administrator General, were expected to 'lead to the 
formation of a new union federation rival to FTUC' (FTUC files 1998). 
It comes as little surprise then that according to its General Secretary 
the provision-by allowing a gold mining company to sponsor a rival 
workers' council-aided the collapse of the Fiji Mine Workers Union 
(personal communication 1995) .2 
In a third change to the Trade Unions Act, the section covering 
immunity from civil prosecution as a consequence of trade union 
activities was repealed, with the exception of activities which had 
been endorsed in a secret ballot of union members conducted under 
the provisions of the labour legislation. As a consequence of this 
change, unions, officials and members could be sued for loss of output 
or damage to materials on account of 'illegal' strikes. The immediate 
impact of this amendment was that it reduced the number of 'wild­
cat' strikes from 25 in 1990 and 11 in 1991 to three in 1992 and six in 
1993 (Khan 1994: 12). 
A fourth change was a new provision that required unions seeking 
international solidarity to get a mandate from their members through 
a secret ballot. The effect of this was to reduce, through delay, efforts 
designed to mobilise international support for workers' struggles in Fiji. 
Trade U nions Regu lations 
The Trade Unions Regulations were amended to allow the 
government to supervise union ballots. The amendments allowed the 
government to report on the regularity of ballots and to intervene to 
prevent any irregularity in connection with ballots. An associated 
amendment required that unions seeking a ballot had to notify the 
La bour ma rket dereg u lation in F ij i  163 
Registrar of Trade Unions at least 21 days before the date of the ballot. 
Moreover, proxy voting was disallowed in any ballot concerning 
executive positions in a union. The amendments also placed a time 
restriction on the use of the ballot: once balloting concerning industrial 
action had been completed, the validity of a strike mandate was 
limited to six weeks. In addition, the amendments allowed the 
government, in its role as an employer, to directly supervise ballots in 
civil service unions. 
The amendments thus served to limit the right of workers to 
conduct their affairs according to rules that they had drawn up. They 
also restricted the capacity of unions to immediately resort to 
industrial action when seeking to rectify grievances. In so doing, they 
violated workers' rights to freedom of assembly and organisation. 
Moreover, they also introduced a degree of arbitrariness into the 
industrial relations system: pro-regime unions which went on strike 
without fulfilling the necessary procedural requirements-like the 
Port Workers and Seafarers Union and the National Union of Factory 
and Commercial Workers Pacific Fishing Corporation branch-were 
not charged with violating trade union regulations, while anti-regime 
unions such as the Fiji Aviation Workers Association were charged 
with violating the law (Khan 1994:12).  
Trade Disputes Act 
There have been numerous smaller amendments to the Trades 
Disputes Act, which together constitute a significant rewriting of the 
Act. A first set of amendments served to distinguish between disputes 
of interests, which deal with the procurement of a collective 
agreement, and disputes of rights, which cover all other disputes . 
Separate procedural machinery for dealing with disputes of interests 
and disputes of rights were set up. This provision reduced the number 
of strikes on disputes of interests from an average of 7 per year 
between 1988 and 1990 to 2 per year for the years 1993 and 1994 (Khan 
1994) . 
A second set of amendments disallowed individuals or groups of 
workers or unions who were unrecognised by the Registrar of Trade 
Unions from reporting trade disputes. As a consequence of this 
amendment, the Garment Workers Union could not file a trade dispute 
concerning check-off because it remained unrecognised. Similarly, the 
government did not recognise a dispute between Emperor Gold Mines 
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and the Fiji Mine Workers Union because the employer had 
successfully challenged a compulsory recognition order from the 
Ministry of Labour. 
A further amendment repealed the provision of representation by a 
lawyer in dispute and conciliation proceedings except those before the 
Arbitration Tribunal. The rationale was to reduce the involvement of 
outside parties such as lawyers, in order to resolve disputes more 
quickly. This had a possible benefit for unions because employers had 
a greater financial capacity to hire lawyers. However, this benefit was 
muted by the fact that employers could still obtain leave from the 
authorities to be represented by lawyers. 
A key amendment of the Trade Unions Act was an expansion of the 
list of essential services. Essential services require a forty-nine day 
notice to the Ministry of Labour before any strike action; strikes thus 
become a more difficult tool for unions dealing with essential services. 
Indeed, since the Minister of Labour is empowered to order 
compulsory arbitration for disputes in essential services, the range of 
activities in which strikes become effectively redundant has increased 
as a result of the enlargement of the list of essential services. 
The impact of labour market reforms 
There can be little doubt that the labour market reforms of the early 
1990s have had an impact on the functioning of the labour market. 
This section discusses this impact. In what follows, attention will be 
paid to unionisation rates, strikes and industrial disputes, wages and 
employee remuneration, and the structure of employment. The 
discussion is largely confined to the trends in these variables; no 
attempt is made to find a correlation between the reforms and the 
variables as this would require more detailed econometric testing. 
Unionisation 
A specific aim of the government when undertaking labour market 
deregulation was to weaken the influence of trade unions. The 
unionisation rate can be used as one indicator of the influence of 
unions. If used in this way, it is clear that deregulation has had 
significant success. First, union membership has plunged. Table 7.1 
shows the unionisation rate in per cent between 1985 and 1995 for 
different economic sectors. 
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In the period 1985-86 the overall unionisation rate was 45 per cent. 
This compares to a peak unionisation rate of 49 per cent in 1982. The 
rate declined to 37 per cent by 1995, a decline of 25 per cent (Chand 
1996) . It is of interest to note that the decline from 1985-86 followed 
the imposition of the wage freeze in 1984, when structural adjustment 
policies began to be implemented in earnest, and when the capacity of 
unions to produce a key benefit-wage increments-was directly 
inhibited by government. Moreover, the decline in the unionisation 
rate has been systematic in all industrial sectors except mining, 
transport and finance. Indeed, even in mining union power has been 
reduced: a management-sponsored 'in-house' union has been created, 
weakening union autonomy. 
The National Union of Factory and Commercial Workers (NUFCW) 
demonstrates the impact of labour market reforms on a large union. 
From a peak of 5,021 members in 1972, its membership declined to 
2,270 by 1995, a decline of about 50 per cent (Chand 1996) . Most of this 
decline occurred during the structural adjustment period. The decline 
in the membership of the NUFCW was due to job reclassifications, 
which has resulted in a higher proportion of 'casual' workers; the 
formation of new plant-based unions; the collapse of certain branches 
in factories affected by trade liberalisation; and specific efforts at 
union busting by management. Labour law amendments empowered 
management further, thereby creating greater job uncertainty and fear 
amongst the workers of job losses if they resorted to trade unionism. 
Table 7.1  Unionisation rate by sector, per cent 
1 985-86 1 988-9 1 1 992-95 
Agriculture 1 4. 6  1 2 . 9  1 2 . 5  
M in ing  1 2 .4 26 .7  65 .8  
Manufactur ing 48. 8  2 7 . 7  24.2 
E lectricity 32 .8  2 5 . 5  2 5 . 5  
Construction 54.2 64 . 1  45 . 2  
Wholesale/Reta i l  1 5 . 8  1 8. 5  1 7 . 6  
Tra nsport 3 3 . 2  30 .5  3 2 .4 
F inance 35 . 3  3 1 . 6 42 .3  
Services 64.8  58 .8  54.9 
Overa l l  45 . 2  38 .4 36 .6 
Source: Chand, G., 1 996. 'The labour market and labour institutions in Fiji in an era of 
globalisation and economic liberalisation', Fiji Trades Union Congress, Suva. 
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Unionisation rates have also been affected by the already-noted 
changes in the Industrial Associations Act. One impact of the changes 
in the Act was to reclassify certain unions as associations, with the 
consequent 'loss' of thousands of union members. An example is the 
National Farmers Union: with the reclassification of the union as an 
association, statistics on unionisation dropped by about 3,000. 
A significant aspect of unionisation in the era of labour reforms is 
that while the rate of unionisation has declined the number of trade 
unions has increased. In the years 1965 to 1990, 84 trade unions were 
registered; of these, 25 were cancelled, abandoned or amalgamated 
with other unions, leaving 59 registered unions. Of these, a maximum 
of 45 could be considered 'operational' in that they were active, and of 
these, 36 were affiliated to the FTUC. However, between 1991 and 
1997 a total of 36 new unions were registered. Of these, at least 6 were 
breakaways from existing unions. 
The increase is largely due to two factors. The first factor is 
management-sponsored workers' councils or plant-based unions 
encouraging sections of the workforce to splinter from existing unions 
in order to form a new collective bargaining unit. The second factor is 
turbulence within the FTUC during the period 1991-94. A group 
within the FTUC sought to gain control of it by actively forming new 
unions in order to weaken existing unions and, as a corollary, create a 
potential 'vote bank' for itself within the FTUC. This second factor 
ceased after 1994, when peace returned to the FTUC and union­
sponsored breakaways ceased. 
Strikes and industrial disputes 
A central objective of the government in introducing changes to the 
labour laws was to reduce strikes and industrial disputes. Table 7.2 
reports strike activity between 1970 and 1997. As Table 7.2 
demonstrates, the average annual number of strikes during the period 
1970-75 was 51; during the period 1978-84 it was 41; during the 
period 1988-90 it was 17; and during the period 1991-97, a mere 9. 
The decline from the 'Tripartite era' of 1978-84 to the era of labour 
reform of 1991-97 was 78 per cent; in the manufacturing sector the 
decline was 50 per cent. Table 7.2 also shows that the number of 
workers involved in strikes declined between the two periods. The 
number of working days lost, however, rose. The rise in the number of 
working days lost is explained by three specific strikes: the Fiji Bank 
Table 7 .2 Strike activity, 1 970-97 
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Overall strike activity In manufactu ring 
Number Workers Work Days Number Workers Work Days 
1 970-7 5 5 1  7765 47846 6 1 465 9938 
1 978-84 4 1  372 1 20970 6 1 1 26 4283 
1 988-90 1 7  1 640 50433 9 826 40699 
1 99 1 -97 9 1 763 36399 3 1 009 1 1 934 
Source: Ministry of Labour records/Unpublished data held at Ministry of Labour, Suva. 
Employees Union strike in 1996, involving 656 workers and 11 days; 
and the 1995 and 1997 Fiji Sugar and General Workers Union strikes, 
involving around 800 workers over 10 and 16 days respectively. 
In terms of industrial disputes, Table 7.3 provides data on the 
number and nature of industrial disputes between 1980 and 1997. 
Table 7.3 demonstrates that disputes reported rose from 63 per year 
during the period 1980-86 to 102 per year during the labour reform era 
of 1991-97-an increase of 62 per cent. The basis of this increase is a 
jump in disputes relating to the dismissal of workers and the log of 
claims. Those relating to dismissals rose from 19 per year during the 
period 1980-86 to 34 per year during the labour reform era of 1991-97 
-an increase of 79 per cent. The number of disputes relating to either 
a refusal to negotiate log of claims or disputes over the application of 
log of claims rose from 9 per year in the period 1980-86 to 30 per year 
in the period 1991-97-a jump of over 230 per cent. The jump in disputes 
on refusal to negotiate unions' log of claims can be explained in terms 
of the attitude of employers towards trade unions in the era of labour 
market reform, which re-asserted the philosophy that it is management's 
prerogative to exclusively determine the terms and conditions of 
employment, as well as a more aggressive approach by trade union 
leaders who had become discouraged over the lack of consultation about 
labour market deregulation at the firm as well as at the national level. 
Table 7.4 provides evidence on modes of dispute resolution 
between 1980 and 1997. Table 7.4 demonstrates that in the period 
1980-86 and 1991-97, there was a 48 per cent decline in the incidence 
of settlement through the conciliation machinery provided by the 
Ministry of Labour. At the same time, there was a 68 per cent increase 
in the resort to arbitration. Thus, reliance on conciliation mechanisms 
has declined significantly during the era of labour market reforms. 
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Table 7.3 Number, nature and composition of disputes 
1 980-86 1 99 1 -97 
Total % Yearly Tota l % Yearly 
Dism issa l of workers 1 35 3 1  1 9  239 33 34 
Log of c la ims negotiation 62 1 4  9 2 1 2  30 30 
Cond it ions of employment 6 1  1 4  9 40 6 6 
Non-payment 63 1 4  9 4 0 
B reach-co l lective agreement 50 1 1  8 1 62 23  2 3  
J o b  eva l uation 7 2 1 1 0 0 
Others 62 1 4  9 55 0 8 
TOTAL 439 1 00 63 7 1 3  1 00 1 02 
Note: From 1993, job evaluation related disputes were merged with others, while non­
payment was merged with breaches of collective agreements. 'Others' include disputes 
over redundancies. 
Source: Ministry of Labour records/Unpublished data held at Ministry of Labour, Suva. 
The effect of labour market reform has therefore been to increase 
reliance on arbitration to settle industrial disputes. The arbitration 
mechanism for the settlement of disputes was established by the Trade 
Disputes Act, which provided for one or more arbitrators to resolve 
disputes. A key reason for the increasing reliance on arbitration 
procedure in the era of labour market reform is that the incidence of 
non-agreement has increased. With the rapid rise of a professional 
cadre of unionists seeking to justify their positions and pay, with the 
establishment of a new generation of management asserting its right 
to make decisions, and with an inability of the government to keep 
pace with the negotiation and analytical skills of employers and 
unions, seeking a binding solution from an arbitrator often seems 
preferable to conciliation. As a past Arbitration Tribunal put it, the 
'process has made an excuse for avoiding or evading extensive 
negotiations and conciliation' (Madraiwiwi 1994:6) . 
Wage and salary trends 
Table 7.5 provides evidence on trends in real wages between 1972 and 
1996, using the wage settlements of the 1977-84 Tripartite era as the 
basis of a comparative index. Table 7.5 demonstrates that while the 
mining sector did particularly well during the labour reform era of 
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Table 7 .4 Dispute resolution 
1 980-86 1 99 1 -97 
Tota l % Yearly Tota l % Year ly 
Voluntary arb itration 95 23  1 4  4 1  6 6 
Compulsory arbitration 3 1 0.4 1 24 1 7  1 8  
Ind ustr ia l  Relations Comm ittee 1 3  3 2 1 06 1 5  1 5  
Conci l iation Machinery 240 58 34 1 24 1 7  1 8  
Pend ing 38 9 5 72 1 0  1 0  
Withdrawn 1 1  3 2 74 1 0  1 0  
Dead Locked 1 7  4 2 2 1  3 3 
Rejected 0 0 0 97 1 4  1 4  
Sent back to parties 0 0 0 44 6 6 
Other 0 0 0 1 4  2 2 
Total 4 1 7 1 00 60 7 1 7  1 00 1 02 
Sources: Chand, G., 1996. 'The labour market and labour institutions in Fiji in an era of 
globalisation and economic liberalisation', Fiji Trades Union Congress, Suva; Ministry 
of Labour records/Unpublished data held at Ministry of Labour, Suva. 
1992-96, so too did electricity, commerce and agriculture. However, 
with the exception of commerce, the sectors where the private sector 
predominates-manufacturing, construction, and transport-fared 
badly during the labour reform era . The manufacturing sector showed 
a marked decline; its average real wages were only 68 per cent of the 
1977-84 level in the period 1992-96. Overall, Table 7.5 shows that 
there was a decline in real wages during the era of labour market 
reform between 1992 and 1996. 
Table 7.6 displays salary data for the period 1970-96. It shows that, 
in general, the era of labour market reform from 1992 to 1996 has 
produced gains for salaried workers when compared to the immediate 
post-coup period. This is particularly the case for private sector 
workers with scarce skills, such as professional and technical workers. 
The trend away from national-level salary setting through Tripartite 
mechanisms and towards enterprise-based bargaining could be one 
reason for the improvement in relative salaries. However, the key 
finding of Table 7.6 is that real salaries in the era of labour market 
reform have, in general, declined when compared to those in of the 
Tripartite era salaries. The exceptions to this trend are the agriculture, 
mining and transport sectors. 
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Table 7.5 Real wage ratios 
1 972-76 1 977-84 1 985-86 1 987-9 1 1 992-96 
Ag ricu lture 1 02 1 00 87 86 91  
Min i ng 1 02 1 00 92 92 1 1 4 
Man ufacturing 90 1 00 90 72 68 
Electricity 83 1 00 1 00 89 94 
Construction 92 1 00 9 1  84 83 
Commerce 94 1 00 9 1  79 84 
Transport 9 1  1 00 95  86  84 
Services 9 1  1 00 92 8 1  8 1  
Overa l l  9 1  1 00 92 80 79 
Note: The data expresses real wages as a percentage of the average 1977-84 real wage. 
Real wage data is the average daily wage rate deflated by the consumer prices index. 
The base year is 1972. 
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics, (various issues). Current Economic Statistics .. 
Government Printer, Suva; Annual Employment Survey, Government Printer, Suva. 
Table 7.6 Real salary ratios 
1 970-76 1 977-84 1 985-86 1 987-9 1 1 992-96 
Agriculture 92 1 00 97 95  1 1 8 
M in ing 1 24 1 00 87 1 2 5 1 4 1 
Manufactur ing 94 1 00 98 92 94 
E lectricity 92 1 00 87 80 89 
Construction 99 1 00 78 72 83 
Commerce 1 03 1 00 98 92 96 
Tra nsport 85  1 00 1 0 5 9 1  1 0 5 
Fi nance 94 1 00 98 92 98 
Services 84 1 00 1 1 2 9 1  95 
Overa l l  88 1 00 1 05 90 96 
Note: The data expresses real salaries as a percentage of the average real salary for the 
period 1977-84. Real salary data is the average annual salary deflated by the consumer 
prices index. The base year is 1970. 
Source: Fiji Bureau of Statistics, (various issues). Current Economic Statistics .. 
Government Printer, Suva; Annual Employment Survey, Government Printer, Suva. 
Employment structure and gender d ifferentials 
It can be hypothesised that the deregulation of the labour market 
might have had an impact on the structure of employment in Fiji. 
Moreover, it might be hypothesised that the increasing 
commercialisation of the economy under adjustment might have led to 
an increasing proportion of females in the labour force: the increased 
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availability of jobs perceived to be predominantly for females and the 
decline in the relative number of 'traditional male jobs', like those in 
commercial agriculture, would tend to attract more females into the 
labour market. These propositions are examined in Tables 7.7 and 7.8. 
Table 7.7 gives the sectoral composition of employment by gender for 
the period 1980-93. Table 7.8 gives the structure of wage and salary 
remuneration by gender for the period 1980-93. 
Table 7.7 shows that the female share of formal employment has 
increased from 20 per cent of total employment in 1980 to 31 per cent 
of total employment in 1993. Within the increasing 'feminisation' of 
the labour force, there has been a particularly sharp jump in the 
proportion of females working in the manufacturing sector (Table 7.7). 
In 1986 the share of females in total manufacturing sector employment 
was 16 per cent. By 1993, the female share of total manufacturing 
employment had doubled, to stand at 32 per cent. This dramatic 
increase is the result of economic policy. The shift to export-oriented 
industrialisation in Fiji under structural adjustment was largely based 
on garment and footwear processing in 'tax-free' manufacturing sites 
which were actively promoted by government policy; both these 
industries grew rapidly following the coups, just as both these 
industries relied predominantly on female labour. 
Table 7.7 The sectoral composition of employment by gender 
Year % of females % of females Tota l females Female labour 
in  manufactu ring in  d istribution in employment force (% of tota l) 
1 980 1 0 .3  24.7 1 4402 20 .29 
1 98 1  1 1 . 1  2 2 . 2  1 55 1 6  2 2 .04 
1 982 1 0 .7  23 . 3 1 46 1 3 2 1 .8 1  
1 983 1 3 .0 24.3 1 58 1 4  2 2 .42 
1 984 1 3 . 3  23 . 7  1 7 1 1 7  2 2 . 9 1  
1 985 1 3 .8 22 .0  1 9027 24.60 
1 986 1 5 .6 20.8 1 8999 25 .09 
1 987 1 8.9 1 8 . 3  1 9563 26 . 1 4  
1 988 20 .2  1 8 .9  1 9655 26 .94 
1 989 28 .7  1 8.4 24725 29 .35  
1 993 32 .3  1 8.8  3 1 1 26 30 .50 
Source: Devi, P. and Chand, G., 1997. 'Female employment and earnings' in G. Chand 
and V. Naidu (eds), Fiji: coups, crises, and reconciliation, 1987-1997, Fiji Institute of 
Applied Studies, Suva. 
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The increasing feminisation of the workforce is essentially taking 
place in the private sector. Indeed, there has been a decline in the 
share of females employed in the public sector, from 45 per cent of 
total employment in 1986 to 29 per cent of total employment in 1993 
(Devi and Chand 1997) . Public sector jobs are, comparatively 
speaking, more secure than private sector jobs; thus, the feminisation 
of the workforce and the predominance of females in the private 
sector also suggests increasing employment insecurity. 
In addition to a possible increase in employment insecurity, the 
feminisation of the labour force has not been accompanied by a shift 
into the 'salariat' by females. Salaried jobs carry relatively greater 
stability, greater job-related benefits, better fringe benefits, better 
prospects of upward mobility, greater authority, and more social 
prominence. They are, in short, more 'desirable'. Table 7.8 shows the 
female share of total wage employees rose from 14 per cent in 1980 to 
28 per cent in 1993. By way of contrast, in salaried employment the 
female share of total employment rose from only 31 per cent in 1980 to 
34 per cent in 1993. Moreover, this trend peaked in 1985, and remained 
reasonably unchanged thereafter. Thus, while female employment 
over the period has increased, the concentration of female workers in 
Table 7.8 Wage and salary structure by gender 
Wage employment Sala ried employment 
% females % males % females % males 
1 980 1 3 .9  86. 1 30 . 5 69 . 5  
1 98 1  1 5 .4 84. 6  3 1 .2 68. 8  
1 982 1 6 . 6  83 .4 28 .6  7 1 .4 
1 983 1 6 . 7  83 .3  30 .2  69 .8 
1 984 1 7 . 1  82 .9 30.4 69.6 
1 985 1 7 . 1  82 .9 34.7 65 .3  
1 986 1 8 . 1  8 1 .9  34 .3  65 .7  
1 987 20 .7  79 .3  33 .2  66 .8  
1 988 2 2 . 2  77 .8  32 .6  67 .4  
1 989 27 .2 72 .8 32 . 3  67 .7  
1 993 28 . 1 7 1 . 9 34. 1 65 .9  
Averages: 
1 980-86 1 6 .4 83 .6  3 1 .4 68 .6 
1 887-93 24.6 7 5 . 5  3 3 . 1 67 .0 
Source: Devi, P. and Chand, G. ,  1997. 'Female employment and earnings' in G. Chand 
and V. Naidu (eds), Fiji: coups, crises, and reconciliation, 1 987-1997, Fiji Institute of 
Applied Studies, Suva. 
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relatively more desirable jobs has stabilised. Moreover, in terms of 
earnings, female earnings as a proportion of national income have 
increased by only 0.7 per cent between the 1980-86 and 1987-93 
periods (Devi and Chand 1997). Almost the entirety of this minimal 
rise has been due to the rise in the female wage earnings component of 
national income. In summary, it is clear that in Fiji women are 
increasingly becoming a cornerstone of the working class, and that in 
part the reason for this structural change is, simply, that women are 
paid less than men. 
Ethnic differentials 
It can be hypothesised that labour market reforms would also have 
had an impact on ethnic differentials in the labour market. Concrete 
evidence of ethnic differentials requires employment and earnings 
data by ethnic categories, but these are not available. Nonetheless, 
three comments can be made. 
The first comment is that, as noted earlier, the reforms were 
brought in following the coups; one purpose behind the weakening of 
what were predominantly multiethnic trade unions was to increase 
the role of ethnicity in Fiji society, and thereby weaken anti-regime 
forces. As a consequence, it might be expected that labour market 
reform would have had an impact on ethnic differentials. It is in part 
for this reason that unions with a predominantly Indo-Fijian 
membership base-like the National Farmers Union-were 
specifically targeted by the amendments. However, in most instances 
the expected outcome did not materialise. In the case of the National 
Farmers Union, the union remained strong, vibrant and multiethnic, 
largely because of its strength in the sugar industry. 
The second comment is that despite ongoing centers of trade union 
strength, the reforms have succeeded in creating labour market 
conditions in which individual workers have become relatively 
vulnerable, and this may have had an ethnic dimension. In its 1998 
Country Report on Human Rights Practices, the US Department of 
State (1999: 15) noted that 'Indo-Fijians, who generally require a cash 
income to survive, are more vulnerable to pressure to work long hours 
than are ethnic Fijians. Many ethnic Fijians can and do return to their 
villages rather than work what they consider excessive hours'. In a 
sense then, the greater reliance on the cash economy found within the 
Indo-Fijian community may, in the context of labour market reforms, 
have increased the vulnerability of the Indo-Fijian community. 
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The third comment supports this point. Public sector jobs in Fiji are 
dominated by indigenous Fijians, while private sector jobs are 
dominated by Indo-Fijians. Given that labour market reforms 
negatively affected private sector employment and earnings more 
than they affected the public sector, Indo-Fijian workers have possibly 
been subject to a more severe impact than indigenous Fijians. 
In summary, while definitive evidence on the ethnic impact of labour 
market reforms has yet to emerge, there is reason to believe that the 
reforms have had a larger impact upon the Indo-Fijian labour force. 
The new constitutional settlement 
The operation of the labour market has changed significantly since the 
labour legislation amendments of the early 1990s. Expecting a 
significant deterioration in the state of trade unionism, the trade union 
movement launched an intensive campaign against the amendments. 
Internationally, the FTUC, through the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions and the Public Services International, lodged 
complaints to the ILO. The ILO rejected many of the FTUC's 
complaints; these included the administrative restrictions on 
recognition, the exclusion of certain categories of workers from 
recognition, the notice and secrecy requirement governing strike 
action, and the removal of compulsory check-off facilities. The ILO 
accepted the other complaints of the FTUC and asked the Government 
to amend the amendments 'so as to leave the necessary autonomy to 
worker 's organisations' (ILO 1992:174) . 
The government did not take any serious step to meet any of the 
ILO's recommendations on amending the labour law amendments 
until July 1997, when the Constitution (Amendment) Act was passed 
by Parliament. The resulting new Constitution has already had a 
significant effect upon the industrial relations framework in Fiji. This 
is because of the fact that under Section 195 all decrees relating to 
labour legislation, except those amending the Trade Disputes Act, the 
Trade Unions Act, and the Trade Unions (Recognition) Regulations, 
have been repealed. The amendments that were not repealed concern 
trade disputes, voting and union dues. 
At the same time, the Constitution (Amendment) Act represents a 
significant advance for labour when compared to other constitutions. 
In previous constitutions, labour relations were covered under the 
'Protection of Freedom of Assembly and Association' provisions of the 
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chapter on the 'Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the 
Individual'. For example, the specific provision in Section 14(1) of the 
1990 Constitution was 
Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the 
enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, 
his right to assemble freely and associate with other persons and in 
particular to form or belong to trade unions or other associations for 
the protection of his interests. 
Under the 1997 Constitution a specific section is devoted to labour 
relations. Section 33 of the new Constitution specifically provides for 
the right to collectively organise and bargain. It states 
(1) Workers have the right to form and join trade unions, and 
employers have the right to form and join employers' 
organisations. 
(2) Workers and employers have the right to organise and bargain 
collectively. 
(3) Every person has the right to fair labour practices, including 
humane treatment and proper working conditions. 
The provision of these rights is a major achievement for labour in 
Fiji, in that legislation must be consistent with the Constitution. The 
right to bargain collectively presupposes union recognition. The latter 
presupposes the existence of a union. Moreover, it is possible, even 
likely, that those 1991 and 1992 amendments which were not repealed 
under the new constitutional settlement may eventually be deemed to 
be inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution. 
Nonetheless, the optimism engendered by the new constitutional 
settlement must be tempered. The 1997 Constitution will affect a 
labour market that operates in a very different way from that which 
existed prior to the amendments of the early 1990s. It remains to be 
seen whether the 'success' of the labour market reforms of the early 
1990s will effectively reduce or indeed negate the impact of the new 
Constitution on the operation of the labour market. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined labour market deregulation in Fiji . Tracing 
the background to the deregulation policies, the chapter has 
documented the objectives of the deregulation drive, the key 
mechanisms for deregulating the labour market, and some 
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consequences of the deregulation. It has been argued that the 
deregulation of the labour market was a central part of the wider 
structural adjustment policies that Fiji began adopting in the mid 
1980s. The military coups and the subsequent collapse of the economy 
provided the opportunity for Fiji to push ahead with the adjustment 
program. Since the basis of the adjustment program was export­
oriented industrialisation, and this required, in the view of the 
government, a wage-competitive economy, the government attempted 
to restructure the operation of labour market in order to foster wage 
competitiveness. A second central objective was to reduce the power 
of trade unions, since many trade union leaders were leading the 
democratic movement in Fiji. 
To this end, labour laws were amended by decrees and national 
wage settlement mechanisms terminated. Deregulation had, in broad 
terms, four consequences. The first was that the decline in the 
unionisation rate, which had begun in the early 1980s, rapidly 
accelerated, particularly in the manufacturing and construction 
sectors. The second consequence was that while both the number and 
intensity of strikes fell significantly, industrial disputes increased as 
the conciliation machinery provided by the Ministry of Labour fell 
into disuse, being replaced by the resort to arbitration. The third 
consequence has been an overall decline in real wages, particularly in 
the manufacturing, construction and transport sectors-sectors where 
the private sector dominates. The fourth consequence has been a 
change in the employment structure, where there has been a 
significant increase in the number of women employed in low-paid 
· jobs, particularly in the manufacturing sector, and specifically in the 
garment and footwear industries . 
The new Constitution has repealed some of the decrees that were 
promulgated during 1991 and 1992. However, this has occurred after a 
significant transformation in Fiji's labour market. Despite the already 
apparent consequences of this transformation, the long-term impact is 
not clear. What is clear, however, is that labour markets have never 
operated according to the principles of neoclassical economics. Even if 
'distortions', in the form of trade unions, were not present, the mere 
fact that the agents entering into the bargaining process do so with 
vastly unequal economic strength implies that the terms and 
conditions of negotiation are affected by the economic strength of the 
agents who are undertaking the negotiation. Power hierarchies thus 
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structure the operation of the labour market, and it is for this reason 
that there is a role for the state. The state provides the institutional 
framework within which the labour market operates, and thus within 
which negotiations between unequally endowed agents occur. When 
the institutional framework reflects the collective will of the citizenry, 
labour market outcomes will usually be regarded by the various 
participants as 'just' . When the institutional framework does not 
reflect the will of the people, labour market outcomes will not be 
regarded as just. There can be little doubt that the new Constitution, in 
repealing many of the labour legislation amendments of the early 
1990s, suggests that the institutional framework structuring labour 
market outcomes in the early 1990s was regarded, by many of the 
peoples of Fiji, as unjust. This may in turn help in part explain the 
outcome of the 1999 general elections. The past can be undone; but 
whether the peoples of Fiji continue to choose to do so remains to be 
seen. 
Endnotes 
1 .  Fiji Trades Union Congress files held at the FTUC Building, Suva. 
2. Transcribed interview with the General Secretary of the Fiji Mine 
Workers Union, 1995. 
CHAPTER 8 
Women in post-coup F ij i :  
negotiating work through old 
and new real it ies 
Jacqueline Leckie 
I ntroduction 
The political economy of post-coup Fiji has profoundly shaped 
women's lives, expectations and identities. Changes in gender 
relations were evident by 1987, but the unprecedented upheavals of 
the coups and subsequent political and economic restructuring 
accelerated change for Fiji's women. Initially, many bore the negative 
consequences of the coups as silent individuals; a few celebrated new 
opportunities as role models for their gender and ethnic group. 
Women have increasingly recognised, to varying degrees, a 
commonality behind the changes that have taken place. Change is a 
reflection of their cultures, the legacy of colonialism, the education 
system, the impact of the post-coup regime, and globalisation. For 
women, gender is the central thread through these changes; but they 
are also linked to other identities and hierarchies, and especially those 
of ethnicity and class. In part, this sheds light on the contradictory 
responses to change from women. Even the most progressive women 
eventually confront 'old realities', not just from the past but as a daily 
reality in the present. Similarly, women identified as traditionalists can 
rarely ignore local and global cultural, economic and political 
challenges. For most women these extremes are not polarised choices 
but rather represent what may seem to be a never-ending balancing 
act between old and new realities, in which personal and collective 
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identities are negotiated to varying degrees. This chapter1 explores 
these issues primarily through women's work in Fiji. However, it is 
predicated on the recognition that it is futile to separate work from 
other components of women's lives. 
Women and work, past and present 
Women's labour was essential, providing food and services, during 
Fiji's initial participation in the global economy, before and after 
cession to Britain in 187 4, when Fiji became dependant on the export 
of sugar, copra and gold. The plantation-dominated economy was 
responsible not only for Fiji's distinctive ethnic composition, it also 
shaped gender relations. For example, from 1879 to 1920 sugarcane 
was produced on plantations that relied upon indentured South Asian 
workers. However, regulations stipulated that forty per cent of 
indentured labourers should be female. Thus, the plantation system 
utilised women's cheap labour. After the last indenture in 1920, sugar 
production shifted to small family farms. Cane contracts were only 
issued to married men, but farms were too small to support extended 
families. Men therefore worked in sugar mills, harvesting gangs and 
other forms of off-farm agricultural work. Women and children's 
unpaid labour was vital for on-farm production. 
Colonial policies also sought to regulate indigenous Fijian 
participation in the paid workforce. Indigenous Fijians were 
predominantly subsistence workers, but many also took up cash 
cropping and paid work to meet taxes and buy commodities 
(Emberson-Bain 1994b:7) .  However, customary controls on women's 
geographical and occupational mobility, which effectively restricted 
entry into paid work, were strengthened by colonial regulations. 
Nonetheless, women's village, fishing and horticultural activities, 
while not recognised as 'work' within colonial society, were essential 
for economic survival, financial resources and community obligations. 
Thus, I suggest that in common with other societies, women's work in 
Fiji's villages subsidised the costs, resources and care of the workforce . 
Women's constricted involvement in Fiji's paid workforce 
continued after political independence. Although their participation in 
paid work expanded, these activities-casual or unregulated, as 
domestic workers, market vendors, in family businesses, or on 
farms-were largely unrecorded. Thus, by independence only 14 per 
cent of women workers were recorded as participating in the cash 
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economy. This increased to 30.5 per cent by 1992 (Fiji Bureau of 
Statistics 1996), representing over 55 per cent of Fiji's 'economically 
active' female workforce . There can be little doubt though that these 
figures severely underestimate the contribution of women. For 
example, only 4,857 women, 5.2 per cent of all, were classified as 
farmers in Fiji's 1991 agricultural census (Department for Women and 
Culture 1995) . Women's farming roles are much greater, however, as 
subsistence and unpaid agricultural labour. Much of this work though 
is categorised as domestic work, and is thus statistically unrecognised, 
because it results in no direct renumeration. Labour force participation 
rates therefore reflect the gender bias of official statistics (Cameron, 
this volume). The assumptions, terminology and categorisation, and 
public identification by women of their working contribution to 
society can all lead to gaps in measurement (Waring 1990) . 
Women's formal employment opportunities are mainly in the 
public, retailing, financial, manufacturing and tourism sectors. Today, 
two-thirds of women in paid labour in Fiji are employed in 
government and manufacturing (International Labour Organisation/ 
South East Asia and the Pacific Multidisciplinary Advisory Team 
(ILO/SEAPAT) 1997:15). Public sector workers may appear to be 
comparatively well paid, but their salaries were cut by fifteen per cent 
after the coups. Subsequent restructuring, through fiscal cuts, 
privatisation, and the corporatisation of government departments, has 
had major implications for the high proportion of women working in 
the public sector, most of whom are employed at lower levels than 
men (ILO/SEAPAT 1997) . Thus, while by 1996 women accounted for 
45 per cent of civil servants, females represented only 8 per cent of 
senior positions, 20 per cent of middle posts, and 48 per cent of lower­
level positions (Booth 1994:18) .  Moreover, the gendered segmentation 
of the public sector labour market was indicated by female 
concentration in health and education. In 1996, 48 per cent of female 
civil servants worked in the Ministry of Education, Women and 
Culture, primarily as lower-level teachers. Even when women are 
appointed as head teachers they tend to remain in smaller schools. 
Similarly, 75 per cent of civil servants in the Ministry of Health were 
women, mostly employed as nurses (Public Service Commission 
1996) . The gender segmentation of the public sector labour market is 
blamed by unionists on management boards. For example, in teaching 
'they say women aren't capable, they can't attend evening meetings, 
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or would feel uncomfortable with a mainly male management 
committee, but these are lame excuses' (Fiji Times, 13 February 1997) .  
Following global trends, much of the growth in new employment 
in Fiji is concentrated in an increasingly feminised manufacturing 
sector. Manufacturing became the main growth area of employment 
since the coups, accounting for about a quarter of formal employment 
(Fallon and King 1995:7; Sepehri and Akram-Lodhi, this volume). This 
work is generally poorly paid, insecure, usually non-unionised, and 
with low levels of responsibility. Undoubtedly, the garment industry has 
attracted the most attention in post-coup Fiji. This has become Fiji's 
main employment growth area and the biggest export after sugar. 
Garment production was integral to the post-coup government's drive 
towards a foreign investment-based export-driven economy. State 
support was delivered through tax-free factories and labour legislation 
outlined below. Structural adjustment policies, including currency 
devaluation, external trade liberalisation and internal deregulation, 
were designed to promote internationally competitive industries such as 
garments. The impact on female employment was rapid. In 1986 
women comprised only 9.7 per cent of the manufacturing labour force. 
They now account for 50 per cent, equating to 14 per cent of formal 
sector employment (Forsyth 1996:8). By 1996 the garment industry had 
an estimated 14,000 workers, the majority of whom were women. 
Women's work in garment production aroused controversy 
because of poor wages, poor working conditions, and little or no 
union protection. Reports revealed 60 hour work weeks without 
payment for overtime. They noted inadequate health and safety 
protection. They spoke of harassment of workers. They demonstrated 
no paid holidays, no leave for illness, and no maternity leave 
(Harrington 1996:3; Ram 1994:246) . These reports, however, had a 
limited impact. Pay had been very poor, with many workers earning 
only F$20 to F$40 per week. In 1997 a new Wages Council Order set 
minimum rates at 90 cents an hour for beginners and F$1 .10 an hour 
for trained workers. The order introduced five days of sick leave for 
workers with three months employment. Garment workers also 
became entitled to annual leave, paid public holidays and national 
provident fund contributions. However, at F$1 .10 an hour, pay 
remains very low. Moreover, qualifying for sick leave is more 
stringent: other manufacturing workers are entitled to ten days leave 
with no qualifying period. 
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The focus on the garment industry has spurred awareness of poor 
remuneration and employment conditions elsewhere. For example, it 
is argued that the Pacific Fishing Company (PAFCO), a government 
owned tuna cannery, has tapped into a 'captive labour market' 
(Emberson-Bain 1994a) of women from villages on Ovalau and nearby 
islands. Critics have condemned the exploitation of women through 
poor pay and working conditions. In 1994 these workers earned 
between F$65 and F$70 a week before taxation and other deductions. 
However, many women had costly loan repayments to Westpac Bank, 
so that cash-in-hand might, at the end of the week, be only F$10. At 
the same time, because of the seasonality of the tuna industry many 
workers were casually employed, even if they had worked at PAFCO 
for several years. Emberson-Bain's report also considered the controls 
and inspection of health and safety for women inferior to that of men. 
The position of women workers on Ovalau indicates the conflicting 
pressures faced by the majority of Fiji's women, who live in 
comparatively small rural settlements. Farming continues to be the 
biggest source of livelihood security for all indigenous Fijians, and 
women's participation in both subsistence and cash farming is 
essential. A recent study found that women did not regard farm work 
as 'the sole responsibility of males or that it was secondary to women's 
roles as wives and mothers. Farm work was perceived and defined as 
an integral part of women's work' (Fiji Association of Women 
Graduates (FAWG) 1994:51) .  Those who took part in the study worked 
up to five hours daily on family farms, except on Sundays or when 
selling produce at the market. Researchers throughout the Pacific (for 
example, Fairbairn-Dunlop 1994) suggest that women's workloads are 
burgeoning as rural communities become more integrated into market 
relations. This increased work manifests itself through not only the 
double shift of farm and domestic work but also through the 
multiplicity of often contiguous tasks in cash cropping, informal 
trading, subsistence and community activities. Similarly, women's role 
in fishing is widening to include not only subsistence activities but 
also collecting and processing fish and shellfish for the market. 
Female farmers, compared to men, have less access to state and 
financial support. Women's labour has been essential to subsistence 
farming and cash cropping but there is little recognition, external 
advice or access to new machinery. Many women still have considerable 
difficulty in securing loans, lacking not only collateral and deposits but 
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also confidence. Thus, during 1993, 56 per cent of Fiji Development 
Bank loans went to agriculture but only 11 per cent were exclusively 
secured by women (Department for Women and Culture 1995:5). 
Similarly, Sue Carswell found that agricultural extension officers rarely 
consult women on farms. Overall, this 'affects not only the subsistence 
situation of rural families but also employability of women in 
agricultural activities' (Department for Women and Culture 1995:10) .  
Opportunities for off-farm labour are also gendered throughout 
Fiji, depending on access to industrial or tourist centres. Negative 
attitudes continue to persist about Indo-Fijian women in rural 
communities participating in formal work. Single women migrating to 
towns are considered morally vulnerable in some lndo-Fijian families. 
However, economic necessity and individual choice are pushing an 
increasing number into seeking off-farm employment. This has 
occurred though during the post-coup period, when Indo-Fijian 
women were susceptible to employment discrimination. As a 
consequence, in many regions off-farm work opportunities for women 
are limited to informal sector cash and exchange opportunities, such 
as producing crafts or providing services such as sewing. At the same 
time, migration depletes the availability of domestic and farm labour. 
Rabuka promised better opportunities for indigenous Fijians but 
many have experienced greater economic hardship. Rising post-coup 
unemployment2 and retrenchment in the public and private sectors led 
to many men being unable to support their families. As the financial 
onus fell on women, many could only turn to the informal sector. A 
survey of market vendors in Suva revealed ethnic disparity, with 44 
per cent of Indo-Fijians supporting unemployed husbands, compared 
to only 12.5 per cent of female indigenous Fijian vendors (FAWG 
1994:61-2) . Ethnic occupational discrimination in the formal sector in 
however refracted through gender relations: obtaining work requires 
migration from villages, and this has implications for childcare which 
many women are reluctant to accept. 
Education and gender 
The education system, consciously and indirectly, has a key role in 
reproducing gender stereotypes. As elaborated below, these are being 
challenged, but gendered assumptions within Fiji's communities 
channel women into sectors of the labour market and hamper their 
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ability to negotiate gender and work (Leckie 1997a). Hindu, Muslim 
and Christian cultures, and ethnic, gender and class stereotypes, 
structured partly through colonialism, have mediated gender and 
work through education. 
Christian ideals of femininity (Ralston 1990:7 4-5) and appropriate 
education, long ago introduced by missionaries, remain prominent in 
Fiji. Many young women are encouraged or choose to pursue 'caring' 
or service occupations. The origin of these choices can be traced back 
to the colonial period: the colonial authorities fostered ethnically and 
gender-segregated education, which in turn was also segmented by 
traditional hierarchies and class. The elite attended boarding schools, 
but most indigenous Fijians had more limited village education, which 
in turn offered fewer occupational possibilities. 
For many years Indo-Fijian women had less access to formal 
education than their indigenous sisters. In a sample of market vendors 
(FAWG 1994:21-5, 61), 44 per cent of Indo-Fijians had no education 
compared to only 2 per cent of indigenous Fijian women. Reasons for 
such disparities in education and the correlation with occupation are 
complex. Indo-Fijian communities have preferred to educate male 
children but the persistence of gender ideology needs also to be 
considered against economic constraints and family labour 
requirements. Moreover, expectations of early marriage and gender 
roles within families have been considerably disrupted by the realities 
of economic and social change during the past decade. Nevertheless, 
in 1996 Carswell was reminded of dominant attitudes among Indo­
Fijian farming families: 'the girls should be only educated up to class 
eight [age 13], then keep two or three years home, stay home, just get 
some education in cooking food and how to put their houses and then 
seventeen, eighteen they marry' (Carswell 1996, personal 
communication) . According to the Director of Fiji's Council of Social 
Services, investment in education still favours boys rather than girls 
(Balance, September-October 1997: 1) .  Economic pressures and 
increasing poverty influence gender choices in allocating money and 
time for education. Young women's labour may also be needed, 
especially for childcare, if the mother is working within the family 
farm, business or elsewhere. 
Having said that, education levels for all women in Fiji have 
increased during the past decade, with high levels of females 
attending primary and secondary school. Women comprise 45 per cent 
Women in post-coup F i j i  1 85 
of students at the University of the South Pacific (ILO /SEAPAT 
1997:24)3• 'Whatever other aspects of Fiji culture limit the economic 
advancement of women, it seems clear that existing attitudes about 
gender have not stopped girls from attending and completing school 
in large numbers' (ILO/SEAPAT 1997:23). However, these impressive 
educational achievements are inadequately developed in the 
workplace, indicating that gender bias still channels women's 
employment. For example, unpaid farm work is acceptable for women 
in most cane farming localities but pursuing it as paid employment is 
frequently considered inappropriate. Community constraints are 
replicated at the wider state level, with little acknowledgment of 
women's farming skills in educational and agricultural extension 
programs. Before 1983 the intake of women at the Fiji College of 
Agriculture was restricted to two and in 1988 no females were 
enrolled there (Department for Women and Culture 1995:10) .  
According to  Carswell, some change is  now evident, with the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and the Agricultural Landlords 
and Tenants Act extension services beginning to recruit female 
officers, conduct gender awareness staff courses, and incorporate 
women into programs. 
Significant gender disparities remain in technical training. In 1993 
women were still concentrated in 'traditional' programs at the Fiji 
Institute of Technology: business studies, secretarial studies, hotel and 
catering services. Participation in all courses-which cover 
management, marketing, and business, with the exception of 
accounting and secretarial work, offered by the Fiji National Training 
Council-is mostly by males (ILO/SEAPAT 1997:20) . Employers 
reproduce gendered training opportunities through their selection of 
sponsorship candidates. Teaching and nursing trainees are 
predominantly women. Women may comprise over half of the 
undergraduates at the University of the South Pacific but there is a 
marked drop in female participation in postgraduate and advanced 
professional studies. 
The introduction of compulsory education in 1997 brought the 
promise of greater equity, but this was offset by rising educational 
costs for families and schools, a trend which was accentuated by 
currency devaluation in early 1998. Books, uniforms and equipment 
are imported and school fees continue to increase. The impact may 
however have been mediated by ethnicity. Some researchers argue 
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that Indo-Fijians have less access to a 'community safety net' (ILO/ 
SEAPAT 1997) compared to many indigenous Fijian families living in 
villages. Indo-Fijian families are likely to bear educational costs as 
individual families, while indigenous Fijians usually have more 
communal and state support. However, as the joint United Nations/ 
Fiji Government Fiji Poverty Report revealed, such assumptions no 
longer apply to all indigenous Fijians. Indeed, community care may 
have been lacking for some destitute women in the past (United 
Nations Development Programme/Government of Fiji 1997:90). 
Ethnicity and gender 
As this volume reiterates, Fiji's contemporary political economy bears 
the legacies of colonial practices. These established Fiji's ethnic 
population; current census figures indicate that 51 per cent are 
indigenous Fijian, 44 per cent trace South Asian ancestry, and 5 per 
cent identify with other ethnic backgrounds. This is a reversal from 
earlier patterns, when Indo-Fijians numerically exceeded indigenous 
Fijians. 
Colonial and racially-bounded hierarchies reinforced ethnic and 
gender stereotypes and inequalities through both ideology and more 
visible structures. Ethnic divisions appear to have been cast in stone 
but in practice were undoubtedly flexible and negotiated (Robertson, 
this volume) . Tensions between essentialised ethnic and gender 
constructions and their constituencies, and the increasing irrelevance 
of such categorisation and identity, evoke contradictory dynamics 
within Fiji society. The implications for women in the contemporary 
political economy of work are explored here. 
Women's identities are more fractured than the seemingly rigid 
ethnic and gender boundaries moulded by colonisation and tradition. 
This disruption reflects changes of the past decade, including political 
upheavals, economic hardship, structural adjustment, changing 
gender relations, and changing expectations from women. Many 
progressive women acknowledge the 'messy realities' (Chhachhi and 
Pittin 1996) of balancing and challenging the gender expectations of 
their cultures. Despite this, representations of ethnic gender 
stereotypes are too often simplistic. These idealised qualities may have 
some purchase on reality; however, they intersect with newer 
pressures, exacerbated by the coups and late 20th century 
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globalisation. As noted, gender stereotypes are manifested in paid and 
unpaid work, sometimes confined to ethnicity, but more often cross­
cutting these boundaries. 
In the Indo-Fijian community, Shireen Lateef has emphasised the 
reproduction of aspects of South Asian gender ideology in Fiji, most 
notably the cultural and spatial constraints of purdah (Lateef 1990b :44-
8)4. This stresses gender segregation, male protection of women, and 
male responsibility for the material welfare of the family. An Indo­
Fijian farming woman told Carswell that although she had impressive 
school qualifications and intended to pursue a career, her father 
blocked this by arranging her marriage so that most of her activities 
were confined to the family space. Her husband also prohibited her 
working outside the farm even when she was offered employment as 
an assistant teaching in a nearby school. 
Limits over women's occupational and spatial mobility are 
reinforced through personal ties of love and loyalty, fear of non­
acceptance in the local community, and bringing shame to the family. 
Control is also maintained through psychological and physical abuse. 
Lateef (1990b:43) identified the 'threat and use of physical violence 
against wives as a powerful and effective mechanism for ensuring the 
maintenance and reproduction of traditional gender relations among 
Indo-Fijians' . This is by no means specific to this ethnic community. 
Women can face violence when their paid work appears to be 
interfering with domestic work. Some men become angry over 
disruption to domestic routines, or when their role as family 
'provider ' reverses to that of dependent. Women can also reinforce 
gendered expectations and controls, both over themselves and other 
women. 
Although violence against women features in all ethnicities, the 
wider context of fear in post-coup Fiji did have specific implications 
for lndo-Fijians. As targets of violence, many families tightened 
controls on women's mobility: 'for Indo-Fijian women the coups 
represent a retrogressive step in their struggle for greater freedom' 
(Lateef 1990a:121) .  
Not all indigenous Fijian women consider the coups to have 
enhanced their lives. Rabuka declared that he seized power in 1987 to 
protect and advance indigenous control of power and resources in Fiji. 
Colonial structures had incorporated these goals, provided they 
remained within precise ethnic boundaries. Indigenous Fijian 
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paramountcy was bolstered through the strengthening of chiefly 
authority and European guardianship (Lawson 1991 :81-123). Colonial 
and native administrations and traditional structures and values 
specified roles that limited women's access to land, monetary 
resources and political authority. This has been challenged in the post­
coup years, but Pauline McKenzie Aucoin's observations of life in the 
interior of western Viti Levu remains pertinent in the understanding 
of contemporary gender roles within indigenous Fijian communities. 
Men exercise authority over women. Their authority derives from a 
number of sources. First, the fact that they are leaders at the societal 
level-the district, village and clan heads are always male-justifies 
extension of 'male authority' over family members. In addition, men 
have control over religious practices that center on the clans' men's 
houses (na beta). Finally, they are considered stronger than women, 
and strength is valued in Fijian society. These factors allow them to 
lead society and to be leaders within the clan and the household 
(McKenzie Aucoin 1990:26; see also Ravuvu 1987:261-80) . 
Indigenous Fijian customary and hierarchical links of authority and 
respect are not confined to traditional spheres but permeate gender 
relations in paid and professional work. For example, nurses have 
encountered political and family interference in the health sector with 
irregular appointments to top nursing posts, selection for post-basic 
training, scholarships and workshops. One nurse noted that 'clan 
favouritism and nepotism within nursing at CWM Hospital had 
overruled the power of wisdom and merit' (Fiji Nursing Association 
(FNA) archives, member to General Secretary FNA, 3 February 1993). 
Indigenous Fijian nurses complain about the influence of customary 
status in the workplace. Some tutors are appointed on ' qualifications of 
blue blood' which 'makes nurses quite passive'. Chiefly rank and state 
political connections have particularly controlled women's post-coup 
political and union activities. At the same time, victimisation was 
common after a major nurses' strike in 1990. Favourable duties, 
promotions, training and leave were allocated to non-striking wives and 
relatives of senior health officials (Fiji Times, 3 October 1990; FNA, nd) .  
Clearly, while the specifics of gendered roles in Indo-Fijian and 
indigenous Fijian cultures are significant, restrictive gender 
representations are common to women of all cultures in Fiji. These 
have proved convenient in hiring practices, low pay and gendered 
skill differentials, particularly in the garment industry, but also in 
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other paid manufacturing work as well. Cliched stereotypes include 
women's 'nimble fingers', passivity and the assumption they should 
be grateful for any paid work as 'half a loaf is better than none' 
(Slatter 1987) . This is because women are perceived by employers as 
supplementary wage earners, choosing to work for personal motives: 
'lipstick', 'pin money', self-fulfilment or social interaction (Grynberg 
and Osei 1996: 15). As a general rule, gendered stereotypes over skills 
and divisions of labour are carried over into factories. Men's and 
women's tasks tend to be segmented according to different 
classifications of skill and remuneration. In many factories men 
occupy most of the managerial and supervisory roles, work on fully 
automated machines and in the 'skilled' cutting sections. 
Women also repeatedly identify how gendered stereotypes are 
reinforced by tradition to shape their working predicaments. For 
example, 
[a]ttitudes about gender provide, first, the immediate motivation and a 
ready rationale for discrimination. Also, aside from direct 
discrimination and male actions that discourage them from advancing 
economically, many women themselves make choices about their 
lives-about family responsibilities, about training, about career 
options-that work to maintain the economic differences between 
themselves and men (ILO/SEAPAT 1997:3) . 
Imrana Jalal and Wadan Narsey have labelled this a 'culture of 
silence' that condemns women's assertiveness as disrespectful to those 
with traditional power. They stress that 
why women remain silent is neither about being inferior, being less 
knowledgeable nor economically disadvantaged. It is a combination of 
many factors such as religion, culture, upbringing, the fear of 
retaliation, the lack of protection-dynamics which attribute to 
people's expectations of an ideal female in a patriarchal society such as 
Fiji (Balance, September-October 1997:8-9) .  
Health activist Mridula Sainath (1997:3) found restrictions still 
applied to business women who were attempting to break out of 
traditional gender moulds. Although discrimination in accessing loans 
and credit appeared to be declining, 'what women were really up 
against were the hostile cultural and traditional environment which 
does not encourage women to own property and assets. In most 
families, the purse strings and investment strategies are men's 
domain'. 
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Women in Business was founded by Nur Ali Bano to counteract 
women being ostracised and stereotyped as weak in business dealings 
(Fiji Times, 25 April 1998) .  Indigenous Fijian representations of men as 
qwaqwa-'hard, strong, tough and resistant' -and women as 
malumaluma-'soft, weak, gentle and easygoing' (McKenzie Aucoin 
1990:27)-can apply to women of any ethnicity. Such stereotypes affect 
professional women. For example, women may numerically dominate 
teaching but, as already noted, promotion to higher levels can be 
constrained by culture and tradition (Fiji Times, 1 April 1996). This also 
reinforces the concentration of women in primary teaching (Booth 
1994:42-6).  
Likewise, nursing (Leckie 1997a) illustrates how multiple hierarchies 
of gender, family, politics, colonialism and ethnicity overlay one 
another. The 'Nightingale tradition' of nursing (Bradley 1989:193-4) as 
an autonomous female space has shaped nursing discourse and 
practices in Fiji. This fitted into indigenous female healing roles and 
missionary ideals of feminity, which together resulted in chiefly women 
being considered as suitable nursing trainees (Fiji National Archives, 
F48/ 168 1936) . By way of contrast, although Indo-Fijian communities 
formerly considered nursing to below status, today it is an acceptable 
career for women and can be valuable when seeking work abroad. Pay 
and working conditions for nurses in Fiji do not though match this 
positive status. Many nurses explicitly attribute such discrepancies to 
the gender inequalities within Fiji's cultures. As one has said, 
customs and traditions have continued to place women in an inferior 
position. This cultural background colours the attitude of the Ministry 
of Health, male society as a whole, in regard to nurses and their 
problems. From time immemorial, therefore, nurses in Fiji have 
generally accepted their inferior role as an integral part of their 
existence (FNA archives, FNA General Secretary to Minister, Women's 
Affairs and Social Welfare, 9 August 1988) . 
Since the coups, ethnicity and politics have further cut into 
workplace relations and added to gender discrimination in promotion 
and training for Indo-Fijian women in the public sector. Some 
indigenous Fijian women have also found that favours based on 
regional, kinship and political ties increased during this period. Family 
relationships are evident in the health sector, where many female nurses 
are married to male doctors. These ties were invoked to break the 1990 
strike. Some nurses kept their strike participation a secret from their 
husbands in order to avoid conflict with his political identity. Those 
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women who defied their husbands' censure of  strike participation 
were challenging his authority as household head. Contradictions 
among attitudes to the nurses' strike were reflected in Rabuka' s 
support of their cause while his government declared it illegal. 
The coups ushered in a resurgence of indigenous Fijian 
traditionalism and nationalism but this representation, particularly 
over gender, was highly contested. Fiji appears progressive at a global 
level, through the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) . 
However, cultural and traditional values supersede gender equality, as 
Fiji has entered a reservation to two CEDAW articles5• This diluted 
acceptance of the CEDAW is at odds with the declaration of gender 
equality in Fiji's 1997 constitution. 
While some Hindus and Muslims have advocated the maintenance 
of traditional gender roles to strengthen religious identity, 
conservative gender roles have been particularly reinforced by post­
coup Christian fundamentalism. Christian morality is linked with 
indigenous identity. A spokesperson for the Methodist Church 
regarded any differing gender roles or sexualities as a threat to 
indigenous Fijian values when they stated that 
Fiji must also be cautious of Western influences. Not all good things 
come from Western civilisation. We must base our future with sound 
Christian doctrine . . .  we should treasure family values and teach our 
people to live a healthy moral standard (Fiji Times, 13 July 1994) . 
Christianity remains the religion that is invoked to control labour 
in Fiji. In the aftermath of industrial unrest at PAFCO during 1993, 
management encouraged prayer meetings that preached obedience, 
non-confrontation, love, unity and 'family togetherness' in the factory. 
Christian values were also reinforced through a company prohibition 
on adultery, which could illegally result in instant dismissal 
(Emberson-Bain 1994a: l60). 
Christianity has also been central to nursing discourse in Fiji, with 
the nursing establishment encouraging nurses to seek solace through 
the Nurses' Christian Fellowship rather than engaging in militant or 
activities. A nursing unionist was frustrated by some members accepting 
their poor pay because 'nursing is seen as a vocation . . .  [A] real 
calling . . .  [ with] healing hands in place of Jesus. The Lord will reward you' 
(field notes 1996) . The applicability of Christian discourse in the caring 
professions is however contested not only by non-Christians but also 
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by committed Christians. Biblical texts have been invoked to 
rationalise rebellious behaviour and to challenge the status quo 
(Leckie 1997b:135) . A prominent FNA official resolved any incapability 
between her religious beliefs and taking strike action when she said 
the message was loud and clear to me, see the message I was given 
was Romans 13, I still remember that, it says that we have to honour 
the government, the government of the day is the one that god, the 
interpretation that was given to me that the government of the day has 
set out the strategies to follow in this time of crisis and that we had 
followed .. .industrial action was also within government strategies for 
such a situation which we have done . . .  So that was really clear in my 
mind, God had chosen this government, this government had given 
this provision and we were working within that provision. That to me 
was enough (field notes 1996) . 
Women and poverty 
If subjective gendered stereotyping has few ethnic boundaries in Fiji, so 
too does the harsh reality of poverty. The gendered impact of poverty 
reflects women's inferior position in the labour market and changing 
family structures. Between 1989 and 1991 the percentage of poor urban 
households doubled from 20 to 40, while in 1993 one in three rural 
households were estimated to live below the poverty line (Bryant 
1993:74) . More recent estimates of Fiji's poor vary from the Fiji Poverty 
Report's quarter of the population (UNDP 1997:39) to the Fiji Council of 
Social Services's half of the population (Fiji Times, 28 January 1998) . 
Estimates of the poverty line in 1995 ranged from a low of F$45 per 
week to a high of F$94.20 per week (UNDP 1997:32-40). The 'economic 
miracle' of export manufacturing created jobs for women, but the low 
levels of pay documented above mean that wages, particularly in tax­
free factories, fall short of minimum household weekly income levels, 
trapping many in poverty. One survey found 55.5 per cent of Fiji's 
female-headed households lived in poverty and among all poor 
households, 20 per cent were headed by women (Bryant 1993:79). 
Eighty per cent of very poor families housed by the Housing 
Assistance and Relief Trust have a female head (Booth 1994:59). 
Women's vulnerability to poverty is associated with shifting family 
structures over the past decade. Accurate figures are not available but 
it appears there has been an increase in the number of nuclear 
households, an increase in the number of female-headed households, 
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and an increase in the number of sole parent households (UNDP 
1997:76-7) . Of 260 female garment workers surveyed in 1993, one­
third were sole income earners (Harrington 1994:90).  Up to 70 per cent 
of the mostly female casual vendors at Suva market are sole family 
income earners (FAWG 1994:27-8, 62) . The poverty position of female­
headed households has been documented, but given the overlap 
between female-headed and sole parent households, it is worth noting 
that conservative estimates derived from the 1990-1 Household 
Income and Employment Survey of the very poor suggest at least four 
out of five widowed household heads and two-thirds of separated and 
divorced household heads are women (UNDP 1997:52) . Separated or 
divorced women are more likely to live in urban areas, where they are 
dependent on a cash income. However, older and widowed women 
also may lack support. That 
almost 40 per cent of women heads who are over 60 years of age are 
economically active is quite remarkable and demonstrates the degree of 
economic need they experience. In other words, if their families were 
supporting them, as the stereotypical view of family support nets 
proposes they do, then this pattern would not be seen. Women are 
disadvantaged by the job market and must often seek menial jobs, 
such as domestic workers (UNDP 1997:57) . 
The economic pressures faced by sole mothers were compounded 
when maintenance support for divorced women was sliced from 
between F$10 and F$15 a week to between F$5 and F$7.50 after the 
coups. To compound this, only 19 per cent of maintenance orders are 
regularly paid and almost half are defaulted on by ex-husbands 
(UNDP 1997:64) . The meagre resources of welfare agencies, such as 
the Bayly Clinic, have been under unprecedented pressure since 1987. 
During 1997 Fiji's Department of Social Welfare exhausted funds to 
assist the very poor. 
Agency and resistance: contrad ictions and gender 
The post-coup decade appears to have cast a gloomy despondency 
over Fiji's women. In many ways economic pressures and political and 
cultural discrimination have sharpened women's subordination. Yet 
during these years there have been strong visible actions by women to 
redress not only their circumstances but also those of others in Fiji. 
Political contestation, albeit focused on indigenous and ethnic issues, 
has accentuated concern over women's rights in Fiji. 
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Although many women are self-congratulatory over their more 
public assertiveness, this is usually tinged with caution. The 
contradictions of women's agency were summed up to me by a young 
nurse who protested about pay and conditions but shrugged her 
shoulders in defeat and said 'we are women, can't fight' (field notes 
1996) . This does not mean that women passively accept the status quo 
but that gender identities and stereotypes override or reinforce other 
hurdles women encounter in the home, community, workplace, and at 
national and global levels. Despite these parameters, women do 
individually and collectively resist the limitations of gender, ethnicity, 
tradition and poverty, but often covertly. Within both the home and 
workplace this can be, for example, through sickness or absenteeism. 
For example, the Indo-Fijian woman described earlier became 
anorexic after her father forbade her to pursue nursing as a career. She 
says that she 'really cried for the work and still I don't go well now. I 
didn't eat food for I think about a week' (field notes 1996) . Industrial 
sabotage and low productivity may also indicate resistance to the 
labour process. Christy Harrington (1999) reported women protesting 
by smearing lipstick on clothes or shoddily sewing garment pieces 
together. David Forsyth (1996:16) attributed the high labour turnover 
in factories to 'an adversarial and unhappy environment' .  This equally 
reflected employer tactics of keeping costs low by dismissing 
employees qualifying for full pay rates. 
When women publicly negotiate their roles, it is often through 
established community structures such as religious groups, women's 
village committees or service organisations. However, beginning in the 
1970s, and particularly in recent years, increasing numbers of women 
have been dissatisfied with 'silent resistance' and conventional 'ladies' 
organisations. This mirrors global shifts, where women have become 
more proactive through new feminist movements and within existing 
organisations, notably trade unions, to confront worsening economic 
realities. These two strands of collective activism have coalesced over 
common issues in post-coup Fiji but also diverged over methods, aims 
and ideals. 
Women's networks, involvement and solidarity were vital in 
workers' protests and achieving union representation. Women in Fiji 
are active as unionists in occupations where they numerically 
dominate: nursing and teaching in the public sector, and banking in 
the private sector. However, overall there has been limited female 
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involvement in Fiji's paid, unionised workforce, and in some service 
sectors such as tourism representation is seriously lacking. According 
to a 1993 South Pacific and Oceanic Council of Trade Unions survey, 
female union membership in Fiji is, at 22 per cent, much lower than in 
Western Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, the Cook Islands and 
Kiribati (South Pacific and Oceanic Council of Trade Unions 
(SPOCTU) 1993). 
Initially, the military-backed government banned unions in Fiji's 
tax-free factories. However, in 1989 the Fiji Association of Garment 
Workers (FAGW) gained registration as an industrial association. 
When employers opposed this, workers took strike action (Leckie 
1992). In 1990, for example, an international ban loomed when 
government rejected a dispute over the dismissal of three union 
activists from Lotus Garments (Fiji Times, 2 November 1990) . Workers 
struck for a month over 'appalling working conditions and extremely 
long hours' .  Wages and conditions have improved in some factories, 
but discontent remains. Despite initial optimism, the FAGW has not 
been able to maintain this momentum, with membership plummeting 
from around 2000 in 1992 to less than 700 in 1996 (Forsyth 1996:15). 
This is due to obstacles from employers-only 2 among 200 firms 
recognise the union-labour laws, the state, and, admittedly, internal 
problems within the FAGW. 
In contrast, nurses are strongly unionised with around three­
quarters belonging to the FNA. There is considerable contestation 
within the FNA about the association's methods and its identity as a 
union and as an organisation representing primarily women. 
Contradictory views on unionism and industrial action were evident 
during the 1990 strike. The key issue of demands for safe night 
transport for nurses highlighted deeper labour discontent in the health 
sector over salaries, understaffing, inadequate promotions and 
arbitrary transfers. Nonetheless, some nurses who went on strike 
experienced guilt, describing the strike as a 'sad occasion . . . . .  It's 
unprofessional to go on strike . . . . .  the ministry should look after nurses 
and their welfare' (field notes 1996) . One nursing activist was 
frustrated over divided solidarity within Fiji's wider union movement 
for the FNA, in part because of its status as an association, and in part 
because of the FNA's identity as a mainstream women's organisation. 
Frustration focused around affiliation to the Fiji Trades Union 
Congress (FTUC). She said of affiliation that 
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It's still a main issue that comes up in the AGM of the FNA, every year 
we have to vote to stay in. I have always maintained when we are out 
on our own we will never be able to do anything, if we stick with our 
other brothers and sisters especially the ones in the public service then 
hand in hand we could fight issues together. Out on our own the Fiji 
government could do whatever they want to do and I have always 
maintained this issue is religious because that most of the people want 
us to get out of [F]TUC. They see it as a satanic organisation, this is the 
way they think. .. There is one argument that says that it [the FNA] was 
a women's organisation and the Fiji Nurses Association is one of the 
most popular women's organisations in Fiji. I said that only because 
we are together with our other brothers and sisters. If we went out on 
our own we are nothing, that's what I maintained, we fight it, we fight 
it together (field notes 1996) . 
The ability of unions to represent women workers has been tested 
by labour legislation introduced in 1991 to tighten control over unions 
and to shape the labour market to meet the need to be globally 
competitive. Amendments to the Industrial Associations, Trade 
Unions (Recognition) and the Trade Unions Acts (Fiji Republic Gazette 
1991; Chand, this volume) had specific implications for women 
workers, as many were unorganised and new to the labour market. 
During 1990 and 1991 garment workers had organised under the 
FAGW and taken strike action (Leckie 1992) . Local and overseas unions 
were lobbied to provide solidarity but the new labour laws impeded 
this. Industrial associations, which technically deal with relations 
between members rather than between employers and employees, and 
which include the FAGW, could no longer engage in labour disputes. 
It became illegal to take direct action to achieve union recognition. 
One of the biggest changes in the legislation was the registration of 
enterprise and employer-dominated unions. This widened the scope 
for ethnic fragmentation within organised labour. It also reinforced the 
isolation of many women workers in small enterprises, especially 
waitresses, retail workers and domestic workers. 
The newer women's organisations have been confronting the 
realities of women's agency and choices with Fiji's traditions and 
economic and political pressures. The two spearheads of feminist 
organisation in Fiji are the Fiji Women's Crisis Centre (FWCC) and the 
Fiji Women's Rights Movement (FWRM), both founded in the mid 
1980s. The FWCC intervenes in situations of sexual assault and 
violence against women and children. It educates about these 
Women in post-coup F ij i  1 97 
problems, and lobbies for law reform in these and associated areas. It 
is based in Suva but in response to an increase in demand since 1987 
centres have been opened in Labasa, Lautoka and Ba. 
The FWRM also has its roots in responses to violence against 
women and to economic exploitation, as became visible in the garment 
industry. Its constitution states that it aims 'to improve women's 
domestic, social, legal, economic and political status in Fiji and to 
promote the equality of women in Fiji' . Workplace discrimination 
heads FWRM's objectives, as outlined in its constitution: 'to remove 
discrimination against women in the work force such as 
discriminatory wages, sub-standard working environments, unequal 
opportunity, restricted access to jobs and promotions, discriminatory 
and inadequate terms and conditions of employment and sexual 
harassment'. Linkages between women's economic vulnerability, 
workplace exploitation, violence and poverty converged in FWRM's 
Women, Employment and Economic Rights Project. Like the FWCC, 
the FWRM has extended its activities outside the capital. Its legal 
literacy, anti-violence and wages for housework campaigns now focus 
on farming localities. 
The FWRM has concentrated its efforts in seeking to change labour 
laws by removing discriminatory employment legislation which 
works against women (Emberson-Bain and Slatter 1995), by 
introducing protection for non-unionised workers, and by enforcing 
employment equity. To date Fiji has not ratified ILO Convention 100, 
covering equal pay for work of equal value, and ILO Convention 111, 
which provides for equal treatment regarding employment. 
The debate over women doing paid night work highlighted 
differing interests over women's rights in post-coup Fiji. Pressures to 
remove legislative prohibitions on female night employment came 
from both employers and women's activist groups, notably FWRM 
and the FWCC (Sharma 1996: 1) .  Garment employers sought an 
extension of women's working hours to further secure cheap labour 
and boost production. In practice, women have been doing evening 
work in Fiji, both legally-for instance as health and hospitality 
workers-and illegally-for instance as garment workers. Feminists 
pushed for legislative change, as existing laws were discriminatory. 
They sought legal sanction for women's right to choose or refuse night 
work. 
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They also rejected arguments that had stressed the protection of the 
'weaker sex' . Protectionist laws had excluded women from categories 
of employment, such as underground mining, and could be 
conveniently invoked when women's labour was not required. 
Women's restricted mobility was tied to cultural and moralistic 
strictures which equated the 'breakdown of the family' with women 
working outside the home. Union voices in post-coup Fiji queried 
these latter views, but still opposed women's entry into night 
employment on the basis that it would increase the scope of women's 
exploitation and increase women's workloads in both paid and 
unpaid work. The ban on women working at night was lifted in 1996. 
Conclusion:  old and new rea l ities and women's working 
futu res 
For many women in Fiji, questions about the impact of the coups may 
be difficult to isolate from personal changes during the past twelve 
years, including gendered expectations from family, community and 
state. The meaning of the coups varied for women of diverging 
ethnicity, class, region and religion. These are not easily quantified 
allegiances, as women sharing such identities may still have 
diametrically opposed views on the coups and Fiji's post-coup 
political economy. This has been evident within the FNA. 
Women's working lives in Fiji highlight the need for caution in 
reductionist arguments that attribute gendered changes purely to the 
coups. The baggage of culture and colonialism is persistent, while 
globalisation both reinforces past and new pressures. Women in Fiji, as 
elsewhere, are increasingly in paid work, are household heads, are 
making significant gains in education, and are active in existing and 
new political and social structures and movements. Women are also 
vulnerable to economic exploitation, sexual discrimination, poverty, 
violence and inadequate political representation. 
What of the specifics for the future of women in Fiji, especially 
within the workplace? Fiji ranks relatively low on the UNDP's gender 
empowerment index, reflecting women's small share of earned income 
(ILO/SEAPAT 1997:4) . Moreover, the instability of Fiji's political 
economy does not bode well for women. In many households women 
experience the direct effects of a faltering economy and a higher cost 
of living. Economists disagree over the impact of the 1997-98 East 
Asian economic crisis on Fiji. Nonetheless, the Fiji dollar was devalued 
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by twenty per cent in early 1998, ostensibly to attract foreign 
investment and tourists. This means little to consumers, for whom the 
price of imports, including many basic household items, have 
increased. Fiji long ago ceased to be a tropical idyll of self sufficiency. 
Dependence on cash income embraces almost all families, including 
those in very remote villages as well as recent migrants to urban areas. 
Garment manufacturing was heralded as a panacea for the 
economic gloom of the 1980s. Despite low wages, many women 
welcomed this as an attractive option to work in the informal or 
domestic sectors. Exporters have relied upon not only cheap labour but 
also protective trade agreements, which are due to be lifted or 
renegotiated. These include the South Pacific Regional Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) and the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement. The percentage of Fiji's garment exports destined for 
New Zealand declined from 55 in 1989 to just eight in 1994 (Chandra 
1996:56) . Fiji now faces competition from lower cost suppliers in Asia in 
the wake of the East Asian crisis. Government economist Ratu Sakuisa 
Tuisolia predicts that 7,000 garment workers may face redundancies 
because of the increased costs of importing raw materials under 
SPARTECA and because of sharper competition in markets flooded by 
cheaper Asian exports (Fiji Times, 5 February 1998) . There seems now 
little chance that wages in Fiji's garment industry will improve. Indeed, 
even with relatively cheap female labour, employers have resorted to 
recruiting foreigners. In 1996 approximately 2,000 garment workers 
were hired, some illegally, from China, Taiwan and the Philippines 
(International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 1997) . 
Women who remain on sugar farms also have an insecure future, 
with the possible renegotiation of sugar quotas to the European Union 
as a consequence of the end of the fifth Lome Convention. This has 
coincided with sugar growers facing the renewals of leases from state 
or indigenously-owned land. A severe drought has caused the most 
recent rural crisis. Such transitions and upheavals cast uncertainties 
over family security in Indo-Fijian sugar communities. Occupational 
diversification is trumpeted as an answer to dependency on the sugar 
industry, but women's options remain circumscribed. It seems 
however that many Indo-Fijian farming families have abandoned 
strictures for daughters to remain on farms. Education for girls has 
greater urgency, while young women may be encouraged to leave 
families for employment or to marry abroad. 
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Education can open greater employment diversity and personal 
choices but Fiji's healthy statistics concerning female scholastic 
achievements have not been commensurate with professional and 
personal advancement. The public sector continues to attract many 
well-educated women, but into familiar territory: nursing, teaching 
and clerical work. Gender stereotypes have not disappeared with a 
more educated workforce. The FWRM's 1997 campaign against sexual 
harassment was greeted by some with amusement or disbelief. Public 
sector unions condemned the removal of employment appeals 
legislation in 1987, although gender was never recognised as grounds 
for appeal. The reconstitution of the appeals system under the 1997 
constitution recognises appeals against discrimination based on 
gender. Structural safeguards are an important step in dislodging 
more subtle forms of discrimination and women's resignation to the 
status quo. 
The acceptance of gender stereotypes and discrimination inside 
and outside the home is being challenged by women. The ability to 
negotiate work reflects wider cultural values. Proactive groups, 
including the Women's Coalition for Women's Citizenship Rights, 
recognise that traditions are not fixed and as interpretations of 
tradition sharpened gender divisions and inequalities in the past, so 
can thorny issues be renegotiated in the future, without condemning 
important cultural identities. Such processes are never easy but 
contestation over tradition, culture and political rights has been 
ongoing since the coups, although not given legitimate public space 
until the review of the 1990 Constitution. As the implementation of 
Fiji's new constitution unfolds over time, it remains to be seen how 
this will translate into women's rights, given the cultural and 
economic realities of the present. 
Endnotes 
1. Vinaka vakalevu to Fiji's Ministries of Health and Labour, the Public 
Service Commission, the Fiji Nursing Association, the Fiji National 
Archives, and the nurses who shared their life histories with me. 
Most interviewees must, however, remain anonymous. This 
chapter gratefully includes insights from Sue Carswell and Christy 
Harrington. Our research was assisted by an Otago Research Grant 
and was affiliated to the Development Studies Programme, 
University of the South Pacific. This chapter is based on a paper 
Wo men in post-co up Fi j i  20/ 
presented at the International Conference on Women in the Asia­
Pacific Region: Persons, Powers, and Politics, Singapore, 11-13 
August 1997, which was initially revised and published as Leckie 
(1997a) . 
2. Ganesh Chand (1996:28-31) queries official unemployment rates of 
10.2 per cent in 1987 and 6 per cent in 1995. His revised 'back of 
the envelope' figures suggest 10.6 per cent and 19.3 per cent 
respectively. 
3. University figures are not broken down by nationality so the 
proportion of female students from Fiji is unclear. 
4. Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1988:66) deconstructs the universalist 
applicability of purdah and the negative implications of this for 
Muslim women. 
5. These are: article 5(a), which aims to achieve the elimination of 
prejudices, customary and all other practices which are based on 
the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or 
on stereotyped roles for men and women; and article 9, covering 
the equal rights of nationality and the nationality of children. 
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CHAPTER 9 
The prob lematics of reform 
a nd the ' F ij i a n '  question 
William Sutherland 
Introduction 
Following the coups of 1987 the indigenous Fijian-dominated state 
mapped out an economic reform program which by the early 1990s 
had lost much of its steam but regained momentum in the second half 
of the decade. This pattern was mirrored in political reforms. Three 
years after overthrow of the democratically-elected coalition 
government of the Fiji Labour Party (FLP) and the National Federation 
Party (NFP) came the racist and undemocratic constitution of 1990, 
which lay the foundation for the huge electoral victory in 1992 of the 
indigenous Fijian political party, the Soqosoqo Vakavulewa ni Taukei 
(SVT) . By the mid 1990s, however, the tide had begun to turn as 
internal struggles for democratic reform intensified. In 1995 the 
process of reviewing the 1990 Constitution began and in July 1997 the 
Constitution (Amendment) Act was passed. With that came fresh 
hopes for political stability and heightened expectations of economic 
growth but whether these hopes and expectations will be realised 
remains to be seen, even in light of the outcome of the 1999 general 
elections. In the twists and turns of Fiji's lost decade lie grounds for 
cautious optimism; on the other hand, while the democratic space is 
now much wider than before, as is evident in the huge victory of the 
FLP in the 1999 general elections, the key issue of indigenous Fijian 
discontent remains unresolved and therein lies a major threat to Fiji's 
future stability. 
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The argument in this chapter is that from 1987 to about the mid 
1990s the reforms pursued by the post-coup state were driven 
primarily by the demands of nationalist indigenous Fijians. However, 
this project became increasingly problematic as the contradictions 
between the demands of economic reform on the one hand, and 
economic affirmative action in favour of indigenous Fijians on the 
other, intensified . From the mid 1990s the state increasingly moved 
away from its nationalist agenda and, driven now by stronger and 
more persistent external pressures for greater economic liberalisation, 
increased the pace and scope of economic reforms. In so doing, 
however, its capacity to deliver on the 'Fijian' question became even 
more limited; and the more it distanced itself from its nationalist 
agenda, the higher the level of indigenous Fijian disaffection became. 
By the second half of 1998, with the 'Fijian' question still unresolved, 
indigenous Fijian dissatisfaction with the SVT-dominated state had 
grown and a range of new indigenous Fijian political parties had 
emerged, which jockeyed amongst themselves for electoral advantage. 
In the aftermath of the 1999 general elections, the viability of the new 
FLP-led government will depend to a very large extent on how it 
manages the 'Fijian' question, and its performance in that regard will 
shape the country's prospects for growth and stability. 
The 'Fij ian' question 
At the heart of the 'Fijian' question is a longstanding indigenous Fijian 
concern about their 'economic backwardness' . As early as 1959 an 
inquiry into the 'economic problems and prospects facing the 
indigenous Fijian people' identified the root causes as the indigenous 
Fijian communal way of life and the system of 'Fijian Administration' 
instituted by the colonial state. One year later another report 
concurred and indigenous Fijian economic disadvantage came to be 
explained in terms of their 'subsistence affluence', their preference for 
a 'leisurely' village lifestyle, a lack of entrepreneurship and capitalist 
discipline, communalistic as opposed to individualistic values, and a 
strong sense of traditional obligation (Sutherland 1992:112-13). 
Educational underachievement was later added to the list, as was also 
a lack of capital. 
The other key dimension of the Fijian question is the highly 
sensitive matter of native land leases, most of which are held by Indo­
Fijians, especially sugarcane farmers (Prasad and Kumar, this 
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volume). The origins of the problem here lie in the shift from 
plantation to small holder production in the colonial sugar economy. 
Native land leases are regulated by the Agricultural Landlord and 
Tenant Act of 1976 (ALTA) and in 1976 the indigenous Fijian­
dominated Alliance government granted lease extensions of up to 30 
years. This decision was strongly opposed by indigenous Fijian 
nationalists and was a key reason for the Alliance's electoral defeat in 
April 1977. Twenty-one years later the leases began to expire, the first 
47 in 1997, and by 2005 more than 5000 will have expired. Many 
indigenous Fijian landowners want the land back and leaseholders, 
understandably, are anxious. Up to 1998, attempts to come up with an 
arrangement which broadly satisfied the stakeholders had failed and 
the ruling SVT, clearly with an eye to the upcoming elections, 
effectively put the matter on hold by referring the whole matter to a 
parliamentary committee. For the new government, there are rocky 
times ahead. But it is not only the land issue that remains unresolved. 
At independence in 1970 indigenous Fijian hopes for improvement 
were pinned on the Alliance government but its early failure to fulfil 
these hopes led in 1973 to a stinging attack by Sakeasi Butadroka, an 
indigenous Fijian and Assistant Minister for Commerce and Industry. 
Soon afterwards Butadroka formed the Fijian Nationalist Party, which 
became the political spearhead of indigenous Fijian nationalist 
aspirations. The Alliance response was its policy of economic affirmative 
action, which had three key elements: preferential access for indigenous 
Fijians to state-funded scholarships; state-funded soft loans to assist 
indigenous Fijians in business; and state assistance to various indigenous 
Fijian business ventures. These initiatives had only limited success 
(Sutherland 1992:142-51; Ratuva, this volume).  The 1987 coups renewed 
indigenous Fijian hopes that their fortunes might finally change. 
In the area of education, a key response of the post-coup state was 
to increase funding for indigenous Fijian scholarships. In addition to 
the existing policy of reserving 50 per cent of Public Service 
Commission scholarships for indigenous Fijians, the annual allocation 
to a special education fund administered by the Fijian Affairs Board 
was increased from F$3.5 million to F$4.5 million. While this helped a 
larger number of indigenous Fijians, it did little to improve the poor 
and longstanding record of indigenous Fijian educational achievement. 
At the time of the coups indigenous Fijians were still performing 
poorly compared to the other ethnic communities; by 1995 the situation 
had not changed (Sharma 1997) . 
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Against this history of comparative underachievement in 
education, indigenous Fijian underrepresentation in the professional 
classes is not surprising. Figures from the 1986 census reveal, for 
example, that indigenous Fijians held 39 per cent of lower level 
professional and managerial jobs, 35 per cent of middle level ones, and 
only 17 per cent at the senior level (Sutherland 1992: 153) . The 
increased 'Fijianisation' of the public sector that followed in the wake 
of the coups is therefore not surprising. In May 1987, indigenous 
Fijians held 47.6 per cent of public service positions; Indo-Fijians held 
47.8 per cent. Two months later, the figures were 53 per cent and 43 
per cent respectively (Leckie 1991 :67) . By then, increasing numbers of 
Indo-Fijians, especially professionals, were emigrating-with the 
result that even more public service opportunities were created for 
indigenous Fijians. In 1991, for example, indigenous Fijians accounted 
for 61 per cent of public service appointments and 57 per cent of 
promotions. Five years later the figures were still high, at 58 per cent 
and 53 per cent respectively. Also, in 1996 indigenous Fijians 
accounted for only 23 per cent of public service resignations, while 
Indo-Fijians accounted for 70 per cent (Kumar 1997:87). 
Successful 'Fijianisation' of the public service was not matched in 
the private sector. Seventeen years of indigenous Fijian state power 
under successive Alliance governments had failed to produce a 
successful indigenous Fijian capitalist class and the much better record 
of Indo-Fijians strengthened the widely-held but false view that Indo­
Fijians dominated the economy, a perception that fuelled anti-Indo­
Fijian sentiment. The coups were supposedly meant to change this and 
the state, now commanding much greater political control than 
previous Alliance governments, appeared much better placed to 
deliver on the promise of ensuring the 'paramountcy of indigenous 
Fijian interests' (Durutalo 1986). For the challenging task of increasing 
indigenous Fijian economic power, the state mapped out an ambitious 
plan which dovetailed with the goal of the Viti Chamber of Commerce, 
an indigenous Fijian organisation formed in late 1987, to 'promote and 
encourage meaningful participation by indigenous Fijians in business' 
(Sutherland 1992:193). 
A key element of the plan was to strengthen the executive 
capability of the Fijian Affairs Board in order to enable it to formulate 
and implement specific policies and strategies. Another was the 
provision of a F$20 million interest-free loan to the Fijian Affairs Board 
to buy shares in the Fijian Holdings Company Limited (FHC), which 
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was 'the holding company for Fijians at the national level'. The FHC 
would in turn acquire shares in 'profitable companies in the industrial 
and commercial sectors' (Ratuva, this volume) . The objective was for 
indigenous Fijians to own 15 per cent of the corporate sector by 1995 
and not less than 30 per cent by the year 2000. Other initiatives 
included the reservation of certain lines of industrial and commercial 
activity for indigenous Fijians; a minimum level of indigenous Fijian 
ownership of at least one English daily newspaper; the introduction of 
an indigenous Fijian retail store scheme, later called the Eimcol 
scheme, to help 'selected indigenous Fijians with the necessary talent 
to successfully manage retail businesses'; and increased funding to the 
state-owned Fiji Development Bank (FDB) to allow greater preferential 
access for indigenous Fijians to soft loans for commercial purposes 
(Sutherland 1992:93). 
Ten years after the coups, however, this grand design remained 
largely that; for the vast majority of indigenous Fijians it meant little. 
Certainly, the FHC grew, and there were marginally more indigenous 
Fijian businesses than before, including one indigenous Fijian-owned 
English daily newspaper. On the other hand, the Eimcol store scheme 
had collapsed and the number of public notices of receiverships and 
mortgagee sales underscored the continuing high level of indigenous 
Fijian business failure. To be sure, a small indigenous Fijian elite did 
well, as Ratuva discusses more fully in his contribution to this volume, 
but it can hardly be said that there was anything like a successful 
indigenous Fijian business class which remotely rivaled the dominance 
of established foreign and local, including Indo-Fijian, capital. 
Indigenous Fijian political power clearly had not translated into 
indigenous Fijian economic power. Much of the explanation for this lies 
in the contradictions between the post-coup state's nationalist agenda 
and its wider economic reforms. 
The contradictions of reform and the indigenous Fij ian 
nationa l ist agenda 
Since independence in 1970 sugar and tourism have been the mainstay 
of the economy and the manufacturing sector remained relatively 
small until after the coups. At the center of the post-coup economic 
reforms, therefore, was the shift in industrial policy away from 
import-substitution towards export-promotion. Such a shift had been 
mooted as early as 1970 but it had 'an extremely long gestation period' 
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(Akram-Lodhi 1996:263). Why was this so? Why was the Alliance 
government 'tentative' about shifting away from its import­
substitution strategy? The limited level of industrial development 
between 1970 and 1987, Akram-Lodhi correctly explains, was 'largely 
based on import substitution, and the economy was subject to a 
regulatory regime deploying quota, license, and tariff protection' 
(Akram-Lodhi 1996:263) . The telling point about this regime, however, 
is that the major beneficiaries were a few local Indo-Fijian 
businessmen who, importantly, had close links with the Alliance 
government and who were financial backers of the Alliance party. 
With this kind of support, therefore, the Alliance's longstanding 
reluctance to change its industrial policy is not surprising. From the 
early 1980s, however, there was external pressure to effect such a shift. 
A employment mission undertaken by the Institute of 
Development Studies of the University of Sussex in the United 
Kingdom argued in 1982 that Fiji's labour costs were uncompetitive by 
international standards and had to be reduced to enhance the 
country's export potential. In 1986 the World Bank did the same 
(Akram-Lodhi 1996:265) . By then the Alliance government had sought 
to cut labour costs by announcing retrenchments in the public service 
as well as a freeze on all wages, salaries and increments (Sutherland 
1992:173-74) . What followed was widespread opposition, the birth of 
the FLP and, in April 1987, the Alliance's second electoral defeat. The 
coups that followed created the political space that made a decisive 
shift towards export-oriented industrialisation possible. To be sure, the 
shift was also a response to international trends towards economic 
liberalisation and export-oriented industrialisation, as well as specific 
advice from consultants and international agencies (Akram-Lodhi 
1996:265). Without the coups, however, it is unlikely that the shift 
would have been as swift and wide-ranging as it was. But the change 
brought its own tensions. Having promised to deliver on indigenous 
Fijian economic aspirations, the post-coup state was now faced with 
the task of managing the inherent contradictions between the 
imperatives of economic liberalisation on the one hand and the 
demands of economic affirmative action on the other (Sepehri and 
Akram-Lodhi, this volume) . 
The showpiece of the post-coup economic reform agenda was the 
spectacular growth of the manufacturing sector and central to this 
success was the establishment of tax-free factories, most especially for 
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garment production. Underpinning this shift towards export-oriented 
industrialisation was the policy of deregulation and the provision of 
highly attractive tax and other concessions. International 
competitiveness, however, required more than this, and in 1991 the 
push for labour market reforms began with the promulgation of 
draconian anti-labour legislation (Chand, this volume) . In 1992 a 
value-added tax was introduced and plans for further tax reforms 
were flagged. Financial sector reforms were also planned, and so too 
key public sector reforms, including downsizing, performance-based 
remuneration, administrative reorganisation, and financial and 
budgeting reforms. In addition, state enterprises were earmarked for 
corporatisation or privatisation and a Public Enterprises Unit was 
established within the Ministry of Finance to oversee the process. 
For the state these reforms were necessary to rescue the economy 
from the severe downturn that followed the coups and lay the 
foundation of longer-term economic growth. In terms of the task of 
delivering on indigenous Fijian economic aspirations, however, the 
reforms were problematic because they impacted negatively on large 
numbers of indigenous Fijians. Labour market reforms affected them 
as workers; the value-added tax did not discriminate between ethnic 
groups; the pain of public sector reforms increasingly fell on 
indigenous Fijians the more that the public service was 'Fijianised'; 
and divestiture of state assets hurt the many indigenous Fijians 
employed in state-owned enterprises. In the face of such negative 
impacts, the significant level of indigenous Fijian support for wider 
worker struggles-for example, against the value-added tax and the 
labour reforms-is not surprising. For the state this was a major 
concern, for the very political support on which it depended most 
critically was being eroded. 
Worried by this the state began to waver in its commitment to 
implement economic reform and investors, of course, complained 
about a lack of leadership, prevarication and backpedalling. The state 
had hoped that with the reforms would come greater opportunities for 
indigenous Fijian economic advancement, especially in the burgeoning 
garment industry. Economic liberalisation, however, meant open 
competition and a 'level playing field', and economic affirmative 
action ran counter to this. Nowhere was the contradiction 
demonstrated more clearly than in the state's changing position on 
deregulation. 
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Early in 1989 the regulation of imports was relaxed and the 
number of items subject to import licensing was reduced to 48 
(Parliament of Fiji 1997a:63). Restrictions on the import of one of these 
items, white polished rice, was eased and of the 17,000 tons to be 
imported that year 3,000 tons were set aside for importation by 
indigenous Fijians (The Review, May 1995:28-29).  Hari Punja, a leading 
Indo-Fijian importer and industrialist, whose business empire was then 
estimated at F$180 million, cried foul (Sutherland 1992:194) but the state 
stood its ground and indigenous Fijians rushed for import licenses. 
Significantly, FDB loans to indigenous Fijians for 'commercial/ 
business services' suddenly leapt, accounting for 43.5 per cent of the 
total value of all its commercial loans to indigenous Fijians. But this 
spurt of enthusiasm soon waned and, as Table 9.1 shows, the pattern 
of indigenous Fijian borrowing changed markedly. Borrowing for 
investment in real estate now became the preference and the value of 
FDB loans to indigenous Fijians for 'commercial/business services' fell 
to a mere 4.5 per cent in 1993, temporarily increased to 25.4 per cent in 
1994 but then dropped back to a low of 3.7 per cent in 1995. 
Indigenous Fijians soon realised that it was one thing to go into 
business, but quite another to be viable and successful. The harsh 
reality was that established competitors would not yield easily. 
Table 9.1  Distribution of Fiji Development Bank commercial loans to 
indigenous Fijians by sector, 1 989-96, per cent 
Service Sectors 
Tra nsport and 
Communication 
Rea l Estate 
Wholesa le/Reta i l  
Commercia l  and  
Business Services 
Investment/Finance 
Tou rism 
Productive Sectors 
Manufacturi ng  
Construction 
T imber/Agro- Industry 
1 989 1 990 1 99 1  1 992 1 993 1 994 1 995 1 996 
30.4 2 5 . 8  37 . 7  2 1 .8 34. 1 
- 3 1 . 5  36 .2  2 5 .8 2 2 . 6  
43 . 5  2 8 . 9  
1 0 .0  1 . 0 
7 . 7  3 . 6  
0 .4 2 .4 
8 .0  6 .8  
1 4 .8 
1 3 .4 1 7 .6  4.5 
1 0 .9  1 6 . 3  
0 . 7  3 .4 1 . 9 
8.0 1 5 . 6  1 . 5 
1 . 7 0 .6  0 .5  
2 .3  4.3 3 . 8  
1 6 .4 9 .2 4.6 
36 .7  6 1 . 6  58. 1 
1 1 .3 7 .6 2 .8 
2 5 .4 
2 . 9  
3 . 7  
1 .9 
0.8 
1 . 7 
3 . 7  3 1 . 5  
7 . 5  1 .8 
3 . 2  0 . 5  
3 . 6  0 . 5  
3 . 6  0 .2  
Source: Fiji Development Bank 1992/93:8; 1994/95:13; 1995/96:19.  
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Nevertheless, over this period indigenous Fijian nationalists 
complained increasingly that the government was not doing enough 
to help indigenous Fijians in business. They again pressed the point 
about lndo-Fijian economic power and reminded the government that 
deregulation undermined the policy of economic affirmative action. In 
the lead up to the 1995 National Economic Summit, the Subcommittee 
on Indigenous Fijian Participation in Business bemoaned, yet again, 
the lack of indigenous Fijian business success and argued that state 
support had to include softening the policy of deregulation. 
The government's deregulation policy runs contrary to its policy of 
enhancing indigenous Fijian business participation because most 
Fijians are involved in small enterprises which are in their infancy and 
cannot compete in terms of economies of scale and product quality 
with more established (and mostly Indian) companies which 
developed during Fiji's import-substitution era. Therefore, Fijian 
entrepreneurs should be protected . . .  Because of the need to replace 
market entry barriers for Fijians, they should get equal opportunities 
in government services that will be contracted out [as well as in] 
government entities and services to be privatised. Apart from a 50 per 
cent opportunity [for] Fijian business participation in the 
economy . . .  tenders by Fijian suppliers should enjoy a 15 per cent 
preference margin (The Review, May 1995:28-29) .  
The Subcommittee had an ally in the Finance Minister, Berenado 
Vunibobo. Although widely perceived as a hardheaded economic 
rationalist, Vunibobo was also a nationalist and he was clear about 
where the major threat to the nationalist agenda lay. For him the 
business community 'essentially belong[ed] to the Indian community' 
and affirmative action was necessary. 
The Fijians seem to have developed the feeling that by having political 
control, they are the master of the house. It doesn't work that way. You 
have to have a significant say in influencing the economy . . .  but at the 
end of the day the Indian business community could squeeze the 
country dry if they choose to do so because of their hold on the 
economic levers. The Fijians realise that now. That is why there is so 
much input, so much concern, about helping and encouraging Fijians 
to get into the economic mainstream (The Review, May 1995:29). 
With the Finance Minister taking this line it is not surprising that in 
the following year the value of FDB loans to indigenous Fijians for 
'commercial/business services' increased markedly. From a mere 3.7 
per cent of the total value of all commercial loans to indigenous Fijians 
in 1995, it jumped to 31 .5 per cent. On the other hand, the 
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Subcommittee's plea for the state to go soft on deregulation and give 
indigenous Fijians more preferential treatment did not elicit a positive 
response. Here was evidence that the state was willing to go only so 
far, and further evidence that it was now distancing itself from the 
nationalist agenda would soon emerge. 
Other, more influential sections of the private sector, especially 
several key Indo-Fijian companies, were also opposed to deregulation 
and in the following year the state's class bias towards them was 
revealed. In August Isimeli Bose, the Minister for Trade, Industry, 
Commerce and Public Utilities, announced a qualified softening of the 
deregulation policy. Competition would continue to be encouraged 
but there would also be limits. Certain interests, in his view, were 
much too important and had to be protected. Those interests, however, 
were not indigenous Fijian ones, as the following report on an 
interview with the Minister revealed: 
He is keen on protecting the interests of local entrepreneurs-the Hari 
Punjas, the Vinod Patels and Mahendra Patels-and long established 
businesses such as Shell, Carlton Brewery and Morris Hedstrom. 'They 
have put their money where their mouth is' . . .  Already the minister has 
advised the [Fiji Trade and Investment Board] to take special care of 
these local investors and make sure that they receive support. . .And he 
is going to 'fight very hard' to protect the big local investors. 'I will run 
to their help whenever they need me'. While the Minister is aware of 
the World Trade Organisation rules promoting a freer trading 
environment, Bose insists that at the end of the day, it's the national 
interest that 'must come first' (The Review, August 1995:38) . 
Bose's explicit privileging of the national interest, together with the 
conspicuous absence of indigenous Fijians from the list of local 
entrepreneurs whose interests were to be protected, underscored the 
state's increasing abandonment of its nationalist agenda. 
Indo-Fijian entrepreneurs and 'long-established' foreign companies 
were the 'pillars of the economy' and it was they who would best 
advance the 'national interest' . They therefore required 'special care' 
and the state duly obliged. One month after Bose's announcement, 
55.6 per cent of the businesses surveyed identified deregulation as the 
'most critical' issue facing them (The Review, November 1996:58). Eight 
months later the figure was just 27 per cent (The Review, June 1997:21 ) .  
The state had moved further away from the nationalist agenda and 
indigenous Fijian entrepreneurs, whose performance continued to be 
generally poor and showed little sign of improving, now had a minor 
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place in the state's economic agenda. The prospect of this changing 
was further reduced in the following year, when indigenous Fijian 
economic performance and the whole policy of economic affirmative 
action were again publicly scrutinised. A well-known indigenous 
Fijian journalist brought to public attention yet again the continuing 
poor record of indigenous Fijians in business (Fiji Business Magazine, 
October 1996:20-21) .  Earlier, the policy of economic affirmative action 
had again been publicly questioned, this time by Don Aidney, a local 
Euro-Fijian and an influential economic figure of long standing (Fiji 
Business Magazine, July 1996:40-41) .  
By the end of  1996, then, with its nationalist agenda now giving 
way to a national one, the state began pursuing with renewed vigour 
the wider economic reform program mapped out in the immediate 
post-coup years but which had been frustrated by the requirements of 
its nationalist project. But this new resolve was not entirely of the 
state's own making. It was also a consequence of growing external 
pressures to adjust to the imperatives of globalisation. 
Global imperatives and the new reform agenda 
By the early 1990s global pressures for economic liberalisation had 
intensified. The Cold War was over, the Uruguay Round was nearing 
completion, and neoliberalism had swept the industrialised world and 
become even more firmly entrenched as orthodoxy in the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and 
other international organisations with which Fiji had close links. 
Increasing competition for shrinking aid budgets strengthened the 
hand of donors in pressing the case for economic reform, which the 
World Bank did in 1991 1993 and 1995 in three reports on the Pacific 
island economies, including Fiji (World Bank 1991; 1993; 1995b). The 
Bank also urged other donors to be more forthright in their policy 
advice to Pacific island governments (Sutherland 1998:5-6) .  Closer to 
home, Australia and New Zealand pushed for reform and the key 
regional site for intervention was the South Pacific Forum (referred to 
hereafter as the Forum) . Wearing two hats-as Forum members and as 
major donors-they were uniquely well-placed to use the Forum to 
urge reforms on the island countries, and in the early 1990s the regional 
reform agenda which they were highly instrumental in developing 
began to emerge. 
216 Confronting F i j i  Futu res 
In 1990 the Forum 'took cognisance of the rapid changes in the 
international political and economic situation' and in the following 
year 'endorsed the view that although many issues, such as programs 
of economic structural adjustment, required action at the national 
level, there was also a key role for regional action' (South Pacific 
Forum 1990; 1991) .  Such action was to begin in 1994 but in the 
meantime the general message about the need for adjustment and 
reform needed to be made more concrete. In 1992, therefore, Forum 
members agreed to put in place 'effective' domestic policies, give 
recognition to the vital role of the private sector, and develop a sound 
investment strategy (South Pacific Forum 1992) .  For Fiji, this was 
particularly significant. Investment was low and foreign investors, like 
many of their domestic, and especially Indo-Fijian, counterparts, were 
not enamoured of the government's policy of economic affirmative 
action. 
In 1993 the Forum again reiterated the need for policy adequacy 
and private sector development (South Pacific Forum 1993) and in the 
following year Australia, as host of the Forum, put regional reform at 
the top of the agenda. Also at Australia's suggestion, the 1994 Forum 
established the Forum Finance Ministers' Meeting to begin the task of 
developing regional reform initiatives. The first meeting of the Forum 
Finance Ministers, which was funded by Australia, sought to 'improve 
overall economic management' and 'identified structural reform as a 
vital element in improving . . .  competitiveness and efficiency' (Forum 
Finance Ministers, 21 February 1995) . The second meeting agreed that 
member countries 'should not delay implementing necessary reforms 
until . . .forced to do so by economic crises or external pressures' (Forum 
Finance Ministers, 8 December, 1995) . 
The 1996 Forum noted the Ministers' 'progress towards defining a 
practical, regionally-focussed, economic reform agenda' and, to allow 
their agenda 'to cover the breadth of economic issues', agreed to 
expand membership of the ministers' meeting to include 'Forum 
Ministers with appropriate economic portfolios' (South Pacific Forum 
1996) . The meeting thus became known as the Forum Economic 
Ministers Meeting (FEMM) and met as such for the first time in Cairns 
in July 1997. There the ministers 'agreed that private sector 
development [was] central to ensuring sustained economic growth, 
and that governments should provide a policy environment to 
encourage this' (Forum Economic Ministers 1997) . 
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In an address to the Fiji Australia Business Council in the following 
month Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer warned against 
'rely[ing] on inward policies of protectionism and import substitution 
to the exclusion of more outward-looking policies'. He noted the 
efforts of the FEMM in advancing the regional reform agenda and that 
Fiji, along with other Pacific island economies, was 'already well 
down the path of reforms', although he then added that the world was 
'moving on quickly' and there was 'no room for a slackening of the 
pace of reform' (Downer 1997) . One month earlier, at a joint 
conference of the New Zealand and Fiji Business Councils, Sir Roger 
Douglas, the architect of economic liberalisation in New Zealand in 
the 1980s, proposed a comprehensive package of reforms for Fiji 
which, he stressed, should be implemented in its entirety and not on a 
piecemeal basis. The conference gave its backing to Roger 's package. 
In the audience was Fiji's indigenous Fijian Prime Minister, Sitiveni 
Rabuka (National Business Review, 20 June 1997) . The key message from 
interventions such as these was clear: reforms were necessary and the 
momentum had to be maintained. For Fiji it was particularly apposite. 
Although there had been some progress, on the whole its record on 
reform was patchy. 
By this time, Fiji had responded to other external pressures. The 
Mid-term Review of the Lome Convention cast doubt over the future 
of Fiji's sugar exports and forced the government to draw up plans to 
restructure the industry. In relation to the manufacturing sector, 
continued pleas by Fiji to Australia to relax the rules of origin for 
preferential access of its manufactured goods, especially garments, 
under the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (SPARTECA) met not only with refusal but strong urgings 
to become more competitive. Then, in April 1996, Fiji faced the World 
Trade Organization's (WTO) Trade Review Panel. 
The Panel highlighted Fiji's relatively slow economic growth and 
raised questions about fiscal balance; progress on public enterprise 
reforms; the promotion of greater competition; exchange and price 
controls; and land tenure issues, including changes to the ALTA. 
Attention was drawn to 'the slowing pace of tariff reform and 
liberalisation'; Fiji was 'encouraged . . .  to continue progress on this front 
and in relation to deregulation' and questions were posed about 
'measures to encourage greater competitiveness in the clothing sector '. 
In relation to the service sector, the Panel sought further information 
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on the 'scope and timing' of the 'new policy statement on services 
[being developed] by the Fijian Government' . A whole range of other 
issues was also brought to scrutiny. The Panel welcomed answers 
given by Fiji to questions and 'looked forward to written replies on 
outstanding issues' (World Trade Organization 1997:2-5). 
In November 1996 the Finance Minister presented his budget for 
1997. The title of his budget address is revealing: 'Confidence through 
clear policy' .  That the Minister was concerned about the confidence of 
external actors, especially Australia, the European Union and the 
WTO, is suggested by this remark: 
We would be very short-sighted to retreat from the policies of 
liberalisation . . .  For too long we have relied solely on preferential trade 
agreements . . .  [but] this is a dangerous strategy, as continued benefits 
from SPARTECA. .. and the Lome Convention are beyond our control. 
As a step in the right direction and away from relying on [such] trade 
agreements, Fiji has . . .  [joined] the World Trade Organization. WTO 
membership greatly assists Fiji's integration into the global economy. 
But it also places an obligation to comply with its requirements 
(Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 1996a: 12). 
The subtitle of the Minister 's address, ' A commitment to Fiji's 
future', is also telling. The government's commitment was to Fiji's 
future, not indigenous Fij ians' future. In his speech there was not a 
single mention of indigenous Fijian interests or of the policy of 
economic affirmative action, let alone any suggestion that these might 
be boosted. Economic affirmative action did not cease, of course, but 
clearly the government's agenda was now a national one . As the 
Minister put it, 'since 1987, a new economic strategy has been 
formulated and implemented . The new approach seeks to encourage 
the economy to grow for the benefit of all our people' (emphasis 
added) (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 1996a:2). The 
nationalist agenda was weakening and in the face of growing external 
pressure the wider economic reform program gathered speed. 
The record until then was uneven at best. There had been some 
deregulation but some backtracking as well : the anti-labour laws 
introduced in 1991 had been repealed; progress on public sector 
reform was minimal; only two state-owned enterprises had been 
corporatised, the Department of Post and Telecommunications and 
IKA Corporation; and only two had been partly privatised, the Fiji 
Pine Commission and the Marketing Authority (Ministry of Finance 
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and Ministry of  National Planning 1996b:54) . But things were about to 
change and the Minister of Finance signaled the government's 
renewed resolve in November 1997 when he presented to the 
parliament the budget for the following year. 
Six more government enterprises were earmarked for corporatisation. 
The telecommunications sector, which had recently been reviewed, 
would be opened up to competition. Further tax reform would be 
implemented following completion of two studies on company and 
income tax then underway and, in line with the recently announced 
Investment Policy Statement, the investment regime would be 
streamlined to make it more workable and transparent. The domestic 
capital market would be boosted by the creation of a Capital Market 
Development Authority. Foreign exchange regulations would be 
further relaxed and the whole financial sector reviewed. Greater effort 
would be applied to initiatives already underway in the public sector, 
including corporate and strategic planning, performance-based 
remuneration, performance-based contract employment for senior 
officials, improved financial systems and management, more effective 
budgeting, and increased devolution of financial and human resource 
management responsibility (Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
National Planning 1997a; 1997b). 
Although not as speedy and thoroughgoing as some would have 
liked, the progressive implementation of these reforms in the course of 
1997 showed that the state was now more serious about its reform 
program. By late 1997 the Public Enterprise Act had been passed; the 
Government Shipyard was privatised and the Fiji Broadcasting 
Commission corporatised; the process of corporatising the Civil 
Aviation Authority of Fiji was well underway; further steps had been 
taken to sell 49 per cent of the Government's share of the national 
carrier, Air Pacific; the Capital Market Development Authority had 
been established; some foreign exchange controls relaxed; and 
significant progress had been made on public sector reform (Ministry 
of Finance and Ministry of National Planning 1997b; Fiji Times, 23 
September and 7 October 1997) . In the area of industrial relations, the 
Health and Safety at Work Act of 1996 was passed and, significantly, 
the Tripartite Forum, which brings together employers, employees and 
government representatives, was reconvened for the first time in two 
years (Fiji Times, 26 September and 7 October 1997) . There was also a 
proposal to merge the Departments of Inland Revenue and Customs 
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into a single 'revenue authority' (Fiji Times, 3 October 1997) . Presented 
as a means of streamlining revenue collection, the proposal was also 
seen, however, as partly a response to the release the previous June of 
a report on an investigation into corruption in the Customs 
Department (Parliament of Fiji 1997b). 
Reporting on this progress in November 1997, Jim Ah Koy, the new 
Finance Minister and one of Fiji's leading businessmen, announced yet 
more reforms, including further streamlining of investment approval 
procedures, greater liberalisation of foreign exchange controls, 
financial market reforms and various measures to achieve a 'large 
reduction' in the budget deficit, which in 1997 stood at 9.2 per cent of 
GDP. To 'speed up the public enterprise reform process', which was 
'now very high on the Government's agenda', over F$10 million was 
allocated to the Public Enterprise Unit over the next two years-an 
enormous increase over the F$0.5 million allocated one year earlier. In 
the area of public sector reform, some earlier initiatives such as 
employment contracts for Departmental Heads had not yet been 
implemented; but Ah Koy reaffirmed the government's commitment 
to push ahead with the reform program. 
Reactions to the 1998 budget were mixed. Some saw it as an 
electoral sweetener; for others it did not go far enough and the 
government's softer position on deregulation was especially worrying. 
Just four months earlier a five-member panel drawn from the private 
sector had tabled its report on deregulation and had strongly argued 
for more wide-ranging reforms (Parliament of Fiji 1997a). But the 
various criticisms notwithstanding, it was clear that the government 
was committed to pressing ahead with its expanded reform program. 
That it was now being driven increasingly by global pressures was 
made clear by Ah Koy: 'our survival rests on how well we adjust to 
these daunting challenges. We cannot run away from these 
developments and isolate ourselves from the rest of the world' 
(Ministry of Finance and Ministry of National Planning 1997a:27) . By 
then the deepening Asian crisis was increasingly taking its toll on the 
Fiji economy and further evidence that state policy was indeed being 
shaped by the logic of globalisation came in January 1998 when the 
Fiji dollar was devalued by 20 per cent. 
With that the state's ability to resolve the Fijian question became 
even more limited. As it was, the nationalist agenda had already been 
severely compromised by the growing pace and expanded scope of 
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the economic reforms, and the 1998 budget contained nothing to 
suggest an about-turn. As was the case with the budget address in the 
previous year, the 1997 address made no mention of indigenous Fijian 
interests and Josefata Kamikamica, leader of the Fijian Association 
Party (FAP), was quick to point this out. Section 44 of the 1997 
Constitution, he reminded the government, explicitly required 
parliament to make provision for programs designed to help those 
that were disadvantaged. The 1998 budget, he complained, contained 
no specific program for this purpose. More specifically, the Fijian 
Affairs Ministry had not been provided with resources to develop an 
effective program and indigenous Fijian participation in business had 
not been adequately addressed (Pacnews, 10 November 1997) . 
Kamikamica was, in effect, charging the government with doing a 
great deal less than before to resolve the Fijian question. 
In the second half of the 1990s, then, the state increasingly distanced 
itself from its earlier nationalist agenda. In the first half of decade the 
contradictions between the needs of that agenda and those of economic 
liberalisation intensified and, pushed along by growing external 
pressures, the state shifted increasingly towards the latter. Driven now 
by global imperatives, it pressed ahead on the reform path and in so 
doing further limited its capacity to deliver on the Fijian question. The 
change of tack alienated the very political support on which the 
government depended for its survival. What, then, of the future? 
The Fij ian question and Fij i 's prospects 
The new constitution makes power-sharing mandatory and for some 
time after its enactment in July 1997 the general expectation was that 
the most likely outcome of the next general elections would be a 
coalition government of the two major political parties, the SVT and 
the NFP. Two factors, however, made this rather less certain. One was 
the growing political fragmentation amongst indigenous Fijians, as 
evidenced by the increase in the number of indigenous Fijian political 
parties; the other was the electoral coalition between the FLP, the 
indigenous Fijian FAP, and the Party of National Unity (PANU). 
At the party level, one of the earliest signs of cracks within the 
indigenous Fijian community came in 1991 . Less than one year after 
the promulgation of the racist and undemocratic constitution of 1990, 
Apisai Tora, then a Cabinet Minister, joined the recently-formed, 
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western-based, multiracial All National Congress (ANC). As a 
westerner, he was concerned about eastern chiefly dominance, and 
believed that 'it [was] time western Fijians challenged the convention 
that eastern Fijians [were] the country's naturally-born leaders' 
(Sutherland 1992:203) . He criticised the formation of the SVT and was 
promptly sacked. Over the next eight months intra-indigenous Fijian 
tensions intensified and by February 1992 there were no less than six 
indigenous Fijian political parties opposed to the SVT. Their small size 
and lack of resources, however, made them no match for the SVT and 
it easily won the general elections later that year. But a major split 
within the SVT beckoned. Disgruntled party members engineered the 
defeat of the 1994 budget and broke away to form the PAP. But it too 
could not match the resources of the SVT and in the snap elections 
held in 1995 won only five seats compared to the SVT's thirty-one. 
By then, as shown above, the tide was turning against the 
indigenous Fijian nationalist agenda and later in 1995 the review of 
the 1990 Constitution got underway. In the course of the review, 
nationalist sentiment again came to the fore, including from within the 
SVT, and continued well after the Constitutional Review Commission 
presented its report in September 1996. With the adoption of a new, 
more democratic constitution in July 1997, however, the nationalist 
cause was dealt a severe blow. But the extremists would not give up 
easily and their cause was bolstered in the following October when 
Kavekini Navuso, a former member of the FLP and trade union leader, 
won a by-election under the banner of the recently-formed and 
Nationalist Vanua Takolavo Party. His objective, he announced, was to 
change the new constitution that had overturned indigenous Fijian 
political dominance and in his maiden speech in November he 
attacked the SVT government for selling out on indigenous Fijian 
rights (Pacnews, 25 November 1997) . 
In the same month, disgruntled members of the recently-formed 
Viti Levu Multiracial Democratic Dynamic Party broke away to form 
the Viti Levu, Kubuna, Burebasaga Multiracial Democratic Party. 
Headed by two chiefs, one from Ra and the other from Rewa, the 
party's main concern was to ensure an equal distribution of wealth 
between indigenous Fijians, especially those they saw as having been 
'forgotten by the SVT and PAP' (Pacnews, 13 November 1997) . By this 
time the SVT and the PAP had formed a coalition but negotiations for 
a merger were floundering and an PAP spokesman predicted that 
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coalition with SVT would be over by Christmas. The main reason for 
this was the lack of consultation by the SVT, especially over the new 
constitution (Pacnews, 29 November 1997) . In December the 
parliamentary coalition between the two parties collapsed and the 
PAP began to discuss with the FLP the possibility of jointly contesting 
upcoming elections (Pacnews, 31 December 1997) . 
By early 1998 rumours were circulating that an indigenous Fijian 
movement known as Cadra Mai, which means to rise up, was planning 
to topple the government and in February Prime Minister Rabuka 
challenged its members to come out into the open. He said he knew 
who they were and described them as a group of clergymen and 
senior military and police officers that had supported him in the coups 
of 1987 (Pacnews, 16 February 1998) . The group was opposed to the 
new constitution and the government's moves to deal with the issue of 
native land leases through a Joint Parliamentary Select Committee 
(Pacnews, 18 February 1998). A few days after Rabuka's statement the 
head of the Methodist Church distanced the church from 'moves by 
some senior clergy to form a political party to rival the SVT' (Pacnews, 
20 February 1998). Soon afterwards a new indigenous Fijian party, the 
Soqosoqo Vakakarisito Party (SVP) or Fijian Christian Party, was formed. 
Its leader, the Reverend Manasa Lasaro, was an extremist nationalist 
who had figured prominently in the events of 1987. There were thus in 
early 1998 five indigenous Fijian parties opposed to the SVT. 
However, yet another indigenous Fijian party was in the offing. At 
a meeting in March 1998 the Ba Provincial Council unanimously 
agreed to form the PANU. Launched by no less a figure than the High 
Chief of Ba, the Party appointed Apisai Tora as its general secretary. 
The PANU was the latest political expression of the longstanding 
regional cleavage between eastern and western indigenous Fijians. As 
a senior party official, echoing Tora' s earlier expression of western 
indigenous Fijian resentment of eastern indigenous Fijian political 
dominance, put it, 'although [Ba] province controls 60 per cent of the 
country's resources, it does not have much say in the political arena' 
(Pacnews, 15 January 1998). 
The threat from the new indigenous Fijian political parties was not 
lost on the SVT. Prime Minister Rabuka claimed that this was simply 
an indication of indigenous Fijians becoming more aware of politics 
(Pacnews, 2 April 1998) . The uncomfortable reality, however, was that 
by the time the 1999 general elections took place the SVT was opposed 
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by a number of rival indigenous Fijian parties, albeit with varying 
degrees of credibility. The threat to the SVT became even more real 
when an electoral coalition between the FAP, PANU and FLP was 
announced. In August 1998 the attractiveness of this coalition as an 
alternative to one between the SVT and the NFP was boosted by the 
election of Adi Kuini Bavadra to the leadership of the FAP following 
the death of Kamikamica earlier that month. Previously the wife of the 
late Dr Timoci Bavadra, former leader of the FLP and Prime Minister 
in the FLP-NFP Coalition government that was overthrown in 1987, 
Adi Kuini was a western chief but also had close family connections to 
the eastern chiefly establishment. Sharp, articulate and finely attuned 
to traditional indigenous Fijian politics, she also made a mark within 
the Great Council of Chiefs. Moreover, in September 1998, 27 per cent 
of people surveyed in a public opinion poll ranked her second as 
preferred Prime Minister, just one percentage point behind Prime 
Minister Rabuka (Pacific Islands Report, 28 September 1998) . 
Advantages such as these no doubt figured prominently both in her 
election to the leadership of the FAP as well as in the eventual success 
of the FLP /FAP /PANU coalition in the 1999 general elections. 
Conclusion 
In the latter half of 1998, then, the evidence was becoming increasingly 
clear that SVT rule was unlikely to continue. The new electoral system 
could not guarantee indigenous Fijian political dominance, increasing 
indigenous Fijian disaffection had thrown up some credible 
indigenous Fijian rivals, and the new constitution required power 
sharing between electorally successful political parties. In this light, 
the outcome of the 1999 general elections is perhaps not as surprising 
as some have thought it to be. 
However, the new government still faces the thorny Fijian 
question, a question that the SVT was unable to resolve. The highly 
sensitive matter of native land leases has not been settled and the 
stand-off between the government and landowners over 
compensation for land taken over for the hydroelectric power station 
in Monasavu will undoubtedly have long term effects. In the area of 
education, indigenous Fijian underperformance continues to be a 
problem. As recently as January 1998 poor indigenous Fijian 
performance in external examinations caused the government to 
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commission yet another an investigation (Pacnews, 15 January 1998) . 
On the economic front, ten years since its formulation, the grand 
design for greater indigenous Fijian control of the economy remains 
largely that-although, it is true, a small minority has prospered. 
In the elections the failure of the indigenous Fijian-dominated post­
coup state to resolve the Fijian question figured prominently. How the 
new government deals with it will be crucial for the country's 
prospects for economic growth and political stability. The danger is 
that for some indigenous Fijians there remains unfinished business. 
Against this stands the hope is that the greater democratic space that 
now prevails in Fiji will allow more sensitive and effective 
management of the problematics of reform and the Fijian question. 
CHAPTER 7 0  
Add ress i ng  i neq ua l i ty? 
Econom ic  aff i rmat ive act ion  
a nd com m u na l  ca p ita l i sm i n  
post-cou p  F ij i  
Steven Ratuva 
Introduction 
Economic affirmative action, defined as 'government-mandated 
preferential policies toward government-designated groups' (Sowell 
1990:10), became an important state policy in Fiji after independence 
in 1970. Economic affirmative action emerged as a result of growing 
concern about imbalances between Fiji's two principal ethnic groups, 
which was the result of the unequal process of capitalist development 
in the colonial economy in general, and the agricultural sector in 
particular (Narayan 1984; Overton 1988) . However, it was not until 
after the 1987 military coups that the term 'affirmative action' began to 
be widely used in government circles. In the period since 1987, 
economic affirmative action has come to occupy a prominent place in 
Fiji's political discourse, being seen as an imperative for post-coup 
national reconstruction. Moreover, economic affirmative action is now 
commonly seen as an embodiment of 'progressive' ethnic Fijian 
thinking. This represents a change in perspective. Previously, 
economic affirmative action was associated with the more 
conservative 'paramountcy of Fijian interests' perspective (Durutalo 
1986) . This latter approach to economic affirmative action was 
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embedded in the abrogated 1970 Constitution, as well as in colonial 
and post-colonial legislation relating to both land and aspects of ethnic 
Fijian culture. Given its pre-independence origins, it was concerned 
with preserving the hegemony of essentially colonial values. This 
conservatism may appear to stand in contradiction with the 
progressivity currently associated with economic affirmative action, 
but, as we shall see later, the seemingly contradictory nature of the 
two perspectives can be synthesised into what I propose to call in this 
chapter 'communal capitalism'. 
Economic affirmative action has been an integral component of 
conflict resolution, sustainable and equitable development, 
democratisation and human rights in many societies. This is because it 
purports to address the phenomenon of equality-or rather, its 
absence. At the level of abstraction, the term equality seems to be a 
simple one. However, when used to examine concrete phenomena in 
their social context it has been the target of semantic manipulation. It 
thus continues to be elusive (Faundez 1994: 1) .  In the US, for example, 
conservatives oppose economic affirmative action, and especially the 
use of quotas, on the grounds that it is a form of 'reverse 
discrimination' with the potential to create a new 'victim class' .  
American advocates of economic affirmative action on the other hand 
argue that it helps to redress the historically determined 
disadvantaged position of marginalised groups like African­
Americans. However, advocates are divided as to whether economic 
affirmative action should be based on class, using 'the poor ' as the 
designated social category, or based on ethnicity (Kahlenberg 1996) . 
Notwithstanding this division though it remains the case that in the 
US economic affirmative action is official policy in some states. A 
similar debate has been witnessed in South Africa, where economic 
affirmative action has become part of the broad post-apartheid process 
of national reconstruction and reconciliation (Adam 1997) . As in parts 
of the US, in South Africa economic affirmative action is mandatory, 
under the Employment Equity Bill. A third example can be found in 
Malaysia, where economic affirmative action was an integral 
component of the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1970. It was 
imposed by a regime with authoritarian tendencies, and was aimed at 
alleviating the poverty within the bumiputeras-ethnic Malays-which 
was a critical source of income inequality between ethnic groups in 
Malaysia (Emsley 1996) . 
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Key aspects of economic affirmative action debates found in the 
US, South Africa and Malaysia can be found in Fiji. There are two 
main strands to the debate on economic affirmative action in Fiji. The 
first is the nationalist position, which pushes for economic affirmative 
action policies to be specific to the indigenous people of the 
archipelago. This position has both conservative and progressive 
adherents, as noted above, and is embodied in the 1990 Constitution. 
The second is the liberal position, which opts for the application of 
economic affirmative action for those deemed to be disadvantaged, 
regardless of ethnicity (Citizens Constitutional Forum 1995). This 
position is reflected in the 1997 Constitution (Amendment) Act. 
The nationalist position has dominated attempts to introduce 
economic affirmative action in Fiji. However, despite an increasingly 
ambitious expression of political will, especially during the immediate 
post-coup period, there is still no coherent economic affirmative action 
blueprint in Fiji. Instead, there are a number of individual state­
sponsored programs implemented by a number of institutions. In part, 
the lack of a coherent blueprint in Fiji for economic affirmative action 
may be because it cannot be justified on the grounds of political 
powerlessness. Like South Africa and Malaysia, but unlike the US, the 
ethnic Fijians who have been designated as the intended beneficiaries 
of economic affirmative action constitute both the demographic 
majority and the politically dominant ethnic and social group. The 
overriding objective of economic affirmative action when it has been 
designed to benefit a designated group which is politically dominant 
has been to address historically-determined socioeconomic disparities. 
This is the case in Fiji. Economic affirmative action in Fiji has been 
designed to redress socioeconomic imbalances between ethnic Fijians 
and other ethnic groups found in the country. This justification has 
however been increasingly called into question in South Africa and 
Malaysia, as well as in the US, because many economic affirmative 
action programs have in fact largely benefited those who least need 
them: the middle class of the designated ethnic categories. 
This chapter will similarly call into question the benefits of 
economic affirmative action in Fiji. The chapter begins by examining 
the origins of what I term communal capitalism. It continues by 
providing an analysis of the economic affirmative action intended to 
benefit ethnic Fijians in the wake of the 1987 coups. The chapter will 
then offer a case study of communal capitalism, using the Fijian 
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Holdings Company Limited (FHC) as its source material. The reason 
for choosing the FHC is because, as the flagship for ethnic Fijian 
communal investment, it has been seen by many in Fiji as a success 
story in as far as communal capitalism is concerned. Be that as it may, 
it manifests some fundamental contradictions, which I will explore in 
this chapter. 
Economic affirmative action and communal capita l ism 
Before and immediately after independence two seemingly 
contradictory positions were articulated in relation to the protection 
and enhancement of ethnic Fijian rights. The first was the protection of 
colonially inherited neotraditional institutions. This focused on 
preserving the vestiges of the colonial Native Policy, which was 
responsible for the marginalisation of ethnic Fijians from mainstream 
economic transactions. The second was the encouragement of ethnic 
Fijian participation in commerce. This focused on creating institutions 
that would be the guardians of ethnic Fijian commercial endeavours. 
The 1970 Constitution contained provision for the protection of 
ethnic Fijian rights, but this was limited to preserving existing 
institutional arrangements such as the Native Lands Trust Board 
(NLTB), the Fijian Affairs Board (FAB), the Great Council of Chiefs, the 
Fijian Development Fund, the Native Land and Fisheries Commission, 
and the Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Ordinance of 1967, which 
was transformed into the Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act in 
1977. In that these institutions had originally been set up to sustain the 
communalistic 'divide and rule' philosophies of the colonial Native 
Policy, which excluded most ethnic Fijians from wider politics, the 
maintenance of these institutions in the immediate post-independence 
period had the direct role of consolidating and legitimising the 
postcolonial state-chiefly class alliance. This alliance constructed a 
new form of hegemony that continued to keep most ethnic Fijians 
within a constricted, 'protected' political space, and served, to use 
Gramsci's (1971) terminology, as a 'historic bloc' in Fiji (Durutalo 1986; 
Akram-Lodhi 1997) . 
Paradoxically, this institutionalised neo-colonial hegemony was to 
be the facilitating mechanism and guardian for ethnic Fijian 
participation in commerce. In the early post-independence period, an 
institution of neo-colonial hegemony-the Provincial Councils-
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served to promote economic affirmative action in Fiji. The Provincial 
Councils are a semi-state and semi-traditional administrative system 
with direct links to the FAB and the Great Council of Chiefs. The 
Provinces themselves are largely subsistence rural economies. 
Beginning in the 1970s Provincial Councils formed companies and 
invested in local or foreign corporations. As a form of economic 
affirmative action, the entry of the Provinces into capital and product 
markets was based on the neoclassical theory of 'trickle-down': that 
with sound investment and good businesses, the benefits of 
development would filter down to ordinary ethnic Fijians. In order to 
be able to pursue economic affirmative action, however, the Provincial 
Councils had to bridge the divide between the capitalist logic of 
accumulation and the need to maintain the hegemony of the state­
chiefly class alliance. In order to do this, resources for investment were 
mobilised through an appeal to a communal sense of obligation to the 
vanua. 
Vanua refers to the relationship between the land and the people 
indigenous to the land. Critically, this relationship is symbolised by 
chiefly power: the chief 'owns' the land and 'owns' the people. The 
relationship has both political and spiritual dimensions, and is thus 
intensely ideological. It can however have a material impact. In 
making an appeal for investable resources to a communal sense of 
obligation to the vanua, capital is ideologically conceptualised as a 
collective entity belonging to the vanua. It is this conceptualisation 
which inspires the altruism witnessed in soli vakavanua, or community 
collection: money is mobilised through neotraditional festivals in 
which various tribal units compete. Indeed, tribal competition 
becomes an end in itself, because winning, and the publicity generated 
by winning, becomes a source of pride for the vanua. As a result, 
Provinces are continually engaged in competition over their soli 
vakavanua. 
However, for the members of the vanua competition is a rivalry 
over the accumulation of social assets such as prestige, rather than the 
accrual of capital for investment in the market. Similarly, the 
ownership of a company that can result from soli vakavanua is not seen 
as a means towards accumulation but as an expression of political 
prestige for the vanua and its symbolic representation, the chief. 
Indeed, there is a painful psychological sanction in a failure to 
mobilise resources: it is an insult to the vanua, the chief and to ethnic 
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Fijians themselves. The significance of capital as an accumulative 
factor of production is thus subsumed within a communal obligation 
to the vanua, and capital becomes an expression of a hegemonic 
collective identity rather than individual enrichment. Recall however 
that the vanua is symbolised by chiefly power. Capital may be 
ideologically conceptualised as belonging to the vanua, but the chiefs 
symbolise the van ua, 'owning' the land and the people. Therefore, in 
the various investments made by the Provincial Councils, chiefs were 
often made the legal holders of shares, the legal holders of company 
titles, and the directors any companies that were created. The result 
was the creation of a hybrid form of capitalist relations, based on the 
communal mobilisation of resources to collect capital for investment in 
enterprises, but often with the chiefs in formal legal control of that 
which has been invested: primordial servitude had been adapted to 
modern commercial exploitation. This is communal capitalism. 
This form of communal resource mobilisation has contributed to 
the failure of many commercial enterprises organised on behalf of 
ethnic Fijians. Simply put, investments have not been based on 
commercial principles, and thus many of the enterprises arising out of 
such investments have been unable to compete in market relationships. 
Moreover, even when enterprises have been able to compete, the 
downside of such investment has been significant and perhaps 
unacceptable risk. As an example, in the 1970s the three Provincial 
Councils of Cakaudrove, Bua and Macuata formed a company called 
CBM Holdings, which operated a diverse investment portfolio. CBM 
Holdings bought shares worth 2.5 per cent of a major local company, 
Stinson and Pearce Limited, owned by a Euro-Fijian who was a former 
Alliance Party Minister of Finance. CBM Holdings' large investment 
left it exposed to significant risk, and when Stinson and Pearce was 
eventually closed, leaving behind a F$12 million debt to the National 
Bank of Fiji, CBM Holdings lost a lot of money. This was not the only 
case in which CBM Holdings' exposure to risk resulted in losses: its 
investment of F$150,000 in the Ferry Freights Company was lost. 
Cakaudrove, Bau and Macuata were not alone in making such 
investments. Tailevu, Rewa, Lau, and Kadavu all had investment 
arms. Many of these investments were in areas that were highly 
competitive, such as retailing, commercial agriculture, transport and 
shipping, and where, as a result, rivalry was fierce and the risks 
involved were great. Moreover, the investments were often in 
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activities that tended to be dominated by Indo-Fijian business. The 
failure of many of these investments has been translated by some into 
an inappropriate ethnic stereotype: namely, that ethnic Fijian culture is 
not conducive to free enterprise. This stereotype has served to 
undermine the genuine efforts of many ethnic Fijian entrepreneurs. 
Ethnic Fijian entrepreneurship grew in the post-independence 
period. Over the three decades preceding 1986 the number of ethnic 
Fijians in business increased dramatically (Hailey 1986:4) . Most of 
these were small-scale businesses in the informal sector that survived 
without state subsidy on a day-to-day basis and which generated 
income for a family unit. Despite this increase in informal small-scale 
entrepreneurship however there was a marked absence of ethnic 
Fijians from the formal and the large-scale business sector. In June 
1987, for example, of the 700 companies listed by the Registrar of 
Companies, the ethnic ownership pattern was 50 per cent Indo-Fijian; 
15 per cent ethnic Fijian; 20 per cent other; and 15 per cent joint 
venture between ethnic groups (Fiji Office of the Registrar of 
Companies 1987) . Little appears to have changed in the decade since 
1987. In 1997, of the 101 local companies registered under the Tax Free 
Zones policy, less than 10 per cent were owned by ethnic Fijians (Fiji 
Trade and Investment Board 1997) . 
Moreover, most ethnic Fijian businesses have been concentrated in 
the urban areas. Rural areas remain largely untouched. Thus, a survey 
done in 1995 by the Ministry of Fijian Affairs (MFA) showed that some 
62 per cent of rural ethnic Fijians survived by participating in 
subsistence agriculture. Of those who eamt wages, 22 per cent relied 
upon agriculture as the source of their income and some 10.6 per cent 
were in non-agricultural paid employment. Only 4 per cent eamt their 
livelihood in retail trade and services (MFA 1995:64) . Indeed, part of 
the reason for the perpetual underdevelopment of the rural economy 
may have to do with the drain of valuable family resources, as a result 
of the material impact of the soli vakavanua, to sustain an exploitative 
communal capitalist system. 
The system was exploitative in the sense that the revenues 
generated from these businesses were not equitably distributed. The 
institutionalisation of communal resource extraction reproduced the 
poverty and perpetual marginalisation of many ethnic Fijians: there 
was no 'trickle down'. The contradiction is that personal and family 
savings that could have been used for daily sustenance and local 
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investment were controlled by dominant state and chiefly elites to 
sustain an agenda which formally fulfilled the imperative of economic 
affirmative action but which in reality fulfilled the economic 
aspirations of elite ethnic Fijians. Thus, the resources mobilised 
through soli vakavanua were passed on through chiefs to Provincial 
bureaucrats and then on to Provincial companies, which then worked 
out the investment technicalities with the relevant financial 
institutions and authorities 'on behalf' of the people of the provinces. 
In the case of the business activities of the Provincial Councils, a 
substantial amount of any surplus that was generated was used to 
finance the administrative operation of the Provincial Councils: it thus 
served to sustain an ethnic Fijian bureaucratic strata. It was not 
distributed as dividends to individual ethnic Fijians, which would be 
normal investment practice, and which might have assisted in the 
alleviation of rural poverty. Moreover, many of these Provincial 
Council companies over the years formed partnerships, based on 
political cronyism and economic expediency, with foreign companies 
with interests in logging, hotels, and other resource-based sectors. I 
have already noted however that within these companies the chiefs 
were usually the legal holders of shares and company titles. Thus, 
using Provincial Council companies, some chiefs were able to acquire 
considerable personal benefit through the accumulation of wealth, 
while foreign and local non-ethnic Fijian companies benefited through 
political security and ready access to natural resources. The results 
were clear: during the 1970s and early 1980s communal capitalism 
clearly benefited the ethnic Fijian elite, whether it was entrenched 
within the state or the vanua .  Moreover, the logic of communal 
capitalism served to reproduce the conditions of the colonial Native 
Policy; ethnic Fijians remained locked into a communal existence 
predicated upon chiefly hegemony. 
In light of the widespread failure of many ethnic Fijian enterprises 
other than those opera ting in the informal sector through the 1970s 
and the 1980s, and the state's inability to create an institutional 
framework which would foster profitability amongst ethnic Fijian 
business, the need to consolidate an ethnic Fijian bourgeois class to 
complement both the chiefly elite and the ethnic Fijian bureaucratic 
strata since the military coups of 1987 became an increasingly urgent 
political priority. The Minister for Trade and Commerce suggested that 
'Fijian society must be prepared to accept changes if our people are to 
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become part of the mainstream of the economic life of our country' 
(Fiji Times, 11 January 1990) . This advice was consistent with post­
coup plans that sought to promote economic affirmative action 
amongst ethnic Fijians. These plans had two general characteristics. 
The first was to enable ethnic Fijians to engage in a wider and deeper 
range of market activities. The second was to dispel the stereotypic 
myth, reproduced over the years, that ethnic Fijians were not 
culturally induced towards private enterprise. Thus, economic 
affirmative action was tied to an expression of a modernist, 
'progressive' ethnic Fijian identity. 
The Nine Points Plan was drawn up in 1988 by a group of ethnic 
Fijian intellectuals, professionals and bureaucrats who came together 
in an umbrella body called the Fijian Initiative Group. Its explicit 
purpose was to promote economic affirmative action in favour of 
ethnic Fijians. It recommended: that F$20 million in equity be injected 
from the FAB to the FHC; that a unit trust for ethnic Fijians be 
established; that a compulsory savings scheme for ethnic Fijians be 
created; that government concessions to ethnic Fijian businesses be 
enhanced; that a Management Advisory Services Department be 
established within the FAB; that ethnic Fijians be allocated a minimum 
ownership of resource-based industries; that certain sectors of the 
economy be reserved for ethnic Fijian investment; that a daily 
newspaper be owned by ethnic Fijians; and that the FAB be 
restructured and strengthened (Fijian Initiative Group 1988) . 
Clearly, the proposals were far-reaching. In response to the 
proposals, the government allocated a F$20 million grant to the FHC 
from the FAB. The Fiji Development Bank (FDB), a parastatal, bought 
shares in an ethnic Fijian-owned daily newspaper. A review of the 
structure of the FAB made recommendations to make it both more 
independent of the MFA and make it more responsive to changes 
within the ethnic Fijian community. Finally, the Interim Government 
also approved the compulsory savings concept, although it has yet to 
be implemented. 
However, the Nine Points Plan failed to deal with two key issues 
that have surrounded attempts to promote economic affirmative 
action within the ethnic Fijian community. The first issue has to do 
with the failure to systematically and objectively identify what 
constituted the 'designated group' to benefit from economic 
affirmative action. The new 1997 Constitution is vague, referring to 'all 
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groups or categories of persons who are disadvantaged'. Even Section 
21 of the 1990 Constitution, the strongest articulation of the nationalist 
view on economic affirmation action, vaguely designated 'Fijians and 
Rotumans' to be the designated group, stating that 
parliament shall, with the object of promoting and safeguarding the 
economic, social, educational, cultural, traditional and other interests 
of the Fijian and Rotuman people, enact laws for those objects and 
shall direct the Government to adopt any program or activity for the 
attainment of the said objects and the government shall duly comply 
with such direction. 
Section 21 was based on Article 153 of the Malaysian Constitution, 
which vests power in the Yang di-Pertuan (President), acting on behalf 
of the Cabinet, to safeguard 'the special position of the Malays'. What 
Section 21 clearly fails to do is to engage with the complicated 
constitutional debate concerning who exactly is a 'Fijian' (Robertson, 
this volume). 
The second issue concerns the continuing inability of advisory 
reports and policy makers to institute relevant and appropriate 
programs which ensure an efficient return on the capital invested as a 
result of economic affirmative action. In post-independence Fiji 
attempts at economic affirmative action in favour of ethnic Fijians has 
resulted in unsustainable waste. Two examples will suffice: the 
Commercial Loans to Fijian Scheme (CLFS); and the Equity 
Investment Management Company Limited (EIMCOL) general store 
scheme of the FDB. The CLFS was specifically designed to create a 
class of indigenous Fijian entrepreneurs. However, failure to repay 
both interest and principal was so common that a number of loan 
portfolios within the CLFS were suspended, including loans for real 
estate and transport. By 1996 some F$70 million worth of CLFS loans 
remained outstanding (FDB 1996) . The EIMCOL scheme was 
established to train general store managers, who were also to be 
provided with loans for the purchase of a general store by the FDB. 
However, the performance of the EIMCOL general stores was very 
poor; all the EIMCOL general stores have either been closed or sold. 
These failures were not addressed in the follow-up to the Nine 
Points Plan. Laisenia Qarase, the former Managing Director of the 
FDB, and a leading proponent of 'progressive' ethnic Fijian economic 
affirmative action, suggested that the objective of such action 'should 
be the achievement of overall parity between Fijians and other 
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communities in all spheres of activities within the shortest period of 
time possible' (Qarase 1995:4). In a proposal entitled Ten Year Plan for 
Fijian Participation in Business, carried out under the auspices of the 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific, Qarase put forward five proposals to be carried out by the 
government to 'ensure that indigenous Fijians achieve 50 per cent 
ownership of the corporate sector and other business sectors by the 
year 2005' (Qarase 1995:2). The five proposals were: the enactment of 
appropriate legislation with the object of promoting and safeguarding 
the interest of ethnic Fijians; the reorganisation and strengthening of 
the ethnic Fijian administration; the accumulation of savings by ethnic 
Fijians to provide investment capital; the encouragement of ethnic 
Fijian investment; and the development of ethnic Fijian 
entrepreneurship, business education and training. 
Both the Ten-Year Plan for Fijian Participation and the Nine Points 
Plan heavily drew upon the Malaysian NEP. This is especially apparent 
in relation to the proposal to establish a definitive timetable within 
which 50 per cent of the economy would come under ethnic Fijian 
ownership. As such, like the Malaysian policy, the plans represented 
attempts at social engineering. However, the uncritical introduction of 
the Malaysian model into the Fiji context can be questioned. The NEP 
has had some unfavourable consequences that must be acknowledged, 
as they could be replicated. Economic affirmative action in Malaysia 
has reinforced ethnic segregation; consolidated a small but 
disproportionately powerful indigenous bourgeoisie which operates in 
conjunction with foreign capital and which survives on state patronage; 
worsened disparities in the distribution of wealth amongst ethnic 
Malays; and created unhealthy competition within the designated 
group itself (Gometz 1994).  It can also be noted that the provision of a 
timetable in Malaysia has not worked (Emsley 1996) . 
Both plans can also be questioned for what they attempt to do. In 
their emphasis on enhancing the size of investments made within the 
ethnic Fijian community, they sought to foster large-scale, capital­
intensive growth directed by ethnic Fijians. In part, this was probably 
due to the marked absence of ethnic Fijians from high profile 
corporate activity, as we have seen. However, in following such a 
strategy, embourgeoisement was the centripetal focus of the 
government's economic affirmative action-as in Malaysia. The 
economic leverage of the ethnic Fijian chiefly and bureaucratic strata 
were thus to be enhanced. 
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This can clearly be seen by some of the criteria that were used to 
judge the effectiveness of economic affirmative action. The FDB, one of 
the sponsors of the two plans, has, during the early 1990s, been using 
the size of loans disbursed to ethnic Fijians as a criteria to measure the 
'success' of its economic affirmative action programs (FDB, various 
issues). As in the past, the rate of return on the investment was not a 
critical variable in judging success. In that the FDB is a parastatal, such 
an approach to lending demonstrates state intervention to carve out an 
economic space for elite ethnic Fijians within the economy. The 
number of ethnic Fijians eligible for large loans was obviously limited; 
the scope for patronage is thus clear. Indeed, ethnic Fijian elites made 
it a point to be seen to be actively promoting large ethnic Fijian 
businesses, in an effort to win political legitimacy. Ironically, such a 
policy, in not letting resource allocation take place through the market, 
ran counter to the economic liberalisation policies of the state 
(Sutherland, this volume). 
The pursuit of large investment by the ethnic Fijian elite that 
benefited from communal capitalism paradoxically undermined and 
marginalised 
very small informally-operated (ethnic Fijian) businesses, including 
people who sold cordial and home-made sweets outside urban 
schools, prepared cooked food for wharf and factory workers, 
operated grass-cutting contracts and sold in the municipal markets 
(Chung 1989:193). 
So too did the failure of the two plans to make recommendations 
designed to assist the development of ethnic Fijian entrepreneurial 
skills. Indeed, a critical area where the plans departed from the 
Malaysian NEP was the failure to couple embourgeoisement with 
poverty alleviation. The two plans did not present an alternative 
development paradigm suitable to the socioeconomic conditions and 
limited resources of the majority of ethnic Fijians, and especially the 
economically marginalised. This is not surprising. Economic 
affirmative action through communal capitalism merely served to 
reproduce the conditions of the colonial Native Policy, in which ethnic 
Fijians were locked into a communal existence under chiefly 
hegemony. It is not 'progressive', it is conservative, and this helps 
explain why a key role of economic affirmative action has been its use 
as an instrument of ethnically based political mobilisation by ethnic 
nationalists and the traditional aristocracy seeking to defend of the 
238 Confronting Fij i Futures 
status quo (Prasad, this volume) . However, the ethnic Fijian elite was 
not the only beneficiary in this structure. By endorsing, in the guise of 
economic affirmative action for ethnic Fijians, orthodox investment 
strategies that had proven wasteful and unsustainable in the past, the 
non-ethnic Fijian bourgeoisie-both local and foreign-had their 
economic dominance within the economy reinforced. 
Although it appears to be a particular-and peculiar-kind of 
entrepreneurial strategy, communal capitalism is more: it has a deeper 
structural form which incorporates ethnic Fijian communal 
obligations, chiefly authority, and collective investment. It is thus an 
adaptation of ethnic Fijian 'tradition' to the demands of the market 
that simultaneously serves to reinvent what had been colonial 
paternalism. It is perhaps this adaptation which serves to give it such 
clear ideological power. Moreover, despite the entrepreneurial failures 
of communal capitalism, it has continued to be the only economic 
strategy that enables the continued enrichment of the ethnic Fijian 
elite. It is in this that it is possible to witness the fundamental 
contradiction of communal capitalism: communal capitalism has 
retarded the development of a vibrant ethnic Fijian bourgeoisie 
because a lot of the capital available for investment and the energy 
needed for individual entrepreneurship has been 'collectivised' 
through communal investment, to the benefit of an elite bureaucratic 
and chiefly strata. That this is so in practice will be demonstrated in 
the next section, where a case study of the flagship of communal 
capitalism, the FHC, is presented. 
The FHC and communal  capita l ism 
As already noted, the Nine Points Plan argued in favour of enhancing 
the equity of the FHC. Although it pre-dates the coups, and thus the 
deepening of the discourse around economic affirmative action, the 
FHC is nonetheless modelled on the Malaysian bumiputera investment 
body, Permodalan National Berhad. However, the principle 
underlying the FHC is that of communal capitalism. The FHC was 
incorporated in December 1984, and was a creation of the Great 
Council of Chiefs. Under the hegemonic guardianship of the Great 
Council of Chiefs the FHC was to symbolically represent the interests 
of ethnic Fijians. Thus, the investment mandate of the FHC, as 
outlined in its corporate plan, was 'to increase Fijian participation in 
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the commercial economy . . .  through acquisition of equity in established, 
well-managed, profitable companies with excellent prospects for 
growth'. Moreover, the FHC was to ensure that the 'benefits spread as 
widely as possible among the Fijian people' (FHC 1994:1) .  
In keeping with communal capitalism, share holding was 
communal, being mobilised through the Provinces, through the NLTB, 
and through the FAB. When the FHC was incorporated resources 
worth F$1,145,145 were mobilised from the ethnic Fijian community 
for investment in it. Of this, F$1 million came from the Provinces, the 
NLTB and the FAB, who in turn received shares in the FHC. The FHC 
then used the same quantity of resources, F$1million, to purchase 
1,000,000 higher dividend 'A' class shares in its first major investment, 
Basic Industries Limited. Proposals were then made for the FHC to 
expand its investment portfolio. The first proposal was that the FHC 
buy a majority holding in two companies, Fiji Industries Limited and 
Standard Concrete Industries Limited; both were owned by Basic 
Industries Limited. Thus, this implied increasing the share ownership 
of the FHC in Basic Industries Limited. The second proposal was that 
the FHC invest in Carlton Brewery (Fiji) Limited, an Australian 
transnational which produced Fiji Bitter, the market leader in the country. 
The FHC however lacked the resources needed to fund either proposal. 
One possibility that was suggested was that the FDB act as a 
middleman, buying shares which would later be sold to the FHC. In 
the event, the Great Council of Chiefs agreed that the proposals 
represented a good way by which to expand the FHC. An action plan 
was drawn up by the board of the FHC, in response to the agreement 
of the Great Council of Chiefs. A key part of this action plan was the 
proposal to increase the share capital received from the Provincial 
Councils, the FAB, and the NLTB, in order to finance the acquisition of 
shares from both Basic Industries Limited and Carlton Brewery. It was 
proposed that F$2 million be raised to buy more shares in Basic 
Industries Limited, and that a further F$4 million be raised to 
purchase a stake in Carlton Brewery. Thus, the capital invested in the 
FHC rapidly increased from F$1 million to F$5 million. 
With an expanded capital base, the FHC increased its portfolio of 
investments. For example, one of its early commercial ventures was to 
buy 50 per cent of the shares in Burns Philp, an Australian company 
with investments in shipping, brewing, agricultural production and 
agro-processing, and wholesale and retail trade. As a result the FHC 
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grew quickly. In 1985, only a year after its creation, it paid its first 
dividend to its shareholders. Moreover, as the portfolio of investments 
held by the FHC expanded, so too did the dividends it paid out to its 
shareholders, barring the disruptions of the 1987 coups. By 1992, profit 
after tax had reached F$2,752,554. 
In 1992, the FHC underwent a corporate restructuring when it 
went from being a public limited company to being a private limited 
company. By changing its status to that of a private company, the FHC 
hoped to facilitate an expansion of individual and private group 
investment through it, in the form of managed funds, and in so doing 
expand its investment portfolio. The FHC thus began to manage 
individual and group investment funds to a maximum limit of 
F$10,000, to ensure that the 'benefits of Fijian Holdings' shareholdings 
are spread as widely as possible' (FHC 1993:7-8) .  To ensure that only 
ethnic Fijians were able to buy into these managed funds, individual 
purchasers were confined to those registered in the Vola ni Kawa Bula, 
the kinship and land ownership register which determines who 
exactly is an ethnic Fijian (Robertson, this volume). This shift in 
company status was significant: it indicated a recognition of the fact 
that economic affirmative action had to generate, in addition to 
communal benefits, benefits for individual ethnic Fijians. Given, 
however, that few individual ethnic Fijians had access to F$10,000 it 
was in reality a recognition of the principle of embourgeoisement 
which, behind the rhetoric, underpinned much of the economic 
affirmative action taking place on behalf of the ethnic Fijian community. 
The dramatic expansion of the FHC in the 1990 to 1994 period was 
not only a result of corporate restructuring; it was also a result of the 
F$20 million interest-free loan provided by the government through 
the FAB in 1989 under the Nine Points Plan. In the wake of both this 
loan and the receipt of funds from individual and groups of ethnic 
Fijians, paid up capital grew from F$1 .2 million in 1985 to F$27.5 
million in 1994. Total assets rose from F$1 .3 million in 1985 to F$36.3 
million in 1994. The net value of assets increased from $170,248 in 
1985 to $3.2 million in 1994. During the 1990s, the dividend paid to 
FHC shareholders was 20 per cent for those with 'A' shares and 5 per 
cent for those with 'B' shares. However, in keeping with corporate 
practice, the 'B' share dividend was paid into a sinking fund to meet 
the repayment obligations of the F$20 million loan received from the 
government through the FAB. 
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In 1994 the FHC had interests in nine major companies in Fiji, 
worth F$27,lll,948. These were: Basic Industries Limited, which was 
100 per cent owned by FHC; the Fiji Sugar Corporation, in which the 
FHC had a 13.2 per cent stake; the Fijian Property Trust, in which the 
FHC had an 89.7 per cent stake; Carlton Brewery (Fiji) Limited, in 
which the FHC had a 30 per cent stake; the Unit Trust of Fiji, in which 
the FHC had an 8.9 per cent stake; Motibhai and Company Limited, in 
which the FHC had 100 per cent of all preference shares; the Merchant 
Bank of Fiji Limited, in which the FHC had a 50 per cent stake; 
Carpenters Properties Limited, in which the FHC had a 50 per cent 
stake; and Goodman Fielder Watties, in which the FHC had 100 per 
cent of all preference shares. In 1995 these companies had profits of 
between F$0.9 million and F$4 million (FHC 1994; 1995) .  
Clearly, as an investment company equipped with an astute young 
management, the FHC has done relatively well, especially in 
comparison to the overall performance of the Fiji economy (Sepehri 
and Akram-Lodhi, this volume). However, as an institution created to 
economically advance the interests of ethnic Fijians, it is necessary to 
deconstruct the actual interests it represents by examining the 
distribution of share holdings in the FHC. Shareholders' names were 
last published in the 1992 Annual Report. That report shows the 
distribution of the outstanding 4,647,934 'A' class shares of the FHC to 
comprise: the NLTB (500,000 shares); the FAB (100,000 shares); the 
Provinces (713,650 shares); and private shareholders (3,384,034 shares) . 
Each share is worth one Fiji dollar. Shares held by the NLTB, the FAB 
and the Provinces thus amount to about 27 per cent of FHC equity. 
The following sections examine each of these shareholders in turn. 
The NLTB 
The biggest single FHC shareholder, the NLTB was founded in 1940 to 
administer 'native land' which is communally owned by ethnic 
Fijians. Such land cannot be bought or sold; it can only be leased, for 
agricultural, commercial or residential purposes. Today, the NLTB 
administers about 83 per cent of the country's land. Of this, 420,000 
hectares is leased out to 24,700 tenants in agriculture, commerce, 
industry, tourism, and public and civil projects. Royalties and lease 
monies from land are distributed by the NLTB in a way that 
reproduces socioeconomic inequality. The NLTB takes 25 per cent of 
land revenues for institutional maintenance, which in essence benefits 
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the ethnic Fijian bureaucracy. Some 75 per cent is distributed to the 
landowners through the chiefs (Prasad and Kumar, this volume) . It is 
common for the chiefs to receive the bulk of the money. The rest 
trickles down the ethnic Fijian social hierarchy, with individuals 
receiving amounts compatible with their social position. 
As an investor and guardian of ethnic Fijian land, the NLTB's 
record leaves a lot to be desired. Over the years it has been rocked by 
financial scandals, charges of nepotism, cronyism and corruption (Fiji 
Times, 15 April 1996) . Moreover, despite a 25 per cent charge for 
administering lease monies from a fixed asset and despite an annual 
government subsidy of F$1 million, the NLTB has recorded losses 
since 1986 and the accounts have not been audited since 1991 . The 
unaudited figures showed an operating deficit of F$1 .6million in 1992, 
a figure that seemed reasonably consistent over the previous few years 
(The Review, June 1997: 19). At the end of 1993 the NLTB had an 
overdraft of F$16.1 million, with some F$4.4 million worth of cheques 
still pending presentation to the bank. By 1997 the NLTB was on the 
verge of bankruptcy. 
The difficulties faced by NLTB are in part due to the extremely 
complex relationship between the state and the chiefs in financial 
affairs. This complexity can be illustrated by an example. In the 1980s 
F$1 .7 million of Australian overseas development cooperation money 
designed to enable ethnic Fijian landowners to participate in the 
timber industry was used to finance a company, Kubuna/Fiji Forest 
Industry (FFI) (The Review, June 1997). The FFI was a joint venture 
between CBM Holdings and Westralian Forest Industries, an 
Australian company. As we have already seen, CBM Holdings was an 
ethnic Fijian company 'owned' by the landowners of the three 
provinces of Cakaudrove, Bua and Macuata, but in reality controlled 
and run by chiefs and, in this instance, their foreign business 
counterparts. The company belonged to the lewe ni vanua, or people, of 
the Kabuna Confederacy, 1 operating through their paramount chief, 
Ratu Sir George Cakobau, who was also both the highest traditional 
chief in Fiji and Fiji's Governor General. Moreover, in his capacity as 
Governor General, Cakobau was not only Head of State, he was also 
Chairman of the NLTB. In charge of the financial operations of the 
company was the General Manager of the NLTB, Josevata 
Kamikamica, a member of the Kubuna Confederacy and a subject of 
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Cakobau. The Chairman of CBM Holdings was Ratu Sir Penaia 
Ganilau, the paramount chief of three provinces within the 
Confederacy, who would be the successor to Cakobau as both Fiji's 
Governor General and Chairman of the NLTB. 
Clearly, huge potential conflicts of interest were witnessed in this 
business arrangement. Power to grant logging licences and 
concessions2 on all native land is vested in the NLTB under the Native 
Land Trust Act. The FFI 'belonged' to the Confederacy of which the 
Head of State and the Chairman of the NLTB was the chief. The General 
Manager of the NLTB was a subject of the chief. The Chairman of CBM 
Holdings was the paramount chief of a component part of the 
Confederacy to which the Head of State and the Chairman of the 
NLTB was the chief. Thus, the power vested in the NLTB could give 
rise to a potential conflict of interest, as in the case of CBM and FFI. 
This is not to say that it did; merely to strongly stress that the complex 
political, communal and bureaucratic entanglement witnessed in the 
establishment of FFI is symptomatic of an NLTB corporate culture that 
makes it difficult to distinguish between purely market, purely 
communal, and purely personal interests. There are many other 
examples to support the premise that, under the guise of vanua or 
vakaturaga, interpersonal relationships can be the basis of decisions 
that are then legitimised within institutional structures. As a 
consequence, economic affirmative action for ethnic Fijian landowners 
has the potential to become a vehicle for the enrichment of companies 
acting in collaboration with strategically located chiefs, self-appointed 
ethnic Fijian leaders, and influential bureaucrats. 
Given such an example, the NLTB's communal investment in the 
FHC needs serious scrutiny. The NLTB, given its history of financial 
scandals, does not have the institutional capacity to be able to 
appropriately scrutinise entrepreneurial investment, especially on 
behalf of ethnic Fijians, who themselves constitute a heterogeneous 
diffusion of class, tribal and political loyalties. Thus, the NLTB does 
not represent a homogeneous ethnic Fijian interest, despite official 
claims to the contrary. It represents a narrow parastatal, bureaucratic 
and private institutional interest, propagated as universally ethnic 
Fijian. The NLTB's shares in the FHC are an entrepreneurial 
engagement that advances this narrow interest. In so doing, the NLTB 
not only administers land, it also legitimises communal capitalism and 
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chiefly hegemony. This will only be deepened if NLTB investments in 
the FHC are ploughed back into the institution. Such a strategy will 
reproduce the cycle of impotent investment that could instead be 
creatively deployed for poverty alleviation amongst ethnic Fijians. 
The FAB 
Established under the Fijian Affairs Act of 1940, the FAB has 
institutional and political control over the MFA, in order to ensure that 
the MFA promotes the well-being and proper government of ethnic 
Fijians. The MFA, which is directly accountable to the Cabinet and the 
FAB, and thus the Great Council of Chiefs, is, as a consequence of this 
line of authority, still anchored to chiefly authority and the political 
norms necessary to preserve that authority. In turn, the FAB is 
accountable to the Great Council of Chiefs. Thus, despite radical 
changes in the national and international political climate, both the 
MFA and the FAB are extremely conservative institutions. 
Nonetheless, both are important institutions in the lives of ethnic 
Fijians. The MFA is an important institution in promoting economic 
affirmative action, especially through its scholarship scheme which, 
despite problems, has been hailed as a success in creating a large 
group of educated ethnic Fijians. 
In addition to the 100,000 'A' class shares already mentioned, the 
FAB has 20 million 'B' class shares in the FHC. As noted above, each 
share is worth one Fiji dollar. The government provided the F$20 
million needed to make the investment under the Nine Points Plan. 
This is the largest single amount of money that has been disbursed for 
economic affirmative action. It was envisaged that being sold to ethnic 
Fijians over time would disperse the amount. However, this has not 
taken place. In this light, it can be argued that ordinary ethnic Fijians 
have not benefited. The FAB, by receiving dividends, has been a major 
beneficiary; this though serves the interests of the ethnic Fijian 
bureaucracy. There have been two other major beneficiaries of this 
investment. First, there have been those who already have shares in 
the FHC: the investment of the FAB serves to enhance the value of 
their holding. Second, there have been local and foreign corporations 
like Carlton Brewery and Motibhai and Company Limited, in which 
the FHC heavily invests, and which stand to gain from the FHC 
having a larger market capitalisation. In both cases, ordinary ethnic 
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Fijians at best stand to make only a peripheral gain. Moreover, in that 
the investment of the FAB in the FHC came from the government, 
FHC investors and investments are in fact being indirectly subsidised 
by the state through its efforts to promote economic affirmative action. 
The Provincial Councils 
As has already been discussed, the Provinces are a mixture of state 
and traditional administration. Investible resources are extracted as a 
consequence of the obligation of ethnic Fijians to the vanua and to the 
chief. Chiefly authority is usually used to collect quotas such as 
F$1,000 per tokatoka, or extended family, or F$15,000 per village. The 
quotas are however arbitrarily imposed by Provincial bureaucrats 
using the authority of the chiefs. With minimal sources of income, 
villagers expend labour and time collecting money in an effort to 
accrue social assets, even at the price of their own domestic poverty. 
All fourteen Provinces have shares in the FHC. If we crudely allocate 
the distribution of shares equally amongst the Provinces, there would 
be about 50,000 per province. If we crudely allocate the distribution of 
shares equally amongst ethnic Fijians, there would be 1 .68 shares per 
ethnic Fijian. Even if we crudely allocate the distribution of shares 
equally amongst the rural ethnic Fijian population, there would still 
only be 2.84 shares per rural ethnic Fijian. These are very low allocations, 
given that each share is worth one Fiji dollar and given that individual 
donations to communal collections are often larger by a factor of ten. 
The figures don't add up, and from the point of view of the return on 
the investment, undoubtedly individual ethnic Fijians would have 
been better off keeping their donations to communal collection and 
investing it themselves. The meagre return from the investment of the 
Provinces is because the dividends paid by the FHC have been used 
mostly to sustain the Provincial institutions and the privileges of 
individuals and groups who have direct access to Provincial 
institutions. Such is the degree of absurdity of communal capitalism. 
Private companies and small groups 
Private companies and small groups such as tikina, or districts, and 
mataqali, or land-owning units, possess about 72 per cent of the shares 
of the FHC. However, most of the private companies who own shares 
in the FHC are owned by individuals or groups of individuals who are 
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established business people, professionals or bureaucrats. Given 
ethnic restrictions on the ownership of shares in the FHC, they are 
clearly owned by the ethnic Fijian elite. In 1992 only about 30 
companies which were kin or community-based owned shares in the 
FHC (FHC 1992) .  
It has already been noted that the change in status of  the FHC from 
a public company to a private company was officially justified on the 
basis that the change in status would extend the benefits of the FHC to 
as wide a group of ethnic Fijians as possible. This justification was 
disingenuous. The change in the status of the FHC was primarily a 
result of lobbying by the ethnic Fijian elite who dominate its private 
company share ownership, and who wanted greater control over their 
investment and the dividends that it paid. Moreover, this emerging 
ethnic Fijian bourgeois class has found a new ally: with the foreign 
and local non-ethnic Fijian bourgeoisie in whose companies the FHC 
has purchased equity. Thus, the new ethnic Fijian bourgeoisie has been 
able to use economic affirmative action policies in order to promote its 
own interests through state-subsidised capital accumulation. This is 
consistent with a long-standing aim of post-coup governments in Fiji 
to create an ethnic Fijian bourgeois class rooted in the market-driven 
logic of capital accumulation. 
This aim has not gone uncontested. There has, for example, been 
growing criticism that economic affirmative action has favoured 
certain individuals from certain Provinces. Most of the private 
company and small group shares in the FHC are from the Provinces of 
Kadavu, Lau and Lomaiviti, all outlying archipelagos (FHC 1992). 
Thus, many of the Provinces are not represented in the emerging 
ethnic Fijian bourgeoisie. This is a potential cause of inter-provincial 
dispute. Moreover, there has been public controversy about whether 
some of the individuals who have invested in the FHC have been 
engaged in insider trading. Some individuals have shareholdings that 
exceed those of their Province. Given the influence and professional 
skills of some within the emerging ethnic Fijian bourgeoisie, it is 
possible that they have been able to monopolise access to information 
about the FHC, and this has raised questions about commercial ethics 
and personal credibility (Korovulavula 1994) . However, these 
criticisms have not extended to the implicit principle underlying much 
government action to promote economic affirmative action since the 
coups: the need to create an ethnic Fijian bourgeoisie. 
Conclusion 
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The FHC is undoubtedly a successful private company. However, it 
does not represent a successful example of either the entry of ethnic 
Fijians into business or of economic affirmative action. Capital 
accumulation in market economies is ultimately determined by the 
forces of market, even if those forces are regulated by the state, and 
not by the ethnic identity of the market participant. Economic 
affirmative action interacts with this dynamic. In Fiji, the interaction 
between economic affirmative action and accumulation has been 
problematic. Part of the problem has been an inability to precisely 
define the group designated to receive economic affirmative action: 
who exactly is an ethnic Fijian? Part of the problem has been the 
unimaginative and uncritical way in which economic affirmative 
action strategies were imported from Malaysia and not based upon the 
socioeconomic position of ethnic Fijians. 
More fundamentally, economic affirmative action through the 
activities of institutions such as the FHC has had a questionable 
impact upon the majority of ethnic Fijians. The FHC is an example of 
economic affirmative action that serves to reproduce what has been 
termed in this chapter communal capitalism. Communal capitalism 
has resulted in institutions such as the NLTB, the FAB and the 
Provincial Councils all becoming directly involved in commerce and 
investment, with often poor economic results. Communal capitalism 
has however served to reproduce the exploitative hegemony of a 
minority of ethnic Fijians within the state-chiefly alliance, and in so 
doing maintained the broad outlines of colonial Native Policy. 
Communal capitalism, and the need for resources that it entails, 
becomes an arena for economic and political mobilisation of ordinary 
ethnic Fijians by an elite concerned with sustaining its own economic 
and political hegemony. Meanwhile, poverty amongst ethnic Fijians 
deepens (Sepehri and Akram-Lodhi, this volume) . Such an outcome is 
a consequence of the fact that the benefits of economic affirmative 
action have been concentrated in the hands of a few: state bureaucrats, 
chiefs, the foreign and local non-ethnic bourgeoisie, and the emerging 
ethnic Fijian bourgeois class. 
The future of economic affirmative action in Fiji had come 
increasingly into conflict with the economic liberalisation policies of 
the previous government. The reason was obvious: liberalisation must 
ultimately threaten state policies that seek to grant ethnically based 
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preferences. In this light, the state in the post-election period faces two 
clear challenges. The first is that the state will need to respond to the 
climate of globalisation. Despite the clear victory of the Fiji Labour 
Party in the 1999 general elections, it is entirely possible that as a 
result of multiparty government the state will do this by maintaining 
as close an affinity as possible to the policies of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization. The second 
challenge faced by the state is that it will need to try and 
accommodate the political impact of the nationalist constituency, 
which policies of economic affirmative action have sustained. Given 
the contradictions of economic affirmative action discussed in this 
chapter, and the limited capacity of the state apparatus in Fiji, whether 
these two challenges can be met is an open question. 
Endnotes 
1 .  A number of Provinces make up a Confederacy (matanitu). There 
are three main Confederacies in Fiji: Kubuna, Tovata and 
Burebasaga. These Confederacies are based upon traditional 
alliances between tribal polities, and have their roots in precolonial 
attempts to form centralised governments in Fiji by early European 
settlers and chiefs. Presently, Confederacies act as means of 
ceremonial and traditional mobilisation. In a way, the political 
loyalty of ethnic Fijians is diverse: they have loyalty to various 
levels of tribal categories, loyalty to the Confederacy and loyalty to 
the state. 
2. The granting of logging licences by the NLTB does not require the 
consent of the members of the landowning unit, but, if deemed 
necessary, the NLTB will carry out consultation with the 
landowners. A concession, on the other hand, is also a licence but is 
'granted over a large area, usually to a major logging company, and 
over land owned by many owning units, and for a longer period 
than a standard licence' (NLTB, nd:2) . 
CHAPTER 7 7 
Ecotourism and the politics of 
representation in Fiji  
Bolger Korth 
I ntroduction 
Development initiatives in the South Pacific have intruded in often 
harmful ways on indigenous people's lives. Indeed, many projects 
have become examples of 'maldevelopment' (Emberson-Bain 1994c) . 
This has led to the search for alternative development options. In 
recent years this search has fostered the emergence of the discourse of 
sustainable development. In essence, sustainable development 
promises holistic solutions to maldevelopment, solutions that are 
guided by sociocultural and environmental considerations. In the 
South Pacific, this discourse has in particular been articulated as the 
solution to the diverse range of economic, social and environmental 
problems associated with the tourism sector. 
Since the mid 1980s development assistance programs in Fiji have 
sponsored sustainability-based ventures in the tourism industry. These 
ventures are now commonly called 'ecotourism'.  Major donors have 
included multilateral aid agencies such as the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the South Pacific Regional 
Environmental Programme, as well as the official development 
assistance of regional industrialised countries. For example, the New 
Zealand Official Development Assistance program (NZODA) has 
sponsored ecotourism projects in Fiji's rural tourism periphery. The 
rationale for such support is clear. According to NZODA, ecotourism 
offers a sustainable alternative that not only helps combat 
environmental degradation and achieve economic growth but also 
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provides an alternative to capital-intensive, large-scale mass tourism 
development by creating business opportunities for rural communities 
(New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1995) .  With such 
overseas economic assistance, it is perhaps not surprising that tourism 
planners in the Fiji government have shown a growing enthusiasm for 
ecotourism. It is also not surprising that indigenous Fijian landowners 
have welcomed ecotourism, predicated as it is supposed to be on the 
principle of sustainability, as an attractive development option 
(Cabaniuk 1989; Wakelin 1991) .  
However, despite widespread and growing support for ecotourism 
in Fiji, the belief that ecotourism is a clearly delineated development 
alternative is erroneous. While ecotourism ideally denotes nature and 
culture-based tourism that involves active appreciation, education or 
interpretation (Backman 1994), in practice it is not the panacea for 
maldevelopment that many purport it to be. Moreover, it has in reality 
often been applied to virtually any kind of tourism which has even the 
vaguest connection with nature (Harrison and Brandt 1997) or with 
culture (Helu-Thaman 1992) . This chapter1 will illustrate that both of 
these propositions apply to Fiji. 
The chapter begins by offering a brief outline of the impact of 
'traditional' mass tourism in Fiji, in order to contextualise the evolution 
of ecotourism. It will be argued that the negative aspects associated 
with mass tourism led to a search for innovative solutions, which then 
acted as catalysts for the emergence of an alternative tourism planning 
discourse in Fiji. This is witnessed in planning documents that sought 
to incorporate Fiji's natural and cultural heritage as tourism assets. This 
process led to the establishment of the so-called 'secondary tourism' 
sector, which laid the foundation for the emergence of ecotourism. 
The principal government institutions involved in the establishment 
and development of ecotourism in Fiji have been the Native Lands 
Trust Board (NLTB) and the Ministry of Tourism (MOT) . As will be 
seen in the chapter, the NLTB has become increasingly concerned with 
policy development and implementation, while the MOT has utilised 
ecotourism as a marketing tool in order to remodel the image 
associated with the secondary tourism sector. However, ecotourism 
representations have not only remodelled the images associated with 
the culture and natural heritage of Fiji, but have also remodelled more 
traditional tourist attractions. This demonstrates the problematic 
status of the ecotourism label. At the same time, despite these 
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remodelling efforts the economic returns to ecotourism have been low. 
As will be shown, rural initiatives have not become commercially self­
sufficient, nor have they met financial expectations, even though the 
ecotourism label has been part of mainstream tourism promotions2• 
Finally, in order to complement the analysis of ecotourism' s 
conception, gradual implementation and economic performance, the 
chapter will evaluate its cultural impact on post-coup Fiji. It will be 
argued that compared to ecotourism' s limited economic role, its 
cultural significance has been disproportionate. While ostensibly 
seeking to provide resources to rural communities as a means of 
promoting localised nature conservation, ecotourism has in fact 
reflected communalist divisions. Representations of ecotourism have 
been politically motivated and ethnically biased towards the 
indigenous Fijian population. Ecotourism discourse has thus become 
tied into a wider discourse, that of communalism. 
Mass tou rism in  Fij i  
Since the 1950s, intercontinental air travel has enabled fast and 
relatively affordable access to Fiji, leading to rapid growth in the 
tourism industry. Air travel to Fiji increased by about 20 per cent 
annually between 1965 and 1973; in 1973 186,000 visitors arrived by 
air. Apart from temporary slumps as a result of the oil crisis in 197 4 
and cyclones in 1983 and 1985, visitor arrivals continued to increase 
by nearly 4 per cent a year up to 1986. After the military coup in 1987 
arrivals temporarily fell to 189,900, a drop of 26.3 per cent. However, 
by 1995 numbers had almost doubled to 359 ,400. By the mid 1990s 
tourism was, at 18.3 per cent of GDP, more important to the economy 
than sugar, which generated 11 .4 per cent of GDP (Fiji Visitors Bureau 
1995; Fiji Bureau of Statistics 1997) .  
Tourist expansion concentrated notably on western Viti Levu, the 
Coral Coast, and the Yasawas and Mamanucas; the spatial integration 
of remoter islands into the tourism industry only partially took place. 
Thus, the Nadi area attracted 31 per cent of hotel visitor bed nights in 
1995, while the Coral Coast and the Mamanucas and Yasawas 
attracted 31 per cent and 20 per cent respectively. In contrast to these 
flows to Fiji's tourism 'centre', the frequency of visitation by tourists to 
the more 'peripheral' outer islands was, at 4 per cent of visitor bed 
nights, much lower (Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation 1995b). 
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Growing visitor numbers encouraged the colonial administration to 
provide legislative support for tourism development, in the form of the 
Hotel Aids Bill of 1958 and the Hotel Aid Ordinance of 1958, which was 
rewritten in 1964. The legislation respectively liberalised duty free 
trading and offered substantial economic incentives to encourage the 
construction of new hotels. Foreign consultants meanwhile advised 
successive Fiji administrations to focus on large-scale tourism 
development as an alternative development option designed to reduce 
the economy's dependence on the production of sugar. 
Ambitious tourism development initiatives sought to capture 
economies of scale; in practice this meant that proposed projects were 
frequently too capital-intensive to be locally funded. State policy was 
thus strongly biased in favor of attracting international capital to 
supplement any investment made by the expatriate business 
community that had come to dominate the local economy. As a result, 
Fiji's tourism industry was an early site of contestation between local 
investors who received token concessions from the state, and foreign 
interests, who sought to consolidate their control of the tourism sector 
(Britton 1983; Britton and Clarke 1987; Plange 1996) . Over time, many 
local entrepreneurs were pushed to the margins of the industry. 
By the 1970s, the predominance of foreign capital in the tourism 
sector led some to argue that it was a new form of colonialism that 
reinforced relations of dependency on metropolitan core capital 
(Britton 1980). In large part, this was because of the fact that as the 
tourism industry became predominantly foreign owned, increases in 
tourism receipts were offset by revenue leakages. Retention of 
earnings from prepaid tour packages by expatriate agencies, as well as 
the need to import fuel, food, construction materials and expertise, 
contributed to the substantial leakage of tourism revenues out of the 
economy. In 1975 the leakage of earnings amounted to 70 per cent of 
total revenues (Britton 1980:148). Indeed, even in 1996 revenue 
leakages remained around 44 per cent of tourism earnings (Tabua 
1996) . There can be little doubt that the leakage of tourism revenues 
slowed the pace of socioeconomic development in Fiji. 
Large-scale tourism has increasingly drawn Fiji into a globalised 
modernity, and rapidly growing numbers of visitor arrivals have 
continued to accelerate this process. However, mass tourism 
development in the postcolonial period has to some extent been 
dependent on Fiji's pre-existing colonial infrastructure (Britton 1980); 
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it has thus brought less economic development of benefit to wider Fiji 
society than might be supposed. Moreover, mass tourism's human 
development impact on both the indigenous and the Indo-Fijian 
communities has remained limited (UNDP 1994) . These shortcomings 
have not gone unnoticed. A growing concern in Fiji has been how to 
redress the flaws of conventional tourism development. These 
concerns have found expression in planning discourse and policy 
development, at both the regional and local level. 
Ecotourism, plann ing d iscourse and pol icy development 
Given the flaws of mass tourism, ecotourism initiatives have 
developed in Fiji in the period since 1986. These initiatives emerged 
through a succession of policy planning documents that increasingly 
noted the possibilities of rural ecotourism as a means of combatting 
uneven development, enhancing autonomy in the tourism industry, 
and promoting community involvement. In this section four such 
plans are examined. These plans demonstrate how ecotourism came to 
be incorporated within planning discourse in Fiji, in large part because 
of a rising awareness within the NLTB of the possible importance of 
Fiji's unique natural environment and indigenous culture in sustaining 
localised tourism initiatives in the rural economy, an awareness that 
found expressien in NLTB policy. 
The Belt Collins Report 
The 1973 Belt Collins Report was jointly commissioned by UNDP, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the 
Government of Fiji. The purpose of the Report was to establish Fiji's 
first comprehensive tourism development program and, at face value, 
the report did indeed maintain a conventional expansionist 
perspective towards the development of Fiji's traditional mass tourism 
market. Promotions were to focus on 'sun, sand, sea and smiles', while 
economic incentives were to be geared towards attracting inward 
investment from foreign capital. According to the Report 
the obvious solution [to tourism development] is to attract capital from 
overseas, but it is equally obvious that overseas capital will remain in 
its own region unless there is sufficient incentive to motivate its own 
movement (Belt Collins and Associates 1973:184). 
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However, although understated, the Report did contain a skeleton 
of ideas and criteria, including concern for the community, the 
environment, and education, which, as we will see, became central to 
landowner-operated ecotourism initiatives during the 1990s. Thus, the 
Report noted that a balance needed to be developed so that the 
potentially substantial economic benefits of tourism could go hand in 
hand with maintaining Fiji's cultural integrity. It was in this context 
that the section on 'visitor attraction' urged that attention be paid to 
the cultural impact of tourism, in order to mitigate any possible social 
conflict. Moreover, a growing cultural and environmental awareness 
was expressed in recommendations for the preservation of significant 
archaeological and historic features. At the same time, and of 
particular significance for the future development of ecotourism, the 
Report urged that national parks be designated as 'tourism assets' .  
Finally, and more generally, the Report argued that tourism 
development should encourage 
the spreading of the economic benefits of tourism throughout the 
society, providing the opportunity for Fiji citizens to participate in and 
control the industry . . .  [T]ourism . . .  [is] a means of residents learning 
from visitors as well as visitors learning from residents . . .  [and] a means 
of cultural and environmental conservation . . .  [V]isitor facilities [should 
be] based on the local environment and culture so that residents can 
relate to the facilities and have a sense of pride in their 
heritage . . .  [E]ducation and training of residents to work in 
tourism . . .  [should provide] for adequate housing and community 
facilities for persons employed in tourism (Belt Collins and Associates 
1973:17) .  
There can be little doubt that these ideas contributed to the 
evolution of the concept of ecotourism in Fiji . Nonetheless, while 
over the course of the late 1970s and early 1980s the tourism sector 
started to diversify, much remained to be done. For example, in 1986 
a visitor 's survey carried out in Nadi revealed that visitors felt Fiji 
holidays offered little in the way of diversion and few places to visit 
(cited in Sawailau 1996) . Clearly, shifting consumer needs and 
perceptions indicated a need for change. However, the conceptual 
roots of later ecotourism initiatives still needed to be fully 
elaborated. 
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Fiji's Ninth Development Plan 
Until 1986, government economic policy was based on five-year 
development plans. The last of these was the Ninth National 
Development Plan (DP9), designed to cover the period between 1986 
and 1990. The strategy of this last five-year plan was neoliberal, 
emphasising the promotion of export-led growth, the phasing out of 
tariffs and trade restrictions, the corporatisation of the state-owned 
enterprises, labour market reforms, and the deregulation of the 
financial and service sectors (Government of Fiji 1986; Chandra 1988). 
The objectives for the tourism sector in DP9 were decidedly 
economistic: the maximisation of the net value of tourism earnings 
was emphasised. Nonetheless, in DP9 one of the nine separate 
tourism sector programs that was elaborated was dedicated explicitly 
to the promotion and development of so-called 'secondary tourism' 
activities by local entrepreneurs, through the provision of basic 
infrastructure, physical resources and credit facilities. This was to 
encourage 'local people to establish rest homes and long distance 
cross-country walking trails . . .  [and] the provision of facilities for horse 
riding, river rafting, diving and other secondary activities' 
(Government of Fiji 1986:87) . The plan explicitly noted that 'to 
encourage . .  . local participation, the entry of expatriate operators in 
these [secondary tourism] areas will be discouraged'. The plan 
further set out the government's intention to maintain the 'judicious' 
utilisation of resources, which, according to Weaver (1994), allowed 
environmental management to form an integral part of development 
planning. 
Thus, DP9 contained two elements of future ecotourism 
initiatives: one, its promotion of greater 'local', by which is meant 
indigenous Fijian, participation in all sectors of the tourism industry; 
and two, its advocacy concerning the need to protect and conserve 
the natural environment. Thus, environmental conservation and the 
provision of business opportunities for indigenous Fijians in the 
tourism industry, concerns which had been present, if understated, in 
the Belt Collins Report, became legitimate parts of Fiji's planning 
discourse. In the years following the coups, these aspects increasingly 
came to the fore. 
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The Cleverdon and Brook Report 
In 1986 and 1987 a comprehensive review of alternative tourism in Fiji 
was comissioned by UNDP, under the auspices of the World Tourism 
Organisation. This review culminated in the publication of the 
Cleverdon and Brook Report (1988) . The Report provided a thorough 
assessment of what was then conceptualised as the 'fledgling field' of 
secondary tourism. Secondary tourism was used 
to refer to all activities in which tourists and recreating Fijians may 
engage, and for which facilities may be provided on a commercial 
basis, which are not 'mainstream' resort accommodation or transport 
operations, either in respect of their style, or location/ area of 
operations. 
It argued that 
Secondary tourism activities typically take place in rural regions 
where there is little, or no, previous tourism development (ie off-the­
beaten-track) and the tourism operations catering for such activities 
are operated and controlled by Fijians, in line with recommendations 
outlined in DP9 that such operations are to be reserved for Fijian 
interests (Cleverdon and Brook 1988:4) . 
The Report went on to more precisely define secondary tourism as: 
water-based activities, including scuba diving, surfing, and boating; 
land-based activities, including trekking, secondary accommodation 
and village tourism and entertainment; and 'general possibilities', 
including plantation and farm visits, anthropology, archaeology, 
forests, landscapes, mountain climbing, and ornithology (Cleverdon 
and Brook 1988:28-80) . 
The contents of the Report had implications for the emerging 
discourse of ecotourism. For a start, the Report displays the bias of 
expatriate discourse. In particular, references to local cultural 
idiosyncrasies are minimal. Thus, the discussion of the role of local 
communities and their need to mediate the social and cultural impacts 
of secondary tourism is very brief, pointing towards a lack of 
acquaintance with local knowledge and sensitivities. At the same time, 
the Report's definition of secondary tourism identified a vast range of 
activities. As will be seen, the broad definition of secondary tourism 
has had a direct impact on ecotourism, in that it has become an 
imprecise classification which eludes clear definition. 
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The Coopers and Lybrand Tourism Masterplan 
In 1989 the Coopers and Lybrand Tourism Masterplan was published. 
The Masterplan called for higher levels of public sector support in the 
tourism sector, recommended implementation of social monitoring 
and public awareness programs, and explicitly advocated the 
provision of safeguards for the natural environment through the 
creation of nature reserves and recreation areas, as had been called for 
in the Belt Collins report (Coopers and Lybrand Associates 1989) .  At 
the same time, the Masterplan recognised the potential of secondary 
tourism. The Masterplan' s chapter on secondary tourism proposed the 
development of culture and environment-based activities. It called for 
the identification of avenues to promote greater local community 
participation, including the recommendation that effective training 
programs be implemented in order to increase local participation in 
secondary tourism. Finally, like DP9 the Masterplan endorsed 
discouraging foreign involvement in secondary tourism, in part because 
of the supposition that it had low capital and technology requirements. 
The Masterplan's elaboration of the concept of secondary tourism 
demonstrated the extent to which environmental conservation, the 
provision of entreprenurial alternatives for indigenous Fijians in the 
tourism industry, and the opportunities provided by indigenous Fijian 
culture were becoming part of 'mainstream' discourse in the tourist 
industry. Clearly, policy advice for Fiji's tourism industry was moving 
closer towards what would later be regarded as ecotourism. Aspects 
of each of the four documents just discussed therefore contributed to 
the formation of the concept of an environmentally-based, sustainable 
tourism. 
The N LTB and tourism policy 
Alongside the documents just discussed a fifth intervention should be 
seen as having contributed to the formation of the concept of ecotourism 
and its entry into Fiji's planning discourse: the NLTB' s tourism policy. 
Whereas each of the four documents elaborate possibilities, the NLTB 
has formulated and implemented tourism policies which have facilitated 
the beginning of experimental tourism initiatives and which moreover 
point to possible ways in which an environmentally-based, sustainable 
ecotourism may develop in the future. 
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Since 1946 the NLTB has had the responsibility of administering 
the 83 per cent of Fiji's total land area which is classified as 'native 
land'. This has been done on behalf of the indigenous Fijian 
landowning groups who were assigned title (Prasad and Kumar, this 
volume). As the most important institution designed to administer 
land in Fiji, the NLTB has emerged as a powerful leader in sustainable 
resource management. The sustainable land management policies of 
the NLTB have evolved over time through a series of documents: the 
NLTB (1985) Policy on the Logging of Indigenous Forests; the Policy 
for Tourism Development on Native Land 1990-95 (NLTB 1990); the 
Environmental Charter (NLTB 1992); and the Tourism Policy for 
Native Land 1997-2000 (NLTB 1996; see also Cabaniuk 1996) . These 
documents, and the policies which they have produced, have 
developed a greater clarity concerning the need to ensure that Fiji's 
natural environment is safeguarded, that indigenous Fijian lands are 
developed and used in a sustainable fashion, and that the cultural 
heritage of indigenous Fijians is preserved. 
It is the Board's Landuse Planning Section which is the local leader 
in current ecotourism development efforts. In so doing, the NLTB is 
following the medium-term policy direction envisaged in the 
government's 1993 economic strategy, which included the promotion 
of ecotourism in order to enhance an awareness of Fiji's ecology and 
cultural heritage while at the same time ensuring enhanced 
indigenous Fijian participation, particularly in rural areas 
(Government of Fiji 1993). As a consequence, in partnership with 
indigenous Fijian landowners the Landuse Planning Section seeks to 
link ecotourism development with the conservation of nature, the 
protection of Fiji's heritage, and community development. In order to 
do this, the Section chairs and provides the secretariat for the inter­
departmental Native Lands Conservation and Preservation Projects 
Steering Committee (NLCPPSC). The NLCPPSC was founded in 1991 
to provide input into NZODA projects and is a multi-sector advisory 
panel including representatives from the Ministry of Tourism and 
Civil Aviation, the Ministry of the Environment, the Department of 
Forestry, the Fijian Affairs Board, the Fiji Development Bank, the Fiji 
Museum, the National Trust for Fiji, and Fiji Pine Ltd. The group 
meets irregularly to discuss environmental conservation projects. The 
Section has also prepared an enviromental policy statement; it has 
worked directly with landowners to promote ecotourism around 
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forest conservation; and it has been working with the Fiji Museum on 
an integrated educatational ecotourism package tour (Matararaba and 
Cabaniuk 1996) . 
The Landuse Planning Section is currently seeking to facilitate 
enhanced coordination and management of tourism development 
across the regions, by working towards the establishment of a nation 
wide system of forest conservation areas, reflective of recommendations 
in the government's National Environment Strategy (Watling and 
Chape 1993) . These forest conservation areas will be community­
based, and should form a keystone for both rural ecotourism 
initiatives and the protection of Fiji's natural environment. 
It is thus reasonably clear that over the last two decades planning 
discourse and policy interventions in Fiji have started to incorporate 
concerns regarding the impact of tourism on the natural environment 
and on indigenous culture. Ecotourism has as a result become 
conceptually embedded within the dominant planning discourse. This 
has been particularly the case since the late 1980s, when the need to 
mitigate the negative economic, sociocultural and environmental 
impact of conventional mass tourism became increasingly apparent. In 
recent years interventions by the NLTB in the field of secondary 
tourism perhaps demonstrate most clearly the growing conceptual 
power of ecotourism. 
Thus far this chapter has emphasised the development of the 
concept of ecotourism in Fiji through an interpretation of planning and 
policy texts. However, the development of ecotourism in Fiji warrants 
a wider reading. In particular, it is necessary to take account of the 
evolution of the concept as a reflection of political agency within the 
MOT. By changing the angle of observation in this direction, the 
polysemy of ecotourism representations and terminology will become 
apparent. 
The MOT, ecotourism and changing sign ifications 
The use of ecotourism as a label in Fiji can be traced back to the early 
1990s, when concern grew within government and industry over 
secondary tourism's negative image as 'second best' tourism. 
Institutions involved in travel promotion and tourism marketing were 
weary of this negative connotation, prompting MOT officials to seek to 
replace the label with a more positive term (Schuller 1996: personal 
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communication; Sawailau 1996: personal communication).  As a result, 
during the early 1990s ecotourism began to replace secondary tourism 
as a marker for sustainable tourism initiatives. Of course, ecotourism 
is not a hermetically sealed concept. It is however a convenient 
rhetorical device. 
The reinvention of secondary tourism as ecotourism coincided with 
the establishment of the MOT's small Ecotourism Unit in 1993, which 
was given a brief to further the understanding of ecotourism and 
advance the perceived benefits of it through the establishment of 
education and training programs. The Unit was to coordinate the 
development of Fiji's cultural, natural and historical resources as 
tourist attractions (Fiji Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation 1995a) . 
Furthermore, it was to render advisory assistance to the private sector, 
support ecotourism marketing initiatives, and develop policy 
directives. Finally, it was to strengthen relationships between various 
government departments with a stake in either tourism or the 
environment (Francis 1994). 
In so doing, the Ecotourism Unit had to deal with intra­
governmental contestation concerning the development, classification 
and implementation of ecotourism: without doubt, at times, only 
nominal cooperation between departments occured. For example, 
despite regular meetings that were held under the umbrella of the 
NLCPPSC, members claim that feedback from individual departments 
for its initiatives, recommendations and development strategies 
remained extremely low. In part, this was due to certain sections in the 
civil service which were too conservative in their attitude to change. 
Innovation has often been stifled by a public service ethos in Fiji that 
sanctions adherence to hegemonic power structures. Influenced by the 
prominence of the chiefly system, an established culture of tradition, 
especially among non-unionised sections of the public service, has 
been perpetuated (Leckie 1997b). At the same time, the Ecotourism 
Unit has had to deal with diverse and at times conflicting interests 
amongst those with a stake in ecotourism. In addition to the members 
of the NLCPPSC, players with a stake in ecotourism include the 
Department of Town and Country Planning, the Lands Department, 
the Fiji Trade and Investment Board, the Fiji Ecotourism Association, 
the Fiji Hotel Association, the Tourism Council of the South Pacific, the 
Foundation for the Peoples of the South Pacific, NZODA, and UNDP. 
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In a bureaucratic environment that is averse to change, the 
Ecotourism Unit had the difficult brief of implementing an innovative 
concept. One of its first objectives was to raise ecotourism' s public 
profile. Promotional articles were compiled and stronger liaising 
between various government departments with a stake in tourism and 
the environment advocated. More directly, in 1993 a series of Fiji 
National Heritage Posters was launched as the result of successful 
collaborative efforts between the Ecotourism Unit, the Ministry of 
State for the Environment, and to a lesser degree various other 
departments, including the NLTB and the Fiji Museum. Conceived as 
a linchpin in the development of ecotourism (Francis 1994), the posters 
vividly expressed a move away from Fiji's 'sun, sand, sea and smiles' 
image by fostering an appreciation of both the environment and of 
culture while at the same time conveying linkages between 
conservation and heritage. 
The heritage poster series depicts particular aspects of selected 
landowner-operated ecotourism ventures such as the waterfalls at 
Bouma and archaeological features of the Tavuni Hill Fort. It also 
included images of native fauna such as the crested iguana, along with 
more surreptitious features such as World War II sites and depictions 
of Fiji's Parliament. Thus, under the heritage umbrella, themes were 
used to rightly or wrongly identify, define, and represent ecotourism. 
The selection of themes and images is consistent, with a bias towards 
those aspects of the environment and culture that lend themselves to 
commodification as tourism assets, thus selectively prioritising the 
preservation of reified places, environmental features and cultural 
artefacts. 
Ecotourism classifications and defin itions 
As a new marker that replaced the label of secondary tourism, 
ecotourism offers an alternative mediation of reality. Its image allows 
for the invention of a hyperreality in which its products appear more 
authentic, more real, and more traditional than conventional tourism 
products. Over the last five years, the MOT has harnessed this image 
to denote innovative tourism ventures as well as reinvent selected 
traditional mass tourism attractions. This can be witnessed in the 
eclectic ecotourism classification system produced by the MOT. Listed 
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ecotourism ventures include privately run hotel accommodation, 
tribally operated nature trails and tourist lodges, as well as 
mainstream cultural attractions such as the Fiji Museum and the 
Pacific Harbour Cultural Centre. Indeed, even general public 
transport operators such as Air Fiji are included (Fiji Ministry of 
Tourism and Civil Aviation 1996) . It thus becomes apparent that the 
branding of ventures with the label 'ecotourism' has occurred on an 
ad hoe basis, comprising a diverse selection of tourism projects and 
operators. The heterogenous character of registered ecotourism 
ventures reflects not only on the success of the label and the image as 
a marketing tool, but is also the result of differing definitions of what 
constitutes ecotourism amongst diverse groups-definitions that have 
at the same time been subject to change. 
There are two explanations as to why ecotourism has attracted such 
a diverse range of groups. On the one hand, ventures may have been 
deliberately incorporated in order to become associated with an 
attractive image that enhances commercial possibilities. On the other 
hand, the ad hoe fashion in which the terminology has been applied 
suggests that definitions have lacked clear direction and have thus 
allowed for the identification of a wide range of very different ventures. 
Indeed, the definition of ecotourism used by the MOT has been 
variable. At one time, two different definitions were published by 
MOT employees within a single year (Sawailau 1994; Francis 1994) . 
However, while precise definitions have changed, over a two-year 
period in the mid 1990s the general meaning of ecotourism contained 
three common themes: ecotourism should supplement the subsistence 
economy of indigenous Fijian landowners by providing opportunities 
for employment and the enhancement of communal resources; it 
should conserve the environment by minimising the negative impact 
of tourism; and it should sustain traditional cultural identities by 
promoting two-way interactive experiences which educate visitors in 
the cultural and environmental activities of indigenous Fijians. A 
concern with nature is thus arrayed with culturally essentialist notions 
of tradition and identity and articulated within a terrain dominated by 
economic logic. 
The latest policy draft of the MOT on ecotourism is more 
comprehensive than previous efforts, indicating that ecotourism 
should be small scale, labour intensive, locally owned and operated, 
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and involve fewer leakages than mass tourism (Harrison 1997).  
Nonetheless, the draft continues to perpetuate bounded and 
functionalist concepts that value yet at the same time seal the 
environment and culture in a seemingly timeless shell. For example, 
the draft defines ecotourism as 
a form of nature-based tourism which involves responsible travel to 
relatively undeveloped areas to foster an appreciation of nature and 
local cultures, while conserving the physical and social environment, 
respecting the aspirations and traditions of those who are visited, and 
improving the welfare of local communities (Harrison 1997:5). 
The definition continues to perpetuate, if ever so slightly, a 
particularistic vision of indigenous Fijian identity. Of course, any 
attempt to classify or essentialise ecotourism, as is attempted in the 
draft, is inevi tab 1 y reductionist. Ecotourism' s definitional transience 
resists closure, and it is quite possibly an unworkable task to create a 
comprehensive classification system based on a term that is subject to 
constant change. 
The economic sign ificance of ecotourism 
Despite the continued emphasis within Fiji ecotourism on the 
importance of indigenous Fijian culture, very few of the projects listed 
as ecotourism by the MOT are run on communal principles, which 
form the basis of many indigenous Fijian social institutions; private 
sector ventures predominate. These private sector enterprises are 
however caught in a sharp contradiction. For ecotourism to maintain 
its distinctiveness from mass tourism, it will have to remain a fringe 
activity. However, with only a limited number of tourists participating 
in ecotourist activities, activities which are predominantly small in 
scale, the income generated has remained marginal within the tourist 
industry as a whole. For example, the income generated by two of 
Fiji's foremost landowner-operated ecotourism projects-in Bouma 
and Abaca-barely reached F$12,000 annually by 1996.3 Thus, that 
which is unique about ecotourism may also render it economically 
unviable. Indeed, in common with many landowner-operated 
ecotourism projects, substantial funding for the two projects 
mentioned above had to come from official development assistance. 
For Bouma and Abaca, establishment costs were almost entirely 
264 Confronti ng F ij i  Futures 
funded by official development assistance from NZODA. Thus, by 30 
June 1996 total NZODA expenditure for ecotourism in Fiji stood at 
NZ$797,953, according to officials at the New Zealand Embassy in 
Suva. 
The economic performance of ecotourism in Fiji is questionable, 
especially to the consultants and policy makers who frequently assess 
ecotourist initiatives. At the same time, in a society that implicitly 
sanctions nepotism the distribution of the revenues from ecotourism 
will continue to lack transparency. This is especially true for 
landowner-operated ecotourism projects. Thus, in the Bouma project, 
between 1991 and January 1996 only F$5,123 had apparently been 
accumulated4• The wider Bouma community enjoyed few tangible 
returns, and real income distribution apparently centered on the kin 
group associated with project management. 
This indicates the continuing marginalisation of the subaltern 
majority of rural people involved in ecotourism in Fiji. Fringe benefits 
to communities are negligible, while low revenue structures keep 
wage levels at a minimum in the ecotourist service sector. For 
example, the main benefit from ecotourism for Abaca village was a 
foreign-funded truck. Little money has been made available to 
maintain it; in 1996 the driver, working standby, received as little as 
F$50 for up to 80 hours work. 
In part, the poor economic performance of ecotourism is not 
surprising. Donor pressures continue to influence its pace of 
development. A good example of this was the controversial 
appointment of a consultant from the parastatal Fiji Pine Limited 
(Harrison and Brandt 1997) for rural ecotourism projects in Bouma 
and Koroyanitu. Since Fiji Pine is a quasi-autonomous agency, it fell 
outside established channels of communication between government 
departments. Information flows were subsequently limited and at 
times failed. Moreover, since the appointment was driven by NZODA 
both government and the private sector withdrew their support, albeit 
informally, from the projects, thus laying the groundwork for 
disappointing economic returns. As is demonstrated in the example, 
poor communication strategies often mean that donor-driven 
initiatives in ecotourism negatively affect relations between 
government departments, the private sector and other bilateral, 
multilateral and non-governmental donors. They also can fuel the civil 
service conservatism previously noted. 
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The cu ltural sign ificance of ecotou rism 
Indigenous culture has been a major feature in the spread of 
ecotourism. The perceived exoticism of the culture and people who 
are indigenous provides the context for a cultural tourism experience. 
According to Din (1997), the association with 'indigenous' ensures 
product differentiation in the face of homogenising forces associated 
with the internationalisation of destinations and economies. However, 
in order to turn culture into a commodity that tourists can consume, 
its complex processes and features have to be abstracted and refined 
so as to become embedded as a consumer product. Li and Butler 
(1997) argue that commodification may protect a cultural resource, as 
its maintenance is vital to secure the flow of financial returns that are 
generated in exchange for cultural experience. Whether this has been 
or will be the case in Fiji is an open question: the cultural significance 
of ecotourism is only starting to become clear. 
Ecotourism in Fiji has a strong yet relatively little studied ethnic 
component. In the recent past, the culture of Fiji has been perceived by 
visitors only as a bonus and not a primary reason for a visit. Thus, in a 
1992 international visitor survey 86 per cent of visitors holidaying in 
Fiji sought 'rest and relaxation'; only 1 .88 per cent sought 'Fiji culture' 
(Fiji Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation 1992:B15). For these 
resort-based visitors, the 'culture' that has been integrated into mass­
based tourist experiences has been represented as staged events which 
occur within the overarching infrastructure of the resort. These 
versions of staged indigenous elements for the tourist gaze (Urry 
1990) cannot replace authentic and inimitable indigenous products 
and elements. The staged event as a literal frontstage spectacle 
(Goffman 1963) does not meet the need to become acquainted at a 
more intimate level, where the authentic is spontaneous, 
unpredictable and unprovoked, and thus allows for the possibility of 
liminality (Turner 1978) .  Staged events do not appeal to a desire for 
escape, but ecotourism does, in promising transcendence. 
Similar to the experience of other countries, yet with its own 
idiosyncratic features, the indigenous tourism components of 
ecotourism in Fiji are geared towards the desire of many tourists to 
learn about, witness and experience indigenous cultures (Li and Butler 
1997) . Ideally they foster mutually beneficial exchanges between hosts 
and guests. However, for the visitor, the focus of acquaintance rests on 
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the inwardly gazing private definition of a rediscovered postcolonial­
and increasingly post-coup-indigenous Fijian self. At the same time 
though the apparent reciprocal intimacy of the ecotourism 
experience-for example, overnight stays in villages or participation 
in kava sessions-is mediated by indigenous hosts. Trajecting their 
post-independence experience, hosts appear reflexive, and mindful of 
their different identities during the encounter. Thus, breaches of 
cultural protocol are met with enormous tolerance. During kava 
sessions it is common to witness ecotourists getting up to spit the kava 
out. The insult to the host is usually disguised by their laughter. After 
all, the host needs to mediate advertised promotional representations 
that construct them as culturally exotic with non-advertised 
representations that reveal their economic disadvantage in relation to 
the affluent who partake of these experiences. 
In the wake of the coups, there has been a self-conscious 
celebration of indigenousness and a growing nostalgia amongst many 
indigenous Fijians for an illusive past. Post-coup sentiment has 
become sharply associated with the politics of difference and an 
exacerbation of communalism (Durutalo 1986) . Conflict has emerged 
between the advancement of a cosmopolitan liberalism, which can be 
tied to an environmentalist ethos, and the conservation of a rigid and 
essentialist traditional ethos, which is constructed around an 
indigenous identity. Ecotourism is positioned at the intersection of this 
conflict, as it seeks to encompass both the environmental and the 
cultural. 
The experience of culture in post-coup Fiji has been characterised 
by the widespread fragmentation of traditional sociocultural norms. It 
has been expressed distinctly along both a geographical rural-urban 
divide, as well as along ethnic divides, between Indo-Fijian and 
indigenous Fijian communities. By focusing on indigenous Fijian 
culture, ecotourism has become an involuntary ally in power struggles 
that centre around ethnicity. The monopolised domination of a 
projected ecotourism image focuses singularly on the indigenous 
ethnie and thus enhances the experience of alienation amongst the non­
indigenous population. The tourist gaze marginalises Indo-Fijian 
experiences and accentuates ethnic divisions. 
Thus, the voyeuristic perspective of the tourist in cultural 
ecotourism unconsciously witnesses and participates in the private 
struggle to redefine post-independence and post-coup social space 
that has been prominently associated with communalist identity 
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politics. The coercive stifling of the formerly pluralist political 
landscape has ensured that post-coup identification focused on a 
unilateral valorisation of ethnic difference. The ecotourism process 
reflects and contributes to this process. This is a disappointing 
outcome. Fiji's incorporation into the global economy provides ample 
opportunities for ethnic barriers to be reduced. In that tourism has not 
been used to promote an image of emerging cosmopolitan 
heterogeneity, a chance to reconstitute a national image that would 
reduce ethnic tension--even if within the context of a re-awakening 
political pluralism-has so far been missed. 
Confronting futures 
Ecotourism neither alleviates the ethnic tensions created as a result of 
indigenous Fijian identity politics nor does it fulfil the modernist 
promise of providing socioeconomic returns that can ensure sustained 
environmental conservation. Thus, as a sustainable development 
initiative ecotourism has so far failed to counterbalance growing 
ethnic and financial inequalities in Fiji. Yet the development of a 
successful ecotourism sector in Fiji faces an even greater challenge. At 
the core of the development paradox lies a premise of sustainability. 
That premise promises the recognition and maintenance of tradition 
and heritage, while simultaneously striving for community 
development through the establishment of a conservation ethic, 
democratic decision-making processes, equitable resource distribution, 
and equal opportunities across the age and gender divide. 
However, as has been shown in this chapter, much of the focus of 
ecotourist initiatives in Fiji has been on the preservation of cultural 
integrity and the conservation of nature. The conservation of the 
social, cultural and natural ecology suggests stasis. Thus, ecotourism 
development in Fiji has not dealt with the promises of the 
sustainability premise. Indeed, in many ways those promises stand in 
sharp contradiction to ecotourist initiatives in Fiji. At a time when the 
indigenous and non-indigenous peoples of Fiji are invariably 
integrating into the world economy, global imperatives are becoming 
all the more apparent. If ecotourism is to deal with the paradox of 
sustainability, the old dichotomies between modernity and tradition 
and between indigenous and non-indigenous will have to give way to 
a more syncretistic relationship. If not, ecotourism will become just 
another doomed sustainable development initiative. 
268 Confronti ng F ij i Futures 
Endnotes 
1 .  The research for this chapter is based on fieldwork that was carried 
out throughout 1996 and 1997. It is part of a larger study of 
ecotourism development in Fiji, and will form the basis of a PhD 
thesis. The research results are currently being written up in the 
Department of Anthropology at the University of Otago, Dunedin, 
New Zealand. I would like to acknowledge helpful comments on 
this chapter from Ian Fraser, Trisha Korth, Jacqui Leckie and Peter 
Wilson. 
2. The Fiji Visitors Bureau hosts an ecotourism site on the World Wide 
Web: <http :/  /www.fijifvb .gov.fj /ecotour/ecotour.htm>. 
3. These figures come from the confidential monthly revenue 
summaries of the Bouma and Abaca ecotourism projects for the 
period between 1994 and 1996. They have been confirmed as 
authentic by the author. 
4. Personal communication with members of the landowning unit. 
CHAPTER 1 2  
Retreat from exclusion? 
Identit ies in post-coup F ij i  
Robbie Robertson 
Introduction 
For many in Fiji, the coups of 1987 represented an attempt to dismiss 
Fiji's postcolonial policies of multiracial accommodation and to 
determine much more exclusive identities for its peoples. Aboriginal 
Fijians-in the vernacular i Taukei-stood to gain most from post-coup 
changes, which promised to grant them, through the economic 
affirmative action policies of the state, preferential access to jobs, 
contracts and resources (Ratuva, this volume). While the coups created 
opportunities to 'sever the apron strings which tied us to inherited 
colonial characteristics' (Fiji Times, 3 June 1989), the harshness of what 
was required was 'payment for the ease with which we got 
independence' (The Age, 9 September 1991) .  Indeed, many people in 
Fiji believed this was Fiji's belated but nonetheless real struggle for 
independence. However, far from severing 'the apron strings' the 
coups prompted a massive reassertion of colonial power structures. A 
new constitution in 1990 gave political power to chiefly and provincial 
Taukei authorities, and foreshadowed a separate justice system for 
aboriginal Fijians. It was as if the restoration of colonial controls 
would allow the Taukei to bestow upon the future all the certainties the 
past now represented but which the present so obviously and 
manifestly lacked. 
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These contradictions owed much to the differing objectives of 
classes in Fiji. The nascent Taukei middle class expanded after 1987, 
engaging the chauvinistic rhetoric of the coups in order to gain both 
space and benefit for itself. At the same time it employed the rhetoric 
of deregulation in order to weaken the advantages Indo-Fijians were 
said to have gained under the pre-coup postcolonial accord. However, 
the long-term viability of this nascent middle class could not be 
sustained solely by access to cheap state resources. Only a thriving 
economy promised long term viability. Unfortunately, policies of 
ethnic exclusion did not inspire business confidence; consequently, the 
very investment upon which the economy depended for growth 
shrank drastically (Sepehri and Akram-Lodhi, this volume). 
The small but powerful bureaucratic and chiefly classes within the 
Taukei also had agendas. The coups provided them with opportunities 
to re-establish control over the political system and to refashion the 
economic base so as to make it less dependent upon already weakened 
and potentially unstable traditional structures . The Fijian Holdings 
Company Limited and other state-financed Provincial investment 
companies expanded rapidly in the decade following the coups 
(Ratuva, this volume). So too did the fortunes of well-placed 
bureaucrats, who used access to cheap loans to reconstitute 
themselves as a strong faction of the country's bourgeoisie. However, 
in doing so they simultaneously reduced opportunities for others. 
Indeed, the massive costs associated with the National Bank of Fiji's 
loan losses so weakened the economy that Fiji may be unable to reap 
any of the anticipated economic dividends that constitutional reform 
promises (Robertson 1998:192) . 
Ultimately, the inability of Fiji's coup leaders to deliver on their 
promises of a new era for the Taukei forced a partial retreat from the 
goals of 1987. A new constitution ten years later permitted a fairer 
electoral system and created space in which to develop the interests of 
civil society. Both goals have been widely praised and accepted by 
Fiji's peoples, as is manifest in the outcome of the 1999 general 
elections (Prasad, this volume). However, despite these important 
concessions, the new 1997 Constitution also symbolises Fiji's 
continued failure to confront its history, and in particular the way in 
which colonial and postcolonial elites have fostered and exploited 
ethnic divisions in order to maintain power and wealth. The 1987 
coups were but an extreme consequence of those strategies. 
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Taukei identity: accommodation or exclusion? 
Rhetoric implied that the coups were for the benefit of the Taukei. It 
quickly became apparent however that not all Taukei would be 
allowed to call themselves 'Fijian', the common English language 
description for the Taukei, and so gain from changes in state policy 
designed to promote Taukei economic affirmative action. The 1990 
Constitution determined that only people registered on the Vula ni 
Kawa Bula (VKB) could be deemed to be 'Fijian'. Appropriately 
enough, this colonial register, begun eighty years earlier to record 
landowners, was housed with the Native Land Commission. 
However, the VKB mocks the traditions of Fiji. For the past 3000 years 
Fiji has absorbed-no doubt not always easily-many peoples from 
the Pacific, resulting in a unique society with both Melanesian and 
Polynesian characteristics. Paul Geraghty, in Islands Business, has 
argued that there has been no tradition of exclusivity in becoming 
'Fijian'. 'Ancestry had very little to do with' qualifying 'as a Fijian in a 
traditional sense', he claimed (Islands Business, February 1992:19) .  For 
example, earlier this century Tongan warriors at Sawana were given 
tribal status equivalent to that found within Taukei tribes. The tribe 
was given the name Toga, and the Tui Lau title, associated with a 
nineteenth century Tongan leader, was resurrected for its head. 
Similarly, in Rewa one group of Tongans took the name 'Vulagi', which 
means outsiders or visitors, and became a dominant family. 
Much of this flexibility was lost in a British drive to standardise 
and regulate relationships after Fiji became a British colony in 1874. 
More than one hundred years later, coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka 
continued this trend with his 1990 Constitution. Thus, people whose 
ancestors came from the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Banaba and 
Tuvalu, at one time all accepted as 'Fijian', became 'others'. Of course, 
the Taukei had always made decisions about who would be accepted 
into their communities and who would not. Accordingly, most that 
came from outside the South Pacific region were excluded. To some 
extent the different relationships that those who were excluded 
experienced with their former colonial overlords, the British, 
combined with their own different cultural inheritances to create new 
postcolonial Fiji identities. Not surprisingly, these identities were also 
sustained by reference to one another, including the identity of 
aboriginal Fijians. As parliamentarian Mesake Baisagale argued, 'the 
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presence of the Hindi-speaking community is like a covering that 
keeps the indigenous people together ' (Fiji Times, 24 March 1995) . 
There was though a cost: in the process the aboriginal peoples of Fiji 
over time became far more selective in applying the values of sharing 
and reciprocity which they argued lay at the heart of Taukei culture. 
The unintended consequence of exclusion festered destructively. 
Exclusion did not just apply to non-aboriginal Fijians. Vasu had both 
aboriginal and non-aboriginal parents. They were however excluded. 
Taukei were not untouched by this perversity. Ratu Jo Nacola declared 
my wife is a part Fijian, a vasu, and my children are of mixed ancestry 
but they are every bit as Fijian as the offspring of a woman from my 
own mataqali who marries into another community and her children 
are accepted as members of my mataqali in accordance with our 
customs (Daily Post, 11 February 1994). 
Similarly, businessman and politician Jim Ah Koy, whose Taukei 
registration had been challenged in the courts during 1992, argued 
that 'irrespective of whether I got into the VKB does not alter the 
Fijianness in me. I can't help the fact that two bloods run through my 
veins' (Fiji Times, 14 October 1994) .  
A final point can be made about the Vula n i  Kawa Bula. Its 
significance within contemporary Taukei culture can perhaps be 
gauged by the fact that many Taukei have never bothered to register 
with the VKB. If 1993 estimates are correct, some 66000 Taukei-just 
under one fifth of the aboriginal Fijian population-have failed to 
register. As a consequence of this technicality, 20,000 Taukei were 
excluded from voting in 1992 (Daily Post, 8 October 1993). 
A second restriction on the definition of 'Fijian' has much older 
roots than the 1990 Constitution. A rigid fixation with patrilineal 
descent reflects historical disadvantages faced by women (Leckie, this 
volume). It also fosters exclusion. Any concessions to women have 
invariably been seen as gestures of goodwill or favour; they were 
certainly not those of equal rights. Consequently, the state's definition 
of 'Fijian' came to rest solely upon a father 's ethnic classification. No 
offspring could be recognised as Taukei if the father was non-aboriginal, 
even if the mother's mataqali (clan) accepted the child. The marital 
status of the child's parents was irrelevant. Ironically, there are 
Taukei-even Taukeists, members of the extremist Taukei Movement 
which claimed responsibility for the first coup in 1987-whose fathers 
or grandfathers were not aboriginal Fijians. That did not deter them 
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from arguing that the Bose Levu Vakaturaga (BLV), the Great Council of 
Chiefs, had ruled in favour of patrilineal descent in 1962 in order to 
'save the Fijian people from being swamped by others and reduced to 
a pitiful race of beggars' (Fiji Times, 9 October 1993) . That the ruling has 
been largely ignored by aboriginal Fijian people themselves reflects its 
departure from reality. As in the past, mataqalis simply decided for 
themselves whom they would accept and whom they would not. 
The coups' supporters took the BLV's ruling seriously however, 
and began to quietly review all registrations of aboriginal Fijians since 
1962. In 1992 a committee recommended cleansing from the VKB 
thirty-six mataqali-approved Taukei, including Jim Ah Koy, former 
Reserve Bank Governor Savenaca Siwatibau, and Colonel Pio Wong 
(Fiji Times, 10 July 1996) . Its recommendations were chauvinistic and 
sent 'out a sad message for the future of the country', noted the Fiji 
Times (12 July 1996), adding that the heritage of those enforcing it 
might not bear too close a scrutiny. Certainly, the committee's 
recommendations contained uncomfortable shades of a 'master race' 
concept, which had always lain uneasily behind the Taukei Movement. 
Indeed, one of the founders of the Taukei Movement declared that 
Taukeists shared the same dedication to their people as the Nazis did to 
Germans (Auckland Star, 24 August 1987) . 
These attempts to redefine identity assumed that identities are 
static, homogeneous, and can be measured against an idealised norm. 
In Fiji this has never been the case. For example, Indo-Fijians are far 
from homogeneous. At the very least, they came from geographically 
distinct regions of South Asia. They left at a time when the concept of 
India as a nation was in its infancy and there was no fully articulated 
vision of independence. Consequently, the South Asians who came to 
Fiji were not a singular or united people. They were divided by gender, 
religion, caste, place of origin and language. They were also divided 
by their status: indentured or free settler. Ironically, what transcended 
these divisions were their colonial and postcolonial experiences of 
ethnic chauvinism and communalism. The Fiji experience created, 
united and 'indigenised' the Indo-Fijian community. 
Aboriginal Fijians too are far from homogeneous. They are divided 
by commoner and chiefly status, by gender, origin, language, and the 
geography of east and west. Such divisions assumed new characteristics 
under colonialism and postcolonialism, much as they did amongst 
descendants of South Asian migrants. These combined with the 
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consequences of a monetised economy and urbanisation to provide 
both threats and opportunities for hereditary chiefs struggling to 
maintain communal leadership and relevance. Under such 
circumstances the colonial communal divide provided too strong a 
possibility for chiefs and politicians to resist. Using communalism, 
they locked themselves and their people into the rhetoric of ethnic 
difference and conflict, with all its consequences. Communalism 
transcended class-or so they believed-and bestowed new meaning 
on the socioeconomic consequences of change amongst the Taukei. 
Indo-Fijians became the cause of Taukei disadvantage, creating a 
scapegoat that empowered a crusade to draw aboriginal Fijians back 
into the communal fold. 
Divide and ru le: colonial ism, class and exclusion 
The postcolonial party of government until 1987, the Alliance, began 
by presenting itself as a multiethnic party, despite being dominated by 
aboriginal Fijians and being controlled by one of Fiji's highest chiefs, 
Ratu Kamisese Mara. When rural Taukei deserted the party in droves 
in 1977, the Alliance successfully wooed them back by pursuing an 
election campaign that chauvinistically appealed to ethnic identity. 
Communalism gave the Alliance unity, stability and purpose in the 
face of division and confusion until 1987. However, these tactics 
divided Fiji ethnically, frustrated national unity and purpose, 
diminished the benefits of development, and ultimately produced 
political instability and economic stagnation. This occurred because 
Fiji failed to transcend the strategy of divide and rule that had been 
devised by Britain to sustain colonialism as cheaply and as 
comfortably as possible. The failure to transcend the strategy of divide 
and rule was not a recipe for postcolonial development and 
cooperation; it was a recipe for neocolonial stagnation. 
In the wake of the use of communalism by the Alliance, Taukei 
leaders began to rewrite history, portraying Indo-Fijians as colonisers­
wealthy, greedy and ungrateful. This occurred despite the fact that those 
South Asian migrants and their descendants had not been and were not 
privileged. In fact, the majority of Indo-Fijians in the late 1980s were 
little better off than Taukei. The commonly held image of wealthy Indo­
Fijians was highly selective. In 1986 Indo-Fijians held 58.5 per cent of all 
white-collar jobs; Taukei held 30.9 per cent. Indo-Fijians held 69.l per 
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cent of professional and managerial jobs; Taukei held 17.4 per cent. Yet 
the vast majority of Indo-Fijians-89 per cent-and the vast majority of 
Taukei-79 per cent-belonged to disadvantaged classes: farmers, wage 
earners, peasants, unpaid family workers and the unemployed 
(Sutherland 1992:153-59) . These facts though were not allowed to get in 
the way of political goals. The Taukei Movement's spokesperson 
histrionically observed that Indo-Fijians 'can't leave us for dead socially, 
they can't leave us for dead economically, and then think that they can 
take over the political leadership of this country without Fijians fighting 
back' (Radio Australia, 5 October 1987) . Such abuse worked because 
ethnic chauvinism had long permeated Fiji society as a consequence of 
divide and rule. Ethnic chauvinism inverted the meaning of the 
thriftiness and education upon which Indo-Fijians, the Jews of the South 
Pacific, relied for their security and from which they benefited. As the 
Leader of the Opposition noted, 'in this country Indians have a lot now 
which they did not have fifty years ago . . .  The most powerful thing we 
have today is our education' (Fiji Times, 8 April 1996) . 
Yet it was Britain that had segregated the peoples of Fiji. It 
developed the best schools for Europeans and for the sons of chiefs. 
Separate suburbs existed for different ethnic groups. Unions were 
ethnically segregated, often mirroring different patterns of ethnic 
employment. Different laws existed for the different peoples of Fiji. 
Ethnic differences were explained by reference to grand narratives on 
civilisation and children were raised on the resultant stereotypes. 
Although postcolonial policies of multiculturalism in education and 
employment weakened many stereotypes, politically motivated ethnic 
scapegoating during the late 1970s and 1980s served to maintain them. 
Moreover, migrants from monocultural rural areas brought with them 
their own regional variations, and passed these on to their offspring as 
well. They also retained their provincial identities and loyalties, 
sometimes grouping together in urban village settlements, sometimes 
maintaining social links through provincially oriented churches. In the 
short term at least, urbanisation exerted a conservative influence in 
stressing difference and fostering exclusivity. 
In Larry Thomas's play, Men, Women and Insanity, a young woman 
reflects 
The problem is we are all frightened. We like each other, but we don't 
like each other. If we like each other, then there's something wrong. 
You see we are not supposed to like each other. That's the way we are 
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brought up. For the Fijian kid they are told not to like the Indian kid 
because he is cunning and has no manners. For the Indian kid, he is 
told the Fijian kid is lazy and good for nothing and you will never 
learn anything from him. So even if an Indian kid and a Fijian kid 
grow up together, they will still be an Indian and a Fijian, not people 
who are friends (Thomas 1995:201-2). 
However, behind these 'everyday' stereotypes lay a material basis, 
Sutherland argues. 
With Indians being so visibly dominant in high paid professional, 
managerial and other white-collar occupations, the deepening sense of 
Fijian disadvantage is even more understandable. For not only did 
they dominate those economic activities which impacted daily and 
most directly on Fijian lives, they also commanded the most sought 
after jobs (Sutherland 1992: 153). 
Grievances may, over time, have come to be seen in 'everyday' 
stereotypical terms: 'Indian success, Fijian failure' . Sutherland stresses 
though, that the basis of these 'everyday' stereotypes is actually class. 
When, for example, Fijians sneer at an Indian businessman, it is out of 
resentment and envy. He is resented because he is an Indian (as 
opposed to say a European). But he is certainly not envied for being 
Indian. Rather he is envied because he is a businessman. The envy has 
to do primarily with class not race, even if the resentment might 
spring from both. Unfortunately, the racial form of the problem 
invariably hides its class content. And this helps sustain the myth of 
Indian domination (Sutherland 1992:153). 
Grounds for envy based on ethnicity are indeed problematic. They 
are a myth, and a very convenient one, in a country in which 
transnational control, with or without local collaboration, is massive. 
In the early postcolonial years foreign companies retained their 
dominance of the Fiji economy, particularly sectors such as utilities, 
mining, and finance, and controlled 65 per cent of Fiji's total turnover 
in 1980. In the tourist retail sector Indo-Fijians dominated the non­
hotel retail infrastructure, controlling 91 per cent of it, but accounted 
for only 26 per cent of retail turnover. The greatest share-some 72 per 
cent-went to foreign companies (Sutherland 1992:147-50) .  However, 
for political mythmakers only the visible infrastructure mattered-the 
number of Indo-Fijian owned shops, buses and taxis. 'One of the 
greatest causes of dissatisfaction that caused the coup', explained Ratu 
Mara, 'was the fact that Fijians didn't think that they have a fair share 
of the cake' (Pacific Islands Monthly, October 1991) .  
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Ethnic envy was a dangerous weapon for the Alliance to employ 
politically. It created unrealistic expectations and poisoned communal 
relations at a time when economic development began to challenge 
old colonial barriers. As a consequence, it backfired on its 
propagandists. Sakeasi Butadroka, the leader of the extremist Fijian 
Nationalist Party, a long time opponent of Mara and his Alliance 
government, and a staunch advocate of Indo-Fijian expulsion, stood 
outside Parliament within hours of the first coup on 14 May 1987 and 
shouted to the crowds that had gathered 'Where is Kamisese Mara? 
Don't blame Bavadra, don't blame anybody, blame Kamisese Mara 
who sold Fiji. Where is he? Where is he now? Mara, the bloody Judas 
Iscariot?' (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:70) . Mara believed the 
rejection of the Alliance government in 1987 to be cross-communal. 
Nonetheless, he reserved his greatest condemnation for Indo-Fijians. 
In any country in which overseas South Asians are 'almost a majority, 
you have problems', he declared (Fiji Times, 4 December 1991). Mara 
painted a striking picture: a disloyal and ungrateful Indo-Fijian 
majority avariciously grabbing power and bringing down upon itself 
and the postcolonial leadership the wrath of an enraged aboriginal 
Fijian people. His traditional superior and former political colleague, 
Governor General and later President Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, was 
blunter. 'The migrant races in the country have complete control­
except for political leadership'. A new constitution, he asserted, would 
guarantee the Taukei the fulfillment of their aspirations (Fiji Times, 11 
January 1989) . 
Constitutions, chiefs and communal ism 
A founder of the Taukei Movement and later government minister Ratu 
Inoke Kubuabola claimed that Indo-Fijians did not acknowledge that 
aboriginal Fijians had 'made their heritage available for others to 
share. It is time they come to terms with the reality of the situation that 
exists today' (Fiji Times, 27 September 1989). However, this was not 
true. The 1970 Constitution, not the Taukei, gave equality to all citizens 
of Fiji, including Indo-Fijians. In 1970 Fiji declared that it would 
abandon the ethnically divisive policies of colonialism and promote 
instead a new sense of national unity based upon respect for ethnic 
differences. Multiculturalism did not deny communalism; it just did 
not accord it precedence over respect for equal peoples. It was an 
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important symbol of difference for a new postcolonial era, even if it 
was increasingly honoured only in the breach. However, in 1987 new 
communal moguls dismissed multiculturalism as a facade. An 
unwritten agreement, they claimed, made aboriginal Fijian 
paramountcy the reality. It became convenient to deny that Indo­
Fijians were citizens. Aboriginal Fijians were the hosts; Indo-Fijians 
mere guests. The problems involved in regarding fourth or fifth 
generation citizens as guests, not equals, and implicitly giving them 
the same status as immigrants on short term work permits, are 
obvious. Mara 'lamented on his failure to create a truly multiracial 
Fiji', Rabuka declared. 'I think he was too cruel on himself, he was 
trying to achieve something that was impossible' (The Age, 21 July 
1990). Following the coups no space existed for multiculturalism. 
Or for democracy. Democracy meant equality according to 
members of the Taukei Movement. It respected that which 
communalism had to destroy in order to dominate. The Taukei called 
democracy 'demon-crazy', claimed it to be alien to Taukei culture, 
argued that it was a conspiracy to deprive aboriginal Fijians of the 
leadership of their own country, and saw it as a means to drive a 
wedge between commoners and chiefs. Taukeist, unionist and 
government minister Taniela Veitata distributed 10,000 letters to Taukei 
households in 1988 declaring that 'he who is not proud of his race has 
no right to live and should go hurrying with that crazy demon 
democracy to bloody hell' (Daily Post, 12 December 1992) . 
In 1988 Rabuka told a provincial council that 'the chiefs are the 
mainstay of the Fijian race and it is important that the chiefly system 
be maintained if the Fijian race is to remain united' (Fiji Times, 31 
October 1988). However, there was no consensus amongst aboriginal 
Fijians as to whether the chiefs should assume complete political 
leadership. Politician Kolinio Qiqiwaqa noted that chiefs sold Fiji to 
Britain in 1874 to liquidate a debt owed by the Vunivalu of Bau (Fiji 
Times, 7 August 1987) . By way of contrast, the commoner Rabuka 
justified his first coup by claiming that personal attacks made by 
politicians against Mara-a high chief-were too much for 
commoners to bear (New Zealand Herald, 19 May 1987) . By the time of 
the second coup, though, his views had changed. ' A lot of people say 
that chiefs should not participate in politics because in politics you 
might be subjected to some adverse comments that are unbecoming to 
your status', he claimed (Islands Business, October 1987) . Mara 
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disagreed, retorting that chiefs had always been involved in politics 
and could not remain aloof as they provided stability and moderation 
(Fiji Times, 3 October 1991) .  Both men did however recognise that 'for 
the last 20 years [Taukei] have failed to distinguish between culture 
and politics, between chiefs as chiefs and chiefs as part of the political 
structure' (Vesikula 1989: 12). 
The nature of relations between chiefs and commoners was also a 
subject for disagreement. Leading Taukeist and later government 
minister Filipe Bole regarded chiefs and their people as indivisible (Fiji 
Times, 5 August 1991) .  Yet for much of Fiji's history, both before and 
after colonisation, chiefs and 'their ' people had been divisible. Indeed, 
one of the most striking class struggles of twentieth century Fiji is that 
of chiefs struggling against the social and political consequences of 
change and the not inconsiderable antipathy of some colonialists to 
the retention of their roles within society. Britain benefited from the 
chiefly struggle-it enabled a conservative alliance of chiefs and 
locally based Europeans to emerge, reducing pressures for 
decolonisation. It was only on the eve of its departure that Britain, not 
wanting to be seen internationally as condoning the communalism it 
had fostered, sought to dismantle the structures of communalism in 
Fiji by introducing a new power sharing constitution which, while 
marginally biased towards aboriginal Fijians, was purportedly 
designed to break down communalism. It is not very surprising that 
within seventeen years both legacies of the last years of British 
colonialism in Fiji-power sharing and multiculturalism-were 
overthrown: the chiefs had to ensure that the communal project 
remained under their effective control in order to maintain their own 
social and economic position. At first there seemed no doubt. 'We 
want the chiefs to hold leadership', Rabuka stated late in 1987 (Islands 
Business, December 1987) . 
Twenty-one months later Rabuka's position had changed. He was 
out of the army and had become a politician. He could afford a touch 
of defiance. While 'chiefs have the final say', 'when it comes to politics 
these chiefs do not have the mandate of their people' (The Age, 17 
August 1991) .  Rabuka wanted chiefs to assume a symbolic role and to 
modernise by being trained to use 'modern systems of leadership, 
rather than relying on total loyalty, traditional blood-ties and so on; 
you make them effective managers' (Fiji Times, 29 August 1991) .  There 
was a need 
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to slow down the process of totally making ineffective the chiefly 
system and hopefully we can introduce certain policies and systems in 
which we can work at getting our chiefs into an effective ruling group, 
not to the extent that they rule the politics of the nation, but they rule 
their own little vanuas (territories) and the divisions of the vanua 
effectively, capable of understanding the modern democratic systems 
that we now live in (Islands Business, July 1991) .  
Any alternative, he believed, eroded the chiefly system and 
produced a new elite based on competition, education and personal 
initiative. While Rabuka did not endorse that 'kind of democracy' (The 
Age, 21 July 1990), it was clear that his views concerning the political 
role of the chiefs had dramatically changed. Many chiefs had expected 
something different after 1987. 
Certainly the Fiji Labour Party's leader, Dr Timoci Bavadra, had 
promised the chiefs nothing when he upset the postcolonial cocoon by 
winning the 1987 election. His new deal had been for commoners. He 
wanted to return to them the management and wealth of their own 
lands. Bavadra's Minister of Labour and Immigration was 
unequivocal when he said 'the days of the old leaders club are coming 
to an end. In the modern world, it is democratic rights that give the 
commoner Fijian their best chance in life' (Dominion Sunday Times, 17 
April 1988). Nationalist Butadroka had similarly promised little for the 
chiefs. 'The time for chiefly leadership had long gone' (Fiji Times, 6 
December 1988), he declared. 
The assumption of such a view had not been expected from Rabuka. 
He was the chiefs' 'brave hearted champion', as Ro Lady Lala Mara 
reportedly called him at the first BLV meeting after the coup which 
toppled Bavadra (Fiji Times, 2 November 1995). They anticipated using 
post-coup circumstances to secure their own status. Indeed, they 
succeeded in gaining paramountcy in the 1990 Constitution by restoring 
the political role of their provincial bases and by winning a new role 
for a much more concentrated BLV, which now became a de facto 
parliament, closed to the public and media. Rabuka accepted that the 
BLV was 'the supreme constitutional body' (Fiji Times, 16 January 1989) .  
The chiefs saw their post-coup consolidation within the Fiji polity 
as essential in order to achieve a central goal of the coups: maintaining 
the unity and self-reliance of Taukei culture. For the chiefs, achieving 
this goal meant restoring to themselves control over many Taukei 
institutions, which were increasingly influenced by commoners. 
Moreover, the chiefs saw themselves as moderates and regarded their 
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own self-interest as altruism. Not all Taukei agreed. Bavadra for one 
was dismayed, seeing it as 'the manipulation of Fijian institutions for 
advantage of a particular proposition shared by the military leader 
and some members of the interim administration' (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 28 June 1990) . Similarly, the dissident Bauan chief 
Ratu Jone Madraiwiwi argued that the actions of the chiefs were 'the 
result of an attempt to shore up a system that is being eroded by 
change' (Griffen 1997:231) .  Such actions, he believed, would 
encourage tribalism and provincialism at the expense of nation 
building. Butadroka too dismissed the BLV, although this did not stop 
him from creating his own rival Viti Levu Council of Chiefs in 1992 
(Fiji Times, 6 December 1988). 
The chiefs viewed their critics suspiciously. The Bavadras, 
Butadrokas, Vesikulas, and perhaps even now the Rabukas of this 
world sought to upset chiefly power bases inherited from the 
nineteenth century and frozen by colonialism. They would throw 
these bases into confusion. They wanted a western fourth confederacy, 
which might become the revenge of old Colo, once the first casualty of 
colonialism but now, with western Viti Levu, the backbone of the 
economy. They would, as Rabuka himself proposed, keep the chiefs 
one level removed from politics by harmlessly confining them to the 
Senate, a kind of House of Lords. A Senate of Chiefs might enable 
chiefs to be involved in politics, Rabuka speculated, while not 'getting 
down to the level of politics where, look, I can say this against the 
prime minister, regardless of who he is' (Islands Business, July 1991) .  
This was not what the chiefs had wanted. Nonetheless, as time went 
on, Rabuka-his goal now firmly on succession to Mara once the 
Interim Government's term ended-identified himself more and more 
with those calling for reform of the role of chiefs in the governance of 
Fiji. The coup leader now staked his claim both as a commoner and as 
a moderate in arguing that 
Sakeasi Butadroka, Jolame Uludole, Isireli Vuibau and the Soqosoqo ni 
Vakavulewa ni Taukei are all fighting for the same cause-ensuring 
Fijian political dominance and protection of indigenous rights. The 
only difference in our style is that we're following different channels 
to achieve such ends (Fiji Times, 11 November 1991) .  
Nonetheless, Rabuka's emergence as a moderate was relative. He 
wanted to help 'Fijians live with the threat [from Indo-Fijians]; and not 
only living and surviving but overcoming it' (Fiji Times, 16 July 1991).  
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His views were the same as nationalists such as Butadroka, except that 
he promised not to expel Indo-Fijians. Rabuka made no promise of 
equality or a return to multiculturalism. 
Exclusionary economics 
When Mara retired as Prime Minister in 1992, he told President 
Ganilau that 'if our people are misled into believing that economic 
manna will simply fall from heaven because there is a Fijian 
government, then those responsible will have to answer to the country 
when the truth becomes evident' (Fiji Times, 30 May 1992). Yet the 
Interim Government which Mara headed had been created specifically 
to secure aboriginal Fijian political paramountcy as the necessary 
precondition of Fiji's economic growth. As a leading technocrat noted, 
'businessmen don't care about the voting structure' (Islands Business, 
February 1989). That might have been true for short-term foreign 
investors, but Fiji in the early 1990s depended to a large extent on 
internal investment; and many internal investors sought evidence of 
the government's commitment to an acceptable constitution and to a 
resolution of land lease negotiations before they committed resources. 
Indeed, as early as 1988 Westpac Pacific's General Manager had put 
the case very directly: growth would remain frustrated until such time 
as people saw 'a democratically elected government in place' 
(Financial Review, 30 November 1988) . 
The understandable failure of many Indo-Fijian businesses to 
invest following the coups sent an important message to politicians. 
As Mary-Louise O'Callaghan wrote, 'if Fiji is really only for Fijians 
with Indians as guests . . .  not much long term commitment can be 
expected from non-Fijians or as equal but different citizens (The Age, 1 
June 1991) .  Exclusion thus fostered a form of economic apartheid that 
could not work in Fiji. Mara too seemed on occasion to accept the 
fallacy of apartheid. In 1989 he told the National Economic Summit 
that 'the major challenge on the road to economic progress at this time, 
and no doubt we will face it in the next 11 years, is national unity' 
(Pacific Islands Monthly, July 1989) .  Two years later a senior 
government minister told a Fiji Trade and Investment Forum that 'the 
welfare of the country takes precedence over the rights of any 
specialised group' (Fiji Times, 16 November 1991) .  Jai Ram Reddy, the 
leader of the opposition National Federation Party, also recognised the 
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impact of economic apartheid, stating that 'the success of my 
community depends on the success of every other community in Fiji' 
(Fiji Times, 8 April 1996). 
Despite widespread agreement about the negative economic 
consequences of exclusion, Taukei leaders did not act to dismantle 
economic apartheid in Fiji. In 1988 Sir Shridath Ramphal, then 
Secretary General of the British Commonwealth, could not 'see much 
evidence of even a will to forge a political settlement'(The Age, 17 
September 1988). Accommodation was indeed slow in coming. In 1992 
Rabuka succeeded Mara as Prime Minister, but he regarded himself 
first and foremost as a Taukei prime minister, not as a prime minister 
for all Fiji's peoples (Fiji Times, 4 August 1994) . Only in early 1997 did 
Rabuka appear to concede that government must serve the interests of 
other communities and that the Taukei would have to learn to accept 
that there were other communities which belonged to Fiji (Fiji Times, 
28 February 1997) . 
'Throughout history, when a state has taken an exclusive and 
intolerant idea such as religion and ethnicity as its cornerstone', wrote 
former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, 'this idea more often 
than not has been the very mainspring of violence and war '. 
[A] state that defines its function essentially in terms of ethnic or 
religious attributes inevitably becomes chauvinistic and intolerant. . . [A] 
truly democratic government. . .cannot be nationalist because it must 
pursue the good of all citizens, regardless of their sex, colour, race, 
religious belief or ethnic origin. Democratic government stands for 
good citizenship, never nationalism (Australian, 2 July 1990) . 
Identity i n  post-coup Fij i 
Fiji, of course, is a modern creation. Prior to colonisation the nation of 
Fiji did not exist, although parts of the country were known as Viti, 
from which the British corruption derived. The British came to call its 
aboriginal peoples 'Fijians', but they could just as easily have called 
them kai Viti or i Taukei. Over time, the use of 'Fijian' to describe the 
aboriginal peoples of Fiji has become natural. However, it makes 
finding a common name to describe the citizens of Fiji very difficult. 
Sixty-three per cent of the people of Fiji polled in 1995 favoured a 
common name, but aboriginal Fijians were almost equally divided on 
the issue. Less than forty per cent recognised 'Fijian' as the logical 
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national name (Fiji Times, 28 March 1995) . Clearly, a society in which 
one community takes for itself exclusive ownership of the country's 
name will have difficulties making other communities welcome. As a 
former Deputy Leader of the Opposition lamented, 'I, being a third 
generation and my children beir�.g a fourth generation in this country, 
born and bred here, are still called Indians . .  .In Fiji, after living together 
for more than 100 years, we do not yet have a common name' 
(Weekender, 2 April 1994) . 
For a long time some descendants of South Asian migrants have 
attempted to overcome this dilemma by explicitly referring to 
themselves as 'Indo-Fijian' . Indeed, for convenience this term has been 
used in this chapter. However, this term is highly problematic because 
it maintains a focus on ethnicity. National identity, not ethnicity, must 
be the focus for identity in a multicultural country, especially when the 
variety of relationships between peoples increasingly contradicts rigid 
definitions and when a substantial proportion of the population is 
saying in effect 'we believe that our lives here have produced a culture 
peculiar to Fiji, that is, indigenous to Fiji, and often transcultural. We 
want to belong' . Unfortunately, many Taukei do not believe this or 
deliberately choose not to acknowledge this publicly. They argue 
instead, against all evidence, that Indo-Fijians regard India and not Fiji 
as their homeland (Fiji Times, 12 July 1995) .  Indeed, it is important to 
recall that ethnic diversity in Fiji extends beyond the two principal 
communities. Non-aboriginal Fijians and non-Indo-Fijians also regard 
Fiji as their home, 'the country of their roots, their citizenship and their 
heritage. They are not strangers and outsiders here. They belong here' 
(Fiji Times, 11 July 1995). They too require a national identity. 
Unfortunately, this has not happened. Ethnic identities in the 1990 
Constitution were so 'boxed [in] that national identity [was] virtually 
nonexistent', claimed Yash Ghai in 1993. People might be Taukei or 
Indo-Fijian, but 'in fact we're all of those things and many more; there 
are many points of intersection'. What the country needed was to start 
seeing problems as national problems, rather than as communal 
problems, he concluded (Fiji Times, 25 April 1994) . President Mara 
expressed a similar view when told the BLY in 1996 that ethnic 
integration was the only way forward. 
While each race may possibly find solutions to its own problems, it has 
to be understood that such solutions will react on other races. And 
therefore, it is only when the races get together to discuss problems, that 
solid and lasting progress can be achieved (Fiji Times, 16 August 1996). 
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Yet, as former Taukeist Filipe Bole noted, aboriginal Fijian 
paramountcy was 'deeply entrenched' and would be 'difficult to 
erase' (The Review, November 1994) . 
The role of Rabuka in the growing recognition of the need to retreat 
from exclusion is contradictory. In his 1995 New Year address Rabuka 
tried to move beyond exclusivity, just as Bavadra had ten years earlier, 
when he stated that 
for too long we have kept our society fragmented by concentrating too 
much on our racial origins. We look upon ourselves as Fijians, as 
Indians, part-Europeans, Chinese, Pacific Islanders. A country that 
does not have an encompassing identity for its citizens will always be 
incomplete. I have concluded, after much searching of my conscience, 
that it is time for us to become 'Fijians' .  I will repeat that-all citizens 
of Fiji should be known as Fijian (Fiji Times, 2 January 1995) . 
In 1996 Rabuka condemned his old soul mates, the Taukei 
Movement, arguing that 'the stance of Fiji for Fijians won't work. We 
need others. People have to change their attitude. I am for Fiji and I 
am pro-Fijian. That doesn't mean that I'm anti-Indian. Indians are 
good for Fiji. Other communities are good for Fiji. What's good for Fiji 
is good for Fijians' (Fiji Times, 6 September 1996) . 
In 1997 Rabuka welcomed the Fiji Sevens home by referring to 
'Fijians of all races' (Fiji Times, 5 April 1997) .  Later, when addressing 
Commonwealth leaders in Edinburgh on the occasion of Fiji's re­
admission to the British Commonwealth, he described the peoples of 
Fiji as 'the family of Fiji': 'we are all bound together by the reality that 
we need each other, that we can't do without each other and that we 
are indeed a family' (Fiji Times, 25 October 1997). However, remarkable 
as these public utterances are by the two-time coup leader, they did 
not necessarily represent a significant change in attitude. Rabuka 
acknowledged the continuing strength of 'us' and 'them' perspectives 
when referring to his days in exclusively aboriginal Fijian schools and 
in the military, stressing that 
my tolerance level of other races was very low. But since coming out of 
that cocoon I have managed very well to accept that I have to compete 
with them, I have to look after them, and I have to devise policies and 
programmes that will be good for them as well as being good for us 
(Fiji Times, 17 January 1997) . 
For Rabuka to be credible, there is a need to acknowledge that past 
actions have been misguided. This he has consistently refused to do. 
In 1994 he declared that 'apartheid here in Fiji . . .  [is] a necessary evil' 
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(The Review, April 1994) and that 'the interests of indigenous people 
come first' (The Review, September 1994) . 'I will not and will never 
apologise for the coups of 1987' (Australian, 17 June 1994) . He was 
though prepared to make some concessions. A stagnant economy and 
growing popular disenchantment with corruption and cronyism left 
him little choice. A clause within the 1990 Constitution stipulating 
regular constitutional reviews provided a means by which to make 
concessions. Moreover, he received unexpected support from Jai Ram 
Reddy, who had declared dead the multicultural goals that his party 
had previously pursued while in coalition with the Fiji Labour Party 
(Daily Post, 19 March 1993) . 
With the majority of parliamentary seats still communally defined, 
the compromise Constitution that emerged in 1997 retained much of 
its former communalist orientation (Chai, this volume) . However, it 
did promise to bring Indo-Fijians into government through the 
mechanism of a government of national unity. Some small concessions 
were also made to urban Taukei; their proportion of the aboriginal 
Fijian population rose from 33 per cent to 41 per cent between 1987 
and 1997, and they were underrepresented in parliament (Statistical 
News, 1997:4) . Rural Taukei seats were also adjusted to better reflect 
population distribution rather than that of provincial authority. One 
third of lower house seats were no longer communally reserved. 
Concessions were made to enable greater Parliamentary accountability 
and to remove the strict definitions of race imposed by the 1990 
Constitution. The Constitution gave equal status to the country's three 
main languages-Fijian, Hindi and English-for the first time, 
although with local language usage increasing at work places and on 
the air waves, and with a new emphasis on teaching local languages to 
all students at school, one colonial legacy might be about to pass. In 
other matters though the Constitution did not mark a clear transition. 
'Besides broad references to equality [and] citizenship rights, Fiji 
essentially remain[s] a nation of separate identities', sociologist 
Satendra Prasad wrote at the end of 1997. 'Its political structures and 
institutions emphasise and feed off the separateness of those 
identities' (Griffen 1997:317) .  'The "us" and "them" mind set. . . is still 
in our midst', lawyer Imrana Jalal concurred (Fiji Times, 19 June 
1997) . 
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Indeed, Rabuka made it very clear that despite the potential of these 
changes to restore much of the emphasis on multiculturalism eroded 
by the coups, as far as he was concerned most of the measures were 
symbolic. He intended to pursue the goal of Taukei communal unity. 
However, given the huge migration of Indo-Fijians from Fiji since the 
coups, the Taukei no longer feared Indo-Fijian numerical domination. 
They could afford to retreat a little from 1987. Consequently, clauses 
stressing ethnic exclusivity were no longer required; their damage to 
Fiji's reputation internationally was deemed now to outweigh their 
usefulness nationally. Nonetheless, the communal emphasis remained 
entrenched. The Constitution sidestepped the issue of 'Fijian' as the 
national name by adopting 'Fiji Islander ' as a common name. In this 
way the communal divide remains. Singular ethnic perspectives and 
zero-sum relations between communities remain, defining identity 
and shaping the nation's future. 'It shows that while policies steeped 
in racism and based on racial supremacy can be instilled into the 
system almost overnight', the Fiji Times lamented, 'any changes towards 
multiracialism can only be achieved in small doses' (15 April 1997) . 
Before being adopted as the inclusive national name, the 
description 'New Zealander ' described only Maoris. Today Pakeha is 
the term used to descri8e the descendants of European settlers. Both 
Pakehas and Maoris are New Zealanders. Some change of that order is 
required in Fiji. As early as 1969 Ratu Mara suggested 'Fijian' as the 
logical common name, but the BLV insisted on preserving the national 
name for aboriginal Fijians. 'Fijian' has thus remained, a little uneasily, 
the name used to describe only the Taukei. This must change. 'If we 
cannot come together to agree on a common name for ourselves, 
something that effects each of us equally', the Fiji Times editorialised in 
1994, 'how can we ever hope to agree on anything more 
difficult. . . [which] demand[s] even greater sacrifice and understanding 
from each other ' (Fiji Times, 15 October 1994) .  All Fiji citizens should 
be Fijians, because the name of the country is Fiji. Those derived from 
the aboriginal peoples of Fiji-no matter their specific heritage­
should be kai Viti or i Taukei, if they personally wish to be so described. 
All others should be known by some non-ethnic and inclusive term 
such as vasu. Such an accommodation better reflects the values of 
sharing, hospitality and respect at the center of the way of life of Fiji. 
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Conclusion 
Even in light of the results of the 1999 general elections, Fiji's retreat 
from exclusion remains qualified. Powerful interests have too much to 
lose by conceding to change, while at the same time one of the most 
important stumbling blocks remains the nation's failure to address 
adequately issues of identity. Fiji needs to use its official resources to 
overcome the chauvinistic rhetoric that has been encouraged during 
the last twelve years. Much of this, as political philosopher Richard 
Mulgan wrote concerning New Zealand, is due to oversimplifying 
abstract theories of societies (Mulgan 1989:71) .  Generalisations and 
stereotypes not only reinforce distrust and division, they rebound on 
their advocates by generating a belief in collective failure, cultural 
backwardness, and a loss of control. A 'victim syndrome' is re­
established, as Fiji's most persistent public nationalist, Sakeasi 
Butadroka, demonstrated when he translated ethnic antagonism into 
genetic backwardness. 'Indians and Asians have civilised blood in 
them because when they were civilised we were still cannibals', he 
said. The Taukei need more 'time to develop a better sense of the 
Western World' (Fiji Times, 6 October 1996) . 
No one has yet been able to adapt in a manner and pace directed 
solely by themselves. The notion though that Indo-Fijians are 
'naturally' better than aboriginal Fijians in education and business is 
not new, despite flying in the face of logic and causing the 
infrastructural basis for educational and business success to be 
neglected. Nor is there evidence for such assertions. The 1996 Fiji 
Poverty Report demonstrated that while Taukei households in general 
had the lowest incomes, lower income Indo-Fijians were worse off 
than lower income Taukei households. Half of the poor were Indo­
Fijian, with incomes fourteen per cent lower than Taukei households. 
Taukei dominated middle income groups. Only in the small 
proportion of high income households were Indo-Fijian households 42 
per cent better off than high income Taukei (Fiji Times 19 March 1997) . 
These matters are rarely commented on by politicians. Public 
debate and official assistance to get the picture right is rare. Instead, 
myths are perpetuated. Even the former managing director of the Fiji 
Development Bank, Laisenia Qarase, sees Taukei development in these 
terms. ' [W]hat we must always keep in mind', he contended, 'is that 
we are dealing with a problem which has its origins in thousands of 
years of culture and tradition' (Weekender, 25 June 1993). Such beliefs 
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fit well with the siege mentality Imrana Jalal believes many of Fiji's 
leaders have adopted, making 'ceaseless calls for ethnic unity and the 
preservation of tradition and custom, even as they personally discard 
them to make their own compromises with the modem world'. Blaming 
someone else might be politically useful for survival in communal 
electorates, but it is misdirected, she argued. Indo-Fijians do not 
threaten the so-called 'Fijian system'. Equal opportunity, education, 
and nuclear families do (Fiji Times, 24 October 1996) . The late 
sociologist Simione Durutalo said the same thing in 1993. Indo-Fijians 
had become the scapegoat even though 'it is not [they] who are the 
threat to Fijian culture, but the modem way of life' (Durutalo 1993:7) .  
At the heart of ethnocentrism lies a series of misconceptions about 
the world and ethnic identity. In many ways race and ethnicity are 
imperial artifacts. The ideas of race and ethnicity spread as 
industrialisation fragmented societies across the world. They remain 
today socially constructed concepts, with no biological basis except in 
terms of superficial appearances (Jones 1996:172-6). Genes have 
nothing to do with business acumen; 'success', senator Francis Hong 
Tiy noted, is 'based on the acquisition of skills', not race or cultural 
heritage (Fiji Times, 13 August 1992) . Aboriginal Fijian nationalists are 
mistaken when they regard their cultural heritage as an inhibitor; they 
perform a great disservice to their own communities. Not only do they 
foster a victim mentality, but they also hide from their people a very 
important truth: that all societies are dynamic and that they themselves 
have already survived great changes. As anthropologist Nicholas 
Thomas wrote, the British may not have dispossessed the Taukei as 
they did Aborigines in Australia or Maoris in New Zealand, but they 
certainly did not preserve village society in Fiji. In fact, whole villages 
were relocated or broken up. New health and gardening regulations 
dramatically changed their appearance, as did the transformation of 
bures and the ending of male and female segregation. Land tenure 
practices in the country were homogenised, religious practices and 
authorities changed, the language of Bau became the national standard, 
and kava drinking became democratised. Even Taukei values such as 
respect, kinship and sharing underwent change, sometimes gaining 
exaggerated importance as they confronted British efforts to transform 
them. Consequently, these values are not 'those of timeless tradition' . 
Nor is the role of chiefs a timeless one. Their reciprocal obligations have 
been reduced while the removal of traditional priests made chiefs 
more central than they had once been (Thomas 1992:17-8) .  
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Fiji was and is a dynamic and inclusive society, not the exclusive 
patrilineal one of the colonial VKB or the master race of the Taukei 
Movement. Taukeism, in all its manifestations, produces a victim 
mentality from which it is difficult to escape. Under the umbrella of 
aboriginal Fijian nationalism it raised a false notion of indigenousness 
and a false concept of chiefly protection which served to disguise 
abuse. Too often, lamented the former head of the Methodist Church, 
Reverend Josateki Koroi, 'the chiefly dictatorship system is promoted 
as the ultimate good as though the mastery and exploitation of other 
races were the high road to the new world order ' (Fiji Times, 1 May 
1992) .  'The main culprits are people who have gone to monoethnic 
schools and see themselves as the select race to run this country', 
argued Vijay Naidu. ' [T]his orchestration takes place not only at the 
level of political leaders but through the Methodist Church, 
community leaders, school teachers and the public service' (The 
Review, April 1997) . 
The Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa n i  Taukei (SVT), the 1992 replacement 
for the Alliance Party, told the Constitutional Review Commission that 
political control 'is the collective right of self determination of the 
indigenous people' (Fiji Times, 11 October 1995). However, contrary to 
SVT belief, it is not a right promoted by the Draft United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Draft 
Declaration is designed to encourage special protection and privileges 
for threatened groups. Disadvantage, not indigenousness, is the 
criteria for assistance. 'Otherwise the result of special protection is not 
to achieve equality', Mulgan commented, 'but to offer the possibility 
of entrenching an unequal position of superiority' (Mulgan 1989:85). 
The word 'indigenous' has been hijacked in recent years and given 
connotations it should not enjoy. In 1990 at a United Nations 
Development Programme regional workshop on environmental 
management and sustainable development, a senior government 
minister claimed that 'the environmental perceptions of their cultural 
heritage' had served Pacific peoples well before 'the arrival of white 
men'. Perhaps, he mused, island nations should return to these. 
Although evidence to the contrary abounds, the image of aboriginal 
people as noble custodians of the environment is a powerful one. 
Ironically though the real message to the workshop was the opposite: 
that 'developing countries could not afford to bend to environmental 
concern' (Fiji Times, 18 April 1990) . 
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Rabuka also believed that 'indigenousness' created a special bond, 
particularly among the peoples of the Pacific (Fiji Times, 26 April 
1997) . Yet his 1990 Constitution meant that all descendants of 
Europeans, Indians, Solomon Islanders, ni Vanuatu, Tuvalu, i-Kiribati 
and others could never regard Fiji as their home, no matter whether 
they and past generations had been born and raised in the country or 
were in fact indistinguishable from most 'indigenous peoples' .  Indo­
Fijians are certainly different from the Taukei, but their culture is a 
branch of South Asian culture now indigenous to Fiji. After 120 years 
the mix of many different peoples descended from South Asia living in 
the Fiji environment has produced something different, something 
unique to Fiji, evolving within Fiji and therefore indigenous to Fiji. The 
same is true of all other peoples. Taukei culture is likewise indigenous 
to Fiji, even though today it is very different from what it was 100 
years ago, and has been greatly influenced by British, Australasian 
and South Asian cultures (Mulgan 1989:20-1) .  Moreover, Fiji and its 
peoples-like peoples in most countries-are integrated into and 
influenced by a growing global culture that is experienced through the 
media, professional organisations, business and political 
organisations, and education. 
As one nation, with at least two main peoples and many cultures, 
Fiji needs to treat identity carefully. Mulgan argues that flexible ethnic 
identity is an essential lubricant for any ethnically tolerant society. The 
dangers and injustices inherent in exclusive definitions of ethnicity 
have already been pointed out. They are not only historically wrong, 
but they also retard the growth of the nation (Mulgan 1989:132) . Some 
Taukei have been dismissive of attempts to forge a stronger, more 
inclusive, Fiji identity, especially by means of the word 'Fijian'. 
However, inclusive symbols and language are very important for 
social and national development. According to one Australian 
commentator it 'helps create spaces of temporary equality, working 
tolerance in which every one has a good chance to participate' (Morris 
1997:13). If Fiji is to prosper, it will do so only as one nation, with all 
cultures and backgrounds working together to create a transformed 
and vibrant society. Calling everybody by the name of the country is 
such a small thing to do, and yet its consequences are vast. Certainly, it 
is the first step in overcoming the legacies of colonialism and moving 
forward. It tells everybody they belong, that they are equal and valued 
as people and as individuals. 
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'It is not enough that we should accept our collective presence in 
Fiji as simply one of coexistence', Rabuka conceded when introducing 
his constitutional amendments in 1997. 'We should accept each other 
as belonging together as one people and one nation' (Fiji Times, 21 
April 1997) . Nonetheless, the question remains: is this clear to the 
country's leaders? Have they conceded the problems of the past and 
moved forward? Or will they once more fall victim to their own power 
and greed and-as conflicting strategies frustrate expectations of 
dramatic transformation-play on the insecurities of their people by 
exploiting the distinctive characteristics of identities? As yet these 
important questions cannot be answered, although the election of a 
new, Fiji Labour Party-led government in May 1999 suggested that 
one turning point had at least been successfully navigated. 
Nonetheless, in the days preceding Mahendra Chaudhry's 
appointment as the country's first Indo-Fijian Prime Minister, calls for 
his replacement by an aboriginal Fijian suggested that even opponents 
of Rabuka' s government and the Fiji Labour Party's allies remain 
deeply affected by the rhetoric of ethnicity which has affected Fiji's 
politics for so long. Reservations concerning the retreat from exclusion 
thus remain, and will undoubtedly continue to haunt Fiji. 
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i j i ,  post- independence has seen several gove rnments, two 
m i l itary coups and amidst sweeping social ,  economic and 
pol itical changes, the presence of divisive identity pol itics in  
its jou rney towards a u n ited, co l lective Fij i com mun ity. 
Confronting Fiji Futures takes i n  these landmark events and 
eventual ities, and aims at a forward- looking assessment of the 
real ities faci ng Fi j i in  the present and the futu re. It focuses on the 
period of the coups up to and i nc lud i ng the 1 999 general  e lections, 
when an exp l icitly mu ltieth n ic  party won government i n  a s u rprise 
lands l ide resu lt. 
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